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SUMUM 
In  this  thesis,  the  concept  of  the  character  as  reader 
is  explored  as  a  means  of  revealing  the  poetics  of  the 
text  of  2  Samuel.  A  preliminary  examination  of  David's 
interpretation  of  the  story  of  the  Amalekite  messenger 
in  2  Sam  1  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  polysemy  of 
the  Amalekite's  utterances  iS  turned  against  him. 
David  as  reader  re-writes  the  Amalekite's  utterances. 
This  leads  to  a  theoretical  investigation  of  what  it 
might  mean  to  refer  to  a  character  as  reader.  The 
concept  of  mise  en  abyme  suggests  that  the  character's 
reading  may  be  both  a  model  and  an  antimodel  of  the 
reading  strategy  revealed  by  the  character. 
The  concept  of  the  'character  as  reader,  is  then 
investigated  using  theories  of  the  literary  character 
from  Aristotle  to  Greimas  coupled  with  theories  of 
reading  as  inference  and  the  linguistic  theories  of 
Bakhtin  and  Austin.  These  all  combine  to  reinforce  the 
contention  that  meaning  is  a  dialogic  process,  dependent 
on  the  response  of  the  interlocutor,  but  in  inviting 
response,  provokes  the  hearer  or  reader  to  utter.  The 
character  as  reader  is  defined  as  a  signed  site  of 
translation,  a  particular  interpretative  transformation 
of  perlocutionary  force  into  illocution  which  is  given 
coherence  by  a  proper  name.  Character  as  reader  is 
character  as  utterer. 
This  definition  is  then  used  to  look  at  two  stories 
where  David  'interprets'  a  text,  2  Samuel  12:  1-15  and  2 
Sam  14.  Here  the  parodic  relationship  between  these  two 
texts  is  explored,  and  the  difference  in  reading  stances 
which  are  labelled  by  the  name  David  is  pointed  out. 
This  parodic  relationship  foregrounds  the  fact  that  both 
stories  share  the  device  of  provoking  an  oath. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Summary  14 
The  narratological  function  of  the  oath  is  shown  to 
depend  on  a  convention  that  oaths  in  the  name  of  Yahweh 
are  always  fulfilled,  though  often  by  the  unlooked-for 
resolution  of  the  polysemy  of  the  oath.  The  paradox  is 
that  the  attempt  to  resolve  the  polysemy  of  utterance  by 
invoking  the  divine  name  frees  the  utterance  to  be 
reinscribed  in  an  unexpected  interpretative  context. 
In  the  particular  case  of  2  Sam  12,  David's  oath 
involves  the  expression  son  of  death,.  It  is  argued 
that  this  utterance  acts  as  both  a  prolepsis  of  the 
death  of  David's  child,  and  a  self-description  of  David. 
It  puts  in  question  the  'authorship,  of  David  himself, 
which  has  a  particular  significance  for  his  position  as 
Saul's  heir  who  is  not  his  biological  son. 
In  the  final  part  of  the  thesis,  it  is  argued  that  the 
impact  of  the  text  on  the  reader  is  due  to  its 
activation  of  an  anxiety  of  utterance,.  The  inevitable 
gap  between  utterance  and  reception  in  speech  is 
analogous  to  the  gap  between  the  act  of  coition  and  the 
birth  of  a  son.  The  work  of  Lacan  on  the  Name-of-the 
father  and  the  investigations  of  the  tension  between 
fathers  and  heirs  in  the  work  of  Rank  and  others  is  used 
to  elucidate  the  place  of  the  divine  name  as  guarantee 
of  continuity. 
This  continuity,  however,  is  shown  to  be  predicated  on 
the  vulnerability  of  the  human  body,  and  divine  speech 
is  shown  to  be  subject  to  the  same  uncertainties  as 
other  speech.  The  response  of  the  reader  to  the  text, 
it  is  argued,  is  the  product  of  its  inducing  the  reader 
to  follow  David  in  his  utterance  of  judgments  which 
expose  him  to  judgment.  The  parallels  with  the 
methodological  premises  of  Freud's  interpretation  of  the 
Oedipus  legend  are  explored. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Summary  15 
Ultimately,  the  reader  is  confronted  with  the  formally 
unresolvable  conflict  between  God  and  reader  as  'father, 
of  the  world  of  the  text.  The  reader  is  invited  to 
'give  birth  to  his  own  father,  in  Kierkegaard's  words,  a 
process  which  gains  its  power  through  its  engagement 
with  the  reade2s  anxieties  as  father  and  child.  The 
character  as  reader,  then,  may  activate  the  reader's 
awareness  of  herself  as  'character',  as  inferred 
construct. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Epigraph  16 
EPIGRAPH 
Rabbi  Levi  Isaac  de  Berditschew:  'Here  is  the  way  it  is: 
the  blanks,  the  white  spaces  in  the  Torah's  role  also 
arise  from  the  letters;  but  we  cannot  read  them  as  we  do 
the  blackness  of  the  letters.  when  the  messianic  era 
comes,  God  will  unveil  the  white  in  the  Torah  in  which 
the  letters  are  now  invisible  to  us,  and  this  is  what 
the  term  "new  Torah"  implies.,  (Derrida  1981:  345) Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Preface  17 
PREFACE 
The  question  which  this  thesis  addresses  is  captured  in 
the  conjunction  of  two  striking  remarks  from  the  writ- 
ings  of  two  scholars  who  havedevoted  their  efforts  to 
elucidating  what  it  might  be  to  'read'  the  Old 
Testament. 
The  first  is  a  quotation  from  the  noted  Spanish  scholar 
Luis  Alonso  Sch6kel,  who  in  1976  published  a  paper  enti- 
tled  'David  y  la  mujer  de  Tecua:  2  Sm  14  como  modelo 
hermenduticol['David  and  the  woman  of  Teqoa;  2  Samuel  14 
:1 
as  a  hermeneutical  model  I]'.  It  ends  with  this  stirring 
summons  to  his  readers: 
What  we  must  seek,,  what  the  bible  requires  of  us,, 
is  readers  like  David:  willing  to  enter  into  dia- 
logue  with  the  text,  participants  in  the  drama  of 
human  existence,  willing  to  take  decisions  in  order 
to  accept  their  consequences  properly.  [my  emphasis] 
(1976:  205) 
Secondly,  John  Barton  in  his  discussion  of  Roland 
Barthes,  analysis  of  Gen  32:  22-33  (Barthes  1977:  125- 
141),  the  story  of  Jacob  wrestling  with  the  angel,  of- 
fers  this  intriguing  insight  into  his  own  reaction  to 
this  biblical  text: 
I  suspect  many  readers  of  Genesis  will  share  the 
experience  that,  however  often  they  read  this  pas- 
sage  and  however  much  they  may  try  to  ask  only  his- 
torical-critical  questions  about  it,  it  never  fails 
1  Subsequent  quotations  from  this  paper  are  my  own  translations  of 
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to  give  them  a  certain  frisson,  a  blend  of  fascina- 
tion  and  repulsion...  (1984:  117) 
These  two  sentences  encapsulate  the  issues  with  which 
this  thesis  hopes  to  engage.  Fundamentally,  it  arises 
out  of  a  personal  question:  what  is  it  that  grips  me  as 
a  reader  of  the  books  of  Samuel  to  the  extent  that  I  am 
prepared  to  devote  considerable  time  and  effort  to  the 
writing  of  this  thesis?  What  is  the  nature  of  the  text, 
of  the  reading  process,  and  of  the  reader,  that  leads  to 
this  powerful  interaction  and  the  production  of  this 
present  derived  text? 
This  is,  moreover,  not  a  purely  personal  reaction.  The 
amount  of  secondary  literature  on  all  aspects  of  Samuel 
is  overwhelming,  ranging  from  scholarly  monographs  to 
novels  by  major  literary  figureS2.  What  is  it  in  a  text 
that  provokes  this  plethora  of  secondary  writing  in  re- 
action  to  it,  of  which  this  thesis  in  turn  takes  its 
part? 
So  we  begin  from  the  circular  position  of  a  thesis  which 
is  written  in  order  to  answer  the  question  of  why  it 
came  to  be  written.  How  is  this  circularity  to  be  ad- 
dressed?  The  approach  adopted  below  is  to  focus  on  the 
self-referential  aspect  of  the  text  of  2  Samuel  itself. 
The  quotation  from  Alonso  Schdkel's  sentence  itself  is 
intriguing  because  it  indicates  that  it  is  in  reading 
the  text  that  the  model  for  the  interpetation  of  the 
text  is  to  be  found.  Specifically,  he  suggests  that  a 
2  So,  for  instance,  the  bibliography  of  McCarter's  1984  commentary 
on  2  Samuel  runs  to  some  thirty  pages.  Among  recent  novelistic 
treatments  of  the  stretch  of  narrative  including  2  Samuel  12  are 
Stefan  Heym's  The  King  David  Report  (1984),  Joseph  Heller's  God 
Knows  (1985)  and  Torgny  Lindgren's  Bathsheba  (1989). Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Preface  19 
useful  model  might  be  provided  by  one  of  the  characters 
in  the  text  who  acts  as  a  reader,  in  this  case,  David. 
Indeed  he  goes  further  and  argues  for  that  the  text  it- 
self  requires  such  a  reading. 
But  in  Alonso  Schdkel's  formulation,  this  conception 
seems  to  raise  more  questions  that  it  solves.  We  might 
ask: 
1.  In  what  sense  does,  or  can,  the  bible  require 
anything  of  us?  What  is  the  source  of  the  author- 
ity  that  determines  what  we  must  seek?  Who,  indeed 
are  'we'  whom  Alonso  Schdkel  addresses  and  in  whose 
number  he  counts  himself? 
2.  what  does  it  mean  to  describe  David,  a  character 
within  the  text,  as  a  'reader'?  This  raises  wider 
questions  of  what  the  process  of  reading  entails, 
and  the  relationship  between  author,  character  and 
reader. 
3.  In  the  light  of  this,  how  far  does  Alonso 
Sch6kel's  summary  a)  reflect  David  as  reader  in 
this  particular  instance  b)  David  as  reader  gener- 
ally?  How  might  one  arrive  at  this  description? 
4.  In  what  sense  does  2  Sam  14,  or  any  other  pas- 
sage,  provide  a  'hermeneutical  model'?  How  is  the 
reader  to  detect,  assess  and  implement  this  model? 
In  attempting  to  come  to  grips  with  these  questions,  I 
propose  to  concentrate  on  a  passage  that  has  exercised  a 
fascination  on  succeeding  generations,  and  that  seems  to 
be  for  many  readers  the  source  of  the  kind  of  frisson  to 
which  Barton  refers:  the  so-called  parable  of  Nathan  and 
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This  restricted  focus  concentrates  attention  on  a  text 
which  raises  many  general  points  of  interpretation  and 
issues  surrounding  the  impact  of  a  text  on  its  readers, 
because  it  represents  in  nuce  an  event  of  interpretation 
by  a  character.  After  taking  the  wife  of  his  faithful 
retainer  Uriah  and  having  him  murdered,  David  in  these 
verses  is  confronted  with  Nathan's  story  of  the  rich  man 
who  steals  his  poor  neighbour's  beloved  lamb.  The 
reader  is  made  privy  to  David's  reaction  in  which  he  un- 
compromisingly  condemns  the  rich  man's  injustice.  This 
provokes  Nathan's  unforgettable  reprimand  to  David,  'You 
are  the  man.  ' 
The  relationship  between  this  text  and  Alonso  Sch6kells 
chosen  passage  in  2  Samuel  14  will  form  part  of  our  in- 
vestigation,  and  the  justification  for  choosing  2  Samuel 
12  rather  than  the  text  Alonso  Sch6kel  opts  for  will 
emerge  as  a  result  of  this  discussion.  Immediately, 
however,  the  very  fact  that  Nathan's  retort  has  such  an 
impact  makes  this  passage  particularly  interesting. 
Leaving  aside  the  issue  of  their  relationship,  the  argu- 
ment  of  this  thesis  will  be  that  such  passages  as  2 
Samuel  14  and  2  Samuel  12  do  offer  a  model  to  the  reader 
of  the  text,  but  that  it  is  a  model  that  subverts  the 
notions  of  reader',  text'  and  indeed  model,  as  they 
appear  in  Alonso  Sch6kelIs  text. 
Furthermore,  it  is  in  just  such  a  process  of  subversion 
that  the  kind  of  frisson  which  intrigues  Barton  is  gen- 
erated,  or  so  he  himself  argues.  Drawing  on  Barthes, 
analysis,  Barton  traces  the  effect  of  Genesis  ý2  to  the 
way  in  which  this  story  offers  itself  to  the  reader  as  a 
folktale  and  then  turns  the  tables  on  the  reader  by  an 
illicit  twist  of  the  conventions.  Jacob's  opponent,  the 
man  who  wrestles  with  him,  turns  out  to  be  the  same  God 
who  sent  him  on  his  way  and  is  expected  to  protect  him. 
By  playing  on  the  conventions  of  folktales,  the  text  un- Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Preface  21 
settles  the  reader:  'confusions  of  role  undermine  our 
confidence  that  we  know  what  we  are  reading'  (Barton 
1984:  119). 
This  leads  him  to  the  following  wider  conclusion  that: 
If  Barthes  is  right,  much  of  the  distinctiveness  of 
the  Old  Testament  may  well  lie  in  the  way  that  it 
exploits  conventions.  We  have  become  accustomed  to 
seeing  the  prophets  as  parodists,  taking  up  secular 
or  orthodoxly  religious  forms  of  speech  (the  law- 
suit,  the  popular  song,  the  priestly  oracle)  and 
filling  them  with  new  and  surprising  meanings;  but 
perhaps  a  great  deal  more  of  the  old  Testament  is 
'prophetic,  in  this  sense  than  we  have  hitherto 
suspected  -  including  much  of  the  narrative  mate- 
rial.  (1984:  119) 
The  consequences  of  this  speculation  will  also  be  part 
of  our  investigation.  In  what  sense  is  the  Old 
Testament  distinctive?  Is  the  concept  of  parody  a  use- 
ful  strategy  to  be  borne  in  mind  in  the  attempt  to  un- 
derstand  the  transaction  between  the  biblical  text  and 
its  readership?  What  indeed  defines  a  parody?  Is  it 
a  textual  quality  or  does  it  describe  a  mode  of  reading? 
If  so,  what  conventions  are  operating  within  the  bibli- 
cal  text,  and  why  should  their  subversion  have  such  an 
effect  on  its  readers? 
This  in  turn  involves  us  in  a  consideration  of  the  rela- 
tionship  between  language  and  the  speaking  subject,  and 
the  analogies  between  a  literary  character  and  the 
reader  him-  or  herself  as  the  site  of  production  of  lan- 
guage.  We  will  seek  to  draw  an  analogy  between  the  re- 
lationship  of  the  subject  to  its  speech  and  the  rela- 
tionship  of  a  father  to  a  son.  This  particular  rela- 
tionship  is  at  the  heart  of  the  narrative  of  2  Samuel  in 
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and  the  complex  interactions  between  Saul,  David  and 
David's  sons,  and  is  again  brought  to  a  particular  focus 
in  the  text  we  have  selectRAy  the  story  of  Nathan's  para- 
ble.  The  parable  arises  from  David  fathering  of  a  child 
on  Bathsheba,  and  his  response  to  the  parable,  we  shall 
argue,  entails  the  death  of  the  child.  How  these  events 
in  the  text  impinge  on  the  reader  may  lead  us  to  revise 
our  notions  of  what  it  is  to  read  a  text  such  as  2 
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CHAPTER  ONE 
READING  2  SAMUEL 
The  David  of  (2  Sam]  12:  1  sqq  is  himself  a  reader 
...  who  may  serve  us  as  an  example.  Indeed  we  can 
see  the  entire  situation  of  David-Nathan  as  a 
parable  directed  towards  us.  Just  as  David  takes 
the  story  seriously  and  consequently  extracts 
everything  which  might  be  useful  to  himself,  so, 
too,  can  we  assume  a  serious  attitude  with  respect 
to  the  stories  and  poems  of  the  Old  Testament. 
(Fokkelmann  1981:  82  n.  6) 
The  David/Nathan  story  is  a  key  text  for 
understanding  the  nature  of  allegorizing  in  the 
Bible  for  it  allows  us  to  see  one  character 
allegorizing  for  another.  It  is  thus  a  kind  of 
allegory  of  allegory,  for  the  whole  transaction 
ultimately  serves  another  oblique  purpose  whose 
target  is  the  reader.  This  is  true  however  much  we 
might  debate  the  oral,  or  the  'written'  character 
of  the  Bible.  The  semantic  operations  that  we 
witness  between  one  character  and  another  are 
transacted  again  between  the  text  and  us.  lRosenberg 
1986:  43) 
1.1  INTRODUCTION:  A  QUESTION  OF  TEXT 
1.1.1  WHAT  TEXT  DO  WE  READ? 
The  books  of  Samuel  and  in  particular  the  character  of 
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innumerable  readings  over  the  centuries  since  their 
f  irst  appearance'.  The  present  study  arises  out  of  an 
interest  in  the  process  of  reading  itself,  and  asks  the 
question:  what  does  it  mean  to  'read,  the  books  of 
Samuel? 
1.1.1.1  Sternberg 
In  the  sense  that  Sternberg  uses  the  terms  (1985:  15), 
this  study  then  is  'discourse  oriented'  rather  than 
'source  oriented';  that  is  to  say,  its  object  of  inquiry 
is  not  'the  realities  behind  the  text,,  but  the  text 
itself  as  a  pattern  of  meaning  and  effect'.  One  of  the 
central  questions  of  this  sort  of  inquiry  which 
Sternberg  identifies  is  'What  are  the  rules  governing 
the  transaction  between  story  teller  or  poet  and 
reader?, 
This  division  also  leads  him  to  make  clear,  if  with  some 
caveats,  the  inescapable  fact  that  the  reading  of  the 
text  is  the  starting  point  for  all  inquiry  into  the 
biblical  narrative  whatever  its  orient  ation,  The  text 
is  the  one  given,  in  the  transaction.  Sternberg  also 
concedes  that  a  historicist  might  disagree  and  argue 
that  the  first  priority  is  the  establishment  of  a  valid 
text.  Yet  how  else  is  this  to  be  done  without  first 
reading  the  text  as  offered,  albeit  in  the  light  of  its 
variants? 
1  It  is  not  proposed  to  offer  an  exhaustive  bibliography  of  such 
study.  Its  bulk  alone  would  preclude  this.  During  the  course  of 
this  study  we  will  have  recourse  to  many  works  whose  titles  can  be 
found  in  the  References  at  the  back  of  this  thesis.  Particular 
works  and  the  varieties  of  reading  stances  adopted  will  be 
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Sternberg  refers  to  the  enterprise  of  research  into  the 
genesis  of  the  texts  as  both  an  indispensable  tool  and 
one  which  has  been  abused. 
Rarely  has  there  been  such  a  futile  expense  of 
spirit  in  a  noble  cause;  rarely  have  such  grandiose 
theories  of  origination  been  built  and  revised  and 
pitted  against  one  another  on  the  evidential 
equivalent  of  the  head  of  a  pin;  rarely  have  so 
many  worked  so  long  and  so  hard  with  so  little  to 
show  for  their  trouble.  Not  even  the  widely 
adopted  constructions  of  geneticism,  like  the 
Deuteronomist,  lead  an  existence  other  than 
speculative  (1985:  13). 
In  discussing  the  'arrogance,  of  the  antihistorical  view 
which  argues  the  irrelevance  of  the  conventions  and 
expectations  of  the  author  and  intended  audience  of  the 
text,  Sternberg  rightly  says:  'It  is  condescending,  not 
to  say  arrogant,  because  it  still  remains  to  demonstrate 
that  in  matters  of  art  (as  distinct  from  their  abstract 
articulation)  the  child  is  always  wiser  than  its  parent, 
that  wit  correlates  with  modernity,  that  a  culture  which 
produced  the  Bible  (or  the  Iliad)  was  incapable  of  going 
below  the  surface  of  its  own  product  or  referring  it  to 
the  worthwhile  coordinates  of  meaning.,  (1985:  10). 
Such  a  statement  seems  hard  to  disagree  with,  but  it  can 
be  taken  further  than  its  context  suggests. 
1.1.1.2  other  critiques  of  text-critical  approaches 
In  his  reading  of  1  Samuel,  Robert  Polzin  bemoans  the 
fact  that  a  critic  like  Kyle  McCarter,  author  of 
exhaustive  commentaries  on  both  books  of  Samuel 
(McCarter  1980,1984),  devotes  great  ingenuity  to 
establishing  an  original,  text  only  in  the  interest  of 
using  it  lexcavatively',  in  order  to  dig  out  the 
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analysis  of  biblical  material  is  necessary  for  even  a 
preliminary  scholarly  understanding  of  what  this  ancient 
text  means'  (1980:  5). 
Robert  Alter  (1987:  24-28)  discusses  the  issue  of  the 
relationship  between  literary  and  historical  criticism 
and  argues  as  Polzin  does  for  a  priority  of  the 
literary:  'Before  you  can  decide  whether  a  text  is 
defective,  composite  or  redundant,  you  have  to  determine 
to  the  best  of  your  ability  the  formal  principles  on 
which  the  text  is  organised.  1(1987:  26)  He  argues  that 
these  are  by  no  means  uniform  across  time,  and  so  that 
the  imposition  of  conventions  across  texts  and  across 
time  can  involve  unwise  presuppositions. 
An  underlying  maxim  of  the  approach  adopted  in  the 
present  study  will  be  that  it  remains  to  be  proved  that 
the  composers  and  compilers  of  the  biblical  text  were 
less  astutely  attuned  to  the  possibilities  of  language 
and  less  resourceful  in  its  use  in  narrative  than  the 
modern  reader.  In  this  regard,  the  historicist  attempt 
to  reconstruct  the  original  context  and  conventions  of 
the  production  of  the  text  may  not  be  the  most 
appropriate  question. 
Todorov  (1977:  53-65)  makes  much  the  same  point  in 
opposition  to  the  whole  concept  of  'primitive  narrative, 
in  relation  to  study  of  the  Odyssey.  He  regards  the 
tacit  laws  of  stylistic  unity,  non-contradiction,  non- 
digression  and  non-repetition  which  are  proposed  as  the 
characteristics  of  primitive  narrative  as  the  product  of 
the  naive  aesthetics  of  the  critics  who  propound  them, 
rather  than  any  reflection  of  the  nature  of  the  texts. 
To  disentangle  various  strands  of  narrative  on  the  basis 
that  any  breach  of  these  laws  argues  for  redactional 
interference  is  a  complete  misapprehension  of  the 
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From  an  ideological  standpoint,  Mieke  Bal  rests  her 
critique  of  the  ideological  stances  of  various  readings 
of  the  book  of  Judges  on  the  MT,  because  she  sees  it  as 
'a  starting  point  that  allows  us  to  measure  what  has 
been  done  to  this  text  and  why,  (1988:  267  n.  20).  Her 
concern  is  to  elucidate  the  effects  of  presuppositions 
about  gender  and  coherence  on  the  reading  of  Judges. 
Commentaries  and  translations  are  the  results  of 
reading,  and  carry  with  them  the  assumptions  and 
strategies  of  the  reader  and  of  the  interpretive 
community  to  which  he  (generallyl)  belongs.  Bal  does 
not  deny  that  the  text  itself  is  the  product  of  a  long 
series  of  readings  and  re-readings  of  traditions  and 
conflicting  systems  of  interpretation,  but  the  attempt 
to  disentangle  these  instantly  becomes  compounded  with 
the  interpretive  conventions  applied  by  the  analytic 
reader. 
THE  TEXT  OF  2  SAMUEL 
This  is  all  very  well,  but  what  is  to  be  done  in  the 
face  of  the  fact  that  there  are  variant  textual 
traditions  of  the  books  of  Samuel?  Peter  Miscall  in  his 
reading  of  1  Sam  (Miscall  1986)  reads  the  Masoretic 
text,  while  acknowledging  the  problems  of  its  critical 
history.  He  defends  this  decision  by  saying: 
I  do  not  automatically  consider  the  Masoretic  text 
to  be  the  best:  I  leave  it  as  it  is,  because  text- 
critical  study  should  be  preceded  by  extended 
readings,  wherever  possible,  of  each  version.  Is 
it  obvious  that  the  Septuagint  represents  a  better, 
or  more  correct,  text?  Perhaps  the  two,  and 
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but  not  necessarily  used,  2  [sic]  to  produce  the 
correct  and  original  text  (1986:  viii). 
Conroy  (1978:  12-13)  takes  an  admirably  pragmatic  view 
on  this  matter.  While  holding  out  the  ideal  of  a 
preliminary  text-critical  investigation  on  the  largest 
scale,  Conroy  acknowledges  that  this  is  not  achievable 
and  so  opts  to  follow  one  text-type,  the  Masoretic  text, 
rather  than  attempt  to  establish  some  eclectic  text. 
Where  the  text  is  disputed,  he  follows  Masoretic 
readings,  especially  consonantal  readings,  even  where 
these  may  seem  less  satisfactory  than  the  readings  of 
other  witnesses.  He  specifically  states:  'It  should  be 
clear,  then,  that  this  preference  for  the  MT  readings  is 
a  pragmatic  and  provisional  option;  it  is  not  meant  as 
an  expression  of  Masoretic  fundamentalism,  and  still 
less  as  a  camouflaged  form  of  theological 
fundamentalism,  (1978:  13). 
A  particular  example  of  this  approach  is  represented  by 
Lyle  Eslinger  (Eslinger  1985).  In  discussing  the 
problem  of  competing  versions  of  the  text  of  Samuel,  he 
takes  as  an  example  1  Sam  10:  1.  where  the  Septuagint  has 
an  addition,  although  the  MT  is  not  noticeably  corrupt 
(1986:  467-68).  In  opting  to  follow  the  MT,  he  argues 
that  in  such  cases  there  is  no  justification  for 
2  Interestingly  enough,  Miscall's  text  here  seems  to  demonstrate  a 
text-critical  problem.  As  it  stands,  it  argues  that  comparison 
and  contrast  of  alternatives  to  produce  a  correct  text  is 
allowable  but  not  their  use,  which  seems  a  strange  exclusion.  if 
however,  the  comma  after  'used,  is  deleted,  then  the  point  becomes 
the  possibility  of  comparison  or  contrast  as  against  the  use  of 
this  comparison  to  produce  a  corrected  text.  This  seems  to  give  a 
more  coherent  reading  when  juxtaposed  to  his  assertion  that  he 
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composing  a  new  text  from  a  'little  LXX  here  or  a  mite 
Of  MT  there'.  In  any  event,  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
text  criticism  is  dependent  on  literary  interpretation, 
'a  preference  for  one  version  over  another  is  partially 
a  product  of  a  preference  of  one  interpretation  over 
another.  '  He  quotes  Mowatt's  opinion  (1971:  26) 
The  author's  version  of  his  own  work  is  a  desirable 
starting  point  of  the  literary  historian  and 
critic.  Where  this  is  not  available,  however,  it 
is  doubtful  whether  we  are  justified  in  trying  to 
reconstruct  it.  If  we  do  try,  we  are  obscuring  our 
own  function,  which  is  the  interpretation  of  the 
facts  as  found. 
THE  RISK  OF  READING 
The  attitude  of  David  Jobling  (1986)  is  refreshing  and 
justifies  the  spirit  of  this  thesis.  Discussing  the 
relationship  of  Jotham's  fable  (Jud  9:  7-21)  to  its 
context,  Jobling  sees  the  usefulness  of  reading  the 
fable  in  isolation  in  order  to  determine  its  range  of 
,  tolerable  meanings'.  but  also  stresses  the  importance 
of  the  interaction  between  the  story  and  its  context, 
which  may  even  produce  new  readings.  The-  fable  in  turn 
suggests  a  reading  of  the  context.  It  is  his  underlying 
methodological  point,  however,  which  I  wish  to  stress: 
The  reading  needs  to  be  done  without'prejudice,  and 
the  danger  of  loverinterpretation,  has  to  be 
courted,  since  one  cannot  determine  what 
overinterpretation  is  until  one  has  done  itl  Bits 
of  meaning  float  around  in  both  text  and  context 
like  charged  particles.  Some  of  them  attract  each 
other  and  undergo  chemical  change  (others  seem  to 
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Though  one  might  take  issue  with  the  idea  that 
autonomous  'bits  of  meaning,  can  be  found  in  a  text, 
let  alone  float  freely  through  it,  Jobling's 
justification  of  the  risk  of  overinterpretation  is  one 
we  will  offer  in  our  own  defence.  The  task  of  the 
interpreter  then  consists  of  an  interplay  of  imagination 
and  discernment  -  imagination  which  is  able  to  activate 
possibilities  of  reading,  and  discernment,  which  is 
able  to  note  patterns  of  allusion,  coherences  and 
limitations  on  significance,  to  judge  which 
possibilities  work,  have  heuristic  value,  and  which  do 
not.  The  warnings  of  historical  critics,  though 
important  in  stressing  the  need  for  responsibility  to 
the  text,  run  the  danger  of  fettering  the  imagination  of 
the  reader  too  soon. 
This  means  that  we  will  also  feel  free  to  draw  on  a  wide 
range  of  allusions  throughout  the  biblical  text.  Again, 
this  is  not  an  argument  for  or  against  a  particular  view 
of  the  development  of  particular  books  or  the  nature  of 
the  process  of  canonisation.  We  will  also  feel  free  to 
draw  on  comparison  with  works  of  literature  which  bear 
no  relation  to  the  biblical  text.  Our  concern  is  to 
elucidate  some  basic  principles  of  textual  construction, 
and  again  Jobling  provides  us  with  an  excuse  for  this 
approach,  if  one  be  needed. 
We  need  to  risk  over-reading,  pointing  out  some 
analogies  and  echoes  which  may  prove  to  be  nothing  but 
coincidence,  in  order  to  be  sure  that  we  have  been  open 
to  the  range  of  possibilities  that  the  text  offers.  A 
key  part  of  the  argument  of  this  thesis  is  that  reading 
is  a  matter  of  compromise  between  imagination  and 
discernment.  Unless  the  imagination  is  given  rein,  the 
processes  of  discernment  and  evaluation  which  are 
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Yet  unfettered  imagination  is  also  a  peril.  At  its 
worst,  it  too  can  dispense  with  the  text  as  it  stands. 
So  how  then  are  we  to  temper  our  imagination  without 
importing  to  the  text  a  set  of  conventions  alien  to  it? 
1.2.  DAVID  AS  READER 
1.2.1  THE  TEXTS  IN  QUESTION 
The  line  of  inquiry  we  shall  follow  in  this  study  is  to 
seek  to  elucidate  something  about  the  reading  of  the 
text  from  the  observation  of  acts  of  reading  within  it. 
Hence  the  quotations  at  the  head  of  this  chapter.  David 
will  be  our  guide.  By  observing  David  in  the  act  of 
reading,,  we  may  learn  something  of  the  interpretive 
conventions  that  the  authors  of  the  text  used,  whether 
consciously  or  unconsciously. 
The  immediate  objection  occurs  that  David  is  never 
represented  as  reading,  within  the  text.  The  whole 
question  of  what  it  might  mean  to  speak  of  a  character 
as  reader  is  one  that  will  demand  some  thorough 
exploration.  Yet  even  what  might  appear  the  most 
minimal  requirement  is  not  met  in  the  text.  'David' 
never  appears  as  the  subject  of  the  verb  mip  to  read., 
There  are  three  particular  episodes  in  the  text  of  2 
Samuel,  however,  where  David  is  confronted  with  the  task 
of  interpreting  a  story  that  is  told  to  him,  and  where 
the  text  itself  devotes  a  considerable  space  to  this 
scene  of  interpretation  of  language.  These  are 
1:  2  Sam  1:  1-15;  The  story  of  the  Amalekite  messenger 
2.2  Sam  12:  1-15;  The  story  of  Nathan's  parable 
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Each  of  these  will  be  considered  in  some  detail  below, 
but  we  shall  be  equally  interested  in  considering  the 
interaction  between  these  stories,  and  between  them  and 
the  wider  text  in  which  they  are  embedded.  Why  should  2 
Sam  contain  such  stories,  and  how  together  do  they 
illuminate  the  character  David? 
1.2.2  2  SAMUEL  1:  1-16 
1.2.2.1  The  Amalekite's  Tale 
As  a  preliminary  plunge  into  the  issues  we  are 
addressing,  however,  let  us  put  the  hypothesis  of  David 
as  model  reader  to  a  practical  test,  being  aware 
constantly  that  there  are  yet  more  questions  we  are 
begging.  How  does  'David  as  Reader,  deal  with  just  this 
issue  of  textual  variants  and  competing  versions  of 
events? 
Fittingly  for  our  purpose,  2  Samuel  begins  with  an 
account  which  sheds  a  surprising  light  on  just  this 
question.  2  Sam  1:  1-16  recounts  the  story  of  David's 
reaction  to  the  news  of  Saul's  death,  which  he  hears 
through  the  report  of  an  Amalekite  messenger.  This  man 
claims  to  have  delivered  the  coup  de  grace  to  the 
injured  Saul  and  brings  the  king's  regalia  to  David. 
David  responds  with  an  act  of  public  mourning,  and  by 
arranging  for  the  summary  dispatch  of  the  messenger  for 
daring  to  lay  hands  on  the  Lord's  anointed. 
The  problem  for  the  biblical  reader  is  that  in  1  Sam  31, 
there  is  another  account  of  Saul's  death,  and  this  is 
different  from  that  given  by  the  Amalekite.  According 
to  1  Sam  31:  4,  Saul's  death  occurs  when  he  falls  on  his 
sword  after  his  armour  bearer  has  refused  to  kill  him. 
No  Amalekite  is  mentioned  here.  There  are  other 
differences  in  detail;  in  particular  1  Sam  31  mentions 
that  Saul  was  wounded  by  archers,  whereas  2  Sam  1:  6 Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  1  33 
mentions  only  chariots  and  horsemen.  isam  31  also 
includes  the  information  that  the  armour  bearer  also 
killed  himself.  This  figure  does  not  appear  at  all  in  2 
Sam  1.  Now,  if  the  account  in  1  Sam  31  is  true,  then, 
strictly  speaking,  David  has  executed  someone  for  a  deed 
which  he  has  not  committed.  In  the  circumstances,  this 
may  be  understandable,  but  it  must  cast  some  doubt  on 
David's  judgment. 
But  this  conclusion  has  already  begged  several  questions 
which  are  the  crucial  ones  we  need  to  consider.  Must  we 
decide  between  the  two  accounts?  If  so,  how  do  we  go 
about  it?  If  not,  how  do  we  avoid  it? 
One  way  of  accounting  for  this  clash  is  to  claim,  as 
many  literary  critics  have  done,  that  the  discrepancies 
are  evidence  of  two  separate  documentary  sources  each  of 
which  preserves  a  different  version  of  Saul's  death. 
These  have  then  been  brought  together  by  later 
redactors. 
This  claim  has  been  extended  to  find  two  traditions 
represented  within  2  Samj.  -1-17  itself3.  An  earlier 
3A  classic  statement  of  this  position  is  in  Budde,  who  sees  the 
combination  of  J  and  E  sources  in  this  pericope  (1902:  193-5). 
Verses  1-4  and  11-12  represent  an  older  story  of  David's  grief- 
stricken  reaction  to  the  report  of  Saul's  death  brought  by  an 
unidentified  messenger,  an  account  in  harmony  with  1  Sam  31. 
Verses  5-10,13-16  represent  an  alternative  version  of  this 
position,  including  a  reference  David's  peremptory  death  sentence 
against  the  messenger.  This  was  softened  at  some  stage  of  the 
tradition  by  making  the  messenger  an  Amalekite  rather  than  an 
Israelite.  Apart  from  the  differences  in  detail  between  this 
later  account  and  the  one  given  in  1  Sam  31,  the  use  of  the  word 
-iM  in  vv  5  and  6  as  opposed  to  t'M  in  verse  2  is  seen  as  evidence Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  1  34 
Source,  represented  by  verses  1-4  and  11-12,  so  the 
argument  goes,  gives  an  account  of  David's  grief- 
stricken  reaction  to  the  news  of  Saul's  death  brought  by 
an  unnamed  messenger.  This  does  not  involve  any  report 
of  the  circumstances  of  Saul's  death,  and  so  no  clash 
with  1  Sam  31.  At  some  later  date,  this  bare  account 
has  been  combined  with  a  separate  source  which  records 
David's  summary  execution  of  an  Amalekite  messenger  and 
includes  a  divergent  account  of  Saul's  death. 
John  Van  Seters  takes  this  approach  to  its  logical 
conclusion:  'A  long-standing  difficulty  has  existed  in 
the  discrepancies  between  the  details  of  Saul's  death 
given  in  1  Sam  31  and  2  Sam  1.  This  difficulty, 
however,  lies  entirely  in  the  Amalekite's  story  in  2 
Sam.  1:  5-10,13-16,  which  can  easily  be  removed  as 
secondary,  leaving  a  harmonious  continuity.,  (Van  Seters 
1983:  285).  * 
So  why  was  this  harmony  ever  disrupted?  This  approach 
ducks  out  of  accounting  for  these  discrepancies.  Rather 
than  reading  the  text  as  it  stands,  it  opts  to  alter 
of  the  combination  of  sources,  as  is  the  discrepancy  that  the 
messenger  is  said  to  be  coming  from  the  camp  of  Saul  in  verse  two, 
but  claims  in  v6  to  have  been  on  Mount  Gilboa.  An  earlier 
source,  represented  by  verses  1-4  and  11-12,  so  it  is  argued, 
gives  an  account  of  David's  grief-stricken  reaction  to  the  news  of 
Saul's  death  brought  by  an  unnamed  messenger.  This  does  not 
involves  any  report  of  the  circumstances  of  Saul's  death,  and  so 
no  clash  with  1  Sam  31.  At  some  later  date.  this  bare  account  has 
been  combined  with  a  separate  source  which  records  David's  summary 
execution  of  the  messenger.  This  story  in  turn  has  been  softened 
by  a  yet  later  hand  which  identifies  the  messenger  as  an 
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it.  4  Ad6le  Berlin  (1983:  79-82)  takes  this  pair  of 
accounts  as  a  paradigm  case  of  the  failure  of  source- 
centered  critics  to  spot  the  significances  of  the 
differences  in  point  of  view  between  the  two  chapters. 
She  cites  Smith's  opinion  that  'It  seems  impossible  to 
reconcile  the  two  accounts.  The  easiest  hypothesis  is 
that  the  Amalekite  fabricated  his  story.  But  the  whole 
narrative  seem  against  this.  David  has  no  inkling  that 
the  man  is  not  truthful,  nor  does  the  author  suggest  it. 
The  natural  conclusion  is  that  we  have  here  a  document 
different  from  the  one  just  preceding  it,  (Smith  1899: 
254).  She  contrasts  this  with  the  reaction  of  Caird  in 
the  Interpreter's  Bible:  'The  obvious  explanation  of 
this  discrepancy  is  that  we  have  to  do  with  material 
from  two  different  sources.  But  any  solution  based  on 
the  two  source  theory  is  invalidated  by  a  further 
reference  to  the  event  in  2  Sam  4:  9-10,  which  is  beyond 
doubt  from  the  early  source...  The  only  alternative  is 
to  say  that  in  the  one  case  the  Amalekite  and  in  the 
other  case  David  was  not  adhering  strictly  to  the  truth' 
(Caird  1953:  1041).  Berlin  points  out  that  both  are 
wedded  to  the  idea  that  discrepancies  imply  different 
sources.  Once  the  sources  have  been  established,  this 
seems  to  allow  the  interpreter  to  'abdicate  his 
responsibility  as  critic  by  assigning  passages  to 
different  sources  when  he  fails  to  perceive  the 
relationship  between  them,  (1983:  81).  Shp  goes  on  to 
4  As  Arnold  puts  it:  'If  the  Biblical  text  has  a  contradiction  of 
this  nature,  either  an  original  author  was  willing  to  live  with 
that  contradiction  or  a  later  redactor  was  willing  to  leave  it  in 
the  text.  Early  literary  criticism  has  not  helped  with  our 
understanding  of  this  passage  but  has  merely  moved  the  problems 
into  a  different  time  frame  and  credited  the  difficulties  to  later 
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stress  that  'It  is  his  job,  often  difficult,  to  make 
sense  of  the  present  arrangement  of  the  text'(1983:  82). 
If  we  choose  not  to  follow  this  disjunctive  approach, 
can  we  then  find  a  way  of  harmonising  the  stories;  in 
other  words,  can  we  show  that  the  discrepancies  are  not 
really  discrepancies  after  all?  This  is  what  Josephus 
did  in  the  f  irst  century  in  his  AntiquitieS5.  He 
conflates  the  story  of  Saul's  suicide  in  1  Sam  31  and 
the  Amalekite's  deed  in  2  Sam  1.  According  to  Josephus, 
Saul  first  tells  his  armour  bearer  to  kill  him.  When  he 
refuses,  Saul  tries  to  kill  himself  and  fails.  At  that 
point  he  catches  sight  of  the  Amalekite  and  orders  him 
to  finish  him  off.  6. 
Of  course,  looked  at  with  an  unsympathetic  eye,  all 
Josephus  has  done  is  to  add  yet  another  account  of  the 
events  surrounding  Saul's  death  to.  those  represented  in 
the  two  biblical  stories.  we  now  have  three  stories  to 
choose  from  rather  than  two.  Both  biblical  accounts  are 
shown  to  be  partial  reflections  of  this  third  story:  1 
Sam  31  knows  nothing  of  an  Amalekite,  and  the 
Amalekite's  report  omits  any  mention  of  the  armour 
bearer.  Though  it  may  solve  the  problems  of  deriving  a 
unitary  event  from  the  narrative,  it  gives  us  no  help  in 
actually  reading  the  text  in  front  of  us.  We  might  well 
wonder  why  we  are  not  told  the  whole  story  in  either  of 
the  accounts  in  Samuel. 
There  is  a  fundamental  point  here  that  should  not  be 
missed.  Both  the  source-critics  and  the  harmonisers  are 
5  AntiquitieB  6.14.7 
6  See  also  McKane  (1963:  175)  for  a  modern  proponent  of  this 
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on  a  quest  for  the  unitary  narrative  that  represents 
'what  really  happened'.  This  procedure  can  of  course 
occur  without  any  specific  claim  that  the  events 
Postulated  ever  happened  in  the  real  world.  Plausibility 
and  actuality  have  no  necessary  connection.  The  reader 
attem.  pts  to  create  a  plausible  narrative  that  would 
account  for  the  disparate  details  of  the  narrative. 
1.2.2.2  The  Reader  as  Detective 
It  is  just  this  form  of  reading  that  is  enacted  in  the 
classic  detective  story.  We  need  not  suppose  for 
instance  that  there  ever  was  a  hound  of  the  Baskervilles 
in  order  to  appreciate  Sherlock  Holmes,  sifting  of 
conflicting  stories  in  order  to  provide  us  with  an 
overriding  master-  narrative  that  accommodates  most 
plausibly  every  detail.  Indeed,  on  the  face  of  it,  this 
stretch  of  Samuel  could  well  be  read  as  a  detective 
story.  We  are  given  two  accounts  of  Saul's  death. 
Which,  if  either,  should  we  believe? 
The  model  of  the  detective  story  is  one  which  has  been 
used  extensively  by  Stuart  Lasine  in  his  examination  of 
the  ideological  function  of  such  stories  in  the  biblical 
teXt7.  He  sees  this  genre  as  basically  an  affirmation 
of  the  social  values  that  it  invokes.  By  presenting  a 
situation  of  crisis,  where  the  conventions  of  society 
have  been  broken,  whether  in  a  murder  or  a  theft,  it 
both  speaks  to  the  anxieties  of  an  audience  which  is 
suffering  under  the  sense  of  the  possible  breakdown  of 
7  See  in  particular  his  paper  'Solomon,  Daniel  and  the  Detective 
Story:  The  Social  Functions  of  a  Literary  Genre,  (1987),  and  his 
subsequent  examination  of  the  story  of  Solomon's  judgment  in  1 
Kings  3,  (1989b,  1991)  and  the  stories  of  David's  judgment  of  the 
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its  society  and  thus  is  becoming  painfully  aware  that 
its  conventions  are  conventions,  and  also  serves  as  a 
source  of  reassurance. 
The  incursion  of  crime  indicates  that  not  everyone 
values  property  or  human  life  as  convention  demandsr  but 
the  superhuman  intelligence  of  the  detective  figure  in 
solving  the  crime  and  capturing  the  criminal  serves  as 
an  assurance  that  the  powers  that  be  can  restore  order 
and  that  the  conventions  triumph. 
So,  for  instance,  according  to  Lasine  the  story  of 
David's  judgement  of  the  rich  man  in  2  Sam  12  displays 
the  injustice  of  the  rich  man's  action,  and  the 
injustice  that  the  king  is  capable  of.  Both  king  and 
rich  man  flout  societal  conventions.  Yet  the  story  in 
the  end  serves  to  reassure  the  audience  that  though  this 
kind  of  breach  of  convention  may  occur,  it  may  also  be 
repaired.  The  success  of  the  Lord  and  of  Nathan  in 
bringing  David  to  book  indeed  strengthens  the  audience's 
sense  of  security  in  that  their  moral  conventions  are 
reinforced. 
If  we  are  to  adopt  this  forensic  model,  the  obvious 
first  question  is:  How  reliable  are  the  witnesses?  Many 
commentators  have  noted  the  neat  solution  that  is 
provided  to  the  apparent  clash  by  assuming  that  the 
Amalekite  was  lying  in  the  hope  of  getting  into  the  good 
books  of  the  likely  successor  to  Saul.  For  example, 
W.  G.  Blaikie  opines  that  'no  doubt  it  was  to  ingratiate 
himself  the  more  with  (David],  and  to  establish  the 
stronger  claim  to  a  splendid  recompense,  that  he 
invented  the  story  of  Saul  asking  him  to  kill  him,  and 
of  his  complying  with  the  king's  order,  and  thus  putting 
an  end  to  a  life  which  was  already  obviously  doomed' 
(1892:  2-3).  This  is  a  fourth  plausible  story  -  but 
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betrays.  Does  the  case  against  the  Amalekite  stand  up? 
What  is  needed  is  a  good  detective. 
1.2.2.3  David  as  Detective 
In  2  Sam  1,,  David  is  the  one  who 
He  has  to  react  appropriately  to 
of  a  detached  sense  of  justice, 
to  do  with  the  transfer  of  power 
own  followers  are  at  stake.  How 
crucial  consequences  for  the  way 
will  unfold. 
is  cast  in  this  role. 
this  situation,  not  out 
but  because  vital  issues 
and  the  loyalty  of  his 
he  reacts  may  have 
in  which  his  own  story 
David  is  thus  faced  with  his  own  problem  of  reading. 
Confronted  with  the  report  of  Saul's  death,  will  he 
believe  the  Amalekite?  In  this  chapter,  as  in  any 
detective  story,  we  are  encouraged  to  match  our  wits 
against  a  character  who  has  to  establish  the  truth  of  a 
case  from  the  same  clues  that  we  as  readers  are  given,  a 
character  who  mimics  our  reading  of  the  evidence.  In 
this  case  it  turns  out  that  the  reading  strategy  which 
David  adopts  is  very  different  from  that  applied  by  most 
of  the  commentators. 
In  this  situation,  we  need  to  proceed  with  caution,  to 
examine  the  clues  with  care.  We  have  one  great 
advantage  over  David;  we  can  read  1  Sam  31.  And  it  is 
very  important  to  notice  the  source  of  our  information: 
a  direct  report  by  the  narrator  of  the  story.  No 
character  is  involved.  Within  the  world  of  the  text, 
the  narrator  knows  everything.  He  may  not  choose  to 
tell  us  everything,  but  in  principle,  he  could.  He  has 
an  authority  that  cannot  be  gainsaid,  especially  by  one 
of  the  characters  within  his  narrative.  If  we  wish  to 
dispute  with  him,  we  have  to  go  outside  the  text  and  ask  the 
questions  about  historical  plausibility  which  we 
mentioned  earlier.  In  his  own  world,,  he  is  master.  And 
this  is  the  world  we  are  dealing  in  with  this  reading. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  1  40 
Sol  unlike  some  of  its  critics,  the  text  itself  does  not 
set  up  the  accounts  in  1  Sam  31  and  2  Sam  1  as  competing 
stories  on  an  equal  level.  The  first  comes  to  us 
straight  from  the  horse's  mouth,  from  the  omniscient  and 
all-seeing  narrator.  The  other  is  mediated  through  the 
perspectives  and  desires  of  a  character,  and  an 
Amalekite  at  that.  8 
David,  however,  only  has  the  Amalekite's  report  to  go  on 
and  we  get  to  read  that  report  just  as  he  receives  it, 
as  direct  discourse  addressed  to  him  on  which  we 
eavesdrop.  The  matter  at  issue  for  us  readers  then 
becomes  one  of  observing  the  process  by  which  David 
arrives  at  his  conclusion  on  the  basis  of  the  partial 
evidence  to  which  he  has  access.  We  know  that  Saul  is 
dead,  and  how  he  died,  but  we  ask  ourselves  'Given  the 
minimal  information  David  has,  would  we  be  able  to  match 
his  ability  to  come  up  with  a  solution?  '  Our  interest 
becomes  focussed  on  the  way  that  David  reads  the 
evidence. 
The  parallel  has  been  drawn  between  this  story  and  the 
story  of  the  arrival  of  another  ragged,  earth-smeared 
messenger:  the  Benjaminite  who  brings  Eli  the  news  of 
8  Fokkelmann  makes  this  point  as  follows:  I  If  the  man  [sic]  who 
has  first  and  last  responsibility  for  everything  in  and  about  the 
story  tells  us  personally  how  Saul  has  died,  then  there  is  no  one 
who  can  refute  him,  and  certainly  not  a  character  which  he  himself 
has  created.  The  Amalekite  is  merely  a  figure  within  a  story  and 
cannot  possibly  compete  for  authority  with  his  creator,  the 
narrator.  The  contradiction  on  both  sides  of  the  border  between  1 
and  2  Samuel  is  therefore  not  a  contradiction  at  all  because  the 
voice  of  the  character  sounds  on  an  entirely  different  level  of 
communication  than  the  voice  of  the  writer  [sic;  'narrator,  might 
have  been  a  better-advised  term],  (1984:  46). Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  1  41 
the  capture  of  the  ark  in  1  Samuel  4:  12-189.  Both  David 
and  Eli  are  confronted  with  a  messenger  in  this  state 
which  can  be  interpreted  as  a  sign  of  mourning  and  of 
travail.  David  however,  has  the  advantage  over  Eli  in 
that  we  are  specifically  told  that  Eli  is  unable  to  see, 
and  thus  to  'read',  the  condition  of  the  messenger. 
Both  ask  the  respective  messengers  'How  did  it  go?  '(1 
Sam  4:  16,2  Sam  1:  4).  after  it  has  been  established  that 
they  have  been  in  a  position  to  bring  news  of  a  vital 
battle.  Both  messengers  reply  with  the  bad  news  in  an 
ascending  order  of  personal  involvement  for  the  hearer, 
leaving  the  most  emotionally  charged  news  till  last.  In 
2  Sam  1,  David  is  told  first  that  many  have  fled;  then 
that  many  have  been  killed;  then  specifically  that  Saul 
is  dead,  and  lastly,  and  most  personally  significant, 
that  Jonathan  has  been  killed.  In  1  Sam  4,  Eli  hears 
first  of  the  defeat,  then  the  death  of  his  sons  and  then 
the  loss  of  the  ark. 
But  the  crucial  difference  between  these  stories  comes 
with  the  reaction  of  the  respective  hearers.  Eli  hears 
the  news  and  is  so  shocked  that  he  falls  backwards  to 
his  death.  David  asks  the  messenger  'How  do  you  know?, 
This  is  an  interesting  question,  made  all  the  more 
striking  by  the  comparison.  The  contrast  here  between 
Eli's  instant  response  and  David's  concern  to  establish 
the  appropriateness  of  his  own  reaction  is  of  course  one 
reason  why  verses  5-10  have  been  seen  as  an  insertion. 
If  they  are  omitted,  we  can  pass  straight  from  David's 
receiving  the  message  to  his  reaction.  But  what  if  that 
contrast  is  in  fact  the  point?. 
9  See  Gunn  (1974:  286-92)  for  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  parallels 
which  he  regards  as  pointing  to  a  common  basis  in  oral  tradition. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  1  42 
So  far,  of  course,  we  as  readers  have  no  reason  to  doubt 
the  messenger's  reliability.  He  has  said  nothing  which 
contradicts  1  Sam  31.  So  why  does  David  ask  his 
question?  What  prompts  his  suspicion? 
He  begins  with  a  question  that  gets  to  the  heart  of  the 
problem  of  the  reliability  of  the  evidence  that  we  have 
been  discussing:  'How  do  you  know  that  Saul  and  Jonathan 
are  dead?  '  As  we  read  the  answer  over  David's  shoulder, 
so  to  speak,  we  readers  note  the  discrepancies  with  the 
narrator's  account  in  1  Sam  31.  David  cannot  do  this. 
What  is  available  to  him  are  the  rhetorical  devices  that 
the  Amalekite  uses,  and  these  are  clues  available  to  us 
as  well. 
For  a  start,  the  Amalekite's  blithe  'By  chance  I 
happened  to  be  on  Mount  Gilboa,  rings  a  little  hollow. 
Who  happens  on  a  major  battlefield  by  chance"O?  In 
addition  Adele  Berlin  in  her  discussion  of  this  speech 
sees  something  suspicious  in  the  use  of  hinneh  clauses 
in  verse  six.  She  characterises  this  word  as  an 
attention  getter,  but  also  a  word  that  expresses  wonder 
and  surprise  at  a  turn  of  events  (1981:  92-93). 
Perhaps  a  more  vivid  translation  of  it  might  be:  "Would 
you  believe...  "  In  the  Amalekite's  speech,  there  are 
two  hinneh's  in  verse  6.  'By  chance  I  happened  to  be  on 
Mount  Gilboa  and  hinneh  -  would  you  believe?  -  Saul 
leaning  on  his  spear  and  hinneh  -  would  you  believe?  - 
the  chariots  and  the  cavalry  officers  had  closed  on 
him.  '  Berlin  notes  that  this  repeated  use  of  hinneh  is 
a  feature  of  dream  reports  and  that  this  convention 
10  Fokkelman  comments:  ...  we  understand  the  narrator  to  be 
giving  us  a  knowing  wink,  for  no  one  just  happens  to  be  on  a 
battlefield  coincidentally,  (1984:  48). Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  1  43 
might  alert  the  reader  to  the  unreliability  of  the 
Amalekite's  account  (1983:  91). 
This  may  be,  but  it  also  just  as  likely  that  both  the 
Amalekite  and  those  reporting  their  dreams  are  doing 
their  best  to  involve  their  listeners  in  what  might  seem 
an  implausible  tale.  This  is  a  dangerous  tactic. 
Someone  who  continually  prefaces  his  remarks  with 
'You're  not  going  to  believe  this..,  may  well  increase 
rather  than  allay  the  scepticism  of  the  audience.  By 
striving  too  hard  for  vivid  effect,  the  language  of  the 
Amalekite's  report  lays  bare  its  own  artifice,  which 
makes  it  less  rather  than  more  believable.  So  both 
style  and  content  raise  questions  about  the  soundness  of 
the  Amalekite's  evidence. 
But  we  may  now  be  struck  by  the  fact  that  this  report 
does  contain  striking  similarities  to  1  Sam  31, 
especially  in  the  key  event  of  Saul  requesting  someone 
to  put  him  out  of  his  misery.  If  it  is  simply  regarded 
as  a  tall  tale  concocted  by  the  Amalekite,  then  it  is 
amazingly  coincident  with  the  facts  as  the  wider 
narrative  presents  them.  Fokkelman  (1986:  640)  explains 
this  as  implying  that  the  Amalekite  was  an  eyewitness  of 
the  attack. 
Now  of  course  this  can  only  be  of  relevance  to  the 
reader;  David  has  no  way  of  comparing  the  two  accounts. 
This  highlights  an  important  point.  Two  levels  of 
communication  are  represented  by  this  single  speech:  the 
communication  between  the  Amalekite  and  David,  and  the 
communication  between  the  narrator  and  the  reader. 
Indeed,  there  is  a  third  level  in  the  reported 
conversation  between  the  Amalekite  and  Saul.  Fokkelmann 
writes  'The  narrator  had  to  pull  the  following  stunt  in 
the  middle:  he  had  to  let  the  Amalekite  speak  in  such  a 
manner  that  he  was  credible  for  David  and  Saul,  yet 
simultaneously  write  the  war  report  in  such  a  way  that Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  1  44 
the  more  knowledgeable  reader  is  able  to  deconstruct  it 
as  deceit,  (1984:  52). 
The  narrator  gives  us  clues  that  David  cannot  pick  up. 
But  what  is  the  effect  of  this?  Put  succinctly,  the 
fact  that  the  two  versions  of  Saul's  death  correspond  so 
closely  makes  more  demands  on  the  reader.  we  are  led  to 
see  the  Amalekite  as  a  clever  liar,  a  twister  of  the 
truth,,  r4ther  than  as  a  barefaced  romancer.  Whether  or 
not  we  are  to  make  the  inference  that  the  Amalekite  was 
an  eyewitness  as  Fokkelmann  contends,  is  another 
question  and  is  formally  unanswerable  in  terms  of  the 
text.  All  the  information  we  receive  is  of  course  given 
by  the  narrator  who  does  not  need  the  Amalekite  as  an 
eyewitness  in  order  to  pick  up  this  allusion. 
This  speech  also  contains  the  messenger's  self- 
identification  as  an  Amalekite.  He  remains  unnamed 
except  for  this  gentilic  designation.  For  Hertzberg, 
this  fact  in  itself  is  enough  to  condemn  the  man  in 
David's  eyes:  'Amalekites  remain  Amalekites,  even  if 
they  are  sojourning  in  Israel;  these  born  robbers  do  not 
even  shrink  from  the  Lord's  anointed1l  (1964:  237).  After 
all,  these  are  the  very  people  David  has  just  been 
raiding  (1  Sam  30:  17-18),  and  the  people  against  whom 
Saul  was  fighting  when  he  committed  the  fatal  error  of 
sparing  their  king  that  led  to  the  withdrawal  of  God's 
favour  (I  Sam  15:  9).  11  Is  Hertzberg  right,  however;  is 
11  It  is  hard  not  to  see  the  irony  in  the  fact  that  an  Amalekite 
claims  to  have  given  the  coup  de  grAce  to  Saul  whose  failure  to 
kill  the  Amalekite  king  Agag  in  1  Sam  15  was  the  beginning  of  his 
downfall.  Hertzberg's  attack  is  supported  by  the  fact  that  the 
messenger  himself  gives  a  rather  different  response  to  David's 
later  direct  question  about  his  origins  in  v  13.  Suddenly  he 
revises  his  answer  and  describes  himself  as  'the  son  of  a Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  1  45 
this  admission  going  to  influence  David's  assessment  of 
his  evidence?  Would  he  believe  an  Amalekite,  let  alone 
one  who  brings  him  a  tale  full  of  'would-you-believe- 
it's? 
1.2.2.4  The  Reader  as  Writer 
The  odd  fact  is,  all  this  turns  out  to  be  tangential  to 
the  answer  to  David's  original  question  'How  do  you  know 
that  Saul  and  his  son  Jonathan  are  dead?  '  This  question 
is  not  asked  in  order  to  confirm  the  death  of  the  two 
men.  The  evidence  of  this  is  not  given  in  the 
Amalekite's  speech.  It  is  provided  by  the  irrefutable 
physical  evidence  of  Saul's  death,  in  the  form  of  his 
diadem  and  bracelet  in  the  hands  of  an  Amalekite. 
These  signs  of  kingship  are  marks  of  identification.  How 
they  arrived  in  Ziklag  is  not  the  point.  The  very  fact 
that  they  are  there  signifies  the  loss  of  Saul's  power 
and  that  it  lies  within  David's  grasp.  Saul  without 
these  signs  of  power,  and  manifestly  without  the  power 
to  keep  them  in  his  possession  is  dead  as  a  king, 
whatever  his  physical  state.  That  being  so,  whatever 
sojourner,  i.  e.  a  resident  alien,  an  Amalekitel.  Instead  of  being 
identified  as  the  antithesis  of  Israel,  he  becomes  an  ambiguous 
figure,  neither  truly  alien  nor  truly  part  of  Israel.  That 
ambiguity  stretches  to  the  point  that  it  becomes  difficult  to  know 
whether  he  is  acknowledging  that  he  is  an  Amalekite,  or  is  trying 
to  offload  this  potential  stigma  onto  his  father. 
Whatever  the  case,  he  represents  himself  as  a  figure  who  is 
marginal,  claiming  a  share  in  both  the  privileges  and 
responsibilities  of  Israel,  and  yet  only  a  partial  share  -  enough 
privilege  perhaps  to  incline  the  king  to  extend  mercy,  but  not 
enough  responsibility  to  be  taxed  with  the  full  consequences  of 
laying  hands  on  Israel's  king. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  1  46 
the  messenger's  trustworthiness,  it  is  much  more 
reasonable  to  believe  that  Saul  is  dead  than  to  believe 
that  the  living  Saul  would  have  parted  with  these 
symbols  of  his  power12. 
So  David  and  his  men  put  on  the  signs  of  mourning.  Yet 
we  more  knowledgeable  readers  are  left  with  a  quandary. 
If  we  are  to  believe  the  narrator,  Saul  died  by  his  own 
hand.  So  how  did  the  Amalekite  come  by  the  king's 
regalia?  We  know  no  more  about  this  than  David  does  and 
the  narrator  has  no  interest  in  enlightening  us.  All  we 
know  is  that  the  Amalekite's  own  account  lies  under  a 
cloud  -  and  that  is  all  we  need  to  know.  The  important 
aspect  of  the  story  is  not  what  happened,  but  how  it  is 
interpreted. 
David's  own  assessment  is  swift.  He  condemns  the 
Amalekite  to  death.  But  is  this  just?  Granted  that  the 
Amalekite  is  a  suspicious  character,  what  has  he  done 
that  deserves  death  from  the  reader's  perspective?  Has 
David  condemned  a  man  for  a  crime  that  he  did  not  commit 
just  on  his  own  confession  without  corroborating 
evidence?  13 
12  A  similar  implication  is  drawn  by  Edelman  (1991:  304): 
'Presented  with  Saul's  personal  items  of  jewellery,  David  is 
convinced  that  Israel's  first  king  has  died.  '  See  also  Arnold 
(1989:  296)  who  brings  out  the  significance  of  these  accoutrements 
for  the  kingship. 
13  On  this  point,  see  Anderson's  comment:  'Irrespective  of  whether 
the  Amalekite  told  the  truth  or  not,  David  acted  correctly  from 
the  legal  point  of  view;  the  man  had  "confessed"  his  crime  and 
therefore  no  further  evidence  was  required,  (1989:  10).  This  is  a 
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This  might  be  very  understandabler  but  there  is  a 
question  mark  here.  This  is  David's  first  act  as  de 
facto  king.  Is  it  a  foreshadowing  of  things  to  come?  14 
The  point  is  that  it  is  the  narrator  who  has  led  us  to 
experience  this  slight  unease  by  offering  us  the  two 
accounts.  He  is  under  no  obligation  to  tell  the  story  in 
the  way  it  now  appears.  There  are  many  examples  of 
stories  in  the  books  of  Samuel  where  all  we  read  is  'It 
was  told  to  David  that  ..,  If  the  point  is  just  to 
inform  us  that  David  learnt  of  Saul's  death,  why  all 
this  elaborate  palaver  including  messengers  and 
duplication  of  the  stories?  We  need  only  contrast  the 
treatment  of  these  events  in  1  Chronicles  10,  where  the 
narrator  reports  Saul's  death  but  there  is  no  scene 
corresponding  to  2  Sam  1  at  all. 
If  we  look  again  more  closely,  however,  we  may  find  that 
something  more  subtle  is  going  on.  Exactly  what  leads 
David  to  condemn  the  man?  His  indictment,  addressed,  be 
it  noted,  to  the  corpse  of  the  messenger,  is:  'Your  own 
mouth  has  testified  against  you,  saying  "I  have  slain 
the  Lord's  anointed.  "'  The  messenger,  being  dead, 
cannot  be  the  audience  for  this  remark;  nor  indeed  can 
the  messenger  reply. 
case  is  the  basis  for  this  assessment  of  what  is  correct  legal 
procedure? 
14  Edelman  also  sees  this  incident  as  David's  first  cognizant  act 
as  de  facto  king.  However,  her  view  is  that  'the  audience  almost 
certainly  would  have  felt  that  justice  have  been  served,  even 
though  they  knew  for  certain,  unlike  David,  that  the  Amalekite  I's 
death  was  not  a  strict  case  of  poetic  justice'(1991:  306).  The 
point  is  that  it  is  only  almost  certain,  even  by  Edelman's  own 
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Now  the  fascinating  thing  about  this,  of  course,  is  that 
the  messenger  never  actually  said  any  such  thing,  nor 
does  he  imply  it.  His  version  of  events  was  that  he 
carried  out  an  act  of  mercy  in  ending  the  sufferings  of 
Saul,  and,  what  is  more,  at  the  express  command  of  the 
dying  king  himself.  In  no  way  d  id  he  set  out  to 
assassinate  anyone.  In  explaining  this,  however,  he  did 
utter  the  fatal  syllables  'welamothethehu  [and  I  slew 
him]r. 
This  act  of  utterance  makes  it  irrelevant  whether  the 
facts  of  the  case  are  best  represented  in  1  Sam  31  or  in 
2  Sam  1.  It  is  not  what  he  did,  but  what  he  said,  that 
becomes  his  condemnation.  And  indeed,  not  what  he 
himself  said,  but  the  implication  read  into  it  by  David 
from  within  the  perspective  of  an  Israelite  society 
which  made  an  identification  between  the  man  Saul  and 
the  anointed  of  the  Lord.  David  activates  a  semantic 
implication  of  the  name  Saul  that  the  Amalekite  has  not 
brought  to  light  and  rewrites  the  Amalekite's  statement 
of  his  actions.  It  is  not  the  Amalekite's  statement 
that  kills  him,  but  David's.  By  the  quick  dispatch  of 
the  messenger,  David  eliminates  the  dialogic  element 
that  the  messenger  might  represent.  This  raises  the 
question  of  what  the  messenger  might  have  said  in  his 
own  defence.  Indeed,  the  swift  execution  of  the 
messenger  could  lead  a  suspicious  reader  to  see  the 
whole  transaction  as  David's  shrewd  dispatch  of  his  own 
hired  assassin  who  has  carried  out  the  necessary  murder 
of  Sau115. 
15  On  this  point  see  VanderKam  (1980:  529  n-27)  who  raises  the 
possibility  that  the  Amalekite  is  a  prisoner  of  war  primed  to  tell 
this  story-only  to  dismiss  it  as  'simply  speculation,.  There  is  a 
widespread  view  that  there  is  an  underlying  thrust  in  this  and  the 
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David  has  no  need  to  get  embroiled  in  the  tangled 
business  of  establishing  the  underlying  events.  In 
Fokkelman,  s  phrase,  'With  his  final  judgment  he  cleaves 
in  twain  the  Gordian  knot  he  has  been  presented 
(with]1(1984:  53).  Instead  of  untying  the  knot  of  the 
correspondence  to  events  which  the  Amalekite  claims  for 
his  speech,  his  verdict  turns  on  a  linguistic  feature, 
on  a  set  of  words  which  he  puts  in  the  dead  Amalekite's 
mouth  and  then  uses  to  condemn  him. 
For  confirmation  of  this  we  can  turn  to  an  explicit 
recollection  of  this  incident  in  2  Sam  4:  9-12.  In  a  grim 
reprise  of  the  events  reported  in  2  Sam  1,  Saul's  son 
Ishbosheth  meets  an  ignominious  death  at  the  hands  of 
two  of  David's  henchmen,  who  bring  back  even  less 
equivocal  proof  of  their  victim's  demise:  his  severed 
head.  David  has  them  executed  and  mutilated, 
commenting,  'When  one  told  me,  "Behold,  Saul  is  dead,  " 
and  thought  he  was  bringing  good  news,  I  seized  him  and 
slew  him  at  Ziklag,  which  was  the  reward  I  gave  him  for 
his  news.  '  Here  it  is  spelt  out  that  the  justification 
for  the  punishment  is  not  the  implicit  deed  of  murder, 
but  the  assumed  effect  of  the  communication  of  Saul's 
death.  It  was  not  even  what  the  Amalekite  said  but  the 
way  that  he  said  it  that  sealed  his  fate. 
So  David  here  offers  a  model  of  reading  which  does  not 
buy  into  the  need  to  unearth  the  events  which  underlie 
this  report16.  The  whole  business  that  we  have  just 
allegation,  valid  or  not,  would  be  that  he  was  involved  in  Saul's 
death,  from  which  he  undeniably  benefited.  See  for  instance 
Anderson  (1989:  10),  McCarter  (1984:  64)  and  particularly  Mabee 
(1980;  esp  98). 
16  Anderson  provides  a  concise  statement  of  one  possible  reading 
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become  involved  with  crumbles17.  David  as  reader  is 
David  as  writer,  as  we  have  said,  the  one  who  writes  the 
Amalekite's  own  speech  of  self-condemnation  and  puts  in 
the  mouth  of  a  dead  'author'. 
Far  from  supporting  the  forensic,  model  of  reading 
which  Lasine  represents,  and  which  is  at  the  root  of  the 
the  critical  approach  of  the  scholars  who  tease  out  the 
historical  facts  or  plausibilities  behind  the  text, 
David  is  revealed  as  a  skilled  practitioner  of  the  art 
of  anacrisis,  of  the  eliciting  of  a  response  which  can 
readers  would  be  aware  of  the  partially  fictitious  nature  of  the 
Amalekite's  story,  it  seems  that  its  primary  function  was  to 
counter  any  possible  rumors  or  accusations  leveled  against  David. 
Had  not  Saul  been  David's  bitter  enemy?  Had  not  David  and  his  men 
been  in  the  Philistine  ranks  shortly  before  the  battle  of  Gilboa? 
was  not  David  in  possession  of  the  royal  insignia?  It  would  not 
require  much  imagination  for  some  to  argue  that  David  had  helped 
to  bring  about  Saul's  death  and  was  duly  rewarded  by  the 
Philistines.  If  such  a  situation  existed  then  the  present  story 
as  well  as  the  account  of  David's  defeat  of  the  Amalekites  (1  Sam 
30),  would  be  the  best  defense  of  David:  he  simply  could  not  be 
in  two  places  at  the  same  time,  (1989:  10). 
17  Arnold  (1989)  links  the  deceptive  strategy  of  the  Amalekite  to 
Hagan's  argument  (Hagan  1979)  that  the  role  of  deception  is 
central  to  the  so-called  succession  narrative,  the  cycle  of 
stories  in  2  Samuel  9-20,1  Kings  1-2.  Arnold  finds  13  examples 
in  1  Samuel.  His  conclusion  is  'It  would  seem,  then,  that  taking 
this  important  transitional  chapter  as  an  example  of  deception 
does  no  injustice  to  an  analysis  of  the  books  of  Samuel  as  a 
wholel(1989:  289). Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  1  51 
be  turned  against  the  speaker.  If  this  text  is  to  offer 
a  model  of  reading,  it  calls  into  question  the 
appropriateness  of  a  methodology  that  seeks  to  recover 
the  irrecoverable  events  or  sources  behind  the  text,  and 
to  assess  their  reliability  and  accuracy.  Instead  it 
offers  a  model  where  the  responsibility  for  utterance 
can  be  turned  against  a  speaker  with  no  regard  for  his 
intentions  or  deeds.  The  words  themselves  are  enough. 
1.3  MISE  EN  ABYME 
In  considering  the  implications  of  such  an  episode,  a 
fruitful  line  of  inquiry  is  to  look  at  the  work  of 
various  literary  critics  who  had  taken  up  Andrd  Gide's 
concept  of  mise  en  abyme.  The  term  Imise  en  abyme, 
derives  from  heraldry,  where  it  describes  a  device 
whereby  a  shield  is  emblazoned  with  a  smaller  replica  of 
itself.  Gide  uses  the  term  to  describe  the  reflection 
of  the  theme  or  more  importantly,  the  processes  of  a 
work,  by  an  internal  reduplication  of  an  incident  at  the 
level  of  the  characters.  He  introduced  the  concept  in 
his  Journals  as  follows:  'In  a  work  of  art,  I  rather 
like  to  find  thus  transposed,  at  the  level  of  the 
characters,  -the  subject  of  the  work  itself.  Nothing 
sheds  more  light  on  the  work  or  displays  the  proportions 
of  the  whole  work  more  accurately'  (Gide  1948:  41  as 
translated  in  Ddllenbach  1989:  7).  Each  of  the  stories 
cited  above  is  an  example  of  mise  en  abyme.  By  taking  a 
preliminary  look  at  some  of  the  theoretical  issues 
involved  in  this  concept,  we  may  end  up  in  a  better 
position  to  analyse  the  working  of  these  stories. 
DALLENBACH 
A  major  study  of  the  concept  is  that  of  Lucien 
Ddllenbach  in  his  The  Mirror  in  the  Text  (1989).  He 
summarises  Gidels  concern  as  a  fascination  with 
incidents  where  a  character  mimics  the  activity  of  the Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  1  52 
narrator  of  the  story  in  which  the  character  appears.  In 
DAllenbach's  view,  critics  have  tended  to  subsume 
several  different  phenomena  under  this  heading,  and  he 
offers  a  complex  typology  of  the  possible  combinations. 
For  our  purposes,  it  is  the  category  that  Ddllenbach 
describes  as  the  Imise  en  abyme  at  the  level  of 
enunciation,  where  the  mimicry  of  the  reading  of  the 
text  occurs.  A  given  character  in  the  text  can  act  the 
part  of  the  producer  or  receiver  of  a  discourse  within 
the  text,  imitating  the  production  or  reception  of  the 
wider  text  by  its  author  or  reader.  Such  a  discourse  is 
often  termed  an  'embedded  text,  and  it  can  stand  in  a 
variety  of  relationships  to  the  wider  or  'primary' 
textI8. 
Ddllenbach  interestingly  observes  that  the  protagonist, 
the  principAl  character,  is  usually  cast  in  the  role  of 
the  receiver  of  the  communication.  'One  cannot  enact 
one's  own  story  and  be  a  witness  to  it,  '  he  comments 
(1989:  81).  The  whole  function  of  the  mise  en  abyme  is 
to  afford  a  pause  where  the  protagonist  can  be  brought 
to  a  moment  of  recognition.  The  main  character  is 
confronted  by  another,  often  an  'extra,,  a  relatively 
extraneous  character,  who  represents  to  the  character 
his/her  own  past  actions:  I...  s/he  must  be  confronted 
with  a  resemblance  whose  decipherment  -  which  concerns 
him/her,  not  just  the  reader  -  will  have  a  decisive 
influence  on  the  rest  of  the  plot.  The  mise  en  abyme  of 
18  Of  course,  this  phenomenon  can  be  repeated  and  stories  within 
stories  within  stories  can  be  generated.  A  standard  example  of 
this  is  The  Arabian  Nights,  where  within  the  overarching  narrative 
of  Scheherazade's  communication  with  the  Sultan,  she  tells  tales 
where  the  characters  tell  tales  about  characters  telling  tales, 
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the  narrated  story  must  therefore  be  made  to  appear  as 
an  exemplum  to  its  diegetic  addressee,  (1989:  82). 
DAllenbach  explains  that  an  exemplum  is  in  ancient 
rhetoric  an  argument  by  analogy  used  as  to  persuade  the 
hearer  to  alter  his/her  self-consciousness  and  therefore 
way  of  acting19. 
Ddllenbach  himself  raises  the  question  of  authority  in 
regard  to  the  character  who  is  responsible  for  the  mise 
en  abyme.  If  it  represents  a  moment  of  revelation  for 
the  character,  the  reader  as  well  as  the  character  needs 
to  be  led  to  lend  credence  to  it.  If  the  mise  en  abyme 
represents  the  wider  narrative,  then  the  character  is 
effectively  speaking  in  the  name  of  the  narrator.  How 
can  the  author  ensure  that  this  inspires  confidence  in 
the  reader? 
Most  obviously,  the  narrator  may  briefly  appear  as  a 
'sponsor'  for  the  character,  giving  confirmation  of  the 
character's  view  from  outside  the  story.  Ddllenbach 
offers  three  further  criteria  which  may  reinforce  the 
authority  of  these  characters: 
1.  They  tend  to  be  agents  who  are  not  integral  to 
the  plot,  and  so  are  free  to  perform  this 
particular  task  without  narrative  complications. 
2.  They  tend  to  be  qualified  personnel  who 
specialize  in,  or  make  their  living  from,  the 
19  The  relevance  of  these  remarks  to  2  Sam  12  is  clear.  The 
receiver  of  the  communication  in  that  case  is  David,  the 
principal  character.  He  is  confronted  by  Nathan,  a  character  who 
appears  in  only  three  incidents  in  the  biblical  text  with  a  story 
which  indeed  purports  to  alter  David's  self  consciousness  and 
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truth'(1989:  53):  he  cites  as  examples  the 
artist,  the  critic  or  the  clergyman. 
3.  In  the  absence  of  any  such,  the  author  may  use 
the  services  of  a  'work  of  art'  which  might  need 
no  such  validation. 
In  the  case  of  Nathan  and  the  woman  of  Teqoa,  these 
criteria  are  well  exemplified.  In  both  cases,  the 
'author'  appears  to  validate  them.  In  Nathan's  case,  we 
have  the  very  rare  case  of  direct  intervention  by  God 
into  the  text  of  2  Samuel  when  he  sends  Nathan  to  David 
(2  Sam  12:  1).  In  the  Teqoite's  case,  we  are  explicitly 
told  that  Joab  has  sent  her  (2  Sam  14:  1-3).  Both 
Nathan  and  the  Teqoite  woman  are  also  marginal 
characters.  The  Teqoite  woman  appears  nowhere  else  in 
the  book.  The  case  of  Nathan  is  a  little  more  complex 
as  he  appears  in  three  scenes,  but  in  the  two  scenes  in 
2  Samuel,  he  appears  only  in  order  to  convey  a  divine 
message  to  David.  His  later  appearance  in  1  Kings  1  may 
in  fact  honour  this  convention  in  the  breach20. 
Certainly,  both  of  them  are  representatives  of 
professions  whose  business  is  the  'truth',  prophets  and 
wise  women2l.  Again,  the  dubious  status  of  the  wise 
woman's  intervention  may  honour  this  convention  in  the 
20  See  the  discussion  of  this  episode  in  Chapter  6  below,  where 
the  argument  could  be  made  that  the  reader's  response  to  Nathan's 
intervention  is  coloured  by  his  claim  of  authority  as  God's 
messenger  in  a  context  where  he  at  least  stands  under  suspicion  of 
political  machination  on  behalf  of  the  Solomonic  party. 
21  On  the  argument  that  'wise  woman'  designated  a  recognised 
'professional'  status  within  Israelite  society  see  Camp  1981. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  1  55 
breach.  The  claim  to  truth-telling  is  certainly  part  of 
the  claim  to  wisdom,,  but  claims  may  not  be  borne  out. 
Ddllenbach  goes  on  to  discuss  the  particular  matter  of 
the  reception  of  the  embedded  text  by  the  character  who 
is  addressed.  He  distinguishes  three  phases  of 
reception: 
l.  a  deciphering  of  signs 
2.  a  realization 
3.  a  subsequent  action 
and  explains  that  as  they  form  a  hermeneutic  sequence, 
they  can  be  used  to  expose  the  hermeneutic  competence  of 
the  character.  Will  s/he  perceive  the  analogy  between 
his  or  her  own  situation  and  the  embedded  text,  or  not? 
But  as  part  of  the  narrative  suspense,  the  narrator  must 
manipulate  the  situation  so  that  the  interpreting 
character  does  not  have  access  to  the  whole  truth  until 
the  d6nouement,  just  as  David  fails  to  grasp  the  deeper 
significance  of  Nathan's  remarks.  This  condition  also 
means  that  in  a  narrative,  no  character  can  ever 
entirely  elucidate  any  mise  en  abyme  unless  it 
terminates  the  story,  otherwise  the  character  would 
already  have  anticipated  the  moment  of  recognition  and 
transformation  that  the  primary  narrative  itself  hangs 
upon.  There  would  be  no  need  to  tell  the  primary 
narrative  in  this  case. 
This  may  give  us  pause  in  considering  the  interpretation 
of  a  text  such  as  2  Sam  12.  What  aspect  of  the 
situation,  what  recognition,  is  withheld  from  David  so 
that  the  narrative  continues  into  the  following 
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DAllenbach  argues  that  the  reader  may  be  put  in  a 
different  position  from  any  of  the  characters.  usually, 
but  not  always,  the  reader  is  privy  to  knowledge  that 
the  character  does  not  have.  In  2  Sam  12  the  reader 
knows  that  Nathan  is  sent  by  a  disapproving  God.  There 
are,  however,  exceptions  to  this  rule.  Ddllenbach  cites 
Kafka  as  an  instance  of  a  writer  whose  readers  are  often 
as  bewildered  as  his  characters  by  the  stories  and 
incidents  that  they  are  offered  to  interpret. 
In  a  later  paper,  Ddllenbach  relates  his  investigation 
of  mise  en  abyme  more  directly  to  the  question  of  text 
reception.  He  introduces  the  idea  of  an  lorgane  de 
lisibilit6f,  an  'organ  of  readability,,  to  describe  the 
functioning  of  the  device  (1980-1:  23).  Drawing  on  the 
phenomenological  reception  theories  of  Jauss  and  Iser, 
where  the  activity  of  reading  is  seen  as  a  reckoning 
with  the  indeterminacies,  the  'gaps'.  of  the  text,  which 
the  reader  consciously  or  unconsciously  is  stimulated  to 
fill,  Ddllenbach  sees  the  mise  en  abyme  as  providing  an 
exemplar  to  the  reader  of  this  process  of  gap-filling  in 
action.  He  cites  Hamon  who  argues  that  this  process 
demands  that  the  text  itself  contains  its  own 
metalanguage,  its  own  system  of  paraphrase,  in  order  to 
ensure  at  least  a  minimum  of  readability  (Hamon 
1977:  274-5)  and  argues  that  this  is  supplied  by  the  mise 
en  abyme. 
But  Ddllenbach  is  far  from  asserting  that  the  function 
of  the  mise  en  abyme  is  to  provide  an  uncomplicated 
model  of  the  reading  process.  one  of  its  effects  is  to 
remind  the  reader  that  she  is  engaged  in  the  act  of 
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of  reading.  22  Ddllenbach  concludes  that  the  mise  en 
abyme  often  functions  by  opening  up  the  possibility  of  a 
counter-reading  of  the  text. 
If  the  primary  text  calls  for  a  pragmatic,  direct 
reading,  any  mise  en  abyme  offers  an  example  of  self- 
reflexivity,  of  text  reinscribing  text;  if  on  the  other 
hand,  the  text  is  already  self-reflexive,  the  mise  en 
abyme  offers  the  spectacle  of  communication  between  a 
narrator  and  a  narratee,  reminding  the  reader  that  the 
primary  text  'is'-tied  into  such  a  transaction  (1980- 
1:  37). 
1.3.2  CRITIQUES  OF  DALLENBACH 
Bal 
Ddllenbach's  work  has  been  adopted,  though  not 
uncritically,  by  other  students  of  narrative.  Mieke  Bal 
(1985:  142-148)  prefers  to  use  the  term  mirror  texts, 
for  such  embedded  narratives,  as  she  feels  the  term  mise 
en  abyme  implies  a  more  direct  resemblance  between  the 
texts  than  is  often  the  case.  Too  close  a  resemblance 
between  the  primary  text  and  the  embedded  one  tends  to 
give  things  away  too  quickly.  Often  the  resemblance  is 
thematic  or  structural  and  may  only  be  partial.  It  may 
be  only  comprehensible  to  the  reader  in  retrospect. 
22  DAllenbach  refers  to  the  painting  by  Magritte  where  a  canvas 
with  a  sky  scene  stands  in  front  of  a  window,  where  the  pattern  of 
clouds  continues  over  the  canvas.  Not  only  does  this  problematise 
the  relation  between  this  painting  and  the  scene  'behind,  it,  but 
it  serves  to  remind  the  viewer  that  the  very  differentiation 
between  'window,  and  'painting,  is  encoded  in  a  painting.  How  is 
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Alternatively,  it  may  serve  to  alter  the  reader's 
perspective,  giving  him/her  an  advantage  over  the 
character  in  that  the  question  becomes  not  how  the  story 
will  end,  but  whether  the  character  will  discover  in 
time.  Yet  this  is  always  a  precarious  advantage,  as  the 
reader  can  never  be  sure  that  she  has  not  been  misled  by 
the  narrator,  or  by  her  own  (mis)interpretation  of  the 
embedded  narrative.  -  Bal  sees  such  embedded  texts  as 
'directions  for  use,  of  the  primary  text.  They  contain 
suggestions  as  to  how  the  story  should  be  read.  But 
more  than  this,  they  can  imply  a  poetics;  'a  declaration 
of  principle  with  regard  to  the  ideas  about  literature 
that  have  been  embodied  in  the  events  in  this  text' 
(1985:  148). 
Bal  cites  the  example  of  the  protagonist  of  Poe's  'The 
Fall  of  the  House  of  Usher,.  It  is  this  actor's 
realisation  that  the  text  he  reads  aloud  in  the  story 
which  talks  of  the  'fall  of  the  house,  is  playing  on  the 
double  meanings  of  these  terms  that  enables  him  to  save 
himself.  The  'fall  of  the  house,  means  both  'the  end  of 
the  dynasty'  and  'the  collapse  of  the  castle,.  By 
realising  this,  he  is  able  to  anticipate  the  destruction 
of  the  ancestral  building  on  the  death  of  the  last  of 
the  line  of  Usher,  and  so  survive  the  ruin  to  recount 
the  tale.  Bal  comments  that  this  indicates  that  the 
wider  narrative  itself  needs  to  be  read  with  this  device 
of  duplicity  of  meaning  in  mind.  just  as  for  the  actor- 
witness  the  right  interpretation  of  the  doubleness  of 
the  meaning  was  a  matter  of  life  and  death,  so  the 
double  interpretation  of  the  relationship  between 
primary  and  embedded  text  is  a  matter  of  life  and  death, 
to  be  or  not  to  be,  for  literaturel(1985:  148)23 
23  In  actual  fact,  Bal's  account  of  the  function  of  mise  en  abyme 
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1.3.2.2  Chambers 
But  there  is  a  further  twist,  brought  out  by  Ross 
Chambers  (1984).  He  prefers  the  term  'narrative 
embedding',  within  which  he  distinguishes  two  sub- 
classes  'narrational  embedding,  and  figural  embedding' 
(1984:  33).  Narrational  embedding  involves  the 
representation  in  the  text  of  a  communicative  act 
involving  narrator,  narration  and  narratee,  whereas 
figural  embedding  involves  a  figure,,  either  character 
or  image,  which  represents  art  or  the  narrative  act.  He 
makes  the  point  that  the  implicit  poetics  such 
representations  convey  limit  the  reader  in  approaching 
the  text  by  defining  a  range  of  reading  options. 
But  all  models  can  be  antimodels.  In  so  far  as  a 
portion  of  a  text  models  the  whole  of  which  it  is  a 
part,  it  necessarily  must  be  different  from  as  well  as 
similar  to  the  whole.  Otherwise,  it  would  be  the  whole. 
This  must  mean  that  every  model  is  ambiguous.  where  it 
reflects  the  whole,  it  is  a  model:  where  it  differs  from 
the  whole,  it  functions  as  an  antimodel.  Such 
itself  (see  Poe  1978).  The  text  the  narrator  reads  aloud  is  an 
old  romance,  but  the  connection  between  it  and  the  primary 
narrative  is  a  coincidence  of  sounds:  as  he  reads  a  passage 
dealing  with  the  scream  of  a  dragon,  a  scream  is  heard  in  the 
castle,  for  instance.  There  are  many  complex  and  fascinating  uses 
of  mise  en  abyme  in  this  story,  the  songs  sung  and  the  pictures 
painted  by  Roderick  Usher  amongst  others,  and  the  ambiguity  of  the 
phrase  'house  of  Usher,  is  indeed  insisted  on,  but  not  in  the 
embedded  text.  However,  Balls  points  stand  as  theoretical 
observations,  even  if  they  do  not  relate  directly  to  the  text  she 
cites.  'The  Fall  of  the  House  of  Usher,  could  have  contained  the 
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antimodels  may  be  cautionary  examples  of  how  not  to 
interpret  the  teXt24. 
1.3.3  CHARACTER  AS  INTERPRETANT 
1.3.3.1  Schor 
Another  aspect  of  this  situation  is  explored  by  Naomi 
Schor  (1980)  who  introduces  the  term  linterpretant'  to 
denote  a  character  within  the  text  who  is  cast  in  the 
role  of  interpreter,  the  one  who  is  set  the  problem  of 
coming  to  understand  the  story.  Schor's  essay  was  a 
reaction  to  Susan  Sontag's  book  Against  Interpretation 
which  portrayed  the  activity  of  interpretation  as 
essentially  an  aggressive,  reductive  operation  on  the 
text.  Schor,  by  contrast,  presents  interpretation  as  an 
activity  inscribed  within  any  work  of  fiction.  'Novels 
are  not  only  about  speaking  and  writing  (encoding)  but 
also  about  reading,  and  by  reading  I  mean  the  decoding 
of  all  manners  of  signs  and  signals'(1980:  168). 
Interpretation  is  intrinsic  to  the  work,  not  an 
illegitimate  intrusion  upon  it.  Characters  interpret, 
and  in  doing  so  mirror  the  activity  of  interpretation 
24  Chambers  cites  Saki's  short  story  'The  Open  Window,  where  the 
protagonist,  ironically  named  Vera,  makes  a  speciality  of  'romance 
at  short  notice',  spinning  yarns  which  alarm  and  confuse  the  other 
characters.  The  narratorial  voice,  however,  is  coolly  lucid  in 
recounting  her  exploits  and  the  reader  is  amused  rather  than 
alarmed.  Vera  is  an  antimodel  of  this  narratorial  voice,  but  also 
a  model,  in  that  the  story  of  her  attempts  to  make  a  boring 
afternoon  visit  interesting  does  indeed  mirror  the  narrator's 
intent  to  amuse  the  reader  (1984:  35-39). Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  1  61 
f  or  the  reader25.  Schor  seems  to  identify  this  activity 
with  the  protagonist  of  the  text,  a  claim  which  she  then 
drastically  modifies  in  a  footnote  when  she  acknowledges 
the  role  of  minor  characters.  Indeed,  the  interaction  of 
various  interpretations  within  the  text  may  well  figure 
large  in  the  interpretative  puzzle  the  reader  is  set. 
Interpretants  do  not  simply  provide  the  definitive 
reading  of  a  text.  on  the  contrary,  they  mirror  the 
reader's  lack  of  comprehension  and  confusion.  The 
narrator  may  be  omniscient,  but  characters  always  have  a 
limited  perspective.  Schor  sees  this  as  a  necessary 
virtue:  I  ...  what  could  comfort  and  delight  the 
interpreter  more  than  to  find  the  interpretant,  his 
specular  image,  mirroring  his  confusions  as  well  as  his 
triumphs?  '(1980:  169).  She  refers  to  Henry  James,  who 
in  his  preface  to  the  New  York  Edition  of  The  Princess 
Casamassima  remarks  that  it  is  the  'wary,  reader  who 
'warns  the  novelist  against  making  his  characters  too 
25  See  here  Todorov's  rather  bold  statement:  'Construction 
appears  as  a  theme  in  fiction  because  it  is  impossible  to  refer  to 
human  life  without  mentioning  such  an  essential  activity.  Based 
on  the  information  he  receives,  every  character  must  construct  the 
facts  and  the  characters  around  him;  thus  he  parallels  exactly  the 
reader  who  is  constructing  the  imaginary  universe  from  his  own 
information  (the  text,  and  his  sense  of  what  is  probable):  thus 
reading  becomes  (inevitably)  one  of  the  themes  of  the  book, 
(1980:  77).  Though  making  the  important  point  that  this  process  is 
certainly  not  confined  to  the  main  character,  and  indeed  may  be 
part  of  the  definition  of  a  character,  the  'exactness'  of  the 
parallel  is  where  Todorov  may  be  being  a  little  bold,  not  to 
mention  the  question  which  we  must  consider  below  of  what  it  can 
imply  to  say  'Every  character  must  construct  ...  '  In  what  sense 
can  a  character'  do'  anything,  let  alone  be  under  an  obligation 
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interpretive  of  the  muddle  of  fate,  or  in  other  words, 
too  divinely,  too  priggishly,  clever,  (1984:  1090).  Schor 
does  not  discuss  the  relationship  between  the 
interpretant  and  the  interpreter,  or  reader  of  the  text 
in  detail,  but  declares  that  via  the  interpretant  the 
author  is  trying  to  tell  the  interpreter  something  about 
interpretation,  and  the  interpreter  would  do  well  to 
listen  and  take  notel(1980:  170).  The  reference  to  the 
author's  intention  may  be  misleading:  the  point  is 
surely  that  the  author,  or  rather  the  text,  is  revealing 
willy-nilly  quite  unconscious  assumptions  about  the  way 
that  interpretation  operates,  of  which  the  interpreter 
should  indeed  take  note. 
1.3.3.2  Wimmers 
The  concept  of  the  character  as  interpretant  is  explored 
further  in  Inge  Crosman  Wimmers'  Poetics  of  Reading 
(Wimmers  1988)  though  she  does  not  use  Schor's  actual 
term.  She  looks  at  the  way  in  which  a  reader  can  gain 
information  about  characters,  but  also  be  led  to 
judgments  about  various  possible  strategies  of  reading, 
from  the  display  of  characters  in  the  act  of  reading. 
So,  for  instance,  in  Madame  BovaZy  Flaubert  satirises 
the  light  romances  which  are  Emma's  diet  as  a  teenager, 
but  also  by  implication  her  judgment  as  a  reader.  It  is 
not  just  her  powers  of  discrimination  and  interpretation 
in  relation  to  texts  which  are  called  into  question, 
however,  but  her  ability  to  come  to  proper  assessments 
of  the  world  around  her,  and  the  discourse  directed  at 
her  by  others.  But,  as  Wimmers  points  out: 
It  is  quite  evident  by  the  time  that  we  finish  the 
novel  that  the  repeated  emphasis  on  Emma's  way  of 
reading  serves  as  a  negative  model  for  the  reader  - 
a  model  not  only  for  judging  Emma  and  those  around 
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reading  of  the  very  novel  we  are  immersed  in,  and, 
by  implication,  of  the  world  we  live  in.  (1988:  67) 
This  is  not  an  explicitly  stated  model,  but  one  which 
relies  on  the  reader's  inferential  skills  to  be  brought 
to  light.  To  take  one  example,  Flaubert  follows  his 
ironic  description  of  the  mere  romances,  which  make  up 
Emma's  reading  with  a  passage  of  free  indirect  discourse 
in  which  she  indulges  in  a  reverie  about  her  honeymoon. 
The  juxtaposition  prompts  the  reader  to  connect  Emma's 
ideals  of  love  with  her  uncritical  and  hedonistic 
reaction  to  cheap  fiction,  rather  than  to  any  sober 
assessment  of  her  situation. 
Wimmers  goes  on,  however,  to  complicate  this  model  by 
indicating  alternative  strategies  of  reading  which  could 
be  taken  from  the  text,  and,  indeed,  the  ever-present 
possibility  of  deconstruction  which  would  turn  the 
text's  problematisation  of  reading  against  the  narrator 
himself.  Her  point  is  not  that  we  have  to  choose 
between  these  varied  models  but  that  'a  poetics  of 
reading  built  on  the  concept  of  multiple  frames  of 
reference  ...  enables  us  to  see  which  readings  are 
possible  within  certain  frames  of  reference.  We  are 
then  confined  neither  to  one-sided  emphasis  nor  to 
endless  proliferation  of  meaningf(1988:  88)26. 
1.3.3.3  Sternberg 
26  Win-aners  then  goes  on  to  look  at  similar  phenomena  in  the  work 
of  Proust  and  Robbe-Grillet.  She  sees  reading  as  the  central 
frame  of  reference  in  A  la  Recherche,  but  here  it  is  offered  as  a 
series  of  timely  interpretive  models'(1988:  158)  to  the  reader. 
Robbe-Grillet,  by  contrast,  offers  in  his  Projet  pour  une 
r4volution  A  New  York  a  novel  which  is  in  its  own  disjunctive 
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Within  the  field  of  Old  Testament  studies,  Meir 
Sternberg  examines  the  interrelationship  between  the 
reading  perspectives  of  the  character  and  the  reader  in 
his  The  Poetics  of  Biblical  Narrative,  particularly  in 
the  chapter  entitled  'The  Play  of  Perspectives'.  He 
distinguishes  three  basic  strategies:  reader-elevating, 
character-elevating  and  evenhanded  (1985:  163).  The  two 
'elevating'  strategies  depend  on  a  difference  in 
information  between  the  reader  and  the  character,  which 
allows  ironic  display  of  the  reading  strategies  employed 
by  the  other.  So  in  the  reader-elevating  strategy,  we 
who  are  privileged  to  know  of  Jacob's  deception  watch 
the  blind  Isaac's  attempts  at  determining  which  of  his 
sons  is  speaking  to  him,  for  instance.  Alternatively, 
when  the  character  is  given  more  knowledge  than  the 
reader,  we  emerge  from  initial  mystification  or 
misjudgment  to  surprise,  for  instance  in  the  realisation 
of  the  mixed  motives  in  Laban's  offer  of  hospitality  to 
Jacob. 
The  evenhanded  strategy,  however,  provides  the  reader 
with  the  same  information  as  the  character,  and  so  gives 
her  the  opportunity  to  test  her  skills  on  the  same  terms 
as  the  character.  Sternberg's  example  of  this  is  the 
story  of*Solomon's  judgment  (1  Kings  3).  In  this 
instance,  he  argues,  the  text's  perspective  of  'fair 
play,  with  the  reader  operates  with  conventions  which 
millennia  later  were  codified  as  the  basic  groundrules  of 
the  detective  story  (1985:  167).  Sternberg  summarises 
the  effects  on  the  reader  of  the  narrator's  range  of 
options:  'From  one  position,  we  enjoy  a  grandstand  view 
of  history  in  the  making;  from  another,  we  form 
hypotheses  and  impressions  only  to  be  proved  wrong  and 
inferior  to  our  natural  peers;  from  still  another,  we 
can  puzzle  out  the  truth  given  to  humanityl(1985:  171). 
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1.4.1  IMPLICIT  POETICS 
1.4.1.1  De  Man 
Of  course,  in  order  to  find  what  the  implicit  poetics  of 
the  Old  Testament  texts  may  be,  we  have  to  read  them. 
This  leads  us  right  into  an  abyss  of  circularity  which 
has  been  relentlessly  exposed  by  Paul  de  Man  in  his 
Allegories  of  Reading  (De  Man  1979).  One  of  the  best 
known  analyses  in  that  book  is  his  examination  of  a 
passage  in  Proust's  A  la  Recherche  du  Temps  Perdu  where 
the  narrator  gives  a  graphic  description  of  the  solitary 
pleasures  of  reading: 
What  does  A  la  Recherche  du  Temps  Perdu  tell  us 
about  reading?  I  approach  the  question  in  the  most 
literal  and  in  fact  naive  way  possible  by  reading  a 
passage  that  shows  Marcel  engaged  in  an  act  of 
reading  a  novel.  This  procedure  in  fact  begs  the 
question,  for  we  cannot  a  priori  be  certain  to  gain 
access  to  whatever  Proust  may  have  to  say  about 
reading  by  way  of  such  a  reading  of  a  scene  of 
reading.  The  question  is  precisely  whether  a 
literary  text  is  about  that  which  it  describes, 
represents  and  states.  (1979:  57) 
De  Man  says  rightly  that  if  reading  is  truly 
problematic,  if  a  nonconvergence  between  the  stated 
meaning  and  its  understanding  may  be  suspected,  then  the 
sections  in  the  novel  that  literally  represent  reading 
are  not  to  be  privileged,  (1979:  58). 
An  illuminating  case  in  point  is  offered  by  Shoshana 
Felman  in  her  essay  on  Henry  James's  Turn  of  the  Screw 
(Felman  1985).  This  narrative  is  well  known  for  its 
elusiveness.  It  is  the  story  of  a  governess  who  tries  to  save 
her  charges  from  the  malign  influence  of  two  ghosts.  The 
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ghosts  the  governess  sees  are  real  or,  as  psychoanalytic 
critics  have  suggested,  the  product  of  the  governess's 
own  perverted  imagination.  James  himself  called  the 
story  'an  amusette  to  catch  those  not  easily  caught  (the 
"fun"  of  the  capture  of  the  merely  witless  being  ever 
small)1(1984:  1185).  Felman  talks  of  the  suspicious, 
sophisticated  reader  here  being  led  into  a  trap.  That 
is  because  both  the  suspicious  and  naive  reader  are 
inscribed  in  the  text,  the  first  as  the  governess  and 
the  second  as  the  housekeeper  Mrs  Grose: 
The  reader  of  The  Turn  of  the  Screw  can  choose 
either  to  believe  the  governess,  and  thus  to  behave 
like  Mrs  Grose,  or  not  to  believe  the  governess  and 
thus  behave  exactly  like  the  governess.  Since  it 
is  the  governess  who,  within  the  text,  plays  the 
role  of  the  suspicious  reader,  occupies  the  place 
of  the  interpreter,  to  suspect  that  place  and  that 
position  is  thereby  to  take  it...  James's  trap  is 
then  the  simplest  and  the  most  sophisticated  in  the 
world:  the  trap  is  but  a  text,  that  is,  an 
invitation  to  the  reader,  a  simple  invitation  to 
undertake  its  reading.  But  in  the  case  of  the  Turn 
of  the  Screw,,  the  invitation  to  undertake  a  reading 
of  the  text  is  perforce  an  invitation  to  repeat  the 
text,  to  enter  into  its  labyrinth  of  mirrors,  from 
which  it  is  henceforth  impossible  to  escape.  (1985: 
231-32) 
Peterson 
Carla  Petersont  discussing  the  representation  of 
characters  as  readers  in  Victorian  novels,  which  she 
sees  as,,  among  other  things,  a  way  by  which  the  novelist 
can  create  and  comment  on  the  literary  values  that 
inform  his  or  her  society,  draws  our  attention  to  the 
role  of  the  narrator,  and  the  double  communication 
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reading  becomes  a  mode  of  communication  between  narrator 
and  reader: 
Above  and  beyond  the  reader-protagonists,  finally, 
stand  the  narrators,  who  are  both  readers  and 
writers.  It  is  these  narrators  who  take  upon 
themselves  the  responsibility  of  composing  written 
accounts  of  their  characters  and  their  reading 
processes.  If  the  protagonistsýreading  is  so  often 
hesitant,  confused,  and  distorted,  resulting  in 
misinterpretations  and  misapplications  to  life,  the 
function  of  the  narrators  is  to  elucidate  these 
problems  of  reading  for  us,  the  readers. 
Consequently,  the  very  narrative  structure  of  their 
texts  is  designed  to  provide,  explicitly  or 
implicitly,  a  critical  assessment  of  their 
Y  characters.  readings  and  interpretations.  Beyond 
that,  however,  the  narratives  also  reflect  the 
narrator's  own  attitudes  to  reading  and  writing, 
the  complexities  of  which  are  revealed  in  their 
frequent  and  persistent  questioning,  even 
subversion,  of  traditional  and  inherited  narrative 
forms  and  of  the  cultural  themes  they  embody.  (1986: 
36) 
So  such  embedded  texts  bear  a  complex  relationship  to 
the  conventions  of  reading  operating  in  a  text.  When 
Alonso  Sch6kel  (1967)  subtitles  his  examination  of 
David's  reaction  to  the  woman  of  Teqoa  12  Sam  14  como 
modelo  hermendutico,  and  goes  on  to  draw  a  picture  of 
David  as  model  reader,  he  raises  more  questions  than  he 
deals  with.  The  reaction  of  David  to  the  story  told  to 
him  by  the  woman  of  Teqoa  may  provide  a  'hermeneutic 
model,,  but  the  relationship  of  his  reading  to  the 
reader  of  the  text  is  likely  to  be  much  more  complex 
than  Alonso  Schdkel  seems  to  claim.  The  text  may  be 
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seeking  them,  and  may  be  unsettling  our  notions  of  what 
it  is  to  read  by  displaying  David's  reading. 
1.4.2  CHARACTERS  AS  READERS 
But  there  is  a  preliminary  set  of  problems  that  must  be 
considered.  Throughout  the  previous  discussion,  the 
concept  of  a  character  as  reader,  has  been  taken  as 
read.  Yet  what  exactly  is  assumed  by  this?  'David'  is 
just  three  Hebrew  consonants  on  a  page,  What  sense 
does  it  make  to  speak  of  'himllinterpreting,  or  reading 
something'? 
In  order  to  elucidate  this,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
consider  the  status  of  David  as  a  character,  and  in  what 
sense  'reading'  or  interpretation  could  be  predicated  of 
a  character  in  a  text. 
In  order  to  do  this,  we  shall  go  on  to  examine  some 
recent  studies  of  the  literary  character  with  particular 
attention  to  those  aspects  which  are  relevant  to  the 
concept  of  the  character  as  reader,  drawing  on  the 
contribution  of  recent  studies  on  the  poetics  of 
characterisation  and  in  particular,  characterisation  in 
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CHAPTER  TWO 
CHARACTER  AS  READER 
2.1  THE  ACT  OF  READING 
We  have  already  begun  with  a  potential  circularity.  In 
order  to  investigate  the  character  as  reader,  we  have  to 
be  able  to  read  the  text  to  begin  with.  But  even  for 
you  as  reader  to  have  this  anomaly  pointed  out  to  you, 
you  must  be  able  to  read  this  sentence.  This  means  that 
inevitably  we  have  to  begin  in  mediasres,,  begging  the 
very  questions  that  we  are  seeking  to  answer.  As 
Tzvetan  Todorov  put  it: 
what  is  omnipresent  is  imperceptible.  Nothing  is 
more  commonplace  than  the  reading  experience,  and 
yet  nothing  is  more  unknown.  Reading  is  such  a 
matter  of  course  that,  at  first  glance,  it  seems, 
there  is  nothing  to  say  about  it.  (Todorov  1980:  67) 
2.1.1  NOTICING  READING 
Given  the  prevalence  of  illiteracy  in  the  modern  world, 
let  alone  the  ancient  one,  Todorov's  statement  quoted 
above  may  seem  rather  sweeping.  In  the  context  of  the 
readership  of  a  particular  text,  however,  it  makes  an 
important  point.  On  the  whole,  we  are  no  more  conscious 
of  carrying  out  the  act  of  reading  as  we  read  than  we 
are  of  breathing  or  walking.  Indeed,  an  important  part 
of  our  education  is  to  make  reading  just  such  an 
automatic  process  so  that  we  can  go  on  to  use  it  for 
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up  in  the  mechanics.  It  becomes  tacit  knowledge',  to 
use  Polanyi  Is  phrase',  knowledge  put  at  the  service  of 
other  ends,  just  as  the  skill  of'riding  a  bicycle  is 
learned  in  order  to  be  able  to  travel  from  A  to  B. 
But  consider  a  text  such  as  the  following  extract  from 
Dooling  and  Lachman  (1971:  cited  in  Sanford  1985:  141): 
With  hocked  gems  financing  him,  our  hero  bravely 
defied  all  scornful  laughter  that  tried  to  prevent 
his  scheme.  'Your  eyes  deceive,,  he  had  said.  'An 
egg,  not  a  table,  correctly  typifies  this 
unexplored  planet.  '  Now  three  sturdy  sisters 
sought  proof.  Forcing  along,  sometimes  through 
calm  vastness,  yet  more  often  over  turbulent  peaks 
and  valleys,  days  became  weeks  as  many  doubters 
spread  fearful  rumours  about  the  edge.  At  last, 
from  nowhere,  welcome  winged  creatures  appeared 
signifying  momentous  success. 
Without  a  title,  this  passage  is  very  difficult  to 
recall,  or  to  read.  It  seems  difficult  to  impose  a 
semantic  coherence  on  it.  The  reader  struggles  to 
resolve  the  ambiguities  of  the  text.  what  are  the 
winged  creatures?  Who  are  the  sturdy  sisters  and  how  do 
they  relate  to  the  'hero'  of  the  tale?  what  are  the 
'winged  creatures'?  Are  they  birds?  The  mention  of  an 
,  unexplored  planet,  may  lead  the  reader  to  make  a  guess 
that  this  is  an  extract  from  a  science  fiction  novel. 
This  generic  hypothesis  allows  for  a  degree  of  fantasy 
and  imagination  on  the  part  of  the  writer.  In  that 
case,  the  'winged  creatures,  could  be  almost  anything. 
1  See  Polanyi  1962:  55-57;  95-100  for  the  distinction  between 
tacit  and  active  knowledge,  which  is  allied  to  his  concept  of  two 
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If  they  were  birds,  why  would  the  writer  not  say  so 
directly? 
The  very  difficulty  of  this  passage  is  of  course  its 
point.  By  the  fact  that  it  frustrates  what  is  normally 
an  unconscious,  *tacit,  process,  it  forces  the  reader  to 
become  aware  of  the  interpretative  procedure  that  he  or 
she  is  engaged  in.  Both  the  effects  of  such  textual 
disruption,  but  also  the  importance  of  the  reader's  own 
interpretative  presuppositions  for  the  detection  of  such 
anomalies  are  summed  up  by  Chabot: 
As  the  reader  strives  for  understanding,  certain 
passages  of  aspects  of  the  text  can  take  on  the 
quality  of  recalcitrance;  they  stand  as  stubborn 
witnesses  to  the  partiality,  and  hence  falsity,  of 
our  present  efforts.  If  we  can  relegate  the 
impasse  to  some  lesser  status,  think  it  local,  we 
lessen  its  force,  (but  not  its  irresistible  effect 
upon  the  adequacy  of  our  understanding).  But  in 
any  event  the  relative  force  of  a  recalcitrant 
passage  depends  on  our  awareness  of  its  resistance; 
that  is,  although  any  unassimilated  residue  always 
falsifies  our  interpretation,  it  only  has  force  in 
any  interpretative  situation  in  so  far  as  we  are 
aware  of  it.  Thus  while  we  might  say  that  reading, 
or  interpretation  generally  is  inherently  a  self- 
correcting  activity,  one  in  which  remainders 
repeatedly  necessitate  that  we  revise  our 
projections  of  the  totality  the  text  forms  as  we 
read,  it  is  such  only  insofar  as  we  recognize  its 
necessarily  tantalizing  character.  To  put  it 
another  way,  ignorance  of  the  interpretive  process 
has  consequences  also:  it  cannot  only  lead  us  into 
inadequacy,  but  insure  that  we  remain  there  as  well 
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What  our  response  to  this  passage  reveals  is  that  the 
process  of  reading  is  a  constant  tension  between  the 
activation  of  possibilities  of  meaning  and  the  choice 
between  those  possibilities.  The  reader  who  is  unaware 
of  the  range  of  possibilities  will  misread,  just  as  much 
as  the  reader  who  activates  an  inappropriate  because 
incoherent  set  of  possibilities,  or  indeed  the  reader 
who  imposes  a  coherence  on  the  text  which  is  not 
sustained  by  the  text  itself. 
Expectations,  however,  are  produced  because  there  are 
conventions  which  lead  to  predictable  outcomes  which  may 
or  may  not  be  fulfilled.  Such  conventions  are  a  product 
of  repetition.  The  expectation  of  the  reader  is  aroused 
when  it  seems  that  there  is  a  repetition  of  a  theme  or  a 
formal  structure.  The  familiar  phenomenon  of  the  three- 
fold  repetition  in  folk-tales  bears  this  out.  A  theme 
or  narrative  element  is  stated,  and  then  repeated.  This 
is  enough  to  set  up  an  expectation  which  the  third 
appearance  of  the  theme  either  confirms,  or  can 
disconfirm. 
2.1.2  CONVENTION  AND  DEFAMILIARIZATION 
2.1.2.1  Formalism 
This  battle  between  convention  and  the  unconventional, 
the  familiar  and  the  unfamiliar,  is  classically  stated 
by  the  Russian  critic  Vladimir  Shklovsky2,  who  explains 
this  in  terms  of  the  contrasting  terms  'habitualization, 
and  Idefamiliarization'.  The  code  of  convention  can 
become  so  'habitualized,  that  the  users  do  not  even 
regard  it  as  a  code. 
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According  to  Shklovsky  and  his  followers  in  the  Russian 
Formalist  school,  the  business  of  art  is  to  force  us  to 
look  again  by  making  the  familiar  strange.  In  the  words 
of  one  such  followerr  Tomashevsky,  'The  old  and  habitual 
must  be  spoken  of  as  if  it  were  new  and  unusual.  One 
must  speak  of  the  ordinary  as  if  it  were  unfamiliar, 
(Lemon  &  Reis  1965:  85). 
The  Russian  term  lostranenniel,  making  strange,  is 
used  for  this  process.  The  literary  artist  has  a  whole 
range  of  techniques  for  doing  this  to  the  elucidating  of 
which  the  formalists  devoted  their  energies.  These 
techniques  depend  on  ways  of  impeding  or  prolonging  the 
process  of  perception  by  adding  or  subtracting  from  the 
information  available  to  the  reader  so  that  she  is 
either  left  to  create  one  or  more  meanings  from  an 
elliptical  text,  or  to  decide  what  redundant  information 
should  be  discarded  to  disambiguate  her  reading. 
2.1.2.2  Fowler 
In  a  series  of  recent  books  on  what  he  calls  'linguistic 
criticism,  Roger  Fowler  develops  this  idea  (Fowler  1981, 
1986)  by  arguing  that  these  techniques  are  not  something 
grafted  on  to  language  or  the  preserve  of  the  artist, 
but  are  part  and  parcel  of  the  function  of  language  and 
3  communication  .  While  adopting  the  notion  of 
defamiliarization,  Fowler  takes  issue  with  the  formalist 
critics  for  their  attempt  to  describe  a  special  type  of 
,  literary  language,  as  opposed  to  the  rest  of  language 
3  See  also  his  Literature  as  Social  Discourse  (Fowler  1981)  for 
more  extended  discussions  of  the  blurring  of  the  distinctions 
between  literature  and  'ordinary,  language  use.  In  particular, 
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which  demands  special  'literary,  interpretative 
techniques: 
...  to  claim  that  the  imaginative  writer  creates 
through  language  a  new  world  distinct  from  the  real 
world  referred  to  by  history-books,  newspapers,, 
etc.,  is  not  to  justify  separating  imaginative 
writing  absolutely  from  'referential,  discourse.  A 
series  of  propositions  about  non-existent  people  or 
events  has,  for  the  reader,  the  same  status  as  a 
series  of  propositions  about  real  historical 
circumstances  of  which  the  reader  was  not  aware. 
In  both  cases,  the  reader  has  to  make  sense  of  the 
content  by  reconstructing  it  as  a  world  which  is 
plausible  in  terms  of  the  world  he  knows.  (Or  in 
the  case  of  the  fantastic,  related  to  'our,  world 
by  systematic  transformations).  In  both  cases,  the 
writer's  arrangements  of  words  and  sentences  impose 
an  artificial  order  upon  the  events  real  or  non- 
real  referred  to,  so  that  historical  narrative  is 
ordered,  edited,  by  language,  in  the  way  that  'pure 
fiction,  is. 
This  means  that  the  task  of  the  reader  is  always  one  of 
choice  and  distinction  amongst  possibilities  of  meaning, 
of  the  activation  and  assessment  of  the  possibilities  of 
the  text.  It  becomes  a  process  of  inference. 
2.2  READING  AS  INFERENCE 
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The  study  of  inference  in  the  process  of  reading  has 
received  much  attention  from  cognitive  psychologistS4. 
Many  of  these  studies  have  been  conducted  on  the  basis 
of  the  differential  recall  of  texts.  Having  read  a 
text,  readers  are  asked  to  answer  questions  on  it.  The 
answers  to  the  questions  reveal  the  kind  of  processing 
that  the  readers  had  engaged  in. 
The  results  are  intriguing.  In  recall,  the  'surface 
text',  the  actual  words,  are  often  not  reproduced,  but  a 
general  'gist'  can  be  recalled.  Indeed  subjects  may 
produce  what  can  be  called  elaboration  errors,  where 
plausible  parts  of  a  story  which  were  not  actually 
presented  are  Irecalled'(Sanford  1985:  143-146). 
Such  phenomena  indicate  that  there  is  some  matching  of 
the  information  presented  in  a  text  against  a  more 
general  background  of  knowledge.  Since  the  pioneering 
work  of  F.  C.  Bartlett5,  the  division  of  this  knowledge 
into  various  schemata  has  been  posited.  An  individual 
schema  could  be  thought  of  as  a  packet  of  knowledge, 
often  a  depiction  of  some  situation,  in  memory.  So,  for 
instance,  an  incident  placed  in  a  restaurant  summons  up 
a  whole  range  of  expectations  of  vocabulary  and 
transactions  that  may  take  place.  Aspects  of  a 
discourse  which  cannot  easily  be  fitted  into  a  schema 
will  be  difficult  or  impossible  to  recall,  or  to 
interpret  at  the  time  of  reading.  Conversely,  the 
schema  may  be  used  to  fill  in  details  not  explicitly 
given  in  the  discourse  at  the  point  of  recall. 
4  For  a  thorough  review  of  recent  approaches,  see  Singer  (1988) 
and  the  chapter  on  'Discourse,  in  Sanford  (1985:  249-283). 
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In  the  case  of  Dooling  and  Lachman's  text,  readers  were 
unsurprisingly  unable  to  recall  its  details.  If, 
however,,  they  were  supplied  with  the  title  'Christopher 
Columbus  discovers  America',  the  text  became  much  more 
easy  to  recall  and  interpret.  The  title  activates  a 
schema,  a  packet  of  knowledge  shared  among  most  educated 
readers  of  English,  about  the  voyage  of  discovery  to  the 
New  World  and  the  problems  attendant  upon  it6.  It  gives 
a  framework  in  which  the  polysemy  of  the  individual 
words  and  phrases  can  be  restrained.  For  instance,  the 
'three  sturdy  sisters'  are  resolved  as  the  three  ships 
Pinta,  Nina  and  Santa  Maria;  the  schema  creates  the 
expectations  that  three  ships  will  be  mentioned.  The 
word  'sister'  connotes  femaleness  and  relatedness;  a 
ship  can  be  referred  to  as  'she,  and  the  similarity  of 
form  and  of  purpose  between  the  three  ships  are  an 
acceptable  manner  of  relatedness. 
The  schema  then  works  in  two  ways  for  the  reader.  It 
allows  a  preliminary  discrimination  amongst  the  whole 
range  of  potential  meanings  of  a  particular  word  or 
group  of  words  so  that  the  particular  semantic  field 
which  is  being  actualised  in  the  passage  before  the 
reader  can  be  identified.  Comprehending  the  passage 
then  becomes  a  matter  of  identifying  that  amongst  the 
vast  range  of  potential  referents  of  the  word  'sister', 
that  . 
designated  by  sister  ships,  is  the  most  likely 
resolution  of  the  problem  in  this  case. 
6  The  fact  that  this  some  aspects  of  this  schema  have  been 
challenged  from  the  perspective  of  Native  Americans  during  the 
recent  controversies  over  the  celebration  of  the  quincentenary  of 
Columbus'  voyage  merely  serves  to  reinforce  the  point  that  these 
schemata  are  learnt  and  are  culturally  conditioned,  an  aspect  to 
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In  this  sense  there  is  a  'proper,  reading  of  the  text. 
It  could  be  interpeted  in  many  other  ways,,  but  the  very 
fact  that  most  readers  experience  a  sense  of  relief,  of 
'rightness'  about  this  interpretation  is  significant. 
It  has  the  sense  of  being  the  answer  to  a  riddle.  The 
title  provided  seems  to  offer  a  way  of  resolving  the 
text  that  allows  a  coherence  between  the  various 
semantic  elements  that  the  reader  is  striving  for.  It 
is  only  when  this  attempt  at  coherence  is  thwarted  that 
the  reader  becomes  aware  of  how  powerful  a  drive  this 
is. 
But  the  schema  may  work  in  another  way.  It  may  not  only 
cause  a  restriction  of  meaning,  but  may  in  fact  suggest 
a  resolution  which  had  not  otherwise  occurred  to  the 
reader.  The  reader  may  not  have  entertained  the 
possibility  that  the  word  sister,  might  refer  to  a  ship 
until  the  schema  of  Columbus's  voyage  is  brought  to  his 
or  her  attention.  By  suggesting  a  potential 
actualisation  of  the  the  word,  the  schema  may  in  fact 
add  to  the  range  of  possible  meanings  that  the  reader 
had  considered. 
2.2.2  POLYSEMY 
2.2.2.1  Ricoeur 
Paul  Ricoeur  gives  an  account  of  this  interplay  between 
possibility  and  actuality  in  the  functioning  of  language 
in  his  article  'Word,  Polysemy,  Metaphor:  Creativity  in 
Language'  (Ricoeur  1991:  65-85).  Polysemy,  he  argues, 
performs  a  vital  function  in  the  constitution  of  natural 
language  in  that  it  permits  economy  and  contextual 
dependence.  The  alternative  to  polysemy,  namely 
univocityr  would  demand  an  infinite  lexicon  in  order  to 
convey  the  richness  of  concrete  and  qualitative 
experience.  This  impossible  range  can,  however,  be 
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by  the  activation  of  each  word  in  innumerable  contexts. 
By  context,  Ricoeur  is  here  referring  not  only  to  the 
linguistic  environment  of  the  words,  but  to  the 
behaviour  of  speaker  and  hearer,  their  common  situation 
and  the  'horizon  of  reality,  surrounding  the  speech 
situation. 
The  process  of  determining  which  of  the  limitless  range 
of  meanings  of  the  words  are  to  be  activated  in  the 
given  context  of  exchange  is  interpretation,  in 
Ricoeur's  definition.  In  normal  speech,  it  depends  on  a 
convention  of  'semantic  pertinence,  whereby  only  part  of 
the  semantic  field  of  a  word  is  used.  The  remainder, 
according  to  RiCoeur,  is  'excluded,  or  rather, 
repressed,  by  the  process  of  mutual  selection  exerted  by 
the  sentence  as  a  whole  and  by  the  context  on  its  parts, 
(1991:  73). 
So,  we  might  instance,  even  short  phrases  like  Ia 
spirit  level,,  a  bottle  of  spirit,  or  'the  holy  Spirit, 
tend  to  repress  different  semantic  fields  associated 
with  the  one  word  'spirit'.  Economy  and  the  ability  to 
generalise  depend  then  on  repression,  on  the  ability  to 
forget  some  of  the  specific  qualities  of  an  object  in 
order  to  manipulate  concepts  at  a  higher  level  of 
generalisation.  7  In  this  sense,  it  is  only  as  part  of  a 
7  In  this  regard,  J.  L.  Borges'  story  'Funes  the  Memorious,  (1970: 
87)  is  instructive.  It  tells  of  a  man  who  has  an  infinite  memory, 
and  the  handicap  that  it  proves.  The  narrator  recalls,  'He  was, 
let  us  not  forget,  almost  incapable  of  ideas  of  a  general  Platonic 
sort,  not  only  was  it  difficult  for  him  to  comprehend  that  the 
generic  symbol  dog  embraces  so  many  unlike  individuals  of  diverse 
size  and  form;  it  bothered  him  that  the  dog  at  three  fourteen 
(seen  from  the  side)  should  have  the  same  name  as  the  dog  at  three 
fifteen  (seen  from  the  front),  (1970:  93-94).  The  narrator sentence  that  it 
having  a  meaning. 
to  think  in  terms 
the  meaning  of  an 
utterances. 
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ecomes  appropriate  to  talk  of  a  word 
Even  so,  it  may  be  more  appropriate 
of  the  contribution  a  word  makes  to 
utterance.  Meaning  resides  in 
But  this  process  is  inevitably  open  to  the  risks  of 
ambiguity  and  of  misunderstanding.  Ricoeur 
distinguishes  ambiguity  from  polysemy  as  follows: 
'polysemy  is  a  normal  phenomenon,  ambiguity  may  be  a 
pathological  phenomenon'(1991:  72).  Polysemy  is  an 
inevitable  characteristic  of  the  word,  whereas  ambiguity 
refers  to  the  level  of  the  sentence,  of  the 
communicative  unit.  Ambiguity  represents  the  failure  of 
the  mechanisms  of  the  reduction  of  polysemy  mentioned 
above,  and  thus  has  a  pathological  aspect. 
In  the  phrase  quoted  above,  Ricoeur  uses  the  subjunctive 
C...  ambiguity  may  be  a  pathological  phenomenon  ...  f)f 
because  he  also  allows  for  the  possibility  of  a 
,  functional  ambiguity,,  particularly  in  what  he 
designates  as  'poetic  language'.  However,  he  also  goes 
on  to  make  it  clear  that  ambiguity  is  ineradicable.  The 
attempt  to  eradicate  it  in  scientific  language,  is  only 
concludes,  'I  suspect,  however,  that  he  was  not  very  capable  of 
abstract  thought.  To  think  is  to  forget  differences,  generalize, 
make  abstractions.  In  the  teeming  world  of  Funes,  there  were  only 
details,  almost  immediate  in  their  presence,  (1970:  94). 
Nietzsche  (1969:  57-58)  speaks  of  'active  forgetfulness,  which  acts 
as  a  doorkeeper,  a  preserver  of  psychic  order,  repose,  and 
etiquette:  so  that  it  will  be  immediately  obvious  how  there  could 
be  no  happiness,  no  cheerfulness,  no  hope,  no  pride,  no  present, 
without  forgetfulness.,  For  Nietzsche,  this  is  the  other  side  of 
memory,  which  in  turn  is  necessary  for  the  capacity  to  promise, 
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possible  insofar  as  the  business  of  such  language  is  not 
communication,  but  argumentation.  Even  so, 
misunderstandings  occur. 
2.2.2.2  Critique  of  Ricoeur 
We  may  then  take  issue  with  the  pejorative  colouring  of 
the  word  'pathological,.  what  is  universal  and 
inevitable  can  hardly  be  pathological,  unless  it  is 
being  compared  to  an  unrealisable  ideal.  To  operate  on 
the  basis  of  such  a  fantastic  notion  could  be  termed 
pathological  in  its  own  right. 
This  analysis  of  interpretation  applies  to  any 
linguistic  interaction.  Interaction,  indeed,  is  central 
to  Ricoeur's  understanding.  Ricoeur  sees  the  process  of 
question  and  answer,  of  dialogue,  as  fundamental  to  the 
process  of  the  reduction  of  polysemy,  allowing  speaker 
and  hearer  to  check  what  selection  is  being  made  between 
the  inevitably  plural  meanings  of  any  utterance. 
In  written  texts,  on  the  other  hand,  this  element  is 
impossible.  Ricoeur  states  in  the  essay  'What  is  a 
Text?  '  that  there  is  no  dialogic  exchange  between  writer 
and  reader,  'The  writer  does  not  respond  to  the  reader. 
Rather,  the  book  divides  the  act  of  writing  and  the  act 
of  reading  into  two  sides,  between  which  there  is  no 
communication.  The  reader  is  absent  from  the  act  of 
writing;  the  writer  is  absent  from  the  act  of  reading, 
(Ricoeur  1991:  45). 
The  competent  reader,  then,  is  one  who  is  able  to  carry 
out  a  complex  activity  not  simply  of  mapping  a  sign  onto 
a  realityr  but  of  activating  the  possibilities  evoked  by 
a  given  sign  in  a  particular  context  and  making  a 
decision  between  these.  So  to  understand  a  particular 
signf  it  is  necessary  to  be  able  to  activate  and  choose 
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reason,  it  becomes  difficult  to  say  that  the  sign 
'stands  for'  any  particular  object  or  concept.  It  makes 
more  sense  to  say  that  any  sign  can  stand  for  a 
particular  range  of  objects,  and  that  it  is  constraints 
of  grammar  and  context,  not  something  intrinsic  to  the 
sign,  that  narrow  the  possibilities  down  to  the  meaning 
that  the  reader  opts  for.  The  question  then  becomes, 
what  are  the  constraints  on  the  activity  of 
interpretation? 
2.2.3  READER  RESPONSE:  ISER,  STERNBERG  AND  FISH 
Two  poles  of  this  debate  are  represented  by  Wolfgang 
Iser  and  Stanley  Fish.  In  the  next  section,  I  propose 
to  discuss  their  differing  approaches  to  this  question 
in  order  to  elucidate  further  the  interaction  of  the 
reader  and  the  system  of  conventions  that  he  or  she 
brings  to  the  text. 
2.2.3.1  Iser 
In  a  series  of  books  and  articles,  Iser  has  explored  the 
phenomenology  of  reading  .  meaning,  for  hiiý,  is  not 
something  in  the  text,  or  brought  by  the  reader.  In 
fact,  heLdistinguishes  the  physical  text,  the  system  of 
black  marks  on  white  paper,  from  the  work,  which  he 
regards  as  a  virtual  reality,  something  that  grows  out 
of  the  interaction  of  the  reader  and  the  text.  It  is 
,  an  effect  to  be  experienced,  not  an  'object  to  be 
definedl(1978:  10). 
This  effect  depends  on  the  occurrence  of  indeterminacies 
in  the  text,  which  he  divides  into  two  categories, 
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respond  as  any  other  interlocutor  could  to  correct  or 
realign  the  process  of  the  dialogue  between  itself  and 
its  reader,  it  has  to  resort  to  other  means  to  control 
the  reader's  response.  'Blanks,  in  the  text  operate  by 
forcing  the  reader  to  shift  perspective,  or  to  seek  for 
connections,  spurring  the  reader  into  communicative 
action.  Iser  uses  an  astronomical  metaphor:  'The  "stars" 
in  a  literary  text  are  fixed;  the  lines  that  join  them 
are  variable,  (1974:  282).  But  this  also  means  that  they 
can  be  realised  in  a  multiplicity  of  ways  :  'Two  people 
gazing  at  the  night  sky  may  both  be  looking  at  the  same 
collection  of  stars,  but  one  will  see  the  image  of  a 
plough,  and  the  other  will  make  out  a  dipper., 
For  Iser,  the  time  dimension  of  the  experience  is  also 
all-important.  Rather  than  having  the  stars  spread  out 
as  a  map,  he  favours  metaphors  based  on  a  journey,  where 
the  passenger  has  to  put  together  a  picture  of  the 
country  he  passes  through,  with  a  recollection  of  its 
beginning  and  an  anticipation  of  its  end,  from  the 
glimpses  that  he  can  catch  from  the  window  of  his  stage 
coach  (Iser  is  here  talking  in  terms  of  the  18th  century 
novel).  Like  the  passenger,  the  reader  has  only  limited 
freedom  to  choose  which  elements  he  will  focus  on  in  the 
text. 
Just  as  astronomers  over  the  centuries  have  found  it 
irresistible  to  identify  and  name  patterns  in  the 
heavens,  so  the  reader  will  attempt  to  identify  patterns 
in  the  text,  to  make  connections  and  to  establish  some 
kind  of  coherence,  stability  and  predictability.  These 
patterns  will  be  established  on  a  whole  series  of 
conventions  that  the  reader  consciously  or  unconsciously 
brings  to  the  text. 
But  by  holding  up  such  processes  to  the  reader,  Iser 
believes  that  the  text  supplies  a  critique  of  the  social 
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contains  Inegations'  which  negate  the  texts  and  the 
reader9s  norms,  and  thus  lead  to  the  suspension  of  the 
reader's  belief  system.  Behind  the  text  is  an 
unwritten,  undefined  negativity,  which  offers  a 
deformed  picture  of  the  world,  not  in  order  to  present 
the  world  as  depraved,  but  to  rouse  the  reader  to  a 
healing  resolution  of  that  deformity.  Negativity  is  the 
Inonformulation  of  the  not-yet-comprehendedl(229)  which 
provokes  the  reader  into  an  attempt  at  comprehension. 
'If  the  reader  is  made  to  formulate  the  cause 
underlying  the  questioning  of  the  world  it  implies 
that  he  must  transcend  that  world,  in  order  to  be 
able  to  observe  it  from  outside.  And  herein  lies 
the  true  communicatory  function  of  literature.  ' 
The  reader  is  sent  behind  the  deformations  of  the  text 
to  find  the  'virtual  cause,  of  these  deformations. 
So  he  writes: 
As  we  have  seen,  the  success  of  a  linguistic  action 
depends  on  the  resolution  of  indeterminacies  by 
means  of  conventions,  procedures  and  guarantees  of 
sincerity.  These  form  the  frame  of  reference 
within  which  that  speech  act  can  be  resolved  into  a 
context  of  action.  Literary  texts  also  require  a 
resolution  of  indeterminacies  but,  by  definition, 
for  fiction  there  can  be  no  such  given  frames  of 
reference.  On  the  contrary,  the  reader  must  first 
discover  for  himself  the  code  underlying  the  text, 
and  this  is  tantamount  to  bringing  out  the 
meaning.  (1978:  60) 
As  Holub  summarises  his  argument  here  (1984:  86),  Iser 
claims  that  literature  is  distinctive  in  that  it 
organises  its  conventions  'horizontally,  rather  than 
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on  an  axis  from  past  to  presentr  by  which  Iser  means 
that  it  depends  on  conventions  which  are  grounded  in  a 
long  history  of  prior  use.  In  literature,  however,, 
'these  conventions  are  taken  out  of  their  social 
contexts,  deprived  of  their  regulating  function,  and  so 
become  objects  of  scrutiny  in  themselves,  (Iser  1978:  60) 
This  system  of  conventions,  what  Iser  refers  to  as  the 
'repertoire,  of  the  text,  is  what  the  literary  text 
seeks  to  expand,  question  or  overthrow.  '' 
2.2.3.2  Sternberg 
With  particular  reference  to  the  biblical  text,  Meir 
Sternberg  (Sternberg  1987)  adds  another  dimension  to 
Iser's  discussion  of  gaps.  He  draws  attention  to  the 
need  to  distinguish  between  'gaps'  and  blanks,  in  the 
biblical  text.  As  he  defines  the  terms,  a  gap,  is  a 
lacuna  in  the  text  which  demands  closure,  where  a 
,  blank,  represents  the  case  where  information  has  been 
omitted  because  of  its  irrelevance.  If,  for  instance, 
we  are  not  told  the  colour  of  any  biblical  character's 
eyes,  it  is  because  such  information  is  narratologically 
irrelevant.  It  represents  a  blank,.  Given  the 
infinite  amount  of  information  that  could  be  given  about 
any  character,  object,  or-event,  it  is  inevitable  that 
omissions  occur.  Indeed,  it  is  necessary  if  any 
coherent,  assimilable  narrative  is  to  emerge.  A  'gap' 
however,  is  a  piece  of  information  whose  omission 
affects  the  reader's  assessment  of  the  narrative  in  such 
a  way  as  to  problematise  its  interpretation.  It  is  part 
9  To  revert  to  our  rather  frivolous  example,  Pooh's  encounter  with 
Piglet's  letter,  though  it  is  not  a  literary  text  in  the  sense 
Iser  defines  this,  serves  as  the  occasion  for  the  revision  of  his 
assumptions  about  the  nature  of  signs.  Whether  he  can  or  will 
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of  the  persuasive  strategy  of  the  text  in  involving  the 
reader  in  the  reconstruction  and  elaboration  of  the 
circumstances  and  events  which  the  text  encodes. 
As  Sternberg  says,  the  art  of  reading  consists  in 
distinguishing  between  these  two  categories,  so  that  the 
gaps  can  be  filled  and  the  blanks  disregarded.  Yet 
there  is  no  formal  difference  between  the  two.  'The  gap 
and  the  blank  show  identical  characteristics  in  all  that 
regards  temporal  structure.  So  any  informational  lacuna 
may  in  principle  give  rise  to  either,  and  one  reader's 
gap  may  prove  another's  blank.  1(1987:  236) 
Sternberg  then  goes  on  to  outline  criteria  by  which  the 
two  can  be  distinguished  within  the  poetics  of  biblical 
narrative.  Yet  there  is  an  aspect  of  this  which  could 
bear  further  exploration.  What  is  it  that  makes  a  gap 
for  one  reader  a  'blank,  for  another? 
The  answer  lies  in  the  set  of  assumptions  that  the 
reader  brings  to  the  text.  The  corollary  of  this  is 
that  if  the  text  is  designed  to  shake  the  reader's 
assumptions,  its  purpose  must  be  to  alter  the  reader's 
assessment  of  what  is  a  gap,  and  what  is  a  blank,  and 
perhaps  to  bring  out  the  very  fact  that  the  edge  between 
the  two  is  blurred.  It  is  in  this  oscillation  that  the 
kind  to  challenge  to  the  reader's  assumptions  posited  by 
Iser  occurs. 
AS  Sternberg  points  out,  the  most  obvious  way  in  which  a 
text  can  signal  the  difference  between  the  two  situation 
is  by  subsequently  filling  a  gap.  If  the  gap  is  later 
filled  and  the  missing  information  supplied,  the  reader 
is  made  aware  that  in  fact  there  was  a  gap  to  be  filled. 
it  may  be  that  the  reader  had  not  even  been  aware  of  the 
lacuna,  so  automatic  does  the  process  of  glossing  over 
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2.2.3.3  Fish 
Stanley  Fish  in  his  critique  of  Iser  entitled  'Why  No 
One's  Afraid  of  Wolfgang  Iserl  (1981:  7)  picks  up  on  his 
reference  to  astronomy:,  ...  the  stars  in  a  literary  text 
are  not  fixed;  they  are  just  as  variable  as  the  lines 
around  them.  '  For  Fish,  the  line  between  what  a  reader 
brings  to  the  text  and  what  the  text  'objectively, 
supplies  is  itself  drawn  by  the  reader,  and  the  set  of 
interpretative  practices  which  s/he  adopts.  An  analogy 
might  be  the  fact  that  the  constellations  seen  from 
earth  disappear  if  the  observer  is  sited  in  another  star 
system.  But  Fish  goes  further  than  this:  what  one  opts 
to  take  as  a  fixed  point,  as  a  'star'  in  the  literary 
text,  is  itself  the  product  of  a  system  of  learned 
codes.  What  appears  as  a  'gap'  or  a  'negativity' 
depends  on  the  underlying  system  of  assumptions  which 
Fish  sees  as  the  product,  and  the  constitution,  of  a 
particular  I  interpretive  community  1  10.  This  might  appear 
10  As  an  example,  we  might  take  the  well  worn  problem  contained  in 
the  following  anecdote.  'A  father  and  his  son  are  out  for  a  drive 
when  they  are  involved  in  an  accident.  The  father  is  killed,  and 
the  son  is  critically  injured.  When  the  boy  is  brought  into  the 
operating  theatre  of  the  hospital  where  has  been  taken  the  surgeon 
exclaims,  'But  that's  my  sonil 
The  problem,  if  it  is  one,  and  many  people  in  experimental  trials 
have  difficulty  in  resolving  it,  depends,  of  course,  on  the 
unfounded  assumption  that  the  surgeon  is  male.  She  is  in  fact  the 
boy's  mother.  The  point  about  gaps  in  this  case  is  that,  just 
like  Pooh,  a  large  number  of  readers  automatically  resolve  the 
word  'surgeon'  as  male  on  the  basis  of  societal  conventions,  and 
miss  the  other  possibility.  The  fact  that  the  gender  of  the 
surgeon  is  not  specified  in  the  text  is  not  a  'gap,  for  such 
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to  lock  readers  into  a  set  of  mutually  uncomprehending 
sects.  But  Fish  does  allow  for  the  instability  of  these 
groups.  All  the  strategies  are  learned,  and  thus  can 
be  revised.  The  fundamental  characteristic  that 
constitutes  the  human,  according  to  Fish,  is  the  fact 
that  we  have  an  innate  capacity  and  desire  to  interpret, 
but  our  ways  of  doing  this  are  learnt  and  can  be 
forgotten. 
This  means  that  for  Fish  utterers  are  not  handing  over 
'prefabricated  meanings'.  All  they  can  do  is  to  give 
hearers  and  readers  the  opportunity  to  make  meanings 
(and  texts)  by  inviting  them  to  put  into  execution  a  set 
of  strategies.  1(1980:  183)  In  this  formulation,  the 
assumption  of  shared  strategies  is  what  gives  meaning  to 
the  utterance.  'An  author  hazards  his  projection,  not 
because  of  something  4in"  the  marks,  but  because  of 
something  he  assumes  to  be  in  his  readerl(1980:  130).  So 
to  take  an  example  at  the  most  basic  level,  when  in 
France,  I  will  attract  a  waiter's  attention  by  calling 
'Gargon!  l  rather  than  'Herr  Oberl'.  My  utterance  is 
determined  by  the  interpretive,  here  linguistic, 
community  into  which  I  presume  the  waiter  falls,  though 
I  may  be  in  error.  Or.  indeed,  to  revert  to  the  case  of 
Piglet, 
- 
he  launches  his  letter  in  the  hope  that  it  will 
fall  into  the  hands  of  someone  who  knows  that  IP's  can 
be  Piglets  and  will  come  to  his  rescue. 
Obviously,  the  first  example  assumesthat  I  have  at 
least  a  minimal  competence  in  a  language  other  than  my 
own.  But  this  multilingualism  differs  more  in  degree 
than  kind  from  the  sort  of  choices  the  speaker  of  any 
that  they  were  making  this  assumption.  A  woman  surgeon,  on  the 
other  hand,  might  be  more  accustomed  to  holding  these  two 
possibilities  in  mind  until  other  evidence  in  the  text  enabled  the 
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language  has  to  make  even  within  his  own  community.  The 
Way  in  which  one  speaker  may  address  the  waiter  in  the 
expensive  restaurant  where  he  is  seeking  to  impress  his 
dinner  guest,  and  the  utterances  of  the  same  speaker  in 
the  familiar  context  of  his  works  canteen  are  also 
dictated  by  assumptions  about  the  kind  of  linguistic 
community  and  the  relations  of  power  within  it. 
2.2.4  SCHEMA  AND  READER 
What  are  the  consequences  of  this  for  our  attempt  to 
elucidate  the  process  of  reading?  RiCoeur  draws 
attention  to  the  fact  that  writing  preserves  any  given 
utterance  and  therefore  allows  it  to  move  out  of  its 
immediate  context.  But  this  movement  from  the  immediate 
context  means  that  the  deictic  functions  of  language 
which  in  the  situation  of  face-to-face  speech  are 
resolvable  by  pointing  at  or  otherwise  indicating  the 
objects  and  persons  referred  to  become  irreducibly 
ambiguous.  Removed  from  an  immediate  context,,  these 
very  features  of  deixis  are  the  ones  that  become  hardest 
to  interpret.  words  such  as  this',  'he'  or  'now'  are 
peculiarly  polysemous  to  the  extent  of  not  allowing  even 
the  generalised  contextualisations  of  a  dictionary. 
These  words,  however,  invite  the  reader  to  supply  a 
context  consonant  with  the  patterns  of  reference  they 
offer. 
In  terms  of  the  texts  we  have  been  examining,  the  cues 
as  to  the  interpretative  schema  become  inadequate.  The 
reader  is  forced  to  infer  a  schema.  This  is  not  a 
matter  of  recapturing  an  original  authorial  intention  or 
of  reduplicating  the  reception  of  the  text  by  the 
original  audience.  The  establishment  of  just  what 
contextual  constraints  either  of  these  procedures 
involve  is  itself  a  circular  task.  All  that  can  be 
done,  or  need  be  done,  is  for  the  reader  to  come  to  a 
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Possibility  which  may  involve  changes  in  the  reader  as 
well. 
But  this  way  of  putting  it  seems  to  argue  that  the  art 
of  reading  is  to  find  the  appropriate  schema  in  order  to 
assimilate  the  new  information  that  the  text  provides  in 
order  to  find  its  meaning.  This  may  not  be  the  only 
purpose  of  reading,  or  of  writing  for  that  matter. 
Suppose  that  instead  of  communicating  information  by 
activating  the  shared  knowledge  and  schemata  of  the 
sender  and  receiver  of  the  message,  it  is  the  schema 
that  is  to  be  changed. 
Schemata  are  learned  and  culturally  determined.  What  is 
learned  can  be  relearned,  and  what  is  learned  is  not 
necessarily  adequate  to  any  or  all  situations.  Columbus 
himself  is  an  example  of  the  consequences  of  a 
commitment  to  a  new  schema,  one  that  saw  the  world  as 
'an  egg,  not  a  table.  ' 
If  the  point  is  to  alter  the  reader's  schema,  then  the 
very  ambiguities  and  misdirections  which  seem  to  disrupt 
the  reader's  expectations  become  what  is  important.  The 
reader  is  left  with  the  possibility  that  it  is  the  range 
of  schemata  by  which  he  or  she  is  attempting  to  find 
coherence  in  the  text  that  may  need  to  be  changed  rather 
than  the  text  which  needs  correction. 
The  other  corollary  is  that  it  may  be  possible  to  deduce 
something  about  the  schema  which  someone  else  is 
operating  from  their  interpretation  of  a-particular 
utterance.  This  is  especially  the  case  in  the  approach 
to  a  text  which  comes  from  a  culture  alien  to  the 
reader,  and  is  even  more  important  in  the  approach  to  a 
text  such  as  Samuel  where  the  gap  is  one  of  time  rather 
than  space,  and  where  the  text  itself  is  the  only  source 
of  information  about  the  society  whose  practices  it 
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It  is  here,  then,  that  the  character  as  reader  comes 
into  his  or  her  own.  The  interpreting  character  reveals 
the  interpretative  conventions  by  which  she  operates, 
which  may  either  confirm  or  overturn  the  conventions 
under  which  the  reader  operates. 
Yet  we  are  not  yet  in  a  position  to  determine  how  this 
is  displayed  in  the  text.  In  order  to  do  so,  we  shall 
now  turn  to  address  directly  the  question  as  to  what  it 
means  to  speak  of  the  character  as  reader.  In  order  to 
do  so,  we  shall  begin  by  considering  the  character  as  a 
textual  phenomenon. 
2.3  THEORIES  OF  CHARACTER 
2.3.1  ARISTOTLE 
The  critical  study  of  the  literary  character  begins  with 
Aristotle.  He  discusses  the  concept  of  character  in  his 
Poetics  as  one  of  the  six  constituent  parts  of  tragedy: 
A  tragedy  is  a  mimesis  of  an  action;  action  implies 
people  engaged  in  it;  these  people  must  have  some 
definite  moral  and  intellectual  qualities  since  it 
is  through  a  man's  qualities  that  we  characterize 
his  actions  and  it  is  of  course  with  reference  to 
their  actions  that  men  are  said  to  succeed  or 
fail.  (Russell  &  winterbottom  1989:  58) 
In  Aristotle's  scheme,  it  is  these  moral  and 
intellectual  qualities  ascribed  to  those  engaged  in  the 
action  of  the  tragedy  that  are-  defined  as  character. 
Character  in  this  sense  is  definitely  secondary  to 
action,  or  plot: 
Though  we  consider  people's  characters  in  deciding 
what  sort  of  persons  they  are,  we  call  them 
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their  actions.  So  far  therefore  from  the  persons 
in  a  play  acting  as  they  Ao  in  order  to  represent 
their  characters,  the  mimesis  of  their  characters 
is  only  included  along  with  and  because  of  their 
actions.  (1989:  59) 
He  uses  a  metaphor  drawn  from  painting  to  express  the 
relationship  between  plot  and  character.  Character.  is 
the  colour  secondarily  applied  to  the  drawn  outline,  the 
plot,  which  gives  the  form  to  what  is  depicted. 
Aristotle's  subordination  of  character  to  action  has 
been  followed  by  later  authors,  but  it  should  be 
remembered  that  Aristotle's  definition  of  character  is 
solely  concerned  with  the  moral  disposition  ascribed  to 
the  actors  in  the  text. 
So  when  it  comes  to  the  relationship  between  a  character 
and  its  speeches,  Aristotle  can  say  that  the  mimesis  of 
character  is  what  which  makes  plain  the  nature  of  the 
moral  choices  the  personages  made,  so  that  those 
speeches  in  which  there  is  absolutely  nothing  that  the 
speaker  chooses  and  avoids  involve  no  mimesis  of 
character'(1989:  60).  Other  sorts  of  speeches,  however, 
can  display  mimesis  of  intellect,  their  ability  to  say 
what  the  situation-admits  and  requires'(1989:  60). 
This  observation  of  Aristotle's  on  the  importance  of 
choice  as  the  index  of  character  is  a  key  point  to  which 
we  will  return  in  our  discussion.  If,  as  we  have  seen, 
reading  is  a  process  of  inference,  and  inference  is  a 
matter  of  the  choice  of  some  possibilities  amongst 
others  offered  by  the  polysemy  of  the  text,  then  it  is 
in  this  aspect  of  choice  that  the  character  as  reader  is 
displayed.  The  consistency  of  a  character  depends  on 
the  consistency  of  the  choices  which  she  or  he  is 
represented  as  making.  This  begs  a  further  question, 
which  we  will  explore  below,  as  to  what  it  might  mean  to 
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2.3.2  CHARACTERf  ACTANT  AND  ACTION 
An  important  point  which  Aristotle  goes  on  to  make  is 
that  unity  in  a  tragedy,  one  of  its  cardinal  virtues  in 
his  account,  is  not  to  be  achieved  simply  by  making  it 
revolve  round  one  personage.  'One  man's  actions  are 
numerous  and  do  not  make  up  one  single  action' 
(1989:  61).  So  Aristotle  makes  a  distinction  between 
character,  action  and  person  in  approaching  this  textual 
phenomenon.  This  enables  him  to  make  it  clear  that  a 
particular  character  can  represent  several  divergent 
actions. 
This  insight  has  been  developed  in  this  century  by 
formalist  critics  and  their  structuralist  successors. 
For  Propp,  (1968),  named  characters  represent  a  small 
number  of  typical  formal  positions  or  'roles,  in  the 
structure  of  the  story.  Propp's  studies  of  Russian 
folk-tales  led  him  to  postulate  an  underlying  structure 
which  they  all  manifested  in  whole  or  in  part,  and  to 
the  identification  of  a  limited  number  of  roles,  which 
the  individual  characters  of  any  particular  story 
represent.  Greimas  (1973)  took  this  process  of 
abstraction  further  and  produced  what  he  called  his 
.  actantial  model,  of  narrative.  In  this  theory,  every 
narrative  can  be  reduced  to  the  interaction  of  six 
lactants'  related  in  the  way  that  the  diagram  below 
indicates: 
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The  Giver  conveys  an  Object  to  a  Receiver.  The  Object 
is  affected  by  the  Subject  who  is  assisted  by  a  Helper 
and  opposed  by  an  Opponent.  A  particular  character, 
what  Greimas  would  term  an  lacteurl,  may  occupy  more 
than  one  of  these  positions.  It  should  be  remembered 
that  Propp  and  the  structuralist  critics  who  follow  him, 
notably  Greimas,  are  interested  in  the  general  'grammar' 
of  stories,  not  in  explicating  the  nature  of  any 
particular  character.  This  sort  of  analysis  perhaps  has 
less  to  say  about  what  makes  for  the  uniqueness  of  a 
particular  character  and  how  the  textual  phenomenon  of 
the  interaction  of  actants  is  to  be  resolved  in  a  given 
text.  Its  main  use  is  as  an  analytic  tool  that  can  run 
counter  to  the  intuitive  inference  of  character  from 
texts,  that  can  defamiliarize  the  process  of  reading. 
It  does,,  however,,  depend  on  a  fundamental  division 
between  the  actant  as  the  'peg,  on  which  the  particular 
action  of  the  text  is  'hung'.  This  division  between  the 
character  as  the  actor  and  actions  he  or  she  carries  out 
is  counterbalanced  by  the  much-quoted  remark  by  Henry 
James:  'What  is  character  but  the  determination  of 
incident?  What  is  incident  but  the  illustration  of 
character?  '(James  1963:  80)  James  sees  no  distinction 
-between  character  and  action.  The  traits  of  a  character 
are  revealed  in  and  in  turn  delimit  the  character's 
action,  among  which  can  be  included  the  action  of 
speech. 
Yet  characters  no  more  'act,  than  they  'have  qualities'; 
their  actions  and  their  qualities  are  inferred  from 
verbs,  nouns  or  adjectives.  A  character  is  textually  a 
series  of  verbs,  nouns,  pronouns  and  adjectives  bound 
together  by  the  rules  of  anaphora.  So  Aristotle's 
distinction  between  moral  qualities  and  actions  is  a 
kind  of  division  which  the  verbal  substance  of  the  text 
does  not  immediately  offer.  Characters  are  inferred 
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2.3.3  THE  PROPER  NAME 
What,,  then,  constitutes  the  unity  of  a  character?  What 
ensures  the  coherence  of  the  set  of  inferences  that  the 
reader  activates  and  ascribes  to  this  'paper  person"'? 
One  obvious  answer,  given  by  Roland  Barthes,  is  the 
p.  roper  name: 
The  proper  name  enables  the  person  to  exist  outside 
the  semes,  whose  sum  nonetheless  constitutes  it 
entirely.  As  soon  as  a  Name  exists  (even  a 
pronoun)  to  flow  toward  and  fasten  onto,  the  semes 
become  predicates,  inductors  of  truth  (the  truth  of 
fiction,  of  course],  and  the  Name  becomes  a 
subject;  we  can  say  that  what  is  proper  to 
narrative  is  not  action  but  the  character  as  Proper 
Name;  the  semic  raw  material  ...  completes  what  is 
proper  to  being,  fills  the  name  with  adjectives. 
(Barthes  1974:  190-191) 
Barthes  here  makes  the  seemingly  paradoxical  observation 
that  the  Proper  Name  in  this  context  need  not  be  a  name; 
a  pronoun  will  do12.  As  a  pure  deictic  sign,  in  fact, 
the  pronoun  is  pre-eminently  empty  of  semantic  content, 
11  The  term  is  Balls  (1985:  80). 
12  Chatman  (1978:  131)  expands  this  point:  'Names  are  deictic,  that 
is  pointing,  marked  out  as  definite,  11(de-)finited"  or  cut  out  of 
infinity,  hypostatized,  and  catalogued  (be  it  ever  so  minimally). 
Thus,  narratives  do  not  need  proper  names  in  the  strict  sense. 
Any  deictic  mark  will  do;  a  personal  pronoun,  an  epithet  ("the  man 
with  a  beard,  "  "the  lady  in  blue")  or  even  a  demonstrative  pronoun 
or  definite  article.  (The  character  is  referred  to  as  "a  man"  only 
once  -  in  the  first  sentence.  Thereafter,  he  will  be  called  "the 
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and  therefore  available  to  be  'filled'.  The  character, 
Of  course,  has  to  be  tied  together  across  a  system  of 
pronouns  and  nouns.  But  the  question  then  becomes:  what 
are  the  criteria  by  which  this  unity  is  identified  and 
constructed  by  the  reader? 
In  answer  to  this,  Rimmon-Kenan  (1983:  39)  details  four 
principles  that  lead  to  this  cohesion  of  a  character 
around  a  proper  name:  repetition,  similarity,  contrast 
and  implication.  Repetition  of  various  actions, 
highlighted  by  similarity  and  contrast  in  analogous 
scenes,  lead  to  the  inference  of  stable  configurations 
of  behaviour  and  attitudes,  stable  enough  at  least  to  be 
the  source  of  expectation  and  of  surprise  to  the  reader 
if  they  are  changed  or  broken.  These  predictive 
structures  of  behaviour  can  be  referred  to  as  'traits'. 
In  linguistic  terms,  what  this  means  is  that  out  of  the 
field  of  the  limitless  possibilities  of  combinations  of 
semes,  a  certain  set  becomes  predictably  associated  with 
a  particular  Proper  Name. 
Bal,,  however,  in  a  review  of  recent  critiques  of  the 
notion  of  'character'  in  a  text  (1987:  104-109),  begins 
with  a  discussion  of  the  role  of  proper  names  which  to 
an  extent  subverts  this  view.  'As  the  fixed  point  to 
which  the  illusion  of  wholeness  can  attach  itself,  the 
proper  name  is  the  shortest  and  most  definite  sign  of  a 
character.  It  is  its  textual  marker,  embodying  its 
stability  and  continuity'(1987:  106).  Note  her  use  of 
the  word  illusion'.  She  sees  the  proper  name  as  part 
of  the  narrative  deception  that  would  indicate  that  the 
characters  have  an  existence,  a  wholeness  from  the  first 
time  they  are  mentioned.  The  progress  of  the  story,  so 
the  deception  runs,  is  a  matter  of  gradual  revelation  of 
knowledge,  of  the  reader's  coming  to  know  what  was 
always  implicit  within  the  name.  So.  in  the  books  of 
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David,  of  learning  more  about  this  complex  personality 
as  the  story  progresses. 
This  is  an  illusion,  as  Bal  says.  In  actual  fact,  the 
information  accrues  to  the  proper  name  of  the  character 
as  the  narrative  progresses.  It  is  not  revealed  from 
within,  say,  the  three  letters  dwd.  A  character  such  as 
David  is  constructed  by  the  reader,  not  revealed  by  the 
text. 
What  the  repeated  use  of  this  sign  dwd  does  allow,  Bal 
would  argue,  is  the  activation  of  the  tension  between 
analogy  and  chronology.  As  the  reading  progresse's,,  the 
same  sign  is  attached  to  increasing  numbers  of 
descriptions  and  actions  and  accumulates  meaning.  This 
can  lead  readers,  and  indeed  may  be  designed  to  do  so, 
into  what  she  describes  as  the  'retrospective  fallacy'. 
This  she  defines  as  the  projection  of  an  accomplished 
and  singular  named  character  onto  previous  textual 
elements  that  lead  to  the  construction  of  that 
character,  (1977:  108). 
This  is  an  useful  point  that  underlines  the  importance, 
but  also  the  conventionality,  of  the  chronological 
aspect  of  narrative.  The  proper  name  'David,  in  1 
Samuel  16  and  the  same  name  in  2  Sam  24,  for  instance, 
carry  different  weights  of  resonance  for  the  reader  who 
approaches  these  texts  for  the  first  time.  In  the 
process  of  reading  these  chapters  a  whole  complex  of 
adjectives,  nouns  and  verbs  comes  to  be  associated  with 
that  name  in  an  elaborate  web  of  allusions.  The 
retrospective  fallacy  then  may  lead  the  reader  to  read 
back  signs  of  David's  future  development  in  the  earlier 
narrative. 
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There  is  however  a  further  aspect  which  needs  to  be 
borne  in  mind  as  we  examine  the  role  of  the  proper  name. 
The  name  'David,  carries  a  weight  of  association  outside 
the  text.  The  present-day  reader  may  not  come  'clean' 
to  the  text,  especially  a  text  with  the  wide  cultural 
dissemination  of  2  Samuel.  Scraps  of  information  are 
already  tied  to  the  name  which  will  colour  the  set  of 
expectations  brought  even  to  the  first  encounter  with 
the  name  in  the  text.  If  indeed  the  text  records  the 
exploits  of  a  historical  figure,  however  embellished  by 
legend  or  distorted  by  propaganda,  or  even  a  mythical 
leader,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  assume  that  even  its 
original  readers  and  hearers  would  come  to  the  text  with 
associations  with  the  sign  dwd  as  well,  even  though  we 
need  to  be  cautious  in  reconstructing  these.  The  use  of 
the  name  'David,  conjures  up  a  more  or  less  complex 
schema  for  the  reader,  just  as  the  name  'Christopher 
Columbus,  brings  with  it  a  whole  set  of  associations  and 
narrative  fragments. 
In  this  respect,  Bal  contrasts  the  role  of  the  proper 
name  'Emma'  in  Jane  Austin's  Emma  and  the  name  'Eve'  in 
Genesis  2.  Emma  is  named  at  the  beginning  of  the  novel, 
whereas  Eve's  name  comes  only  at  the  end  of  the  chapter. 
Initially  she  is  spoken  of  as  the  woman'.  Emma  on  the 
other  hand  is  introduced  as  a  fully  fledged  character, 
and  the  novel  represents  the  changing  of  a  full  being, 
whereas,  as  Bal  puts  it,  Eve  'displays  a  slow 
construction  out  of  the  continuous  restriction  of 
possibilitiesf.  It  is  only  when  she  is  given  a  name 
that  she  finally  achieves  the  full  stature  of  humanity13. 
13  sternberg  argues  that  anonymity  is  a  sign  of  supernuminaries  in 
the  Biblical  text:  'To  remain  nameless  is  to  remain  faceless, 
with  hardly  a  life  of  one's  Own.  Accordingly,  a  character's 
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But  surely  we  might  argue  that  this  is  a  difference  in 
degree  rather  than  kind.  'Emma'  also  is  constructed  out 
of  the  restriction  of  possibilities.  Where  the 
difference  lies  is  that  these  possibilities  begin  a  way 
circumscribed  by  her  name.  Names  themselves  encode  all 
sorts  of  social  conventions.  'Emma  Woodhouse,  as  the 
name  of  a  character  in  an  eighteenth  century  novel  is 
resolved  as  female,  for  instance,  and  the  very  form  of 
her  name  ties  her  into  a  family,  raising  the  question  of 
the  status  of  her  father,  Mr  Woodhouse.  To  the  well- 
attuned  ear  of  the  time,  the  name  'Emma'  itself  might 
reveal  a  great  deal  about  the  social  class  or  literary 
tastes  of  those  who  named  her,  just  as  in  modern  British 
society  to  name  a  child  'Kyliel,  'Melanie,  or  indeed 
'Emma'  begins  the  process  of  activating  certain 
assumptions. 
In  the  names  of  Biblical  characters  the  presence  of 
theophoric  elements,  or  the  other  semantic  resonances  of 
a  name,  may  signal  a  restriction  of  their  possibilities 
as  well  in  identifying  them  as  within  the  purview  of  the 
God  whose  name  they  bear14.  The  concern  of  the  text  f  or 
importance.  '(1985:  330)  David,  we  might  recall,  is  not  named  at 
his  first  appearance  in  1  Samuel  16.  It  is  only  at  the  moment  of 
anointing  in  1  Sam  16:  13  that  his  name  is  first  mentioned. 
14  But  see  here  Sternberg  (1985:  330)  who  argues  that  the  Bible 
has  a  marked  tendency  to  assign  unique  names  to  characters,  and 
that  these  names  are  often  opaque  to  etymological  resonance.  The 
etymology  of  'David,  is  a  case  in  point.  Even  where  etymologies 
are  offered,  as  in  the  case  of  Abraham  or  Moses,  they  tend  not  to 
be  coherent  or  exhaustive.  Such  meaning  as  they  do  have  tends  to 
reveal  more  about  the  giver  of  the  name  than  its  bearer.  Leah's 
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etymological  asides  on  the  names  of  characters  bears  out 
the  importance  of  this.  Of  course,  it  may  be  that  the 
way  the  story  progresses  overturns  the  assumptions  built 
into  the  name,  but  it  will  be  overturning  assumptions, 
not  writing  into  a  vacuum. 
The  point  is,  however,  that  the  proper  name  of  a 
character  acts  like  any  other  descriptive  attribution  in 
restricting,  but  not  dictating,  the  possibilities  to  be 
activated  in  the  development  of  the  character.  Indeed, 
Bal  seems  to  miss  the  point  that  it  is  not  only  Eve  who 
changes  her  designation  during  the  course  of  the 
narrative.  Characters  are  not  simply  addressed  by  one 
name  or  designation.  It  is  the  rule  rather  than  the- 
exception  that  at  different  points  of  the  story  the  name 
of  a  character  may  change  or  that  the  character  may  be 
designated  by  different  names  and  titles  by  other 
characters.  In  the  biblical  context,  the  narrative 
significance  of  the  change  of  Abram's  name  to  Abraham, 
or  of  Jacob  to  Israel  is  immense. 
'The'  proper  name  of  a  character  is  in  itself  an 
abstraction,  something  that  Barthes7and  Balls 
concentration  on  this  subject  may  obscure.  Most 
characters  revolve  and  oscillate  between  several  names 
or  designations,  and  that  very  mutability  may  be  a  clear 
signal  of  the  development  of  the  narrative.  So  even  in 
Balls  example  from  Jane  Austen  given  above,  the  story  of 
sons  (Gen  29:  31-30:  19).  If  these  points  can  be  conceded,  it  is 
also  true  that  Sternberg  does  not  note  the  more  general  points 
about  theophoric  elements  and  the  like,  and  does  not  cite  other 
clear  examples  where  character  and  name  are  fitted.  For  instance, 
Gaal  son  of  Ebed  (,  wretch  son  of  slave,  )  the  feckless  rebel 
against  Abimelech  in  Judges  9:  26-41  is  as  good  an  example  of  his 
name  as  could  be  wished,  as  is  Nabal,  Abigail's  husband,  in  1  Sam 
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Emma,  at  least  in  one  aspect,  is  the  story  of  a  change 
Of  names  just  as  much  as  the  story  of  Eve.  The  plot 
itself  might  be  said  to  turn  upon  the  question  of  what 
Emma's  name  will  become.  Will  she  end  up  as  Emma 
Churchill  or  as  Mrs  Knightley,  or  will  she  remain  Emma 
Woodhouse?  15  The  social  strata  of  society  and  the  social 
interactions  of  marriage,  kinship  and  degrees  of 
intimacy  are  all  encoded  on  the  interplay  of  names  and 
titles. 
So  too,,  to  return  to  the  story  of  David,  the  titles  and 
epithets  bestowed  on  David,  ranging  from  son  of  Jesse' 
to  'my  Lord  the  king'  register  differences  in  David's 
status  and  the  attitude,  sincere  or  feigned,  that  his 
interlocutors  address  him  with.  The  proper  name  itself 
is  a  polymorphous  category,  demanding  and  encoding  a 
knowledge  of  the  social  conventions  of  a  society,  as  the 
introduction  to  any  classic  Russian  novel  is  at  pains  to 
explicate16.  This  aspect  of  the  character  of  David  is 
15  Critics  have  read  a  good  deal  into  the  brief  notice  that  occurs 
at  the  end  of  the  book  that  Enma  will  never  call  her  husband 
anything  other  than  Mr  Knightley;  a  comment  bound  to  lead  to 
inference. 
16  This  point  is  made  in  the  context  of  the  biblical  text  by 
Berlin  (1983:  59-61),  where  she  quotes  the  following  extract  from 
Uspensky  (1973:  25-26): 
In  a  literary  work,  one  character  may  be  called  by  different 
names  or  designated  by  a  variety  of  titles.  Frequently, 
different  names  are  attributed  to  one  and  the  same  person  in 
a  single  sentence  or  in  closely  connected  passages 
It  seems  clear  that  several  points  of  view  are  used  in  each 
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dealt  with  at  length  in  the  chapter  below  on  'David  as 
Son'. 
Part  of  the  'development,  of  a  character,  then,  is  the 
accretion  of  a  complex  of  'proper  names',  each  of  which 
becomes  associated  with  a  set  of  perceptions  of  the 
character  setting  him  or  her  within  a  social  milieu. 
Bal  rightly  differentiates  this  development'  of  a 
character  from  the  normal  development  which  is  part  of 
human  life,  the  progress  from  childhood  to  maturity.  We 
need  only  reflect  that  a  character  can  be  introduced  as 
an  adult,  and  then  developed  through  an  analeptic 
recursion  to  its  childhood.  The  accumulation  of 
resonance  at  the  level  of  discourse  proceeds  linearly, 
whereas  in  such  a  case  at  the  level  of  the  story,  the 
chronology  is  reversed.  A  case  in  point  is  provided  by 
the  interruption  of  chronological  sequence  in  2  Sam  21- 
24.  As  we  read  chapters  21-24,  we  revert  to  earlier 
events  in  David's  life,  and  are  given  a  new  perspective 
on  them. 
We  can  add  a  further  dimension  to  this  consideration  of 
what  we  mean  by  a  character  by  turning  to  Roger  Fowler 
(1977:  32)  who  remarks  'Character-individuality  in 
fiction  is  an  illusion,  a  projection  onto  texts  of  the 
cultured  expectations  of  the  community  of  modern  novel- 
several  different  positions.  Specifically,  he  may  be  using 
the  points  of  view  of  various  characters  in  the  work,  each 
of  whom  stands  in  a  different  relationship  to  the  character 
who  is  named... 
if  we  know  how  different  people  habitually  refer  to  one 
particular  character  (that  is  easy  enough  to  establish  by  an 
analysis  of  corresponding  dialogue),  then  it  may  be  possible 
formally  to  define  whose  view  point  that  author  has  assumed 
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readers.  Anything  which  is  mediated  through  a  social 
communication  system  is  conventional;  the  "people"  of 
fiction  are  transmitted  through  the  conventions  of 
fiction-language.  '  But  it  is  pertinent  to  extend  this 
dictum  to  non-fictional  texts,,  and  to  readers  of  any 
kind  of  texts.  Indeed,  Fowler  extends  the  same  insight 
to  the  biological  person.  Our  perception  of  the 
individuality  of  others  is  dependent  on  the  same 
conventional  activation  of  expectations. 
The  character,  then  is  something  constructed  by  the 
reader  from  the  text,  something  'fathered'  on  the  text 
by  the  reader.  David  is  a  field  of  possibilities, 
activated  and  filled  out  by  the  reader,  in  a  complex 
interplay  of  the  polysemous  hints  offered  by  the  text 
and  the  structures  of  expectation  evoked  both  by  the 
text  and  by  the  interpretative  schemas  that  the  reader 
brings  to  the  text. 
2.4  CHARACTER  AND  LANGUAGE 
2.4.1  SPEECH  AND  CHARACTERISATION 
How  then  does  all  this  bear  on  the  question  with  which 
we  began  this  investigation:  the  meaning  of  the 
character  as  reader?  Here  Fowler's  further  definition 
of  the  character  from  the  point  of  view  of  linguist 
proves  helpful.  He  sees  the  character  as  combining  the 
following  four  elements  (1987:  36): 
a)  an  lactant' 
b)  an  assemblage  of  semes 
c)  a  proper  name 
d)  the  structure  and  semantic  content  of  the 
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Much  of  this  summarises  our  discussion  above  though 
]Fowler  could  be  taken  to  task  for  restricting  the 
character  to  representing  one  actant.  What  he  adds  is 
an  important  insight  in  tying  the  distinctiveness  of  a 
character  to  the  speech  assigned  to  him  or  her,  as  well 
as  the  narrator's  speech  describing  him  or  her.  In  a 
dramatic  text,  indeed,  characters  are  almost  entirely 
depicted  in  the  speech  that  they  utter. 
The  use  of  language  by  the  character  can  be  distinctive 
at  a  trivial  level:  dialect  differences  or  the  use  of 
catch  phrases  can  distinguish  a  character's  language 
from  other  language  in  the  text.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
relations  between  the  language  of  narrator  and 
characters  can  be  highly  complex. 
2.4.2  LANGUAGE  AND  BIBLICAL  CHARACTER 
2.4.2.1  Bar  Efrat 
Having  raised  the  issue  of  language  as  an  aspect  of 
characterization,  it  becomes  pertinent  to  ask  how  this 
relates  to  a  biblical  character  such  as  David.  Are  the 
same  criteria  applicable?  In  asking  this  general 
question,  we  shall  bear  in  mind  that  the  goal  of  this 
enquiry  is  to  elucidate  the  concept  of  'character  as 
reader,  and  so  our  discussion  of  the  wider  issues  will 
must  focus  on  the  interaction  between  characters  and 
their  acts  of  speech  and  interpretation. 
The  techniques  of  characterization  in  the  Bible  are 
explored  at  some  length  by  Bar  Efrat  (1989:  27-92).  In 
particular,  he  discusses  the  importance  of  the 
character's  speech  as  part  of  the  indirect  shaping  of 
the  characterr  as  opposed  to  the  direct  shaping  in  the 
use  of  description  of  details  of  the  character's 
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Biblical  narratives  do  not  contain  personal  speech 
distinguishing  one  character  from  another.  The 
characters'  speech  is  more  or  less  identical  with 
the  narrator's  style,  and,  apart  from  a  few 
exceptions,  is  marked  by  its  matter-of-fact, 
restrained  and  unembellished  tone.  It  reaches  us 
through  the  author's  mediation  and  is  subject  to 
the  same  stylistic  principles  which  govern  the  work 
as  a  whole  giving  it  unity.  (1989  :  65) 
what  is  important  in  a  character's  speech,  however,  is 
not  simply  the  style,  but  the  content  and  the 
assumptions  that  are  peculiar  to  it.  The  stylistic 
exceptions,  however,  are  of  interest.  Bar  Efrat  sees 
the  speech  of  Abigail  (1  Sam  25:  24-31),  the  woman  of 
Tekoa  (2  Sam  14:  4-20)  and  Hushai  the  Archite  (1  Sam 
17:  7-13)  as  distinctive  in  the  use  of  metaphor,  which  he 
sees  as  characterizing  their  wisdom.  More  extensively, 
he  discusses  the  variation  in  speech  between  characters 
as  a  reflection  of  their  social  status,  and  the  way  in 
which  this  can  be  played  upon  in  order  to  establish  or 
reform  as  well  as  to  reflect  the  social  order.  He 
contrasts  the  deferential  form  of  address  used  by  Joab 
to  David  in  2  Samuel  14:  22  with  his  forthright  speech  in 
2  Sam  19:  7. 
Bar  Efrat  does  discuss  the  valuable  contribution  to  the 
shaping  of  the  characters  ..,.  made  by  their  )[verbal2 
reactions  to  things  that  are  said  to  them'  (1989:  73). 
For  instance,  he  looks  at  the  situation  where  the 
recipient  of  an  order  either  accepts  or  questions  it, 
and  the  situation  where  a  hearer  replies  to  a  request. 
In  such  casesf  the  character  reveals  information  about 
his  attitude  to  the  speaker. 
However,,  Bar  Efrat  seldom  attempts  to  look  at  the  basis 
of  his  interpretations  of  these  transactions.  When,  for 
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question  as  to  the  whereabouts  of  the  lamb  for  the 
sacrifice  (Gen  22:  7)  shows  Abraham's  'fineness  of  soul, 
in  its  revelation  of  his  delicacy,  honesty  and  deep 
religious  feeling(1989:  76)  he  fails  to  note  that  there 
are  other  explanations  for  this.  Abraham  may  be  simply 
fobbing  Isaac  off  in  an  attempt  to  keep  him  in  the  dark, 
revealing  thereby  either  cowardice  or-a  cynical 
disregard  for  Isaac's  desire  for  truth.  Bar  Efrat's 
approach  does  not  seem  to  take  seriously  enough  the 
problem  of  the  gap  between  the  textual  evidence  and  the 
deduction  of  the  character's  motives  or  to  consider  the 
processes  that  may  be  involved  in  the  bridging  of  that 
gap. 
2.4.2.2  Alter 
For  Alter,  however,  that  very  gap  is  the  essence  of  the 
biblical  art  of  characterization.  Alter's  major 
discussion  of  the  topic  is  in  a  chapter  of  his  The  Art 
of  Biblical  Narrative  entitled  'Characterization  and  the 
Art  of  Reticence'  (1980:  114-131).  He  argues  for  a 
concept  of  the  character  in  biblical  narrative  that  sees 
it  as  containing  an  abiding  mystery.  The  character  is  a 
centre  of  surprise.  So  he  contrasts  the  portrayal  of 
Saul,  Michal  and  David  in  1  Samuel  18:  1-30  in  terms  of  a 
hierarchy  of  specificity  in  the  text's  presentation  of 
characters.  In  ascending  order  of  specificity: 
Character  can  be  revealed  through  the  report  of 
actions;  through  appearances,,  gestures,,  posture,, 
costume;  through  one  character's  comments  on 
another;  through  direct  speech  by  the  character; 
through  inward  speech  either  summarized  or  quoted 
as  interior  monologue;  or  through  statements  by  the 
narrator  about  the  attitudes  and  intentions  of  the 
personages,  which  may  come  either  as  flat 
assertions  or  motivated  explanations.  (1980:  117) In  1  Samuel  18,  Alter 
comments  and  interior 
of  Saul.  David  howevi 
middle  range  devices. 
or  inner  monologue  to 
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contrasts  the  use  of  direct 
monologue  in  the  characterization 
er  is  characterized  by  lower  and 
There  is  no  ascription  of  feeling 
David;  in  such  cases,  he  writes: 
We  are  compelled  to  get  at  character  and  motive,  as 
in  Impressionist  writers  like  Conrad  and  Ford  Madox 
Ford,  through  a  process  of  inference  from 
fragmentary  data,  often  with  crucial  pieces  of 
narrative  exposition  strategically  withheld,  and 
this  leads  to  multiple  or  sometimes  even  wavering 
perspectives  on  the  characters.  (1980:  126) 
Such  a  lack  of  specificity  in  the  protrayal  of  David 
serves  to  mystify  but  also  intrigue  the  reader  in  the 
analysis  of  his  character. 
This  insight  appears  also  in  Auerbach,  who  in  his 
Mimesis  talks  of  the  Imultilayeredness,  of  the 
individual  character  in  the  biblical  text:  I  ...  in 
Homer,  the  complexity  of  the  psychological  life  is  shown 
only  in  the  succession  and  alternation  of  emotions; 
whereas  the  Jewish  writers  are  able  to  express  the 
simultaneous  existence  of  various  layers  of 
consciousness  and  the  conflict  between  them,  (1968:  13). 
The  implication  appears  to  be  that  we  are  left  to  infer 
the  motives  of  a  char&-,  ter  such  as  David  from  his  speech 
and  actions,  the  situation  of  course  in  which  we  find 
ourselves  in  our  ordinary  intercourse  with  the  flesh 
and  blood'  people  with  whom  we  meet.  To  interpret 
David,  then,  calls  on  inferential  skills.  It  is  fr#&m 
the  utterances  that  David  makes  that  we  must  infer  his 
motives.  Yet  David  as  a  character  makes  no  utterances. 
All  the  text  offers  us  is  language.  Our  ascription  of 
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is  a  matter  of  convention.  We  separate  out  a  set  of 
utterances  from  the  general  utterance  of  the  text. 
2.4.3  WHOSE  SPEECH  IS  IT  ANYWAY? 
We  are  left  then  with  a  baffling  complexity  of 
interaction  between  the  language  a  character  utters  and 
the  language  from  which  the  reader  constructs  the 
character.  In  order  to  elucidate  this  complexity,  we 
shall  turn  in  our  next  chapter  to  the  work  of  an  author 
who  investigates  the  relation  of.  the  subject  to  language 
and  makes  a  special  study  of  the  interactions  between 
the  different  forms  of  language  in  a  literary  text: 
Mikhail  Bakhtin.  In  examining  his  view  of  language  and 
of  the  subject,,  we  may  find  some  light  shed  on  the 
interaction  between  the  author,  the  text,  the  character 
and  the  reader  at  the  linguistic  level. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  3  108 
CHAPTER  THREE 
CHARACTER  AND  READER:  A  DIALOGIC  APPROACH 
3.1  BAKHTIN:  UTTERANCE  AS  ANSWER 
3.1.1  THE  DIALOGIC  PRINCIPLE 
Bakhtin'  conceives  of  language  as  'dialogic'.  This  is 
in  conscious  opposition  to  the  model  of  language  as  code 
1  There  is  a  continuing  debate  over  the  extent  of  Bakhtin's 
authorship.  From  the  1920's  to  the  60's,  Bakhtin  was  subject  to 
internal  exile  and  his  writings  were  suppressed.  During  the  20's 
some  of  his  former  associates,  most  notably  V.  I.  Voloshinov  and 
P.  N.  Medvedev,  published  books  which  developed  arguments  very 
similar  to  those  of  Bakhtin,  though  with  a  particular  Marxist 
slant.  The  controversy  arises  over  whether  these  works  were 
written  by  Bakhtin  and  published  under  the  names  of  his  friends, 
perhaps  with  some  editorial  involvement,  or  whether  they  represent 
their  development  of  his  ideas.  The  Marxist  slant  has  been 
interpreted  differently.  Does  it  represent  an  attempt  by  Bakhtin 
to  make  his  works  more  acceptable,  does  it  reflect  a  real  shift  in 
his  thought,  or  does  it  reflect  the  different  ideological  slant  of 
his  colleagues?  It  is  obviously  beyond  the  scope  and  competence 
of  the  present  discussion  to  resolve  this  issue.  Its  importance 
is  that  the  major  interpreters  of  Bakhtin's  work  in  English  differ 
on  this  point.  Clark  and  Holquist  accept  the  so-called 
Iventriloquised'  works  as  part  of  the  Bakhtin  canon  and  cite  them 
under  his  name.  Morson  and  Emerson  regard  them  as  important 
restatements  of  Bakhtinian  ideas  which  lead  Bakhtin  himself  to 
respond  by  revising  his  stance  on  various  topics,  and  cite  them 
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which  underlies  the  work  of  the  Russian  formalists.  He 
bases  his  theory  on  the  'utterance'  (vyskazyvanie), 
rather  than  the  sentence.  This  is  not  to  be  confused 
with  the  Saussurian  concept  of  the  individual  instance 
of  speech  (paxole)  which  instanciates  the  abstract 
semiotic  system  of  language  (langue). 
The  utterance  is  not  a  formal  unit  to  be  defined 
grammatically,  but  a  unit  of  communication,  which  might 
range  f  rom  a  grunt  to  war  and  Peace.  It  is  I  dialogic 
in  that  every  aspect  of  it  is  conditioned  by  the 
particular  need  of  a  speaker  to  communicate  in  a 
particular  context,  as  well  as  the  general  requirements 
of  the  linguistic  system. 
This  specificity  is  reflected  in  the  fact  that  a  crucial 
difference  between  the  utterance  and  the  sentence  is  in 
repeatability.  A  sentence  is  repeatable.  It  can  be 
quoted  and  cited  and  reprinted.  An  utterance  is  not 
repeatable.  The  context  can  be  never  be  exactly  the 
same  on  the  next  occasion  that  a  sentence  is  uttered,  if 
only  because  the  repetition  comes  after  the  audience  has 
reacted  the  first  time  to  the  sentence.  The  essential 
aspect  of  any  utterance  is  whatever  makes  it  unique,  not 
what  it  has  in  common  with  other  utterances.  As 
Voloshinov  puts  it: 
of  their  different  points  of  view,  see  Clark  and  Holquist 
1984:  146-170  (reaffirmed  in  Holquist  1990:  8)  and  Morson  and 
Emerson  1990:  101-119.  In  the  present  text,  individual  works  are 
cited  under  the  name  that  appears  on  the  title  page,  but  the 
adjective  'Bakhtinian,  is  used  to  cover  a  complex  of  ideas 
)  aspects 
of  which  may  be  most  fully  explored  in  works  not  directly 
attributed  to  Bakhtin.  In  view  of  Bakhtin's  own  concepts  of 
dialogue  and  authorship,  the  whole  debate  takes  on  a  curious  and 
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What  is  important  for  the  speaker  about  a 
linguistic  form  is  not  that  it  is  a  stable  and 
always  self-equivalent  signal,  but  that  it  is  an 
always  changeable  and  adaptable  sign.  That  is  the 
speakerfs  point  of  view. 
But  doesn't  the  speaker  also  have  to  take  into 
account  the  point  of  view  of  the  listener  and 
understander?  Isn't  it  possible  that  here,  exactly, 
is  where  the  normative  identity  of  a  linguistic 
form  comes  into  force? 
This  too  is  not  quite  so.  The  basic  task  of 
understanding  does  not  at  all  amount  to  recognizing 
the  linguistic  form  of  the  speaker  as  the  familiar 
,  that  very  same,  form,  the  way  we  recognize  a 
signal  that  we  have  not  become  quite  used  to  or  a 
form  in  a  language  that  we  do  not  know  very  well. 
No,  the  task  of  understanding  does  not  basically 
amount  to  recognizing  the  form  used  but  rather  to 
understanding  its  meaning  in  a  particular 
utterance,  i.  e.  it  amounts  to  understanding  its 
novelty  and  not  to  recognizing  its  identity. 
(1973:  68) 
3.1.2  MEANING  IN  DIALOGUE 
3.1.2.1  This  leads  Bakhtin  to  distinguish  two  kinds  of 
meaning:  znachenie  or  abstract  meaning',  the 
Imeaning(s),  of  a  word  as  found  in  a  dictionary,  and 
smysl,  the  'contextual  meaning,  of  a  particular 
utterance  in  a  particular  situation.  'Abstract  meaning, 
is  Potential  to  mean,  which  must  be  actualized  in  an 
event  of  utterance,  and  which  is  subject  to  a  whole 
complex  of  constraints.  There  is  no  simple  mapping 
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No  living  word  interacts  with  its  object  in  a 
singular  way.  Between  the  word  and  its  object, 
between  the  word  and  the  speaking  subject,  there 
exists  an  elastic  environment  of  other  alien  words 
about  the  same  object,  the  same  theme,  and  this  is 
an  environment  that  it  is  often  difficult  to 
penetrate.  (Bakhtin  1981:  276) 
The  business  of  the  hearer,  of  course,  is  to  attempt 
such  an  act  of  penetration.  Counterposing  the  two  forms 
of  meaning  are  two  forms  of  understanding  or 
interpretation.  'Passive  understanding',  or 
recognition,  merely  demands  the  grasping  of  the 
linguistic  meaning  of  a  sentence.  'Active  understanding' 
is  a  much  more  complex  process  which  Morson  and  Emerson 
sum  up  as  follows: 
The  listener  must  not  only  decode  the  utterance,, 
but  also  grasp  why  it  is  being  said,  relate  it  to 
his  own  complex  of  interests  and  assumptions, 
gine  how  the  utterance  responds  to  future 
utterances  and  what  sort  of  response  it  invites, 
evaluate  it  and  interpret  how  potential  third 
parties  would  understand  it.  Above  all,  the 
listener  must  go  through  a  complex  process  of 
preparing  a  response  to  the  utterance.  These 
various  elements  are  in  fact  separable  only  for 
purposes  of  analysis,  but  in  essence  are 
inseparable  elements  of  any  act  of  real 
understanding.  That  is,  we  do  not  first  passively 
decode  and  then  decide  how  to  respond;  rather,  we 
engage  in  an  act  of  active  understanding,  for  which 
passive  understanding  is  necessary.  (1990:  128) 
Crucially,  for  Bakhtin,  every  utterance  is  already  an 
answer.  It  is  always  conditioned  by  an  utterance  that 
has  preceded  it,  and  indeed  by  the  knowledge  of  a 
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conditioned  by  shared  assumptions  of  what  need  and  need 
not  be  spoken. 
Voloshinov  explains: 
In  point  of  fact,  the  word  is  a  two-sided  act.  It 
is  determined  equally  by  whose  word  it  is  and  for 
whom  it  is  meant.  As  word,  it  is  precisely  the 
product  of  the  reciprocal  relationship  between 
speaker  and  listener,  addresser  and  addressee;  ... 
I  give  myself  verbal  shape  from  another's  point  of 
view.  (1973:  86) 
This  statement  in  itself  reveals  the  further  point  that 
the  notion  of  the  'subject',  the  III,  is  in  the  thought 
of  Voloshinov  and  Bakhtin,  as  much  a  product  of  speech 
as  its  source. 
3.1.2.2  In  this  regard,  the  Bakhtinian  approach  bears  a 
strong  resemblance  to  the  approach  of  the  French 
linguist  Emile  Benveniste.  He  too  made  a  distinction 
between  the  'sentence'  and  the  'utterance',  though  he 
termed  these  the  16noncd,  and  the  16nonciation'.  His 
contention  is  that  it  is  in  the  act  of  utterance  that 
subjectivity  arises.  His  particular  interest,  expressed 
in  his  paper  'Subjectivity  in  Language,,  is  the  function 
of  pronouns  in  language.  He  argues  that  the  word  I 
does  not  refer  to  any  concept  or  individual:  'I  refers 
to  the  act  of  individual  discourse  in  which  it  is 
pronounced,  and  by  this  it  designates  the 
speakerl(1971:  226).  It  is  a  linguistic  construct.  But 
further,  Benveniste  argues  that  every  I  presupposes  a 
you,  an  interlocutor  who  could  in  turn  designate  herself 
as  I.  The  sense  of  'self,  is  a  product  of  the  act  of 
utterance. 
Where  Benveniste  and  Bakhtin  part  company  is  over 
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in  this  relationship:  -ego"  always  has  a  position  of 
transcendence  with  regard  to  youl(1971:  225).  This  ties 
in  with  Benveniste's  notions  of  intrinsic  authority  in 
speech,  which  we  will  discuss  below.  on  the  contrary,, 
Bakhtin's  contention  is  that  the  utterance  is  the 
answer;  the  I  is  the  response  to  the  question  of  the 
other.  Indeed,  for  Bakhtin,  it  is  the  dawning  awareness 
that  what  otherwise  is  a  chaos  of  impression  contains  a 
question  to  which  one  can  make  a  responsible  answer  that 
is  the  coming  into  being  of  the  consciousness  and  the 
self  . 
3.2  LANGUAGE  AND  THE  SPEAKING  SUBJECT 
LEARNING  TO  ANSWER 
3.2.1.1  Vygotsky 
This  ties  in  with  the  theories  of  child  development 
developed  by  the  Russian  psychologist  L.  S.  Vygotsky2  who 
contends  that  it  is  as  children  learn  to  talk  that  they 
learn  to  think.  Vygotsky  deplores  the  fact  that  too 
many  theories  of  language  development  seem  to  have  a 
myth  at  their  root  that  at  some  point  the  child 
conceives  a  desire  to  communicate  and  then  goes  about 
acquiring  a  competence  in  language  to  enable  him  to  do 
so,  moving  from  an  initial  solipsism  to  an  increasing 
capacity  for  social  interaction.  On  the  contrary, 
Vygotsky  insists  that  the  child  is  born  into  a  sea  of 
communication,  and  it  is  its  gradual  acquisition  of 
responsibility  for  its  utterances  in  the  light  of  the 
utterances  of  others  that  is  the  task  of  development. 
2  See  on  this  especially  his  Thought  and  Language  (Vygotsky  1986) 
and  the  discussion  of  his  work  in  the  chapter  with  that  title  in 
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3.2.1.2  Benveniste 
The  same  sentiment  is  expressed  by  Benveniste: 
Language  is  in  the  nature  of  man,  and  he  did  not 
fabricate  it.  We  are  always  inclined  to  that  naive 
concept  of  a  primordial  period  in  which  a  complete 
man  discovered  another  one,  equally  complete,  and 
between  the  two  of  them  language  was  worked  out 
little  by  little.  This  is  pure  fiction.  We  can 
never  get  back  to  man  separated  from  language  and 
we  shall  never  see  him  inventing  it.  We  shall 
never  get  back  to  man  reduced  to  himself  and 
exercising  his  wits  to  conceive  of  another.  It  is  a 
speaking  man  whom  we  find  in  the  world,  a  man 
speaking  to  another  man,  and  language  provides  the 
very  definition  of  man.  (1971:  223-4) 
3.2.2  CHILD  AS  SPECTATOR 
The  French  psychoanalyst  and  critic  Andr6  Green  draws  a 
direct  parallel  between  the  experience  of  the  spectator 
in  the  theatre  and  that  of  the  acquisition  of  language 
in  terms  of  overhearing  and  inference  (Green  1979:  2): 
Does  not  the  theatre  owe  its  peculiar  power  to  the 
fact  that  it  is  an  exchange  of  language,  a 
succession  of  bare  statements  without  benefit  of 
commentary?  Between  the  exchanges,  between  the 
monologues,  nothing  is  vouchsafed  about  the 
character's  state  of  mind  (unless  he  says  it 
himself);  nothing  is  added  to  these  statements  that 
refers  to  the  physical  setting,  the  historical 
situation,  the  social  context,  or  the  inner 
thoughts  of  the  characters.  There  is  nothing  but 
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In  much  the  same  way,,  the  child  is  the  witness  of 
the  daily  domestic  drama.  For  the  infans  that  he 
remains  long  after  his  acquisition  of  language, 
there  is  nothing  but  the  gesture,  actions  and 
statements  of  his  parents.  If  there  is  anything 
else,  it  is  up  to  him  to  find  and  interpret  it, 
the  father  and  mother  say  this  or  that,  and  act  in 
this  or  that  way.  What  they  really  think,  what  the 
truth  really  is,  he  must  discover  on  his  own. 
Every  theatrical  work,  like  every  work  of  art,  is 
an  enigma,  but  an  enigma  expressed  in  speech; 
articulated,  spoken  and  heard,  without  any  alien 
medium  filling  in  its  gaps.  That  is  why  the  art  of 
the  theatre  is  the  art  of  the  malentendu,  the 
misheard  and  the  misunderstood. 
In  this  quotation,  Green  brings  together  a  series  of 
themes  which  we  will  hope  to  explore  further.  He  draws 
a  crucial  parallel  between  the  role  of  the  spectator, 
and  the  development  of  the  human  subject  as  an 
autonomous  being.  On  the  face  of  it,  Green  here  is 
seriously  overstating  his  case.  Surely  costume,  setting 
and  action  all  contribute  in  large  measure  to  the  power 
of  the  theatre.  Even  if  he  is  taken  as  referring  to  the 
text  of  a  play,  stage  directions  add  to  the  information 
available  to  the  audience.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we 
consider  the  original  text  of  a  play  such  as  Oedipus  Rex 
which  forms  the  substance  of  his  subsequent  discussion, 
we  are  perhaps  nearer  to  the  condition  that  he  posits. 
Green's  description  thus  fits  far  more  closely  to  the 
situation  of  the  reader  of  a  text  than  to  the  spectator 
of  a  play3. 
3  One  author  who  discusses  the  position  of  the  reader  as  onlooker 
is  D.  W.  Sarding  (1937).  He  discusses  the  role  of  the  spectator  of 
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register  the  event,  and  detached,  or  else  s/he  would  be  a 
participant. 
Harding  identifies  several  elements  which  may  secure  the 
onlooker's  interest.  First  among  these  he  puts  possibility 
I  ...  a  scene  may  secure  the  onlooker's  interest  because  it 
discloses  or  makes  more  vivid  to  him  certain  of  the  possibilities 
of  his  surroundings,  possibilities  which,  although  not  directly 
involving  him  at  the  moment,  must  yet  affect  his  expectations' 
(1937:  251).  It  is  on  the  basis  of  this  expansion  of 
possibilities  that  hope  and  anxieties  for  ourselves  and  others 
depend. 
A  second  factor  is  sentiment,  the  degree  of  concern  that  the 
onlooker  feels  for  the  participant,  the  factor  that  makes  the 
difference  in  observing  an  incident  where  a  stranger  or  a  close 
friend  is  involved. 
Most  importantly,  however,  the  spectator  provides  an  evaluation  of 
the  event.  By  his  or  her  mere  presence,  s/he  signals  its 
interest.  By  his  or  her  reactions,  s/he  signals  his  or  her 
evaluation  of  its  place  within  his  or  her  scale  of  values,  thereby 
also  -evealing  something  about  what  those  values  are. 
we  might  take  the  example  of  a  crowd  of  spectators  gathered  round 
a  man  and  woman  fighting  in  the  street.  By  being  there,  they 
signal  the  interest  of  the  event.  By  remaining  spectators  rather 
than  intervening  they  sanction  it  in  some  respect,  even  if  they 
express  disapproval  in  other  ways.  The  event  reveals  the  value 
systems  of  those  who  treat  it  as  a  spectacle. 
An  important  point  that  Harding  does  not  make  is  that  the  boundary 
between  onlooker  and  participant  is  a  fluid  one.  In  the  scene  we 
have  discussed  it  is  possible  for  a  member  of  the  crowd  to  wade  in 
on  the  one  side  or  the  other,  or  to  try  to  separate  the  two Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  3  117 
3.2.3  READER  AS  SPECTATOR:  READER  AS  CHILD 
By  interpreting  Green's  insights  in  terms  of  the  reader, 
the  fundamental  point  about  the  centrality  of  the 
inferential  process  both  to  the  spectator  of  the  play 
and  the  infant  in  its  struggle  to  enter  the  community  of 
language  remains  unaltered.  It  is  through  overhearing, 
listening  to  the  transactions  of  those  round  about  us 
and  imitating  them  without  understanding  that  language 
fighters.  This  is  an  evaluative  response,  either  a  commitment  to 
or  refusal  of  the  sanctioning  of  the  event. 
Harding  does  discuss  the  reciprocal  process  of  sanctioning  and 
evaluation  that  occurs  as  soon  as  the  participant  becomes  aware  of 
the  onlooker.  Harding  uses  as  examples  of  this  in  representation 
the  two  phenomena  of  'cooperative  play,  and  'gossip'.  In  both  of 
these  possibilities  of  experience  are  explored  and  offered  for 
evaluation,  by  the  participants  who,  in  gossip  particularly, 
become  the  vicarious  onlookers  on  events,  real  and  imagined  in 
their  communities.  In  most  situations  the  effect  is  one  of 
reinforcing  commonplace  assumptions.  A  more  developed  form 
challenges  these  very  assumptions  at  the  risk  of  bringing  down 
social  opprobrium  on  the  story  teller. 
What  Harding  does  not  discuss  is  the  key  difference  between  the 
spectator  of  an  event  and  the  hearer  of  its  retelling,  whether 
orally  or  through  the  medium  of  a  text.  The  physical  or  temporal 
distance  from  the  event  that  the  latter  experiences  means  that  the 
line  between  spectator  and  participant  cannot  be  crossed.  Even  if 
the  hearer  is  worked  upon  to  such  an  extent  that  he  wishes  to 
spring  to  the  rescue  of  an  endangered  heroine,  there  is  an 
impenetrable  barrier  between  them.  The  spectator  of  a  real  event 
may  be  physically  constrained  from  participating  in  it  -  the 
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is  acquired.  The  child  is  not  a  silent  spectator  in 
this  process,  however,  but  a  constant  utterer. 
It  is  as  particular  utterances  are  taken  as,  meaningful 
by  the  parents  and  those  around  and  repeated  and 
rewarded  that  the  child  comes  gradually  to  be  able  to 
take  responsibility  for  its  utterances.  This,  however, 
leaves  a  legacy  in  that  it  is  the  responsible  utterance 
which  is  the  derivative  form,  not  the  other  way  round. 
We  begin  in  babble,  and  it  is  from  this  babble  that 
language  emerges  by  a  process  of  social  reinforcement. 
Yet  babble  always  reemerges,  and  as  Green  indicates,  the 
possibilities  of  misprision  and  misunderstanding  remain 
at  the  heart  of  language. 
The  child's  language  has  infinite  possibility:  any 
linguistically  competent  human  infant  can  learn  to  speak 
as  its  native  tongue  any  human  language.  Yet  it  has  no 
grasp  on  actuality,  and  cannot  be  used  for  purposeful 
communication  precisely  because  it  is  all  possibility. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  it  has  no  communicative 
function,  but  this  function  is  limited  to  what  Jakobson 
defined  as  the  lphatic,  aspect  of  speech,  the  tying  of 
the  child  into  the  human  community.  By  its  babble,  the 
child  evokes  speech  from  others  to  which  one  day  it  will 
be  able  to  make  answer,  to  be  Iresponsiblef  in  the  root 
sense. 
What  the  passages  cited  from  Green  make  clear  is  that 
the  processes  of  inference  that  we  have  seen  at  work  in 
the  task  of  reading,  and  evoked  by  the  dialogue  of 
literary  and  dramatic  texts  are  foundational  for  the 
acquisition  of  language,  and  therefore  constitutive  of 
the  subject  in  Bakhtin's  terms. 
3.3  AUTHOR'S  VOICE,  CHARACTER'S  VOICE. 
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The  danger  of  this  approach  may  be  that  the  individual 
speaking  subject  is  dissolved  into  a  sea  of  language. 
The  importance  of  Bakhtin's  contribution  is  that  he 
rescues  the  uniqueness  of  the  individual  within  its 
social  matrix  by  seeing  each  subject  as  placed  in  a 
particular  unrepeatable  site  of  the  interaction  of 
ideologies,  each  of  which  speaks  its  own  language.  Each 
subject  is  addressed  by  a  unique  set  of  questions.  By 
ideology  here,  Bakhtin  means  a  more  or  less  coherent 
system  of  values  and  interests  which  stakes  a  claim  in 
providing  an  interpretive  key  to  the  world. 
This  profusion  of  different  languages  Bakhtin  calls 
heteroglossia.  Each  of  us  is  thus  addressed  by  a  unique 
instanciation  of  heteroglossia  and  is  answerable  to 
this.  Each  subject  is  a  distinct  'speech  centrel.  Only 
we  can  speak  from  the  place  we  occupy  and  cannot  evade 
that  responsibility.  'What  the  self  is  answerable  to  is 
the  environment;  what  it  is  answerable  for  is  authorship 
of  its  responses;  "it  is  not  the  content  of  a  commitment 
that  obliges  me,  but  my  signature  beneath  it"'  (Holquist 
1990:  167). 
It  is  with  the  re-emergence  of  the  theme  of  the 
signature,  the  name,  that  we  can  relate  Bakhtin's  theory 
to  the  literary  character.  In  essence,  the  lesson  I 
wish  to  draw  from  Bakhtin  is  that  the  character  is  a 
site  in  a  text  for  a  distinctive  instanciation  of 
heteroglossia,,  a  locus  of  a  particular  form  of  response. 
The  author  of  a  text,  as  with  all  other  authors  of 
utterance,  is  a  nexus  of  interaction  between  discourses, 
and  has  a  whole  repertoire  of  discourse  on  which  s/he 
can  draw.  Within  a  text,  different  characters  represent 
different  combinations  of  discourses.  Each  character 
represents  a  different  signature,  of  commitment  to  a 
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At  a  trivial  level,  this  can  be  manifested  in  a 
particular  linguistic  tic  or  a  use  of  dialect  which 
distinguishes  a  character's  speech  from  the  narratorls. 
At  a  more  profound  level,  it  can  be  a  intricate  social 
and  intellectual  position  within  a  society  that  can  be 
represented. 
3.3.2  SINGLE  AND  DOUBLE  VOICES 
It  is  not  the  case,  however  that  we  can  neatly 
disentangle  a  particular  set  of  utterances  from  a  text 
and  feel  that  we  have  thereby  defined  the  character  as 
an  entity  independent  of  the  narrator.  The  speech  of  a 
character  within  a  text  always  represents  the  overlay  of 
(at  least)  two  different  dialogic  situations  in  the  one 
form  of  words  -  the  dialogue  between  characters  and  the 
dialogue  between  author  and  reader.  In  Bakhtin's 
terminology,  these  words  are  double-voiced'.  The 
nature  of  the  relationship  a  character's  words  can 
express  is  complex  and  variable.  Bakhtin's  discussion 
of  this  diversity  is  systematised  by  Morson  and  Emerson 
into  the  following  table  (1990:  147): 
I.  Single  Voiced  Words 
A.  'Words  of  the  first  type':  Direct, 
unmediated  discourse 
B.  'Words  of  the  second  type,:  Objectified 
discourse  (of  a  represented  person) 
II.  Double  Voiced  Words:  'Words  of  the  third  type, 
A.  Passive  double  voiced  words 
1.  unidirectional  passive  double  voiced 
words 
2.  Varidirectional  passive  double  voiced 
words  (such  as  parody) 
B.  Active  double  voiced  words Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  3  121 
The  first  category  denotes  the  situations  where  a 
speaker  is  employing  language  without  any  consciousness 
that  the  language  he  uses  is  anything  other  than 
adequate  to  express  his  meaning.  The  concept  that 
another  form  of  language  might  be  possible  or  more 
adequate  is  not  in  question.  This  might  be  the 
represented  situation  of  a  literary  character,  but 
cannot  be  the  position  of  the  utterance  of  any  work  that 
contains  characters  as  we  saw  above.  The  very  fact  that 
discourses  are  distributed  between  characters  means  that 
a  diversity  of  languages  is  acknowledged. 
Just  this  situation  of  representation  is  what  Bakhtin 
alludes  to  in  his  category  I  B.  There  a  character  is 
represented  as  using  speech  in  the  lunmediated'  way  that 
it  would  be  used  by  the  speaker  in  category  I  A. 
Formally,  Bakhtin's  description  of  this  category  as 
,  single-voiced,  is  misleading.  His  defence  of  this  is 
that  there  is  no  interaction  between  the  narrator's 
language  and  the  character's,  as  the  character  is 
'unaware'  of  a  second  speech  centre.  This  means  that 
there  is  no  dialogue  between  the  two  forms  of  speech. 
An  argument  based  on  the  character's  'awareness'  seems 
open  to  question:  what  could  this  mean?  All  it  can 
imply  is  that  the  author  has  chosen  not  to  intrude  upon 
the  character's  speech.  This  might  be  possible  if  the 
character  is  drawn  from  life,  so  that  her  speech  is 
recorded  and  can  be  reproduced  verbatim.  But  as  we  have 
seen,  even  this  minimal  necessity  of  reproduction  rules 
out  the  possibility  that  we  are  confronted  with  the 
character's  utterances.  The  case  is  compounded  for  any 
fictional  character,  or  one  whose  speech  is  Provided  by 
the  author.  The  illusion  that  the  character's  language 
is  unaffected  by  the  author  who  has  chosen  and  edited  it 
is  a  double  illusion  of  the  sort  that  seeks  to  deny  that 
any  illusion  is  being  perpetrated. 
Indeed,  this  category  seems  closer  to  that  of  the 
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authorial  control  of  the  character's  language,  and 
where  the  forms  of  the  language  are  in  dialogue.  The 
distinction  between  'unidirectional,  and 
'varidirectionall  speech  depends  on  whether  the  speech 
of  the  author  and  the  character  pursues  the  same  or 
different  purposes. 
3.3.3  VOICE  AND  AUTHORITY 
This  recalls  the  important  point  that,  for  Bakhtin, 
agreement  as  much  as  disagreement  is  a  dialogic 
encounter.  Agreement  expresses  a  negotiation  of 
authority.  It  is  not  appropriate,  for  instance,  for  a 
private  to  agree  to  the  orders  of  a  general.  He  should 
simply  obey  them.  Agreement  opens  up  the  possibility  of 
disagreement.  The  word  of  the  other  is  not  simply 
accepted  but  is  assessed.  In  unidirectional  double 
voicedness,  the  discourse  of  the  other  is  affirmed  by 
being  adopted.  It  is  implicitly  tested  and  approved, 
Where  the  voice  of  the  other  is  tested  but  this  time 
found  wanting,  we  have  the  case  of  Ivaridirectional 
passive  double-voicedness.  '  Bakhtin  takes  parody  as  the 
exemplar  here,  By  exaggeration  of  the  points  at  which 
the  narratorial  voice  and  the  voice  of  the  character 
differ  the  narrator  can  hold  the  character's  voice  up  to 
judgment  or  ridicule.  We  should  not  forget  that  the 
term  'voice,  here  covers  the  whole  gamut  of  linguistic 
and  ideological  particularities  that  distinguish  the 
various  forms  of  discourse. 
But  it  may  be  that  the  parodied  voice  is  capable  of 
resistance,  and  that  in  fact  the  battle  between  the  two 
becomes  a  battle  of  equals.  In  active  double  voiced 
words,  the  characterfs  discourse  resists,  the  author's 
intentions.  This  may  seems  strange.  Surely  an  author 
is  in  control  of  his  characterfs  speech?  Such  a 
response  ignores  the  extent  to  which  any  speaker  is  in 
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more,  for  Bakhtin,  language  is  not  a  neutral  tool 
manipulated  by  the  speaker,  but  a  complex  intersection 
of  evolving  discourses  with  competing  claims  to  power  of 
which  the  speaker  is  a  manifestation.  Just  as  the 
inexperienced  rider  of  a  powerful  horse  may  find  that 
the  animal  bolts  with  him,  so  an  utterance  may  turn  on 
its  speaker,  or  a  character's  speech  may  turn  on  its 
author.  4 
It  may  be  that  an  author  elects  to  have  a  character 
represent  a  particular  set  of  discourses  in  order  to 
undercut  the  claims  to  power  and  coherence  of  that 
discourse.  Those  claims  to  power,  however,  are  founded 
in  discourses  that  run  beyond  the  text,  that  antedate 
it.  The  same  holds  true  of  the  author's  own  preferred 
form  of  discourse.  It  may  prove  to  be  the  case  that  the 
character's  discourse  is  ultimately  better  founded  that 
the  authorfs.  So.  for  instance,  a  nineteenth  century 
skit  on  the  absurdity  of  evolutionary  ideas  might  guy  a 
character  who  propounds  a  thinly-veiled  doctrine  in 
accordance  with  Darwin's  views.  The  last  laugh  is  now 
on  the  author  rather  than  the  character,  as  the 
characterfs  views  are  more  firmly  grounded  in  the  wider 
social  discourse  than  the  authorfs  at  this  date.  This 
is,  of  course,  the  counterpart  of  Leo  Strauss's  position 
on  the  writer  who  conceals  his  sympathies  for  a  view 
which  he  expounds  while  seeming  to  attack  it5.  It  may 
To  anticipate  our  later  argument  this  is  exactly  what  we  will 
find  in  the  case  of  the  oath  on  the  divine  name,  where  the  power 
of  the  discourse  bolts,  with  the  speaker. 
5  Leo  Strauss  (1952)  explores  the  concept  of  writing  between  the 
lines  in  his  Persecution  and  the  Art  of  Writing.  The  avowed 
purpose  of  his  study  is  to  alert  historians  to  the  possibility 
that  the  ostensible  ideology  of  a  text  may  not  reflect  the well  be  that  an  author, 
of  the  correctness  of  a 
Unwittingly  serves  only 
the  opposing  discourse 
upon  it. 
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convinced  in  his  or  her  own  mind 
particular  view  quite 
to  demonstrate  the  strength  of 
by  the  feebleness  of  her  attack 
author's  views.  This  is  especially  so  if  the  text  is  produced 
under  conditions  of  persecution  where  the  direct  statement  of 
unpopular  views  might  lead  to  the  censorship  of  the  text  and 
endanger  the  author's  life. 
Strauss  argues  that  it  is  possible  to  imagine  a  situation  where  an 
author  in  such  a  situation  might  comply  with  the  enforced 
ideology,  but  leave  sufficient  clues  for  the  wise  and  the  curious 
to  catch  on  to  the  subversive  message  of  the  text.  So  Strauss 
uses  the  example  of  a  historian  in  a  totalitarian  atheistic 
society  who  comes  to  doubt  the  government's  interpretation  of  the 
role  of  religion: 
Nobody  would  prevent  him  from  publishing  a  passionate  attack 
on  what  he  would  call  the  liberal  view.  He  would  of  course 
have  to  state  the  liberal  view  before  attacking  it;  he  would 
make  that  statement  in  the  quiet,  unspectacular  and  somewhat 
boring  manner  which  would  seem  to  be  but  natural;  he  would 
use  many  technical  terms  and  attach  undue  importance  to 
insignificant  details;  he  would  seem  to  forget  the  holy  war 
of  mankind  in  the  petty  squabbles  of  the  pedants.  Only  when 
he  reached  the  core  of  the  argument  would  he  write  three  or 
four  sentences  in  that  terse  and  lively  style  which  is  apt 
to  arrest  the  attention  of  young  men  who  love  to  think. 
(1952:  24) 
So  Strauss  envisages  such  a  curious,  intelligent  reader  being 
struck  by  this  incongruous  passage,  and  then  being  lead  to  re-read 
the  book  two  or  three  times,  a  process  which  would  confirm  the 
dawning  insight  that  the  position  which  ostensibly  was  being 
attacked  was  in  fact  being  promoted  with  passion. -.  4 
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An  author  is  therefore  no  more  in  final  control  of  his 
characters'  utterances  that  he  is  of  his  own. 
Authorship  and  authority  become  complex  issues  in 
Bakhtin's  thought.  He  is  at  pains  to  distinguish  the 
'real  author'  from  the  'image  of  the  author'  in  the 
text.  The  two  are  intimately  connected,  but  their 
connections  do  not  form  part  of  the  being  of  the  text. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  decision  to  treat  the  text  as 
utterance  inevitably  leads  to  the  projection  of  an 
author. 
3.3.4  VOICE  AND  AUTHOR 
3.3.4.1  Mukarovsky 
The  same  understanding  of  the  author  is  well  expressed 
by  Mukarovsky: 
The  creator's  personality  is  ...  always  felt  to  be 
behind  the  work  even  if  we  do  not  have  the 
slightest  information  about  the  concrete  creator 
and  his  actual  mental  life.  It  is  a  mere 
projection  of  the  perceiver's  mental  act  ...  behind 
each  work  of  art  the  perceiving  subject  intensely 
feels  the  subject  providing  the  sign  (the  artist) 
to  be  responsible  for  the  mental  state  which  the 
work  has  aroused  in  him.  From  here  it  is  only  a 
step  to  the  involuntary  hypostasis  of  the  concrete 
creative  subject,  constructed  only  on  the  basis  of 
premises  given  by  the  work.  It  is  clear  that  this 
hypostasised  personality,  which  we  shall  call  the 
author's  personality,  need  not  coincide  with  the 
artist's  actual  psychophysical  personality. 
(Mukarovsky  1977:  163) 
3.3.4.2  Foucault 
The  implications  of  this  are  seen  at  their  most  extreme 
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the  author  not  as  the  inexhaustible  source  of  meaning, 
but  rather  as  a  functional  principle  by  which  readers 
limit  the  profusion  of  meaning.  The  very  positing  of  the 
author  as  source  is  a  mechanism  of  confining  meaning;  it 
is  'the  ideological  figure  by  which  one  marks  the  manner 
in  which  we  fear  the  proliferation  of  meaning., 
(1991:  119) 
Confronted  with  a  text,  the  reader  has  to  constrain  the 
possibilities  of  meaning,  and  the  author  embodies  the 
postulate  of  a  unity  of  intention  behind  the  text.  The 
author  then  is  not  the  source  of  meaning,  but  the 
receptacle  for  it.  Foucault  acknowledges  that  such  a 
system  of  constraints  is  inevitable,,  but  argues  for  a 
change  of  strategy,,  one  that  would  shift  the  focus  from 
the  idea  of  an  originating  subject. 
Instead  of  asking  how  a  free  subject  activates  the  rules 
of  language  in  order  to  convey  its  'own'  meaning, 
Foucault  sees  the  relevant  question  as  'How,  under  what 
conditions  and  in  what  forms  can  something  like  a 
subject  appear  in  the  order  of.  discourse?  What  place 
can  it  assume  and  by  obeying  what  rules?  In  short,  it 
is  a  matter  of  depriving  the  subject  (or  its  substitute) 
of  its  role  as  originator,  and  of.  analyzing  the  subject 
as  a  variable  and  complex  function  of  discourse., 
(1991:  118) 
Such  a  view  of  the  author,  however,  holds  equally  true 
for  the  characters  in  the  work  seen  as  the  'authors,  of 
their  own  discourse.  They  too  become  caught  up  in  this 
process  of  'involuntary  hypostasisation'.  Bakhtin 
himself  found  this  revealed  in  the  novels  of  Dostoyevsky 
in  which  he  sees  the  emergence  of  a  form  of  'polyphonic, 
writing,  where  the  authorial  voice  is  on  equal  terms 
with  his  characters.  This  is  opposed  to  the 
,  monophonic'  or  Imonologic'  nature  of  most  texts,  where 
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3.3.5  BIBLICAL  VOICES 
3.3-5.1  Prickett 
We  need  to  pause  here  for  a  moment  because  Bakhtin 
himself  saw  the  Bible  as  an  archetypally  monologic  text, 
making  an  absolutist  claim  for  its  own  authority.  In 
this  regard,  then,  is  it  legitimate  to  introduce  his 
insights  on  heteroglossia  and  polyphony  to  the  texts 
that  we  are  discussing? 
Stephen  Prickett  points  out  (1986:  210-211)  that 
Bakhtin's  attitude  to  the  biblical  text  may  reflect  more 
about  his  presuppositions  as  a  biblical  reader  brought 
up  in  the  atmosphere  of  the  authoritative  Orthodox 
church  in  the  period  of  Soviet  control  than  it  does 
about  the  text.  The  Bible  in  these  circumstances  may 
speak  with  a  'single  voicer  but  that  does  not  belong  to 
the  text,  but  to  the  institution  that  claims  to  speak  in 
the  authoritative  voice  of  the  text. 
The  polyvalence  and  dialogism  of  a  work  that  can 
juxtapose  Deuteronomy,  Ecclesiastes  and  the  Song  of 
Songs  is  subsumed  in  the  interests  of  a  powerful 
discourse  of  authority  from  an  institutional  guardian. 
The  power  of  the  competing  discourses  within  the  text  is 
shown  in  the  energy  of  the  Reformation  return  to  the 
text,  a  power  that  has  all  to  often  proven  capable  of 
,  bolting,  with  those  who  attempt  to  manage  it. 
In  any  case,  our  discussion  indicates  that  the  ideal  of 
monophony  may  be  impossible  to  achieve  in  any  text. 
That  authors  attempt  to  achieve  it  is  one  thing;  whether 
they  succeed  is  another.  Dostoyevsky's  importance  may 
not  be  in  the  'invention,  of  polyphony.  It  may  rather 
be  his  willingness  to  take  on  board  and  make  a  virtue  of 
the  inherent  polyphony  of  text  instead  of  resorting  to 
the  subterfuge  of  monologism. -I-% 
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3.3.5.2  LODGE 
Furthermore,  David  Lodge  (1990:  97-98)  argues  that 
Bakhtin  himself  came  to  collapse  this  distinction 
between  the  monologic  and  polyphonic.  He  cites  a 
passage  where  Bakhtin  asks: 
'Doesn't  the  author  always  find  himself  outside  of 
language  in  its  capacity  as  the  material  of  the 
literary  work?  Isn't  every  writer  (even  the  purest 
lyrical  poet)  always  a  'playwright,  insofar  as  he 
distributes  all  the  discourses  among  alien  voices, 
including  that  of  the  image  of  the  author,  (as 
well  as  the  author's  other  personae)?  (Lodge 
1990:  97) 
3.4  THE  READER  IN  DIALOGUE 
3.4.1  KRISTEVA 
Having  established  the  legitimacy  of  using  Bakhtin's 
insights  into  the  nature  of  the  discourses  in  the  text, 
and  discussed  at  length  their  bearing  on  the  character 
as  author  of  discourse,  the  question  then  becomes:  how 
are  we  to  use  them  to  shed  light  on  what  it  might  mean 
to  speak  of  the  'character  as  reader'? 
Bakhtin  himself  engages  remarkably  little  with  the 
figure  of  the  reader  as  such.  His  work,  however,  was 
taken  up  by  Julia  Kristeva,  who  in  her  article  'Word, 
Dialogue  and  the  Novel,  (1986:  34-61)  does  offer  a  model 
of  the  relationship  between  author,  character  and  reader 
based  on  her  knowledge  of  his  work.  Her  conclusions  are 
codified  in  the  following  rather  forbidding  but 
ultimately  illuminating  diagram  (Kristeva  1986:  46): Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  3  129 
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Beginning  from  the  right  hand  side,  Kristeva  explains 
this  as  expressing  the  fact  that  narration  is  a  dialogue 
between  the  subject  of  narration  (S)  and  the  addressee 
(A)  who  is  quite  simply  the  reading  subjecto,  The  form 
of  the  formula  recalls  the  separation  between  signified 
and  signifier  in  Saussure's  analysis.  The  Addressee, 
however,  has  a  dual  aspect:  he  is  Isignifier  in  relation 
to  the  text  and  signified  in  the  relation  between  the 
narration  and  himself'.  This  is  a  markedly  cryptic  way 
of  expressing  the  Bakhtinian  insight  that  the  addressee 
is  integral  to  the  constitution  of  the  the  text.  The 
text  is  addressed  to  the  reader,  and  so  the  reader 
becomes  a  presupposition  for  and  part  of  the  production 
of  the  text.  The  reader's  language  becomes  part  of  the 
language  of  the  text  which  forms  the  Isignifier,  which 
expresses  and  constitutes  a  relationship  between  the 
subject  of  the  text  and  the  addressee.  That 
relationship  itself  is  the  signified'  of  the  text. 
The  writer  (W)  of  the  text  is  drawn  into  this 
relationship  and  is  reduced  to  zero;  'he  is  neither 
nothingness  nor  anybody,  but  the  possibility  of 
permutation  from  S  to  A.  from  story  to  discourse,  and 
from  discourse  to  story.  '  Again,  this  expresses  the  way 
in  which  the  text  takes  on  an  existence  which  can  be 
independent  of  the  writer,  but  an  existence  which 
depends  on  this  dialogue  between  Subject  and  Addressee. 
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becomes  replaced  by  a  character,  as  a  system  of  pronouns 
(e.  g.  'he'  as  in  the  diagram)  or  of  proper  names  (N)6. 
But  all  this  is  equivalent  to  the  fundamental  division 
in  the  writer  between  6nonciation  and  6nonc6  in 
Benveniste's  terms  or  between  sentence  and  utterance  as 
Bakhtin  would  have  it.  This  is  expressed  in  the  diagram 
by  the  splitting  of  S  into  Sr  (subject  of  enunciation) 
and  Sd  (subject  of  utterance).  This  presents  a  parallel 
split  to  that  in  the  Addressee  (A).  The  diagram 
expresses  the  way  in  which  this  split  in  the  addressee 
transforms  into  a  split  in  the  subject,  The  two 
disjunctions  complement  and  provoke  each  other.  In  the 
act  of  writing,  of  narration,  the  writer's  language  is 
released  from  its  immediate  context  of  utterance  and 
becomes  open  to  being  taken  as  6nonc6,  contextless 
lauthorless'  speech,  rather  than  6nonciation  or 
utterance.  It  also  divides  itself  under  the  signature 
of  different  proper  names,  and  so  becomes  able  to  be 
used  in  the  construction  of  hypostasised  'authors'.  the 
characters. 
As  John  Lechte  summarises  these  points: 
In  the  diagram,  IS'  and  'A'  are  transformations  of 
each  other:  the  writer  is  included  in  what  the 
reader  reads,  but  the  reader  is  presupposed  in  what 
the  writer  writes.  Not  that  either  the  position  of 
the  writer  or  the  reader  can  easily  be  represented 
for  they  are  irrevocably  double  ...  we  note  that 
writing  is  also  a  reading,  and  vice  versa.  (Lechte 
1990:  108) 
6  This  holds  true  even  for  an  autobiographical  confession,  where 
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3.4.2  CHARACTER  AS  READER 
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  express  the  position  of 
character  as  reader  succinctly:  the  character  is  a 
signed  site  of  translation.  That  is  to  say,  the 
language  of  the  text  is  subject  to  rewriting  by  its 
translation  onto  that  particular  system  with  the 
polyphony  of  the  text  that  the  name  of  the  character 
labels  or  signs'.  'David,  in  the  biblical  text  is  a 
point  at  which  a  response  is  enacted  where  the  author's 
language,  directed  at  the  reader,  is  shown  to  undergo  a 
transformation  of  a  particular  sort,  as  one 
character's  language  is  responded  to  and  translated  by 
another.  The  reader  is  offered  an  utterance  labelled 
with  that  name. 
So  the  'character  as  reader,  is  the  character  as 
utterer,  as  responder.  Character  as  reader  is  character 
as  writer.  There  is  no  character  without  utterance. 
This  is  entailed  in  Benveniste's  statement  about  any 
speaking  subject:  'If  one  really  thinks  about  it,  one 
will  see  that  there  is  no  other  objective  testimony  to 
the  identity  of  the  subject  except  that  which  he  himself 
thus  gives  about  himself,  (1971:  226). 
Yet  what  exactly  is  the  nature  of  this  transformation, 
this  translation  that  the  character  signs?  What  happens 
to  the  utterances  in  the  text  which  are  read,  through 
the  mechanism  of  a  character?  What  particular  mode  of 
selection  is  enacted  when  a  character  responds  to  a 
text?  In  order  to  investigate  this  question  further,  we 
will  turn  for  aid  to  the  theory  of  speech  acts. 
3.5  READING  AS  SPEECH  ACT 
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The  theory  of  Speech  Acts  has  its  roots  in  J.  L.  Austin's 
How  to  Do  Things  with  Words  (Austin  1980).  In  this 
fascinating  text,  Austin  attempts  to  move  beyond  the 
positivist  assumption  that  the  business  of  a  statement 
is  to  describe  a  state  of  affairs,  and  that  unless  it 
can  be  seen  to  be  either  true  or  false,  it  has  no 
meaning.  Austin  investigates  those  cases  where  language 
is  used  to  carry  out  an  act,  what  he  calls  a  speech  act, 
to  change  a  state  of  affairs  rather  than  describe  them. 
This  leads  him  to  a  very  different  conclusion  about  the 
function  of  language. 
Austin's  work  has  been  taken  forward  in  different 
directions  by  different  readers,  a  fact  which  has  led 
to  some  confusion.  The  main  advocate  of  Austin's 
approach  in  Anglo-Saxon  circles  has  been  J.  R.  Searle7. 
7  Searle  appropriates  Austin  by  undertaking  a  systematisation  of 
his  categories  on  the  analogy  of  natural  sciences.  So  for 
instance,  in  his  introduction  to  his  discussion  of  the  promise, 
Searle  states: 
I  am  going  to  deal  only  with  a  simple  and  idealized  case. 
This  method,  one  of  constructing  idealized  models,  is 
analogous  to  the  sort  of  theory  construction  that  goes  in 
most  sciences,  e.  g.,  the  construction  of  economic  models,  or 
accounts  of  the  solar  system  which  treat  planets  as  points. 
Without  abstraction  and  idealization  there  is  no 
systematization.  (1969:  56) 
The  irony,  not  lost  on  Searle  himself,  is  that  he  then  entitles 
his  discussion  'How  to  Promise:  A  Complicated  Way'(1969:  57). 
Searle  rules  out  anything  but  'full-blown,  promises,  and  ignores 
sentences  with  irrelevant  components  and  hypothetical  promises. 
This  still  leaves  him  with  a  list  of  nine  conditions  that  must  be 
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He  develops  Austin's  work  into  a  theory  of  the  rules 
which  govern  the  performance  of  speech  acts.  In  doing 
so,  he  quite  explictly  distances  himself  from  Austin  on 
several  counts;  for  instance,  he  does  not  accept  the 
distinction  between  locutionary  and  illocutionary  acts 
(Searle  1969:  23  n.  1),  which  Austin  puts  forward  as  a 
key  plank  of  his  argument,  and  which  will  be  the  main 
focus  of  our  concern. 
Austin's  own  approach  is  very  different,  and  akin  to  the 
method  we  have  been  using.  Instead  of  seeking  to 
propound  a  set  of  prescriptive  rules  based  on  an  ideal 
model,  Austin's  interest  is  in  seeking  to  elucidate 
conventions  by  the  study  of  exceptional  and  marginal 
cases. 
In  this  regard,  he  comes  closer  to  Bakhtin  than  might 
appear.  Morson  and  Emerson  (1990:  58)  speculate  that 
Bakhtin's  attitude  to  speech  act  theory  would  have  been 
highly  critical,  in  that  he  argued  strongly  against  any 
view  of  communication  that  saw  it  as  a  matter  of  obeying 
a  set  of  codified  rules.  They  quote  his  opinion  that 
...  in  live  speech,  strictly  speaking  communication 
is  first  created  in  the  process  of  transmission, 
and  there  is,  in  essence,  no  code  ...  a  context  is 
potentially  unfinalized;  a  code  must  be  finalized. 
A  code  is  only  a  technical  means  of  transmitting 
information;  it  does  not  have  cognitive,  creative 
significance.  A  code  is  a  deliberately 
established,  killed  context.  (1986:  147) 
Yet  to  represent  speech  act  theory  as  a  theory  of  codes 
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however  valid  it  is  as  a  critique  of  Searle.  A  similar 
criticism  of  Austin's  view  of  context  is  to  be  found  in 
Culler,  who  declares: 
A  theory  of  speech  acts  must  in  principle  be  able 
to  specify  every  feature  of  context  that  might 
affect  the  success  or  failure  of  a  given  speech  act 
or  that  might  affect  what  particular  speech  act  an 
utterance  effectively  performed.  This  would 
require,  as  Austin  recognizes,  a  mastery  of  the 
total  context;  "the  total  speech  act  in  the  total 
speech  situation  is  the  only  actual  phenomenon 
which,  in  the  last  resort,  we  are  engaged  in 
elucidating  ([Austin  1980]  p.  148)"  But  total 
context  is  unmasterable,  both  in  principle  and 
practice.  (1983:  123) 
What  Culler  seems  to  overlook  is  that  it  is  he  who 
introduces  the  idea  of  'mastering,  the  context.  Austin 
only  claims  to  'elucidate,  the  act  within  its  context,, 
which  is  surely  rather  different.  To  adopt  a  scientifc 
analogy,  Austin  is  concerned  to  watch  a  particular 
feather  fall  to  the  ground  rather  than  to  work  out  a 
grand  theory  that  will  predict  infallibly  where  any 
feather  will  fall.  His  interest,  as  ours,  is  in  the 
creative  potential  of  a  communicative  system  where  a 
particular  utterance  does  not  infallibly  lead  to  a 
single  predictable  response8. 
8  The  passage  that  Culler  quotes  comes  from  the  final  chapter  of 
How  to  Do  Things  with  Words  where  Austin  engages  in  the  last  of 
the  teasing  summaries  that  punctuate  that  work  where  typically  he 
rehearses  his  own  earlier  arguments  only  to  show  their  inadequacy. 
In  the  immediate  context,  he  is  engaged  in  revealing  once  again 
that  the  constative/performative  distinction  must  be  considered  as 
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Indeed,  one  could  well  argue  that  Austin  is  actually 
making  the  same  point  as  Culler  in  the  very  passage  that 
Culler  criticises.  By  restricting  themselves  to  the 
investigation  of  simplified  'ideal,  acts,  theorists  such 
as  Searle  narrow  their  attention  to  something  less  than 
the  'total  speech  act  in  the  total  speech  situation'. 
But  this  is  precisely  not  to  deal  with  the  only  actual 
phenomenon',  which  is  the  way  people  do  things  with 
words  in  the  hugely  complex  system  of  interchanges  that 
constitute  any  human  society.  They  deal  with  an 
abstracted  or  idealized  phenomenon. 
What  an  adequate  speech  act  theory,  on  the  contrary, 
'must'  demonstrate  is  how  it  comes  about  that  it  is 
unnecessary  to  specify  a  whole  context  before 
communication  can  occur.  That  is  the  mystery  to  be 
addressed.  To  put  it  in  terms  that  Austin  himself  might 
have  used,  how  is  it  that  human  beings  can  get  away  with 
having  such  an  inadequate  grasp  of  the  total  context  and 
still  communicate  effectively? 
Austin's  focus  is  on  the  pragmatic  observation  that 
communication  does  occur  in  spite  of  all  the  obstacles 
that  a  model  of  language  based  on  a  notion  of  a 
universal  code  comes  up  against.  The  constant 
possibility  of  failure,  of  slippage,  in  the  use  of 
language  means  that  any  theory  that  would  aim  at  the 
'mastery'  of  its  totality  shows  a  profound 
illocutionary  acts.  Such  a  general  theory  becomes  necessary 
because  the  traditional  unit  of  linguistic  investigation,  the 
'statement',  is  itself  an  abstraction,  a  special  case.  Austin's 
remark  about  the  need  to  have  regard  to  the  total  situation  is 
thus  a  criticism  of  the  narrowness  of  the  conventional  wisdom  that 
restricts  its  argument  to  the  true/false  statement,  not  a  claim 
that  the  solution  to  this  is  an  exhaustive  knowledge  of  context  as 
a  necessary  or  even  desirable  goal. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  3  136 
misunderstanding  of  the  nature  of  the  pragmatic 
phenomenon  of  speech.  The  fact  of  communication  thus 
demonstrates  the  irrelevance  of  such  an  attempt  at  total 
mastery  as  Culler  suggests.  Any  aim  of  elucidating  a 
speech  act  has  to  take  on  board  the  impossibility  of 
mastering  it. 
It  is  in  this  sense  that  Bakhtin  and  Austin  may  be 
closer  than  Morson  and  Emerson  suppose.  Far  from 
seeking  to  deduce  and  enshrine  a  dead  code;  Austin 
attempts  to  explain  the  workings  of  an  uncodifiable 
system.  It  is  his  methods  of  doing  this  that  we  will 
now  turn  'to. 
3.5.2  'HOW  TO  DO  THINGS  WITH  WORDSt 
3.5.2.1  Constative  and  Performative 
Austin  begins  by  distinguishing  two  classes  of 
statement.  Those  which  can  be  characterised  as  'true, 
or  'false,  he  calls  'constatives'.  The  second  class 
which  he  identifies  he  calls  'performatives'.  As  he 
first  introduces  them,  these  are  the  class  of  statement 
in  the  utterance  of  which  the  speaker  performs  an  act. 
Rather  than  describing  the  state  of  affairs,  such 
statements  alter  it9.  So,  to  use  Austin's  favourite 
In  this  connection  it  is  irresistible  to  recall  the  words  of  the 
woman  of  Teqoa  when  David  asks  her  if  Joab  had  put  her  up  to 
tricking  him  into  an  act  of  reconciliation  with  Absalom:  'It  was 
your  servant  Joab  who  bade  me;  it  was  he  who  put  all  these  words 
[dbz-m]  in  the  mouth  of  your  handmaid.  In  order  to  change  the 
course  of  affairs  [lit.  to  turn  the  face  of  the  deed/word;  sbb  -Vt- 
pny  hdbr]  your  servant  did  this,  (2  Sam  14:  19b-20a).  Here  we  have 
a  demonstration  of  the  range  of  meaning  of  the  Hebrew  word  dbz- 
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example,  when  a  man  says  'I  do,  in  the  context  of  a 
valid  wedding  ceremony,  then  he  alters  his  own  state  and 
that  of  his  bride,  rather  than  describing  it. 
There  is  a  distinction  to  be  made,  howeverbetween 
'explicit,  and  'implicit'  (or  'primary')  performatives. 
The  first  class  involves  a  set  of  verbs  which  when  used 
by  the  speaker  in  the  first  person  present  indicative 
active  not  only  describe  an  action  but  bring  it  about; 
for  instance:  'I  name  this  ship';  'I  bet  five  pounds'. 
one  of  the  features  which  distinguishes  verbs  which  can 
be  used  in  such  ways  is  an  essential  asymmetry  between 
its  use  in  the  first  person  as  opposed  to  the  second  or 
third.  This  is  because  the  utterer  implicates  him  or 
herself  in  the  action  specified,  taking  responsibility 
for  him  or  herself  in  a  way  that  cannot  be  done  for 
others. 
But  then,  what  are  we  to  do  with  a  verb  such  as  'I 
state'?  In  saying  'I  state  that...  II  perform  the 
action  to  which  I  refer.  It  would  seem  to  be  a  prime 
candidate  for  the  category  of  the  performative  verbs. 
Having  begun  with  this  performative  verb,  I  then  go  on 
to  make  a  statement  of  which  it  is  perfectly  legitimate 
to  ask  whether  it  is  true  or  false.  By  reversing  this 
argument,  it  would  seem  that  implicit  in  every  such 
statement  of  fact  is  an  unexpressed  'I  state'.  Every 
constative  statement  is  also  performative. 
Notoriously,  then,  Austin's  argument  proceeds  in  such  a 
way  as  to  collapse  his  own  distinction.  The  attempt  to 
demonstrate  the  existence  of  a  'pure,  performative  or  a 
pure  constative  meets  with  no  success,  as  the  constative 
and  the  deed,  speech  and  act.  The  purpose  of  Joab's  words 
delivered  by  his  proxy  is  to  alter  the  state  of  affairs,  not  to 
describe  them. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  3  138 
turns  out  to  have  a  performative  aspect;  it  always 
involves  the  act  of  stating,  of  committing  oneself  to  a 
statement.  10  Performatives  therefore  prove  not  to  be  a 
distinct  category  of  utterances.  On  the  contrary,  every 
utterance  has  a  performative  aspect. 
Austin  then  proceeds  to  refine  the  concept  of 
performativity.  He  identifies  three  actions  common  to 
any  utterance;  the  locutionary  act,  the  illocutionary 
act  and  the  perlocutionary  act.  The  distinction  between 
these  is  crucial  to  our  argument,  but  not  always  easy  to 
grasp.  Perhaps  the  most  useful  approach  is  to  turn  to 
an  illustration. 
3.5.2.1  Illocution  and  Perlocution: 
Let  us  then  consider  the  story  of  the  boy  who  cried 
'Wolf!  '  The  act  of  uttering  these  sounds  and  the 
conventional  agreement  that  they  may  -  but  need  not  - 
refer  to  a  large  predatory  canine  are  aspects  subsumed 
under  the  locutionary  category.  But  what  is  the  effect 
of  uttering  these  words?  This  depends  on  context  and 
the  hearer's  expectations  deriving  from  convention.  In 
a  small  village  which  depends  on  sheep  for  its 
livelihood,  it  constitutes  a  warning".  This  is  its 
illocutionary  function. 
10  A  very  similar  conclusion  is  expressed  by  Michael  Polany! 
(1962)  who  sees  any  statement  as  entailing  a  degree  of  commitment 
on  the  part  of  the  person  uttering  it,  the  seemingly  impersonal 
pronouncements  of  science  being  his  particular  area  of  concern. 
11  So  Austin  might  argue  that  there  is  a  concealed  performative 
verb.  The  boy's  cry  is  an  abbreviated  form  of  the  sentence:  11 
wa.  rn  you  that  a  wolf  is  approaching.,  In  different  contexts  it 
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However,  there  is  also,  and  all-importantly,  the 
perlocutionary  aspect,  how  the  utterance  is  taken  by  its 
hearers.  The  story  depends  on  that.  Every  time  the  boy 
rushes  into  the  town,  the  cry  'Wolf!,  has  the  same 
illocutiona.  ry  force.  It  is  still  a  warning.  However, 
the  villagers  soon  realise  that  the  conventions  are 
being  abused.  There  is  no  wolf,  and  so  no  valid 
warning.  when  finally  the  wolf  really  does  appear,  the 
boy  can  scream  and  cry  all  he  likes.  The  warning  he 
gives  is  not  taken  as  a  warning.  Both  what  Austin  calls 
the  perlocutionary  effect  of  the  statement  and  the 
perlocutionary  aim  alter  in  the  story.  The  effect 
changes  from  alarm  to  irritation;  the  aim  changes  from 
provoking  a  futile  rallying  of  the  villagers  to  a  cry 
for  rescue. 
This  is  not  to  deny  that  there  is  a  constative  aspect  to 
this  utterance.  One  might  perfectly  legitimately  ask 
whether  it  is  true  that  there  is  a  wolf  or  not.  The 
appearance  or  non-appearance  of  the  wolf  to  corroborate 
the  boy's  cry  is  crucial  to  the  story.  Yet  there  is  no 
point  in  having  a  boy  to  cry  'Wolf,  if  everyone  can  see 
the  wolf  for  himself.  It  is  the  absence  of  the  referent 
that  makes  language  necessary. 
thinking  of  situations  where  it  was:  a)  the  exclamation  of  an 
indignant  woman  to  an  importunate  male;  b)  the  cry  of  recognition 
when  a  long-lost  German  friend  of  that  name  turned  up;  c)  a 
jocular  invitation  to  a  bunch  of  ravenous  schoolboys  to  start 
eating.  In  each  of  these,  the  illocutionary  effect  is  different, 
but  deducible  from  the  context.  we  cannot,  however,  deduce  what 
the  perlocutionary  effect  would  be  in  any  of  them.  Perhaps  the 
man  would  be  covered  with  shame,  or  perhaps  he  would  be  roused  to 
renewed  endeavour;  perhaps  the  friend  has  been  misidentified, 
leading  to  general  confusion;  perhaps  the  schoolboys  all  have  a 
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What  this  story  does  is  to  illustrate  a  very  important 
and  imponderable  element  in  any  reading  process.  The 
perlocutionary  effect  is  not  ultimately  1--n  the  control 
of  the  utterer.  It  depends  on  the  audience.  Equally, 
the  audience  cannot  be  sure  of  the  perlocutionary  aim  of 
the  utterance.  It  may  or  may  not  accord  with  their 
conventional  appraisal  of  the  illocutionary  force  of  the 
utterance. 
So  Austin  here  cuts  the  link  between  intention  and 
utterance.  In  the  end,  the  boy's  language  does  not  do 
what  he  intends,  which  is  either  to  frighten  the 
villagers,  or  to  warn  them.  Nor  can  the  villagers 
accurately  deduce  his  intention  from  his  language.  They 
rely  on  the  existence  of  conventions,  themselves 
linguistically  constituted,  to  decide  on  a  course  of 
action.  The  audience  is  forced  to  choose  between  th  e 
risk  of  being  made  a  fool  of  by  the  boy  or  the  risk  of 
having  their  sheep  stolen  by  the  wolf.  They  cannot  know 
which  effect  their  response  will  have. 
Austin  offers  a  definition  of  his  distinction  between 
the  illocutionary  and  the  perlocutionary  which  carries 
the  discussion  into  the  realm  of  law  and  the 
conventional  construction  of  society: 
Illocutionary  acts  are  conventional  acts: 
perlocutionary  acts  are  not  conventional...  Acts 
of  both  kinds  can  be  performed  -  or,  more 
accurately,  acts  called  by  the  same  name  (for 
example,  acts  equivalent  to  the  illocutionary  act 
of  warning  or  the  perlocutionary  act  of  convincing) 
-  can  be  brought  off  non-verbally;  but  even  then, 
to  deserve  the  name  of  an  illocutionary  act,  for 
example  a  warning,  it  must  be  a  conventional  non- 
verbal  act:  but  perlocutionary  acts  are  not 
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use  of  in  order  to  bring  off  the  perlocutionary 
act.  (1980:  121-22) 
Indeed,  Austin  concedes  that  I  ...  any,  or  almost  any, 
perlocutionary  act  is  liable  to  be  brought  off,  in 
sufficiently  special  circumstances,  by  the  issuing  with 
or  without  calculation,  of  any  utterance 
whatsoever...  1(1980:  110)  This  means  that  there  is  an 
infinite  polysemy  in  any  utterance  which  is  only  to  be 
contained  by  contextual  factors. 
Having  established  this  definition,  Austin  sums  up  the 
position  in  this  telling  statement:  'A  judge  should  be 
able  to  decide,  by  hearing  what  was  said,  what 
locutionary  and  illocutionary  acts  were  performed,  but 
not  what  perlocutionary  acts  were  achieved'(1980:  122) 
Austin's  description,  however,  may  seem  a  little 
bizarre.  Surely  the  perlocutionary  effects  of  the 
speech  are  the  judge's  concern?  After  all,  to  be  at 
issue  the  speech  act  must  at  least  have  had  the  effect 
of  inducing  the  plaintiff  to  bring  the  case  to  court  or 
else  there  would  be  no  case  to  answer. 
Yet  this  also  establishes  Austin's  point.  Whether  or 
not  the  case  has  been  brought  is  one  thing  at  least  that 
the  judge  does  not  have  to  determine.  The  highly 
conventionalised  communicative  interaction  of  a 
courtroom  is  the  setting  for  his  judgement.  The  judge 
does  not  have  to  decide  that  an  action  has  been  brought. 
He  may  have  to  decide  whether  it  was  brought  properly, 
but  that  is  another  matter,  a  matter  of  whether  the 
conventions  enshrined  within  the  law  have  been 
appropriately  applied,  rather  than  whether  they  were 
applied  at  all. 
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So  Austin  here  ruthlessly  cuts  the  intuitive  link 
between  the  effect  of  an  utterance  and  the  intention  of 
the  speaker.  The  most  stark  example  of  this  occurs  in 
his  treatment  of  the  oath.  Austin's  example  is  taken 
from  Euripides>Hippolytus,  where  Hipopolytus  himself 
attempts  to  evade  the  consequences  of  an  oath  to 
secrecy.  In  Austin's  translation,  Hippolytus  says,  'my 
tongue  swore  to,  but  my  heart  (or-Mind  or  other 
backstage  artiste)  did  notl.  (1980:  9-10) 
In  a  much  misunderstood  comment,  Austin  sums  up  the 
implication  of  Hippolytus'  speech  as:  'thus  "I  promise 
to  ...  "  obliges  me  -  puts  on  record  my  spiritual 
assumption  of  a  spiritual  shackle.  1(1980:  10). 
Hippolytus  is  claiming  that  though  he  uttered  the  words 
of  an  oath,  he  had  not  assumed  this  spiritual  shackle, 
and  therefore  had  not  really  promised. 
A  surprising  number  of  readers  take  this  as  Austin's  own 
view  rather  than  the  view  which  he  is  ironically 
displaying.  This  becomes  clear  from  the  subsequent,  and 
highly  characteristic,  paragraph: 
It  is  gratifying  to  observe  in  this  very  example 
how  excess  of  profundity,  or  rather  solemnity,  at 
once  paves  the  way  to  immorality.  For  one  who  says 
'promising  is  not  merely  a  matter  of  uttering 
wordsi  It  is  an  inward  and  spiritual  act!  '  is  apt 
to  appear  as  a  solid  moralist  standing  out  against 
a  generation  of  superficial  theorizers:  we  see  him 
as  we  see  himself,  surveying  the  infinite  depths  of 
ethical  space,  with  all  the  distinction  of  a 
specialist  in  the  sui  generis.  Yet  he  provides 
Hippolytus  with  a  let-out,  the  bigamist  with  an 
excuse  for  his  'I  do'  and  the  welsher  with  a 
defence  for  his  'I  bet'.  Accuracy  and  morality 
alike  are  on  the  side  of  the  plain  saying  that  our 
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So  Austin  concludes  that  to  say  'I  promise'  is  to 
promise.  It  cannot  be  possible  to  evade  this  by 
appealing  to  fictitious  inward  acts  1.12  so  too,  in  the 
story  we  have  been  examining,  the  boy  cannot  excuse  his 
conduct  by  saying  'I  cried  "Wolf111  but  I  did  not  intend 
to  warn  anyone  that  there  was  a  wolf  around., 
Even  in  the  middle  of  this  scenario,  the  cry  'Wolfl,  has 
not  ceased  to  be  a  warning,  but  it  has  ceased  to  alarm 
people.  As  we  have  already  indicated  this  depends  on, 
but  also  reveals  the  decision  made  by  the  villagers  on 
the  otherwise  undecideable  issue  of  the  perlocutionary 
aim  of  the  boy's  cry.  Undecidable  by  the  villagers, 
that  is.  For  the  reader,  the  narrator  indicates  the 
context  in  which  the  boy  is  speaking,  and  reveals  the 
presence  of  the  wolf. 
Here  the  villagers  act  as  readers  in  the  text,  but 
readers  who  are  less  informed  than  the  reader  outside 
the  text.  The  effect  of  this  in  the  story  is  to  reveal 
the  existence  of  the  conventionality  of  interpretation, 
It  is  told  as  a  warning  to  children  not  to  lie,  by 
exposing  the  fact  that  it  is  easy  to  lie,  simply  because 
the  nature  of  language  is  such  that  it  is  only  trust  and 
convention  that  can  maintain  the  system. 
12  This  is  a  significant  shift  from  Austin's  position  in  his  paper 
'Other  Minds,  (1961:  44-84),  first  published  in  1946,  where  he 
concedes  that  a  broken  promise  is  not  quite  a  promise.  In  the 
case  of  a  broken  promise,  '...  it  may  well  transpire  that  you 
never  fully  intended  to  do  it,  or  that  you  had  concrete  reason  to 
suppose  that  you  wouldn't  be  able  to  do  it  (it  might  even  be 
manifestly  impossible),  and  in  another  "sense"  of  promise  you 
can't  then  have  promised  to  do  it,  so  that  you  didn't  promise, 
(Austin  1961:  69).  This  is  the  very  position  that  Austin  later 
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In  this  sense,  unreadability  is  the  order  of  the  day. 
It  is  an  unreadable  world.  And  yet  action  and  decision 
must  be  made,  though  their  consequences  are  formally 
undecidable.  It  is  just  this  tying  down  of  the 
undecidable  into  an  account  of  action  taken,  decisions 
made,  readings  selected,  that  occurs  as  a  character 
"reads".  It  is  a  locus  for  the  representation  of  the 
perlocutionary  effect  of  language.  Of  course, 
perlocution  can  only  be  represented  textually  as 
locution  and  illocution,  and  the  reader  is  free  respond 
to  these  or  not. 
3.6  CHARACTER  AS  JUDGE;  READER  AS  JUDGE 
3.6.1  CHARACTERj,  UTTERANCE  AND  SIGNATURE 
So  the  final  element  in  the  description  of  a  'character 
as  reader,  is  that  in  such  transactions  in  the  text, 
the  reader  becomes  made  aware  of  the  way  that  the 
character  has  taken  a  particular  utterance.  The  formula 
which  we  adduced  above  from  the  work  of  Bakhtin  and 
Kristeva  can  thus  be  amplified. 
The  character  is  a  signed  site  of  heteroglossia.  What, 
however,  is  distinctive  in  the  character's  utterance, 
what  makes  it  a  cue  on  which  the  reader  can  make 
decisions  about  the  range  of  possible  actions  which  this 
character  could  be  expected  to  engage  in  or  utterances 
which  could  be  attached  to  his  or  her  name  is  the  fact 
that  every  utterance  instantiates  a  particular 
perlocutionary  force  of  the  previous  statement  addressed 
to  the  character  in  the  text  or  of  the  text  that  the 
character  is  reading'.  What  is  thus  displayed  to  us  as 
readers  of  this  transaction  is  the  actualization  of  the 
perlocutionary  possibilities  of  the  utterance  in  one  way 
or  another.  That  actualization  can  only  occur  because 
the  perlocutionary  aspects  are  in  some  sense  translated 
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The  reader  is  in  the  position  of  the  judge.  without 
these  explicit  clues  we  are  left  in  the  dark  about  the 
perlocutionary  aim  and  effect  of  the  character's 
language.  It  is  in  having  these  made  explicit  to  us 
that  we  have  the  particular  interpretative  assumptions 
linked  to  the  name  of  that  character  made  manifest  to 
US. 
Yet,  as  we  have  seen,  the  utterance  ascribed  to  a 
character  is  always  double-voiced,  because  the 
transaction  between  characters  is  always  also  a 
transaction  between  author  and  reader13. 
The  existence  of  these  dual  polarities  is  the  condition 
of  discourse  but  each  is  itself  a  dynamic  polarity.  As 
utterance  depends  on  the  hearer  and  the  speaker,  its 
form  emerges  between  these  poles.  The  hearer  is  author 
in  that  her  language  and  expectations  form  the 
parameters  for  the  text;  the  speaker  is  hearer  in  that 
by  being  induced  to  utter,  the  nexus  of  discourse  that 
constitutes  consciousness  is  enriched  by  the  discourse 
of  the  hearer. 
In  the  language  system  of  the  text,  however,  the  role  of 
'third  person,  is  open  to  the  reader  in  relation  to  the 
discourse  of  the  characters.  Another  way  of  expressing 
the  dynamic  interaction  that  constitutes  the  experience 
of  the  reading  is  the  split  that  occurs  in  the  reader  as 
addressant  in  Kristevals  scheme  between  'second,  and 
'third,  person.  The  addressant  or  reader  is  second 
13  Yet  Bakhtin  himself  complicates  this  picture  when  he  speaks  of 
a  character  zone,,  by  which  he  means  the  way  in  which  a 
character's  speech  may  invade  the  authorial  language  around  his 
utterances  (1981:  316)  The  use  of  a  word  in  the  narrator's  speech 
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person  to  the  narrator's  discourse  and  third  person  to 
the  characters. 
In  addition,  as  'co-author,  of  the  text,  the  addressant 
may  also  occupy  the  place  of  first  person.  This 
constant  shift  in  perspective  is  the  work  of  reading. 
The  shift  from  receiver  to  author  of  the  discourse,  the 
shift  between  responses  to  different  voices  within  the 
text,  the  shift  from  first  to  second  to  third  person  is 
what  consumes  the  energy  of  the  reader. 
3.6.2  DAVID  AS  READER:  DAVID  AS  JUDGE 
The  character  as  reader  is  exposed  to  judgement  by  his 
or  her  option  for  one  of  many  Perlocutionary 
possibilities  of  the  language  the  reader  has  read  along 
with  her.  The  reader,  too,  is  exposed  to  the  judgement 
in  that  he  or  she  assents  or  dissents  frc,  m  the 
characters  judgment. 
It  is  this  line  that  David  is  induced  to  attempt  to 
cross  in  the  'leap  on  the  stage,  which.,  in  their 
different  ways,  both  the  woman  of  Teqoa  and  Nathan 
engineer.  David  moves  from  'spectator,  of  the  fictional 
events  to  participant  in  his  act  of  judgment;  an  act 
which  exposes  him  to  the  the  judgement  of  the  spectator 
of  his  act;  the  reader  of  the  biblical  text. 
In  the  next  section  of  the  thesis,  we  will  move  to  a 
detailed  discussion  of  the  mechanisms  by  which  this  is 
effected.  The  two  incidents  where  David  is  confronted 
with  the  reading,  of  an  anecdote  presented  to  him  by 
Nathan  and  the  woman  of  Teqoa  will  form  the  substance  of 
our  discussion  in  the  next  two  chapters.  As  a  result  of 
this,  we  will  be  led  to  a  discussion  of  the  role  of  the 
oath  in  the  biblical  text,  and  to  the  concept  of  David's 
sonship.  This  will  provide  the  data  for  the  final 
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theoretical  discussion  of  the  nature  of  character  as 
reader  will  be  discussed  in  the  particular  case  of  the 
reader  of  2  Samuel,  and  for  the  discussion  of  biblical 
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CHAPTER  FOUR 
READING  NATHAN'S  PARABLE 
4.1  NATHAN'S  PARABLE 
In  2  Sam  12,,  the  prophet  Nathan  is  sent  to  convey  to 
David  the  Lord's  displeasure  at  his  recent  actions  in 
committing  adultery  with  Bathsheba  and  arranging  for  her 
husband  Uriah  to  be  killed  on  the  battlefield.  The  text 
of  the  passage  where  he  accomplishes  his  task  is  as 
follows: 
2  Sam  12:  1-15 
(1)  And  the  Lord  sent  Nathan'  to  David.  He  came  to 
him  and  said  to  him2:  'There  were  two  men  in  one 
city,  the  one  rich  and  the  other  poor.  (2)  The3 
rich  man  had  very  many  flocks  and  herds:  (3)  but 
the  poor  man  had  nothing  but  one  little  ewe  lamb 
which  he  had  bought.  And  he  brought  it  up  and  it 
1  The  LXX  specifies  Nathan  'the  prophet'. 
2  The  LXX  has  Nathan  preface  his  remarks  with  the  words  'Judge 
this  case  for  me.,  It  is  probably  easier  to  assume  that  this  is 
an  interpretive  clarification  by  the  LXX  rather  than  an  original 
specification  which  has  been  dropped  by  the  MT.  There  seems 
little  justification  for  such  an  omission,  as  McCarter 
hypothesizes,  a  haplography  (1984:  294). 
3  English  usage  requires  the  definite  article,  which  does  not 
appear  in  the  Hebrew.  Some  commentators  wish  to  restore  it  to  the 
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grew  up  with  him  and  with  his  sons.  It  used  to  eat 
his  bread  and  drink  from  his  cup  and  and  lie  in  his 
bosom  and  it  was  like  a  daughter  to  him.  (4)  Now 
there  came  a  traveller  to  the  rich  man  and  he 
spared  to  take  of  his  own  flock  and  of  his  own  herd 
to  prepare  for  the  guest  that  had  come  to  him  and 
he  took  the  poor  man's  lamb  and  prepared  it  for  the 
man  that  had  come  to  him.,  - 
(5)  And  David  became  very  angry  at  the  man  and  he 
said  to  Nathan,  'This  man  is  a  son  of  death;  and 
the  ewe  lamb  he  shall  repay  fourfold  because  he  has 
done  this  thing,  and  because  he  did  not  spare.  14 
(6)And  Nathan  said,  'You  are  the  man.  So  says  the 
Lord  the  God  of  Israel,  "I  anointed  you  as  king 
over  Israel  and  I  delivered  you  from  the  hand  of 
Saul.  (8)  And  I  gave  your  master's  house  (or 
daughter]5  and  your  master's  wives  into  your  bosom 
and  if  that  were  too  little,  then  I  would  have 
added  unto  you  like  them  and  like  them.  (9)  Why 
have  you  despised  the  word  of  the  Lord  to  do  what 
is  evil  in  his  eyes?  You  have  smitten  Uriah  the 
Hittite  with  the  sword  and  you  have  taken  his  wife 
for  yourself  as  a  wife,  and  you  have  slain  him  with 
the  sword  of  the  children  of  Ammon.  (10)  And  now, 
The  discussion  of  the  variants  of  this  verse  will  be  held  over 
until  chapter  6. 
5  The  reading  'daughter,  is  supported  by  the  Peshitta.  If 
accepted,  the  allusion  is  to  David's  marriage  to  Michal  (1  Sam 
18:  27).  The  allusion  to  Saul's  wives  is  obscure,  unless  we  follow 
the  suggestion  that  the  Ahinoam  whom  David  marries  (1  Sam  25:  43) 
is  to  be  identified  with  Saul's  wife  of  the  same  name  (1  Sam 
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the  sword  shall  never  depart  from  your  household 
for  ever  for  you  have  despised  me  and  you  have 
taken  the  wife  of  Uriah  the  Hittite  to  be  your 
wife.  (11)  So  says  the  Lord,  'Behold  I  will  raise 
up  against  you  evil  out  of  your  own  house  and  I 
will  take  your  wives  before  your  eyes  and  I  will 
give  them  to  your  friend  and  he  will  lie  with  your 
wives  in  the  sight  of  this  sun.  (12)  For  you  have 
acted  secretly,  but  I  will  do  this  thing  before 
all  Israel  and  before  the  sun., 
(13)  And  David  said  to  Nathan:  'I  have  sinned 
against  the  Lord'  and  Nathan  said  to  David,  'The 
Lord  has  also  caused  your  sin  to  pass  on;  you  shall 
not  die.  (14)  Nevertheless,  because  you  have 
greatly  blasphemed  the  enemies  of  the  Lord6  by  this 
thing,  the  son  that  is  born  to  you  shall  surely 
die., 
(15)  And  Nathan  departed  to  his  house.  And  the 
Lord  struck  the  child  that  Uriah's  wife  bore  to 
David,  and  it  became  mortally  ill. 
The  problem  of  understanding  what  we  mean  by  describing 
David  as  reader'  of  Nathan's  parable  as  we  have  seen 
This  strange  locution  has  met  with  different  resolutions.  The 
commonest  approach  is  to  see  this  as  a  euphemism  introduced  to 
soften  even  the  suggestion  of  blaspheming  the  Lord  (so  McCarter 
1984:  296,  Anderson  1989:  163).  The  alternative  is  to  argue  for  a 
causative  pi'el  form  of  the  verb,  so  that  the  verse  would  read 
,  because  you  have  caused  the  enemies  of  God  to  blaspheme,  (see 
e.  g.  Sertzberg  1964:  315),  though  this  depends  on  whether  the 
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reduces  to  the  question  of  the  relationship  between  the 
parable  and  David's  response.  This  is  complicated  by 
the  fact  that  his  response  is  two-fold.  His  immediate 
response  is  of  anger  against  the  rich  man  in  the 
parable.  Subsequently  he  acquiesces  with  Nathan's 
application  to  his  own  case.  So  how  does  David  read 
this  parable? 
To  begin  with,  we  shall  look  more  closely  at  the 
workings  of  the  parable  that  Nathan  tells  the  king. 
What  in  it  provokes  his  anger  and  his  oath,  and  yet  also 
leads  to  his  acceptance  of  Nathan's  application  of  this 
anger  to  himself? 
4.1.1  STRUCTURALIST  READINGS 
4.1.1.1  Roth 
Wolfgang  Roth  (1977)  offers  an  explanation  of  the 
initial  impact  of  the  parable  in  terms  of  the 
phenomenological-structural  analysis  developed  by  J.  D. 
Crossan7.  This  approach  draws  on  the  work  of  Propp  and 
Greimas  which  we  alluded  to  earlier  in  the  discussion  of 
the  concept  of  the  character.  As  we  saw  at  that  point, 
this  analysis  allows  the  reduction  of  every  narrative  to 
the  interaction  of  six  lactants,  related  in  the  way  that 
the  diagram  below  indicates: 
7  See  in  particular  his  The  Dark  Interval:  Towards  a  Theology  of 
Story  (1975)  esp.  ch  3  'The  Tradition  of  Parable,. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  4 
Giver  Object  00-  Receiver 
Helper  ON-  Sender  -4  Opponent 
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The  Giver  conveys  an  Object  to  a  Receiver.  The  object 
is  affected  by  the  Subject  who  is  assisted  by  a  Helper 
and  opposed  by  an  Opponent.  This  scheme  was  further 
refined  by  Barthes  (1977)  who  identifies  three  axes  to 
the  structure: 
1.  The  axis  of  communication: 
Giver  -  object  -  Receiver 
2.  The  axis  of  volition  or  quest: 
Subject  -  Object 
3.  The  axis  of  test  or  ordeal: 
Helper  -..  Sender  -  Opponent 
Barthes  also  observes  that  two  characters  may  invest  the 
same  position,  and  that  positions  within  the  scheme  may 
not  be  occupied  in  a  particular  narrative.  We  might  be 
permitted  to  ask  how  far  this  basic  universal  scheme  can 
be  modified  before  it  ceases  to  have  any  explanatory 
value.  Be  that  as  it  may,  Crossan  combines  these  two 
observations  to  produce  a  structure  for  parables  which 
depends  on  the  presence  of  two  senders  or  two  receivers 
along  the  axis  of  communication.  He  thus  produces 
schemes  of  the  following  form  (Crossan  1975:  66) Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  4 
Object  a  0-  Receiver  a 
Giver 
Object  z  10-  Receiver  z 
or 
Giver  a  --lo-  Object  a 
Receiver 
Giver  z  00  Object  z 
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These  reflect  the  structures  of  expectation  that  the 
reader  generates  from  the  text.  For  Crossan,  the  impact 
of  a  parable  comes  about  by  its  disruption  of  the 
reader's  expectations.  The  narrator  sets  up  a  structure 
of  expectation  on  the  part  of  the  reader  which  is  then 
subverted.  Roth  applies  this  scheme  to  Nathan's  parable 
as  in  the  diagram  below  (see  Roth  1977:  6): 
Rich  man  00  One  sheep  from  flock 
(Giver  a)  (Object  a) 
Poor  man  0  Only  sheep 
N 
Traveller 
(Receiver 
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In  this  diagram,  the  heavy  arrows  represent  the  story  as 
Nathan  retails  it,  while  the  light  arrows  represent 
David  and  the  reader's  expectations.  We  expect,  so  Roth 
would  have  it,  that  the  wealthy  rich  man  will  give  up 
one  sheep  of  his  many  flocks,  whereas  he  actually 
delivers  the  single  sheep  of  his  poor  neighbour8. 
Though  Roth  does  not  make  this  explicit,  what  has 
happened  is  that  the  implied  contrast  between  the  two 
main  characters,  the  rich  man  and  the  poor  man,  has 
increased  rather  than  decreased.  There  has  been  no 
mediation  of  the  contrast,  rather  its  exaggeration.  The 
poor  man  begins  the  story  with  one  lamb  in  contrast  to 
the  rich  man's  many.  He  ends  it  with  no  lamb,  while  the 
rich  man  not  only  maintains  his  flock  intact,  but  has 
gained  a  guest  and  feasted  him  at  no  expense  to  himself. 
An  imbalance  has  been  exaggerated,  and  the  listener  is 
left  dissatisfied  because  there  is  no  restitution. 
There  is  a  gap  in  the  narrative  which  needs  to  be 
filled. 
4.1.1.2  Altpeter 
8  Stuart  Lasine  (1984:  111),  however,  makes  the  point  that  the 
reader  of  2  Sam  11  may  well  not  expect  the  'conventional'  answer. 
Such  a  reader  knows  that  Nathan  has  been  sent  to  confront  David 
with  the  events  of  2  Sam  11  and  so  expects  the  unexpected  story  of 
greed  and  theft.  This  may  not  prevent  the  reader  from  having  a 
sense  that  some  convention  is  not  complied  with  in  the  story.  His 
wider  point  that  the  telling  of  a  story  presupposes  that  in  some 
way  the  incident  related  will  be  unusual,  however,  applies  equally 
to  David  as  reader.  If  Nathan  had  come  and  told  David  a  story 
where  the  rich  man  did  take  one  of  his  own  lambs,  there  would  have 
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This  aspect  of  the  situation  is  brought  out  in  another 
structural  analysis  of  the  story,  that  by  Altpeter 
(1982),  who  confines  her  study  to  the  parable  itself. 
As  she  describes  it,  there  is  a  disjunction  between  the 
Poor  man  and  the  rich  man  which  can  be  expressed  as  the 
Opposition  between  the  Personal  and  the  Economic 
spheres,  between  eating  withl(companionship)  and 
'eating  upl(consumption).  But  the  situation  is  a  little 
more  complex  than  the  brief  summary  above  indicated. 
There  is  a  reciprocity  of  riches'  and  'poverty'  here, 
which  is  brought  out  by  Fokkelman  who  points  out  that 
verse  3  gives  an  account  of  the  'wealth  of  the  poor  man, 
(1981:  75).  The  verse  begins  by  stating  that  the  poor 
man  had  nothing;  the  contrast  between  rich  and  poor  is 
stark.  But  then  this  opposition  is  undermined  by  the 
little  conjunction  ky-lym:  except',  We  learn  that  in 
fact  the  poor  man  has  a  lamb;  we  learn  that  he  has 
bought  it,  and  so  therefore  he  must  have  some  money. 
Then  we  learn  that  he  has  sons,  and  further  that  he  has 
bread,  drink  and  a  companion  to  lie  with.  He  may  only 
have  one  lamb,  but  the  contrast  between  one  and  many  is 
shown  to  have  two  sides.  It  may  denote  economic 
poverty,  but  it  denotes  emotional  wealth. 
But  as  yet  there  has  been  no  story.  We  only  have  the 
description  of  the  two  protagonists  in  their  polarised 
but  stable  configurations.  For  the  story  to  proceed, 
this  stability  must  be  disrupted,  as  indeed  it  is  with 
the  appearance  of  a  third  character,  a  traveller  who 
comes  to  stay  with  the  rich  man. 
Altpeter  contrasts  the  poor  man's  conviviality  with  the 
situation  of  the  rich  man.  Given  a  guest  as  an 
opportunity  of  sharing  and  finding  the  companionship 
that  the  poor  man  has,  and  he  lacks,  he  opts  to  steal. 
The  poor  man's  sheep  is  translated  from  one  sphere  to 
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master,  she  becomes  the  food  of  the  rich  man  and  his 
guest. 
The  action  of  theft  represents  the  impingement  of  the 
two  characters  upon  one  another  which  the  story 
promises.  For  a  story  to  occur  they  must  either 
interact  wih  each  other  or  act  together  in  an  encounter 
with  a  third  party9.  We  are  told  that  they  live  in  one 
city,  which  defines  a  geographical  parameter  within 
which  the  possibility  of  encounter  takes  place.  In  other 
forms  of  story,  one  of  the  characters  might  undertake  a 
journey  in  order  that  they  may  encounter.  we  then  hear 
of  the  imbalance  between  them,  on  a  economic  level. 
What  is  interesting  is  that  this  is  presented  as  a 
tolerable  imbalance.  One  might  conceive  a  situation  in 
which  a  story  began;  'There  were  once  two  men  in  the 
same  pity.  One  had  many  flocks  and  the  other  nothing 
but  a  single  lamb,,  and  that  in  itself  would  be  enough 
to  enrage  the  listeners,  and  to  prompt  them  to  wish  that 
things  were  distributed  fairly.  But  then  we  are  told 
that  the  poor  man  has  bought  the  lamb  with  his  own 
money.  The  structure  that  allows  the  divergence  between 
the  two  also  allows  the  possession  of  the  one  lamb  that 
the  poor  man  loves. 
But  again  the  point  is  made  that  the  story  lacks  any 
resolution.  The  gap  between  the  rich  man  and  the  poor 
man  which  was  set  up  so  starkly  and  then  subtly  infilled 
by  the  information  that  the  poor  man  had  possessions 
and  had  companionship  is  now  gaping  wide.  At  the  end  of 
Nathan's  recitation,  the  poor  man  indeed  has  nothing, 
while  the  rich  man  has  the  lamb,  the  food  and  the 
9  on  this  point,  see  Funk  1988:  15ff. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  4  157 
traveller.  The  story  has  not  fulfilled  the  promise  of 
resolution. 
David  Is  response  is  to  leap  into  the  gap'O,  to  seek  to 
provide  the  means  of  recompense,  the  restoration  of  the 
lamb  and  the  discomfiture  of  the  rich  man.  David  casts 
himself  in  the  role  of  the  judge  who  will  restore 
order  to  the  society,  the  figure  that  the  story  lacks. 
10  The  notion  of  'a  leap  on  the  stage,  finds  its  classic  exemplar 
in  the  incident  in  Cervantes'  Don  Quixote  where  Quixote  springs 
to  the  defence  of  the  gallant  Don  Gaiferos  who  is  being  pursued  by 
Moors  (Cervantes  1964:  712-720;  esp  p.  716).  However,  this 
incident  is  being  enacted  in  a  puppet  show.  Don  Quixote  leaps  on 
the  stage  to  defend  his  hero  and  merely  succeeds  in  wrecking  the 
puppets.  It  is,  as  Haley  (1986:  104)  says,  'an  attempt  to  invade 
the  impenetrable  world  of  fiction'. 
The  point  is  discussed  by  Alter  (1975:  11-15)  who  observes  that 
the  incident  is  actually  very  complex  narratologically.  The  play 
is  being  narrated  by  a  boy  whom  both  Don  Quixote  and  the 
puppetmaster  keep  correcting.  The  leap  on  the  stage'  occurs  at  a 
point  where  the  Don  has  been  criticising  the  production  of  the 
play  as  the  boy  who  is  narrating  it  ascribes  church  bells  to  the 
mosques  in  the  scene. 
Alter  sees  the  Don  as  representing  that  fact  that  there  are  two 
contradictory  reponses  to  fiction  which  may  not  be  so  easy  to  hold 
in  tension  as  we  like  to  think:  the  response  to  it  as  'only'  a 
fiction  and  the  imaginative  consent  to  its  reality.  This  for 
Alter  is  a  paradigm  of  Cervantes,  technique  whereby  the  fictional 
world  is  repeatedly  converted  into  a  multiple  regression  of 
imitations  that  call  attention  in  various  ways  to  their  own  status 
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Nathan's  reply  to  him:  'You  are  the  man,  identifies  him 
not  with  the  restorer  of  order  but  its  disrupter. 
4.1.2  DAVID  AND  DISTANCIATION 
So  David  begins  by  reacting  as  someone  outside  the 
story.  Yet  why  does  he  not  realise  that  he  is  being 
obliquely  addressed?  What  leads  to  his  distancing  of 
himself  from  the  case? 
4.1.2.1  Vorster  and  Lategan 
The  exact  nature  of  David's  perception  of  the  parable  is 
the  subject  of  a  fierce  debate  between  Lategan  and 
Vorster  (1985).  Does  he  take  it  as  a  real  case  which 
Nathan  is  bringing  to  him,  or  as  a  fictional  test  case 
which  he  is  being  offered?  Lategan  argues  that  David 
treats  the  case  as  fictional  while  Vorster  interprets 
his  reaction  as  only  appropriate  for  a  'real  case,. 
Vorster  quotes  Lategan  as  saying  that  the  story 
character  of  the  parable  puts  David  at  ease'  (1985;  102, 
quoting  1985:  81).  Lategan,  however,  does  not  simply 
assert  this.  He  takes  the  indefinite  and  anonymous 
character  of  the  opening  verse  of  the  story  as-  a  cue  to 
the  hearer,  in  this  case  David,  to  take  it  as  a 
fictional  story,  removed  from  the  immediate  context  in 
which  David  finds  himself.  This  distanciation  is  the 
condition  for  the  subsequent  recognition  by  David  of  his 
own  responsibility.  Lategan  then  comments  on  David's 
reaction,  using  an  intriguing  typographical  device: 
'David  was  very  angry  with  the  rich  manl(12:  5) 
(David  speaks  of  this  fictive  character  as  if  he  is 
a  man  of  flesh  and  blood!  ).  (1985:  81) 
Lategan  seeks  to  reinforce  his  view  Of  David's  reading 
by  marginalising  this  contradictory  reference  to  the Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  4  159 
"reality,  of  the  rich  man  in  parenthesis  and  drawing  an 
alienating  attention  to  it  by  his  use  of  the  exclamation 
mark.  It  is  also  ambiguous:  does  the  pronoun  'he,  refer 
to  David  or  to  the  rich  man? 
This  'as  if,  is  the  central  point  at  issue  between 
Lategan  and  Vorster.  Vorster  contends  that  according 
to  our  narrator,  David  did  not  hear  the  parable  as  a 
parable  at  all,  (1985:  103).  He  does  not  offer  to 
confirm  this  statement,  and  indeed,  we  might  well  ask 
how  this  could  be  done.  The  whole  debate  between 
Lategan  and  Vorster  is  engendered  by  the  ambiguity  of 
the  narrator's  stance.  The  only  evidence  that  exists  is 
David's  reaction,  which  contains  the  paradox  Lategan 
tries  to  marginalise. 
4.1.2.2  First  and  second  order  characters 
Of  course,  neither  David  nor  the  rich  man  is  'flesh  and 
blood'.  Both  are  characters.  What  is  at  issue  between 
the  disputants  is  whether  David  reacts  to  the  rich  man 
as  a  first  order  or  second  order  character.  In  other 
words,  are  we  as  readers  offered  a  scenario  where  David 
imagines  that  he  and  the  rich  man  could  meet  outside 
Nathan's  story,  or  does  he  view  the  rich  man  a  second 
order,  character,  only  available  through  the  narrative 
which  is  embedded  in  the  speech  of  the  first  order 
character  Nathan? 
once  again,  we  have  no  clear  indication  in  the  text. 
This  indicates  that  the  question  that  is  being  discussed 
here  comes  under  Vorster's  own  criticism  as  one  that  is 
not  specifically  raised  by  the  text  itself.  The 
narrator  can  make  this  embedded  incident  convincing 
without  giving  definite  clues  about  the  narratological 
status  of  the  characters,  so  that  what  Vorster  terms  the 
Imacrotext',  the  larger  narrative  in  which  the  parable 
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determine  whether  the  story  has  a  historical  referent  or 
not. 
What  is  true  is  that  the  story  can  work  only.  because  an 
effect  of  distanciation  is  introduced.  David  can 
be  led  to  identify  himself  as  the  man,  only  because  he  has 
initially  not  identified  himself  as  the  man,  either 
because  he  regards  the  -man  as  some  concrete  other 
involved  in  the  case  Nathan  brings,  or  because  he 
regards  him  as  merely  a  fictional  character. 
4.1.3  KIERKEGAARD'S  READING 
4.1.3.1  David  as  Critic 
The  impact  of  this  on  the  biblical  reader  is  given  an 
intriguing  gloss  in  Kierkegaard's  version  of  the 
parable.  In  his  discourse  entitled  'What  Is  Required  in 
Order  to  Look  at  Oneself  with  True  Blessing  in  the 
Mirror  of  the  Word?,  (Kierkegaard  1990:  7-51), 
Kierkegaard  presents  the  meeting  between  David  and 
Nathan  as  a  literary  conversazione.  The  well-known 
belle-lettrist  Nathan  has  composed  a  short  story  which 
he  brings  for  the  renowned  psalmist  to  criticise. 
Kierkegaard  writes: 
I  imagine  that  David  listened  to  this  attentively 
and  thereupon  declared  his  judgment,  did  not,  of 
course,  intrude  upon  his  personality  (subjectivity) 
but  impersonally  (objectively)  evaluated  this 
charming  little  work.  Perhaps  there  had  been  a 
detail  he  thought  could  be  different:  he  perhaps 
suggested  a  more  felicitously  chosen  phrase, 
perhaps  also  pointed  out  a  little  fault  in  the 
structuref  praised  the  prophet's  masterly 
presentation  of  the  story,  his  voice,  gestures  -  in 
short,  expressed  his  opinion  the  way  we  cultured 
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cultured  -  that  is,  a  sermon  that  is  itself  also 
objective. 
Then  the  prophet  says  to  him,  'Thou  art  the  man, 
Behold,  the  tale  which  the  prophet  told  was  a 
story,  but  this  'Thou  art  the  man,  -  this  was 
another  story  -  it  was  the  transition  to  the 
subjective.  (1990:  38) 
This  clearly  sets  David's  inappropriate  objective 
aesthetic  attitude  in  opposition  to  the  subjective 
religious  appropriation  of  the  text.  The  interesting 
thing  is  that  this  version  of  David's  response  is  quite 
diffent  from  what  is  actually  recorded  in  the  biblical 
text.  In  2  Samuel  12,  Nathan  arrives  at  God's  behest 
and,  without  any  preliminaries,  presents  the  story 
baldly  to  the  king.  David's  response  is  a  blaze  of 
anger. 
This  is  a  far  cry  from  the  urbane  reaction  of 
Kierkegaard's  David.  In  the  biblical  account,  David 
leaps  into  the  unresolved  gap  between  the  rich  man  and 
the  poor  man  in  the  story,  appointing  himself  to  the 
role  of  the  just  judge  who  will  redress  this  imbalance, 
only  to  be  told  that  therole  he  really  plays  is  that  of 
the  unscrupulous  oppressor.  In  Kierkegaard's  retelling, 
on  the  other  hand,  David  stands  back  from  the  story  as 
an  aesthetic  critic  without  realising  that  he  is  being 
given  a  description  of  his  own  lived  experience, 
something  from  which  he  cannot  properly  distance 
himself. 
Kierkegaard  prefaces  his  recast  version  with  the 
admission  that  he  is  'modernizing,  it  to  'make  it  more 
vivid  to  us.  '  What  his  version  does,  in  fact,  is  to 
align  David's  perception  of  the  story  much  more  closely 
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the  biblical  text,  we  are  warned  at  the  end  of  chapter 
11  of  2  Samuel  that  Nathan  has  been  sent  by  God  because 
'the  thing  David  did  was  not  pleasing  in  God's  sight'. 
We  are  thus  privileged  spectators  who  can  appreciate  the 
irony  of  David's  ignorant  self-judgment.  We  can 
experience  the  aesthetic  thrill  of  the  ironic  reversal. 
Kierkegaard's  David  is  not  the  naive,  impulsive  and 
inadvertent  author  of  his  own  judgment  represented  in 
Samuel,  but  a  detached  critic  who  mimics  the  modern 
bible  reader  in  his  expectation  of  deriving  just  this 
aesthetic  pleasure  from  the  text,  perhaps  with  an 
indulgent  smile  at  its  primitive  awkwardness  of 
expression. 
4.1.3.2  God  as  Critic 
In  a  striking  passage  in  his  Purity  of  Heart  is  to  win 
one  thing,  Kierkegaard  addresses  the  issue  of  the 
hearer  as  critic: 
Alas,  in  regard  to  things  spiritual,  the 
foolishness  of  many  is  this,  that  they  in  the 
secular  sense  look  upon  the  speaker  as  an  actor  and 
the  listeners  as  theatergoers  who  are  to  pass  the 
judgment  on  the  artist.  But  the  speaker  is  not  the 
actor  -  not  in  the  remotest  sense.  No.  the  speaker 
is  the  prompter  ...  (1956:  180) 
In  the  most  earnest  sense,  God  is  the  critical 
theatec%goer,  who  looks  on  to  see  how  the  lines  are 
spoken  and  how  they  are  listened  to:  hence  here  the 
customary  audience  is  wanting.  The  speaker  is  then 
the  prompter,  and  the  listener  stands  openly  before 
God.  The  listener,  if  I  may  say  so,  is  the  actor, 
who  in  all  truth  acts  before  God  (1956:  181). 
In  the  biblical  account,  David  takes  on  the  role  of  the 
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on  the  stage'.  Someone  called  on  to  the  stage  to  enact 
the  role  appointed  for  him  is,  however,  just  as  much 
under  judgment  if  all  he  does  is  to  stand  in  the  wings 
and  pass  remarks  on  the  performances  of  his  fellow 
actors.  The  latter  is  precisely  David's  situation  in 
Kierkegaard's  version  of  the  scenario.  David  sees 
Nathan's  story  as  a  performance  on  which  he  is  called  to 
give  a  critical  judgment,  whereas  in  fact  Nathan  is 
setting  the  stage  and  providing  the  script  in  which 
David  opts  to  act  out  the  role  of  the  insufferably 
complacent  critic  under  the  properly  critical  gaze  of 
God. 
Kierkegaard's  formulation  here  irresisti.  bly  recalls 
Green's  account  of  the  role  of  the  theatrical  spectator. 
What  Kierkegaard  makes  clear  in  his  inimitable  way  is 
that.  as  in  Austin's  description,  the  division  between 
spectator  and  actor  is  no  more  absolute  than  any  other. 
With  his  'thou  art  the  man',  Nathan,  as  it  were,  causes 
David  to  turn  round  and  see  the  hidden  audience  which 
has  already  watched  and  judged  what  he  thought  was  a 
cleverly  concealed  private  transaction  between  Bathsheba 
and  himself.  As  the  phrase  which  ends  2  Samuel  11  has  it,, 
'these  things  were  evil  in  the  eyes  of  God'.  In  the 
biblical  version,  David's  ethical  judgment  of  the 
actions  of  the  character  within  the  story  reveals  his 
own  ethical  blindness.  In  Kierkegaard's  alternative,  it 
is  David's  stance  as  a  reader  which  is  laid  open  to 
judgment. 
4.1.4  YOU  ARE  THE  MAN 
Nathan's  'You  are  the  man,  is  a  sentence  which  has  a 
particularly  haunting  effect  on  the  reader.  one 
commentator  who  offers  an  account  of  this  is  Joel 
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Nathan's  startling  and  resonant  announcement  ... 
is 
ultimately  capable  of  being  turned  against  the 
reader,  who  has  thus  far  been  habituated  to  imagine 
villainy  primarily  in  the  third  person,  just  as  has 
the  king  himself.  The  sting  of  this  parable 
gathers  force  precisely  from  the  satisfaction  we 
derive  as  readers  at  the  springing  of  this  trap 
upon  a  character  in  the  story.  Only  as  an 
afterthought  (or  perhaps  not  until  the  impending 
civil  war  is  recounted  in  II  Sam  15-19)  does  the 
multivalence  of  the  prophet's  stratagem  occur  to 
us.  The  'you're  the  man,  of  allegorical  discourse 
is  distressingly  contagious,  but  it  likewise  can 
appear  to  quarantine  and  reassure  ('Yes,  he's  the 
one  all  rightP).  It  much  depends  on  the  type  of 
reader  facing  the  material.  (1986:  41) 
We  have  here,  however,  a  point  of  major  significance  in 
the  relationship  between  the  reader  and  the  text.  If 
the  reader  is  in  a  sense  eavesdropping,  on  the  dialogue 
between  David  and  Nathan  as  we  have  suggested  in  our 
earlier'discussion  of  reader  as  loverhearerl,  he  or  she 
is  here  offered  a  place  in  the  text.  Just  as  the 
pronoun  III  instantiates  the  speaking  subject  in 
Benveniste's  descripton,  so  the  pronoun  'you,  indicates 
the  one  addressed.  The  important  point  is  this:  without 
further  specification,  anyone  within  hearing  of  the 
speaker  could  identify  him  or  herself  with  the  one 
addressed. 
The  classic  situation  of  the  teacher  addressing  the 
class  with  'You,  boy!  '  and  evoking  the  response  'Who, 
me,  sir?,  illustrates  the  point.  Linguistic 
communication  always  has  the  potential  for  such  leakage. 
The  pronoun  'you'  is  what  Benveniste  calls  an  empty 
form,  which  the  hearer  may  choose  to  fill.  It  may, 
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maY  well  be  in  doubt  over  whether  he  or  she  is  called 
upon  to  fill  it.  11 
But  as  such,  these  forms  have  a  particular  kind  of 
'Potential,  claim  to  our  attention.  It  is  always 
possible  that  I  am  being  addressed.  Although  all  the 
other  cues  which  exist  in  most  situations  of 
communication  -  eye  contact,  proximity,  use  of  names  and 
so  onm  -  may  lead  me  almost  unconsciously  and  rapidly  to 
decide  that  this  time  I  am  not  being  called  upon, 
initially  the  possibility  is  there.  It  may  be  my  answer 
which  is  being  required.  There  is  here  an  anxiety  of 
possibility,.  Am  I  being  summoned  to  utter? 
This  is  the  lesson  that  Kierkegaard  in  the  end  draws 
from  David  and  his  response  to  Nathan's  parable.  The 
reader  must  not  treat  the  biblical  text  objectively  but 
must  constantly  remind  him-  or  herself,  'It  is  I  to  whom 
it  is  speaking,  it  is  I  about  whom  it  is 
speaking.  1(1990:  40)  He  applies  this  insight  to  the 
reading  of  the  story  of  the  Good  Samaritan,  enjoining 
the  reader  constantly  to  be  aware  that  he  or  she  is 
being  addressed. 
Then  when  the  parable  ends,  and  Christ  says  to  the 
Pharisee,  'Go  and  do  likewise,,  you  shall  say  to 
yourself,  'It  is  I  to  whom  this  is  addressed  -  away 
at  once!  '  You  must  not  resort  to  quibbling,  even 
less  try  to  be  witty  (divinely  understood,  a 
witticism  does  not  compensate  for  anything  but 
merely  sharpens  the  verdict).  You  must  not  say, 
11  If  I  may  be  allowed  an  autobiographical  note,  any  child  named 
'Hugh'  is  only  too  aware  of  the  problems  of  identifying  oneself  as 
the  targetted  hearer  of  discourse.  Was  it  'You  come  here,  or 
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'On  my  honor  I  can  assure  you  that  never  in  my  life 
did  I  come  along  a  road  where  there  lay  a  half-dead 
man  who  had  been  assaulted  by  robbers;  generally 
speaking,  robbers  are  a  rarity  among  US.  '  No.  you 
must  not  talk  that  way;  you  must  say,  'The  words 
"Go  and  do  likewise"  are  addressed  to  me., 
Therefore  you  do  understand  the  words  very  well. 
(1990:  41) 
Kierkegaard  thus  lays  on  the  reader  a  positive  duty  to 
resolve  the  referential  ambiguity  of  the  second  person 
pronoun,  but  one  which  does  seem  to  rest  on  an 
assumption  that  such  ambiguity  exists.  Yet  the  call  to 
judgement  is  reciprocal.  The  reader  opens  him-  or 
herself  to  judgment  by  the  judgment  which  he  or  she 
makes,  just  as  David  lays  himself  open  to  judgment  by 
his  act  of  judgment. 
The  other  word  in  Nathan's  response  is  also  of  interest. 
'The  man'  is  a  word  that  could  be  applied  at  any  time 
to  a  large  number  of  individuals,  and  one  that  also  has 
several  connotations.  Peter  Berger  (1961:  225-7)  offers 
a  sociologist's  view  when  he  speculates  that  here  David 
is  being  reminded  that  he  is  'a  man,  rather  than,  or  as 
well  as,  a  king.  The  abuse  of  power  described  in  2  Sam 
11  is  supported  by  the  illusion  that  different  rules 
apply  to  kings.  But  it  also  carries  connotations  that 
David  is  being  described  as  the  archetypal  human  being 
'the  man'. 
Of  course,  the  whole  transaction  works  on  the 
tranference  between  grammatical  persons.  David  speaks 
of  the  man  as  'he'.  In  terms  of  Benveniste's  theory, 
'he,  as  the  third  person  is  the  one  for  whom  I  am  not 
directly  responsible,  and  whom  I  am  not  addressing. 
'He,  designates  an  autonomous  centre  of  language.  Nathan 
turns  this  round  to  the  second  person  'You  are  the  man', 
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the  embedded  text  but  one  of  his  own  hearers.  In 
David's  confession  'I  have  sinned  against  the  Lord',  we 
have  the  appearance  of  the  first  person. 
Yet  a  further  question  remains.  What  is  it  that  Nathan 
engineers  in  turning  David's  reading  against  himself? 
What  is  it  that  leads  David  to  accept  this  revised 
reading  of  the  parable  as  applicable  to  himself?  How 
are  we  to  account  for  David's  double  reading? 
To  answer  this  question,  we  will  begin  by  reviewing  the 
critical  literature  which  has  been  devoted  to  the  place 
of  the  parable  within  the  text  as  it  stands.  This 
double  reaction,  and  indeed  David's  subsequent  reaction 
to  the  death  of  his  child  have  posed  problems  for 
textual  critics. 
4.1.5  TEXT-CRITICAL  APPROACHES  AND  READING  STANCES 
4.1.5.1  Schwally 
The  modern  critical  discussion  of  the  origin  of  Nathan's 
parable  is  usually  traced  back  to  F.  Schwally  (1892). 
As  part  of  his  source-critical  investigations  into  the 
historical  books,  he  looked  at  the  three  pericopes  in 
which  Nathan  makes  an  appearance:  2  Sam  7.2  Sam  12,  and 
1  Kings  1.  On  the  basis  of  the  labsurdityl(1892:  155) 
that  David  later  mourns  for  his  child  without  any 
reference  to  the  explicit  warning  he  has  been  given  by 
Nathan  that  his  son  will  die,  Schwally  concludes  that 
Z  Sam  12:  1-15a  has  been  inserted  into  an  older  text  in 
which  the  sickness  and  death  of  the  child  followed  on  as 
an  immediate  and  unexplained  consequence  of  the  divine 
displeasure  expressed  in  2  Sam  11:  27.  With  regard  to 
the  parable  itself,  Schwally  notes: 
The  highly  artistic  rounding  off  of  this  parable 
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development  of  this  form  of  literature.  But  what 
is  to  be  taken  from  this?  our  canonic  collection 
has  been  compiled  so  selectively.  (1892:  153  n.  1) 
The  interest  of  this  rather  cryptic  comment  is  that 
Schwally  here  acknowledges  the  limitations  of  the 
critical  method  he  is  employing.  Faced  with  the 
literary  finish  of  the  parable,  the  source  critic  can  do 
no  more  than  acknowledge  it. 
4.1.5.2  Gunkel 
Schwally's  view  was  taken  up  by  Budde  (1902:  254)  who  is 
cited  by  Gunkel  (1987:  54-55)  as  support  for  his 
contention  that  2  Sam  12:  1-13a  is  a  later  addition  to 
the  chapter.  Unlike  his  predecessors,  however,  Gunkel 
turns  his  attention  to  the  parable  itself  as  part  of  his 
investigation  of  the  influence  of  folk  literature  in  the 
Old  Testament.  In  particular,  he  argues  that  the  lack  of 
reference  to  a  death  in  this  pericope  and  the  lack  of 
evidence  for  a  close  bond  of  affection  between  Uriah  and 
Bathsheba  in  2  Sam  11  allow  us  to  conclude  'with  the 
greatest  certainty'  (1987:  55)  that  the  story  originates 
f  rom  another  context  12. 
12  Bernard  Jackson  (1972:  144-49)  on  the  other  hand  goes  so  far  as 
to  rewrite  the  whole  story  on  the  basis  of  the  judgment,  rather 
than  simply  see  the  parable  as  an  intrusion.  He  hypothesises  that 
there  was  an  original  version  of  the  story  where  Uriah  was  not 
murdered  (1972:  147  n.  6).  This  later  became  modified  by  the 
addition  of  the  story  of  his  death,  but,  at  that  stage,  principles 
of  jurisprudence  did  not  extend  to  interpreting  the  remote  link 
between  David  and  the  death  of  Uriah  at  the  hands  of  the  Ammonites 
as  a  charge  of  murder.  All  this  arises  from  his  contention  that 
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He  points  out  the  folkloric  elements  in  the  story: 
The  anonymity  of  the  characters; 
The  contrast  between  rich  and  poor;  13 
3.  the  sentimental  exaggeration  of  the  poor  man's 
affection  for  the  lamb. 
He  notes  that  its  metrical  form  is  unusual.  More 
intriguingly,  he  comments  rather  diffidently  that  it 
does  not  provide  a  complete  story  but  rather  lets  a 
single  aspect  suffice'(1987:  55).  The  question  of  the 
story's  completeness  is  one  that  we  have  already 
addressed.  It  is  its  incompleteness  that  opens  the  gap 
for  David  to  write  himself  into  it. 
At  this  point,  it  is  appropriate,  however,  to  wonder 
what  situation  Gunkel  imagines  such  an  incomplete  story 
could  have  arisen  from.  Either  it  circulated 
independently  in  this  unfinished  form,  which  prima  facie 
seems  highly  unlikely,  or  else  it  was  truncated  in  the 
process  of  its  incorporation  into  the  material  that 
makes  up  2  Sam  12.  If  this  second  hypothesis  is  true, 
it  calls  for  an  explanation.  The  third  alternative, 
that  its  incompleteness  is  a  necessary  part  of  its 
function  in  this  chapter,  might  rather  undermine  the 
basis  for  Gunkel's  investigation  as  it  would  suggest 
active  composition  of  the  story  for  this  setting. 
13  Gunkel  cites  here  Grizmns  I  tale  no  87  as  an  example  of  this 
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His  concern,,  of  course,  is  to  unearth  earlier  folk 
narratives  from  within  the  text.  Ours  is  with  the  later 
form  of  the  narrative.  In  this  connection  it  is  useful 
to  have  it  pointed  out  that  folk  elements  can  be  found 
in  the  parable.  Such  elements,  however,  could  well  be 
available  to  a  later  author.  Whether  an  author  drew  on 
a  pre-existing  folk  story  or  whether  he  drew  on  common 
folk  elements  in  order  to  construct  a  plausible  parable 
seems  hard  to  determine.  14 
We  may  therefore  happily  acknowledge  the  notion  that 
this  parable  has  resonances  with  folk  narrative  without 
feeling  obliged  to  draw  Gunkel's  conclusion  that  it  has 
been  interpolated  into  this  chapter  and  applied  to  a  new 
purpose.  It  is  just  as  likely  that  the  author  has  seen 
the  appropriateness  of  this  style  of  story-telling  to 
his  immediate  needs. 
What  this  draws  to  our  attention  is  the  implicit  model 
of  reading  that  Gunkel  is  working  with.  In  order  to 
provoke  the  reaction  it  does,  he  argues,  the  story 
should  contain  certain  explicit  elements,  notably 
reference  to  death. 
4.1.5.3  Daube 
For  a  highly  developed  modern  version  of  Gunkel's 
argument,  we  can  turn  to  David  Daube  (1982).  In  Daube's 
14  On  this  point,  see  Kirkpatrick  (1988)  who  cites  a  wide  range  of 
evidence  from  folklore  studies  which  indicates  that  there  are  no 
clear  stylistic  features  which  prove  an  oral  basis  for  a 
particular  story.  Any  linguistic  feature  thought  to  be  diagnostic 
of  an  orally  transmitted  or  folk  narrative  can  be  reproduced  in  a 
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opinion  the  incongruities  between  the  parable  and  the 
situation  it  is  supposedly  referring  to  are  glaring. 
Firstly,  and  in  his  view  most  significantly,  Daube 
follows  Gunkel  in  drawing  attention  to  the  lack  of 
reference  to  the  murder  of  Uriah  in  the  parable.  He 
reviews  some  possible  explanations  of  this,  all  of 
which  he  regards  as  inadequate  in  the  face  of  the  other 
inconsistencies  he  identifies15.  There  is,  for  instance, 
the  question  of  the  relevance  of  the  traveller  to  the 
story.  Daube  does  not  find  any  analogy  to  the  situation 
of  adultery  in  this  account  of  theft  in  order  to  satisfy 
the  demands  of  hospitality.  The  parable  also  evokes 
sympathy  for  the  stolen  lamb,  whereas,  in  Daube's 
opinion,  the  main  story  shows  no  reluctance  on 
Bathsheba's  part  which  might  lead  the  reader  to  feel  for 
her  as  a  helpless  victim. 
Daube  concludes  that  the  parable  would  have  more 
pertinently  fitted  a  situation  where  a  tyrant  stole  the 
wife  or  daughter  of  one  of  his  dependants  to  furnish  a 
bedfellow  for  a  visitor  or  a  favourite.  Daube  finds  this 
pattern  in  Saul's  allocation  of  David's  wife  Michal  to 
Palti  (1  Sam  25:  44).  He  conjectures  that  a  parable 
which  originated  in  David's  circle  as  a  condemnation  of 
Saul's  arbitrary  action  over  this  matter  is  here  being 
15  The  first  line  of  argument  which  he  discusses  depends  on  the 
indirectness  of  Nathan's  stratagem.  It  may  be  that  if  this  was  to 
succeed,  it  was  necessary  to  keep  David  in  the  dark  about  the 
thrust  of  the  apologue  (see  the  argument  of  Simon  [1967:  223-224]). 
Alternatively,  the  indirectness  of  David's  own  methods  of 
arranging  Uriah's  death  may  have  made  his  culpability  under  law 
unclear,  as  argued  by  Jackson  (1972:  146).  Alternatively,  the 
parable  may  have  existed  in  a  version  where  the  rich  man  did  in 
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turned  against  David  himself.  He  further  speculates  that 
Nathan  may  have  been  picking  up  on  the  gossip  of  , 
Bathsheba  or  Uriah's  supporters.  Perhaps  it  was  this 
group  who  hit  on  the  idea  of  reapplying  this  attack  on 
Saul's  perf  idy  to  David.  Or  did  this  reapplication 
occur  even  earlier,  at  the  time  when  David  himself  took 
Michal  away  from  her  husband  Paltiel  (2  Sam  3:  13-16)?  16 
Daube's  boldness  in  reconstructing  these  hypothetical 
transactions  is  impressive  but  not  thereby  convincing. 
His  assumptions  about  the  relation  of  Nathan's  story  to 
the  events  it  condemns  are,  as  we  have  seen,  by  no  means 
inevitable.  He  also  clearly  assumes  that  the  text  gives 
a  more  or  less  verbatim  account  of  a  historical 
encounter  between  the  king  and  the  prophet.  The  final 
paragraph  of  his  paper  reads: 
one  missing  item  of  the  jig-saw  would  be  of 
enormous  assistance:  how  did  it  become  known  what 
16  As  Simon  (1967:  226  n.  1)  points  out,  this  last  parallel  was 
already  noted  by  Leben  (1903:  153).  For  the  sake  of  David  ('the 
wayfarer'),  Abner  ('the  rich  man')  takes  Michal  ('the  ewe-lamb') 
from  Paltiel  ('the  poor  man').  This  also  explains  why  the  parable 
has  no  mention  of  Uriah's  death;  Paltiel  does  not  die  in  the  2  Sam 
3  story.  Leben  argues  that  Nathan  used  an  already  familiar  story. 
Ehrlich  (1910:  296)  saw  the  parallel  with  1  Sam  25,  but  he 
employed  it  to  argue  for  the  implausibility  of  the  story  in  2  Sam 
11.  If  Saul  and  David  could  take  away  other  men's  wives  with 
impunity,  why  all  the  fuss  about  Bathsheba  and  the  need  for  the 
murder  of  Uriah?  The  parallels  are,  of  course,  rather  dubious. 
Saul  takes  back  his  daughter  from  an  exiled  rebel,  and  David  is 
recovering  his  lawful  wife.  By  contrast,  David  has  no  claim 
whatsoever  to  Bathsheba,  and,  as  far  as  we  can  tell,  no  cause  to 
show  anything  but  loyalty  to  Uriah  as  one  of  his  most  trusty 
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Nathan  said  to  David,  in  private  no  doubt?  Did  he 
divulge  it  in  his  memoirs?  If  the  paradigm  was 
current  since  the  rape  of  Michal,  and  certainly  if 
it  was  already  turned  against  David  prior  to 
Nathan's  visit,  chroniclers  might  infer  his  use  of 
it  without  being  directly  instructed.  I  would  give 
all  Watergate  tapes  for  a  tape  of  that  interview 
- 
without  an  18-minute  gap.  (1982:  288) 
It  will  not  be  our  concern  to  elucidate  whatever 
historical  transaction  did  or  did  not  take  place  between 
David  and  Nathan.  Such  a  reconstruction  can  only  been 
made  on  the  basis  of  the  text  before  us.  The  critic  is 
then  engaged  in  correcting  the  text  against  the  putative 
constraints  of  the  actual  event.  This  presupposes  that 
any  such  incongruities  must  arise  through  oversight  or 
incompetence  on  the  part  of  the  author  or  a  flaw  in  the 
transmission  of  the  text. 
It  might  be  possible,  however,  that  such  discrepancies 
are  an  oblique  comment  on  the  irreducible  problem  of 
encoding  any  event  in  language.  By  looking  at  this 
episode  as  a  literary  construct  we  may  be  able  to 
appreciate  the  subtlety  of  its  appeal  to  the  reader,  not 
just  as  a  record  of  fact,  but  as  itself  eliciting  the 
judgment  of  the  reader. 
4.1.6  DECODING  THE  ALLEGORY 
In  any  event,  this  judgment  of  Daube  and  Gunkel's 
depends  on  a  simple  identification  whereby 
Poor  man  =  uriah 
Rich  man  =  Davi 
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Traveller  =? 
4.1-6.1  Delekat 
This  may  not  be  the  only  possible  reading.  Delekat 
(1967)  proposes  a  rather  different  scheme  in  order  to 
surmount  some  of  the  problems  with  Gunkel's  reading, 
especially  the  lack  of  concern  with  the  murder.  Delekat 
argues: 
Uriah  was  killed.  If  he  was  meant  by  the  sheep, 
then  David  would  be  the  guest,  and  Yahweh  the  rich 
man.  In  this  way,  the  parable  fits  the  story  much 
better.  The  chief  motif,  the  murder  of  Uriah,  is 
taken  into  consideration  and  the  noteworthy  fact 
that  David  did  not  steal  for  himself,  but  for  the 
guest  in  the  parable,  is  done  away  with.  In  the 
tale  there  is  no  equivalent  for  the  guest.  If 
Yahweh  is  the  rich  man,  then  he  appears  to  be  the 
real  sinner,  Could  he  not  in  fact  easily  have 
thwarted  David's  murder  plot?  (1967:  33) 
So  here  the  cast  list  reads: 
Poor  man  =  Bathsheba 
Rich  man  =  Yahweh 
Lamb  =  Uriah 
Traveller  =  David 
The  details  of  this  scheme  seem  a  bit  forced,  especially 
the  idea  that  the  point  of  the  parable  is  to  show  Yahweh 
as  the  principal  bearer  of  blame.  Nothing  else  in  the 
story  or  its  development  seems  to  indicate  that. 
Indeedr  Nathan  and  David  seem  to  agree  that  David  in 
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Delekat  does  have  a  point  is  in  his  identification  of 
the  mutual  deprivation  of  Uriah  and  Bathsheba,  and  the 
association  of  murder  with  this  element  of  the 
narrative.  If  the  lamb  was  eaten,,  then  it  was  killed;  an 
elementary  knowledge  of  cookery  could  have  alerted 
Gunkel  and  Daube  to  this  fact.  So  Chibaudel  (1989:  79) 
describes  the  lamb  as  the  life  of  Uriah'  and  Bathsheba 
as  the  poor  man  deprived  of  it.  Wesselius  (1990:  346-7 
n.  13)  argues  for  the  identification  of  the  lamb  with 
Uriah  who,  as  a  resident  foreigner  married  into  a 
leading  Israelite  family,  would  be  the  weaker  partner  in 
the  marriage.  17 
4.1.6.2  Seebass 
Seebass  (1974:  205-6)  takes  another  line  in  arguing  that 
the  real  point  of  the  king's  involvement  is  the  abuse  of 
power  by  the  rich  man.  A  fourfold  fine  is  not  going  to 
17  Wesselius  argues  this  on  the  basis  that  Bathsheba  is  described 
as  Eliam's  daughter  as  well  as  Uriah's  wife.  Her  marital  tie  has 
not  effaced  her  connection  wth  her  father's  family.  This  argument 
is  strengthened  by  his  acceptance  of  the  identification  of 
Bathsheba's  father  Eliam  with  the  son  of  Ahithophel  mentioned  in  2 
Sam  23:  34.  He  rather  disarmingly  states  that  'the  usefulness  of 
this  assumption  for  understanding  certain  aspects  of  the  story 
apparently  confirms  it,  (1990:  349).  In  particular,  Ahithophel's 
part  in  Absalom's  revolt,  and  especially  his  part  in  inciting 
Absalom  to  violate  his  father's  concubines  in  a  fulfil  ment  of 
Nathan's  prophecy  of  the  punishment  to  be  visited  on  David  for  his 
conduct  over  Bathsheba  (2  Sam  16:  21  cf  2  Sam  12:  11),  seems 
explicable  in  these  terms.  Bailey  (1990)  goes  much  further  in 
hypothesising  that  David's  alliance  with  Bathsheba  was  part  of  a 
political  strategy  to  strengthen  his  ties  with  the  north, 
Ahithophel's  fiefdom,  in  the  aftermath  of  Absalom's  revolt,  which 
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be  much  inconvenience  to  him,  even  if  the  poor  man  has 
the  resources  and  the  courage  to  seek  redress  at  law. 
The  law  is  not  geared  to  this  kind  of  manifest  but  minor 
injustice  which  if  unchecked  allows  the  powerful  to 
abuse  their  power  with  impunity.  This  is  exactly  where 
the  king  needs  to  step  in.  Here  too  is  the  analogy  to 
David's  conduct  which  is  a  gross  abuse  of  his  power  and 
ultimately  a  threat  to  the  continued  monarchy. 
Perhaps  what  is  borne  out  here  is  the  inappropriateness 
of  the  attempt  to  tie  the  interpretation  to  a  strict 
equivalence  between  the  incidents  and  characters  of 
Nathan's  story  and  those  of  the  wider  narrative.  The 
more  general  themes  of  murder,  deprivation  and  the 
severance  of  a  loving  bond  are  what  matter,,  rather  than 
a  mechanical  transformation  of  one  narrative  into 
another.  Uriah  and  Bathsheba  equally  exhibit 
characteristics  of  both  the  poor  man  and  the  lamb.  Both 
are  deprived  of  the  one  they  love;  both  are  sacrificed 
to  satisfy  the  appetites  of  the  king. 
The  link  between  Uriah  and  the  lamb  is  also  made  in  a 
way  that  reminds  us  that  the  communication  between 
narrator  and  reader  is  here  intersecting  with  the 
communication  between  characters.  Part  of  the  problem 
of  the  connection  between  the  parable  and  the  wider 
context  arises  from  the  interaction  of  these  two 
channels  of  communication. 
The  most  striking  instance  of  this  in  this  text  is  the 
coincidence  between  the  verbs  used  to  describe  the 
relationship  of  the  lamb  and  the  poor  man,  and  Uriah's 
refusal  to  comply  with  David's  plans  for  him.  In  2  Sam 
11:  11,  Uriah  indignantly  points  out  that  the  whole  of 
the  nation  is  on  the  battlefield:  'Shall  I  then  go  to  my 
house  to  eat  and  to  drink  and  to  lie  with  my  wife?, 
Exactly  these  verbs  reappear  in  the  parable  with 
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and  drink  of  his  cup,  and  lie  in  his  bosom,  (2  Sam  12: 
3)18.  Nathan,  s  utterance  then,  is  evoked  by  the  reaction 
Of  the  'over-hearer'  of  this  text,  not  as  part  of  the 
ostensible  communication  between  Nathan  and  David. 
4.2  THE  JURIDICAL  PARABLE 
4.2.1  THE  JURIDICAL  PARABLE  AS  GENRE 
4.2.1.1  Simon 
A  major  contribution  to  the  debate,  which  seeks  to 
defend  the  connection  between  Nathan's  story  and  the 
text  of  2  Sam  11,  is  made  by  Uriel  Simon  (1967).  He 
introduces  the  concept  of  the  'juridical  parable,  to  the 
discussion.  He  defines  this  as  follows: 
The  Juridical  parable  constitutes  a  realistic  story 
about  a  violation  of  the  law,  related  to  someone 
who  had  committed  a  similar  offence  with  the 
purpose  of  leading  the  unsuspecting  hearer  to  pass 
judgment  on  himself.  The  offender  will  only  be 
caught  in  the  trap  set  for  him  if  he  truly  believes 
that  the  story  told  him  actually  happened,  and  only 
if  he  does  notdetect  prematurely  the  similarity 
between  the  offence  in  the  story  and  the  one  he 
himself  has  committed.  Tree  and  animal  parables 
are  intrinsically  intended  to  arouse  comparisons. 
'The  realistic  dress  of  the  juridical  parable,  on 
the  other  hand,  is  intended  to  conceal  the  very 
fact  that  it  is  a  parable.  The  narrator  has  to 
strike  a  careful  balance  between  getting  too  close 
18  The  same  verbs  also  recur  in  the  story  of  David's  mourning  for 
Bathsheba's  child,  where  he  refuses  to  eat  and  lies  on  the  ground 
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to  the  parable's  application  and  being  too  remote 
from  it.  In  both  cases,  he  is  liable  to  undermine 
the  force  of  the  analogy.  Once  the  narrator  has 
succeeded  in  completely  concealing  his  intentions, 
he  drops  the  veil  and  usually  points  the  moral  by 
identifying  the  villian  [sic]  of  the  parable  with 
the  hearer:  "Thou  art  the  man".  The  juridical 
parable  is  a  disguised  parable  designed  to  overcome 
man's  own  closeness  to  himself,  enabling  him  to 
judge  himself  by  the  same  yardstick  he  applies  to 
others  (1967:  221). 
So  Simon  defends  the  apparent  discrepancy  between  the 
parable  and  the  situation  to  which  it  is  applied  as 
integral  to  the  functioning  of  the  parable.  It  is  not 
the  result  of  a  pre-existing  story  being  pressed  into 
service,  but  arises  from  the  need  to  disguise  the  point 
of  the  parable  so  as  to  prevent  its  hearer  from 
realising  its  point  until  he  has  incriminated  himself19. 
Yet  it  must  have  enough  features  with  a  bearing  on  the 
situation  to  force  the  hearer  to  admit  to  its 
applicability  to  his  case  when  this  is  pointed  out. 
'Every  parable,  and  in  particular  the  juridical  one 
where  concealment  is  of  the  essence,  is  based  on  a 
delicate  relationship  of  closeness  and  remoteness 
towards  the  object  of  its  application'  (1967:  223). 
Simon  identifies  four  examples  of  juridical  parables  in 
the  Bible  besides  2  Sam  11:  1-14:  2  Sam  14:  1-20;  1  Kings 
20:  35-43;  Isa  5:  1-7;  Jer  3:  1-5.  The  first  three  involve 
19  In  point  of  fact,  Simon's  claim  is  foreshadowed  by  the  comment 
in  Mezudoth  Zion  as  summarised  by  Sosevsky  (1986:  324)  that  'much 
of  the  parable  was  impertinent  to  David  but  was  included  so  that 
David  take  the  story  literally  and  fail  to  conclude  its  true 
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a  confrontation  with  a  king  who  is  induced  to  pass 
judgment  on  his  own  conduct.  In  the  latter  two,  a 
prophet  appeals  for  the  people's  judgment  only  to  turn 
it  against  them.  For  the  purposes  of  our  discussion  we 
will  confine  our  attention  to  the  three  passages  in  the 
Former  Prophets  as  the  others  are  even  by  Simon's 
reckoning  derived  'rhetorical-literary,  transformations 
of  the  situation  of  appeal  to  the  king20  (1967:  222). 
Simon's  definition  of  this  genre  raises  several 
questions  which  have  been  dealt  with  in  divergent  ways 
by  those  who  have  followed  up  his  suggestions. 
4.2.1.2  Critique  of  Simon 
Firstly,,  we  might  ask  what  the  generic  definition  of  the 
juridical  parable  might  be.  21  It  is  interesting  that 
20  The  appropriateness  of  stretching  the  definition  of  the  genre 
to  these  two  cases  has  been  questioned  in  his  detailed  review  of 
the  various  generic  labels  that  have  been  applied  to  Isaiah  5:  1-7. 
21  For  an  extended  discussion  of  this  problem  see  Coats  1986.  He 
rightly  questions  the  confusion  of  genre  and  function  in  the  use 
of  the  term  'juridical  parable,.  His  own  suggestion  is  that  the 
story  be  regarded  as  a  fable.  He  defines  this  genre  as  follows: 
'A  fable  paints  a  picture  of  relationships  in  the  human  world  by 
casting  these  relationships  in  exaggerated  form  with  characters 
from  the  subhuman  world,  (1986:  373).  The  other  examples  he  cites 
are  Jotham's  fable  (Jud  9:  7-15),  Jehoash's  fable  (2  Kings  14:  9) 
and  the  story  of  Balclam  and  his  ass  (Num  22:  21-35).  In  applying 
this  definition  to  Nathan's  story,  Coats  acknowledges  the 
objections  that  may  be  raised  on  the  grounds  that  the  animal  is 
passive  and  does  not  speak.  He  counters  this  by  arguing  that  the 
action  turns  on  the  animal.  'To  deny  that  this  story  is  a  fable 
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Simon  himself  defines  it  in  relation  to  the  situation  of 
its  telling.  Nathan's  story  has  no  intrinsic  quality  by 
which  it  could  be  identified  as  a  juridical  parable 
without  the  wider  narrative  which  describes  the 
underlying  situation  to  which  it  refers  and  the  reaction 
of  its  hearer.  It  would  make  no  sense  to  describe  an 
isolated  story  of  the  theft  of  a  poor  man's  lamb  as  a 
juridical  parable.  The  most  we  might  be  able  to  say  is 
that  we  could  envisage  circumstances  in  which  it  might 
function  to  elicit  a  judgment. 
It  is  significant  that  Simon  himself  in  citing  these 
stories  gives  a  reference  which  includes  the  reaction  of 
the  target  of  the  story.  What  Simon  has  identified  is  a 
group  of  stories  which  involve  a  self-reflexive  judgment 
by  one  of  the  characters.  There  is  a  confusion  which 
runs  through  the  literature  in  the  use  of  the  word 
'parable,.  If  it  is  applicable  at  all,  then  it  applies, 
in  Nathan's  case,,  to  2  Sam  12:  lb-4.  Any  more  than  that 
and  we  are  not  dealing  with  a  parable,  but  a  story  about 
the  reception  of  a  parable. 
active  roles  is  to  define  the  genre  by  reference  to  particular 
features  in  the  story's  content'  (1986:  372).  To  this  we  may  well 
reply  that  it  is  hard  to  see  what  else  Coats  is  doing  if  he  is  not 
defing  the  story  as  a  fable  precisely  on  the  basis  of  particular 
features  of  its  content:  the  presence  of  an  animal  in  the  text. 
In  order  to  defend  himself  from  this  charge,  Coats  offers  a  new 
functional  definition  of  a  fable  as  a  critique  of  the  power 
wielded  by  the  famous  to  the  pain  of  those  subject  to  the  power, 
(1986:  272).  He  is  of  course  entitled  to  revise  his  definition, 
but  this  does  seem  to  evacuate  the  fable  of  any  distinctive 
features  as  against  satire  or  polemic.  It  is  hard  to  see  how 
assigning  this  story  to  this  revised  and  revisable  category  does 
any  more  to  elucidate  it  than  calling  it  a  parable.  Coats  himself 
does  go  on  to  argue  that  parable  is  best  seen  as  a  functional 
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There  is  something  then  to  be  said  for  the  position  of 
De  Vries  (1978).  He  makes  use  of  the  category  of  'Regal 
Self-judgment  Stories,  to  describe  2  Sam  12:  1-7,  a 
category  that  he  defines  as:  'A  story  in  which  a  king's 
word  or  act  determines  his  own  judgement.  Purpose: 
enhance  the  belief  that  Yahweh's  supreme  authority  comes 
to  paradoxical  expression  in  the  responsible  deeds  of 
the  institutional  holders  of  power,  (1978:  55).  This  is 
a  sub-category  of  his  wider  interest  in  what  he  calls 
,  the  prophetic  legend'.  He  himself  admits  that  this 
description  defines  the  circle  of  tradents  and/or  the 
subject-matter  rather  than  addressing  a  particular 
literary  device.  The  stories  must  involve  a  prophet  and 
a  king.  So  he  does  not  include  2  Sam  14  in  his  purview 
simply  on  the  grounds  that  no  prophetic  figure  is 
involved. 
In  any  case,  the  comments  of  D.  M.  Gunn  (1982:  41)  are 
relevant  here.  He  argues  that  'if  Simon  is  really 
suggesting,  as  would  appear,  that  we  have  here  a 
"literary  genre-  with  a  primary  connection  with  a 
"legal"  setting  of  kings  and  "judges  at  the  gate",  then 
one  must  observe  that  as  such  it  can  hardly  have  enjoyed 
much  of  a  vogue.  '  He  points  out  that  situations  in 
which  a  litigant  against  the  king  would  practice  a 
deliberate  deception  against  him  must  have  been  'rare 
and  risky  events  1.22 
22  In  his  novelistic  treatment  of  the  confrontation  between  David 
and  Nathan  in  2  Sam  12,  Stefan  Heym  has  David  remark  to  Nathan: 
'Either  the  Lord  is  truly  speaking  through  you,  Nathan,  or  you  are 
the  most  insolent  man  this  side  of  the  Jordan...  1  (1984:  166).  The 
possible  consequences  for  Nathan  if  the  latter  proves  to  be  the 
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Such  considerations  lead  K.  Whitelam  (1979:  135-6)  to 
suppose  that  both  the  story  of  Nathan,  s  encounter  with 
David  and  the  story  of  the  woman  of  Teqoa  are  literary 
constructions  from  the  outset,  designed  to  exonerate 
David  from  blame.  The  legal  authority  and  probity  of 
the  kings  that  these  stories  rely  on  and  depict  is,  he 
claims,  more  a  product  of  the  wishful  thinking  of  later 
writers  than  descriptions  of  actual  circumstances.  They 
reveal  the  gap  between  the  theory  and  the  practice  of 
royal  judicial  authority. 
4.2.2  THE  FORCE  OF  THE  PARABLE 
4.2.2.1  Simon 
But  for  the  purposes  of  our  investigation,  the  question 
that  needs  to  be  addressed  is:  what  leads  David  to 
accept  the  judgment  in  both  cases  as  applying  to  him? 
Or.  to  put  it  another  way,  what  is  the  textual  feature 
that  makes  acceptable  to  the  reader  the  transformation 
of  the  character  David  brought  about  by  these  two 
stories? 
Simon  appears  to  argue  that  this  depends  on  the  law. 
David  as  king  is  the.  final  arbiter  in  Israel's  legal 
system,  but  is  also  not  above  his  own  law.  'The  legal 
issue,  which  is  the  hallmark  of  this  literary  genre,  is 
realistic  in  character  when  addressed  to  the  king-judge, 
(1967:  221)  Having  been  induced  to  give  a  ruling,  David 
is  obliged  to  stick  by  it  when  the  case  is  shown  to 
parallel  his  own  conduct.  The  constraint  thus  becomes 
the  overarching  rule  of  law.  23 
23  The  legal  implications  of  these  stories  are  discussed  by 
Whitelam  (1979:  123-256).  He  cites  commentators  who  have  used  these 
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If  this  is  the  case,  then  Simon  is  obliged  to  argue  that 
2  Sam  14  is  the  exception  proves  the  rule.  He  claims 
that  the  extenuating  facts  that  the  woman  adduces  for 
the  case  of  her  son  (that  he  was  the  only  son,  that  the 
killing  was  the  result  of  a  quarrel  that  could  have  gone 
either  way)  mean  that  the  intention  of  Joab  and  the 
woman  could  not  have  been  to  lead  David  to  a  verdict 
which  would  implicitly  bind  him.  Neither  of  these 
provisions  applt4sto  Absalom,  who  had  carried  out  a  cold- 
blooded  act  of  revenge  and  who  was  one  of  several 
brothers  (cf  Anderson  1989:  186). 
The  implication  is  that  these  discrepancies  in  this  case 
reveal  the  underlying  dependency  on  the  binding  force  of 
the  law.  By  introducing  these  inappropriate  details, 
the  woman  subverts  the  genre  of  the  juridical  parable. 
She  and  Joab  were  not  seeking  to  gain  a  verdict  on  the 
basis  of  a  parallel  case.  Rather,  they  sought  to 
prevail  upon  David  gradually  by  awakening  his  mercy  for 
a  son  who  had  committed  fratricide  (Simon  1967:  225). 
Hoftijzer  takes  issue  with  Simon  over  this,  arguing  that 
these  extenuating  circumstances  serve  to  deflect  David 
from  noticing  the  parallel,  but  do  not  alter  the  legal 
position.  He  sees  the  ruling  of  the  king  as  binding  in 
that  the  underlying  nature  of  the  cases  is  the  same. 
The  extenuating  circumstances  are  not  relevant  to  the 
judgment.  'The  conclusion  must  be  that  for  juridical 
cases  being  parallels,  they  -only"  needed  to  be  so  in 
the  basic  facts:  one  brother  killing  another,  a  rich  man 
stealing  from  a  poor  one,  a  prisoner  of  war  let 
gol(1970:  423  n-1). 
(1972)  argues  that  Nathan's  device  suggests  that  court  officials 
could  act  as  judicial  mediators.  There  is  no  other  biblical 
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4.2.2.2  Critique  of  Juridical  Concept 
So  to  defend  the  concept  of  the  juridical  parable,  Simon 
has  to  argue  that  2  Sam  14  is  a  derived  form  which 
subverts  the  genre,  a  strange  way  of  justifying  his 
concept,  or  else  Hoftijzer  has  to  claim  that  the  most 
general  similarity  can  give  rise  to  a  binding  precedent. 
This  claim  on  the  face  of  it  seems  unlikely.  Such 
similarities  might  have  a  moral  force,  but  not  a  legal 
one.  The  whole  thrust  of  the  halakhic  revision  of  legal 
material  in  the  Old  Testament  and  its  elaboration  of 
basic  principles  illustrates  the  fact  that  a  workable 
system  of  law  demands  that  vague  parallels  be 
systematised  into  strict  case  law. 
Without  this  strict  definition,  it  must  be  possible  to 
demonstrate  that  the  general  parallel  established 
between  the  two  cases  is  unassailable  if  it  is  to  be 
regarded  as  legally  binding.  This  is  doubtful  in  the 
case  of  Uriah,  as  we  have  seen,  but  even  more  so  in  the 
case  of  Absalom.  As  Whitelam  puts  it:  'The  terms  of 
reference  in  the  case  presented  by  Nathan  were  so  vague 
that  it  is  unlikely  that  the  king  would  be  bound  by  any 
such  precedent'  (1979:  128).  In  any  case,  as  Phillips 
points  out,  'While  the  king  was  subject  to  the  criminal 
law  and  therefore  could  suffer  divine  punishment  for 
breach  of  it,  it  is  possible  that  as  head  of  the 
judiciary  he  was  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts, 
and  therefore  could  not  be  indicted  and  tried  on  a 
criminal  chargel(1970:  135  n.  33).  Whether  or  not  we  grant 
the  assumptions,  acknowledged  and  unacknowleged,  that 
Phillips  makeS24,  he  brings  out  the  point  that  there  is 
24  Is  it  really  the  case  that  God  punishes  those  who  breach  the 
criminal  law?  Is  it  not  rather  the  case  that  the  criminal  law  is 
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an  irremediable  gap  between  our  knowledge  of  the  text 
and  our  knowledge  of  its  context.  The  circularity  of 
the  argument  is  plain:  Why  does  the  king  accept  the 
sentence?  Because  he  is  bound  by  the  law.  What 
evidence  do  we  have  that  he  is  bound  by  the  law?  He 
accepts  his  sentence25. 
In  the  case  of  the  Teqoite  woman,  Whitelam  casts  even 
more  doubt  on  the  appropriateness  of  the  legal 
interpretation.  Again,  this  case  has  been  used  to  argue 
that  the  king  had  a  function  as  supreme  court  of  appeal. 
Whitelam.,,  as  we  have  remarked,  sees  such  stories  as 
reflecting,  indeed  promoting,  an  idealised  view  of  the 
monarchy,  and  not  necessarily  representing  any  actual 
situation.  Whitelam  concludes  that  'there  is  no 
Testament?  In  any  case,  any  such  statement  has  to  rely  on 
assumptions,  justifiable  or  not,  about  the  relation  between  these 
texts  and  any  actual  social  or  legal  events  in  Ancient  Israel. 
25  In  the  absence  of  other  evidence,  however,  those  interested  in 
the  judicial  procedures  of  ancient  Israel  have  used  these  stories 
to  argue  for  particular  views  of  the  nature  of  Israelite  society. 
So,  for  instance,  Bellefontaine  defends  her  use  of  2  Sam  14:  4-20 
in  promoting  her  thesis  that  judicial  authority  of  the  chief  was 
being  expanded  at  the  expense  of  autonomous  local  groups  by 
saying:  'The  account  presents  a  story  plausible  enough  for  the 
king  to  believe  and  which  is  realistic  enough  to  allow  us  to 
glimpse  through  it  the  dynamics  of  a  politically  sensitive 
judicial  situation,  (1987:  48).  She  sees  no  reason  to  suppose 
that  there  is  a  legal  system  in  place  which  traps  David.  On  the 
contrary,  Joab's  purpose  is  to  make  David  realise  the  potential  of 
the  burgeoning  monarchy  to  override  local  traditionary  law. 
David's  hesitancy  reflects  the  boldness  of  this  move  with  its  far- 
reaching  implications  for  the  legal  system  of  Israel. 
Bellefontaine  is  quite  explicitly  not  concerned  with  the 
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evidence  to  show  that  the  -juridical  parable"  ever 
functioned  in  ancient  Israel.  The  discrepancies  between 
basic  facts  indicates  that  not  too  much  importance  can 
be  attached  to  the  decisions  that  were  given  in  each 
case.  The  indications  are  that  these  were  literary 
constructions  whose  purpose  was  an  attempt  to  exonerate 
David  of  any  blame  in  the  Bathsheba  affair  or  the  case 
of  Absalom'(1979:  135). 
Gunn  in  fact  dismisses  the  legal  element  as  'merely  an 
accident  of  these  particular  cases  where  the  one  to  whom 
the  parable  is  addressed  happens  to  be  a  king  with 
(implicit)  judicial  powers'  (1982:  41).  He  claims  that 
all  that  is  necessary  is  that  the  parable  is 
sufficiently  apt  to  induce  the  addressee  to  make  the 
decision  that  the  teller  deems  apt,  and  that  when  the 
key  is  provided  'he  cannot  escape  the  force  of  its 
application  to  his  own  casel(1982:  41).  But  this  begs 
the  question  of  what  provides  that  force,  what  prevents 
that  escape. 
Claudia  Camp,  citing  Gunn  with  approval,  regards  the 
wise  women  of  2  Samuel  as  early  practitioners  of 
Iliteratherapy,  in  all  but  name,  using  stories  to  create 
the  conditions  of  distancing  and  re-involvement  that  can 
help  a  person  see  a  situation  in  which  they  are  involved 
from  a  new  perspective  (1981:  21-22).  The  trouble  is 
that  it  seems  rather  ineffective  in  the  long  term.  In 
actual  fact,  in  neither  of  these  situations  does  David 
seem  to  regard  himself  as  bound  to  follow  out  any  more 
than  the  letter  of  the  provision.  His  recall  of  Absalom 
is  half-hearted  to  say  the  least,  and  there  is,  as  we 
have  seen,  little  evidence  of  major  repentance  on  his 
part  once  the  price  of  his  son's  life  has  been  paid  in  2 
Sam  12. 
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4.3.1  THE  BINDING  OATH 
Much  more  to  the  point  is  an  observation  that  Hoftijzer 
makes,  but  does  not  follow  up:  'The  woman  takes  much 
pains  to  let  David  confirm  his  ruling  on  oath,  (424). 
Later  he  remarks  in  passing  that  this  means  that  God  is 
'guarantor  for  the  king's  ruling  (He  is  that  because  of 
the  oath  sworn  by  the  king)'  (438),  Strangely,  he  sees 
this  imposition  of  the  oath  as  a  difference  between  this 
story  and  the  parable  of  Nathan:  'It  is  also  told  of  her 
that  she  went  to  much  trouble  to  let  the  king  confirm 
his  ruling  in  the  fictitious  case  by  an  oath  (see 
especially  2  Sam.  xiv  12),  both  the  prophets  do  not  do 
this  (my  emphasis],  (443).  This  is  odd  as  David's 
response  to  Nathan  is  a  blatant  oath:  'As  the  Lord 
lives,  the  man  who  did  this  is  a  son  of  death.,  If 
Nathan  does  not  go  out  of  his  way  to  induce  David  to 
swear  an  oath,  it  is  because  he  did  not  need  to. 
Just  because  of  this,  my  contention  is  that  the  oath  is 
the  key  to  these  storieS26.  As  Hoftijzer  puts  it,  God  is 
26  This  point  is  made  forcibly  by  Bovati  (1986:  329  n.  4)  who  notes 
that  an  oath  often  accompanies  a  royal  verdict,  perhaps,  he 
speculates,  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  the  king  going  back  on 
his  decision.  Pokkelman  also  acknowledges  the  importance  of  the 
oath,  if  rather  obliquely.  In  the  context  of  his  contention  that 
the  standard  translation  of  2  Sam  14:  1  that  David  was  longing, 
for  Absalom  is  misleading,  he  adduces  as  evidence  the  'way  he 
carries  out  to  the  letter  the  oath  elicited  from  him  but  violates 
its  spirit'  (1981:  26).  He  sees  the  oath  by  David  as  the  climax 
of  the  story,  in  that  'Joab  and  the  woman  have  achieved  the 
utmost,  in  gaining  this  irrevocable  commitment  from  David  (1981: 
135),  which  he  himself  acknowledges  without  demur  in  v.  21.  'The 
king  acknowledges  that  he  is  bound  by  the  oath.  ...  David  does  not 
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the  guarantor  of  these  verdicts.  it  is  the  invocation 
of  the  divine  name  in  both  contexts  that  is  the  crux  of 
the  device27.  The  implications  of  this  we  shall  go  on  to 
explore  in  our  next  chapter.  our  immediate  concern  will 
be  to  strengthen  this  claim  in  the  case  of  2  Sam  12  by 
looking  at  the  structure  of  analogous  passages. 
4.3.2  1  KINGS  20:  35-43 
In  this  context,  it  is  instructive  to  turn  to  the  other 
story  often  bracketed  together  with  Nathan's  parable  and 
the  story  of  the  wise  woman  of  Teqoa  as  a  juridical 
parable,  the  story  of  the  encounter  between  Ahab  and  a 
nameless  man  of  God  in  1  Kings  20:  35-43.  In  this 
pericope,  there  is  no  oath.  Does  this  then  invalidate 
our  argument? 
on  closer  inspection,  this  story  turns  out  to  be  the 
exception  that  proves  the  rule.  In  it,  we  find  what 
amounts  to  an  inversion  of  the  device  in  2  Sam  12  and  14 
about  the  fiction.  He  immediately  faces  up  to  the  consequences  of 
his  oath,  and  by  realizing  them  at  once  he  seems  to  accept  them 
chivalrously,  (1981:  145).  'Seems',  however,  because  as  Fokkelman 
points  out,  when  it  comes  to  the  point  David  only  goes  as  far  as 
recalling  Absalom.  He  will  not  meet  him.  Fokkelman  here, 
however,  is  reading  more  into  the  oath  than  is  there.  All  that 
David  swears  to  is  the  fact  that  not  one  hair  of  the  fratricide's 
head  will  fall  to  the  ground.  The  issue  of  the  recall  from  exile 
and  reconciliation  is  not  specifically  addressed  in  the  oath. 
27  McCarter  sees  the  royal  oath  as  placing  the  fictional 
fratricide  and  by  implication  Absalom  under  royal  protection.  He 
regards  the  oath  itself  as  a  factor  in  the  danger  that  the  woman 
predicts  for  the  people  of  Judah;  '...  now  that  the  oath  is  in  the 
air,  she  is  probably  correct.  At  this  point  Israel  is  in  trouble 
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which  lays  bare  the  inadequacy  of  the  juridical  model  of 
these  stories. 
1  Kings  20:  35-43  concerns  one  of  the  sons  of  the 
prophets  who  appears  on  the  scene  to  confront  King  Ahab 
with  the  dire  consequences  of  his  leniency  to  Ben-hadad, 
the  king  of  Syria,  whom  the  Lord  had  instructed  him  to 
dispose  of.  The  prophet  presents  himself  in  the  guise 
of  a  soldier  who  has  been  charged  on  his  life,  or  the 
payment  of  a  talent  of  silver28,  to  guard  a  captive  whom 
he  has  allowed  to  escape.  He  makes  no  explicit  plea  for 
a  ruling,  but  by  telling  his  story  to  the  king 
implicitly  invites  a  judgment  in  his  favour. 
The  king's  answer  is  to  pick  up  on  the  implicit  verdict 
in  the  prophet's  own  account.  The  prophet  himself  in 
the  guise  of  the  soldier  has  told  the  king  that  he  had 
made  an  agreement  to  forfeit  either  money  or  his  life  if 
he  failed  in  his  duty.  The  king  turns  his  own  words 
back  on  him:  I  So  shall  your  judgment29  be;  you  yourself 
have  decided  it,  (1  Kings  20:  40).  The  judgment  which 
the  man  has  recited  is  to  be  applied  to  him. 
28  The  absurdly  high  value  of  the  ransom,  about  one  hundred  times 
the  price  of  an  ordinary  slave,  coupled  with  the  anonymity  of  the 
characters,  has  been  used  by  Whitelam  (1979:  168-70)  to  argue  that 
the  whole  incident  is  a  literary  construction.  As  such  it  is 
designed  to  show  that  the  king  is  subject  to  divine  law  despite 
his  de  facto  status  of  operating  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
courts.  Whitelam  sees  this  as  the  function  of  Nathan's  parable 
as  well  - 
29  'Judgment'  here  bears  a  double  sense  in  Hebrew  as  well  as 
English:  it  refers  both  to  the  judgment  that  the  prophet/soldier 
has  pronounced,  or  more  accurately,  reported,  and  also  to  the 
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The  king  thereby  explicitly  establishes  the  principle 
that  the  prophet  is  condemned  out  of  his  own  mouth. 
Here  the  prophet  has  provoked  the  king  into  articulating 
the  necessary  convention  that  the  judgment  a  man  utters 
applies  to  him.  Here,  of  course,  there  is  the  further 
refinement  that  it  is  not  the  prophet's  own  judgment  of 
his  own  case  which  applies  to  him,  but  the  penalty 
attached  to  the  contract  he  entered  into  with  the  man 
who  assigned  him  to  guard  the  prisoner.  By  accepting 
the  contract,  the  king  implies,  he  has  accepted  the 
judgment. 
It  is  this  principle  that  the  prophet  then  turns  against 
the  king.  If  a  soldier  is  to  be  held  to  the  contract  he 
made,  how  much  more  should  the  king  of  Israel  be  held  to 
the  consequences  of  breaching  a  divine  command?  He  uses 
the  king's  own  avowed  principle  to  drive  home  the 
consequences  for  the  king  of  his  own  remissness  in 
making  a  treaty  with  Ben-hadad,  whom  the  Lord  had 
devoted  to  destruction.  Note  here  that  the  juridical 
model  again  proves  inadequate.  There  is  no  appeal  by 
either  party  to  any  code  of  law  or  legal  practice.  It 
is  the  logical  and  linguistic  consistency  and  coherence 
of  both  characters'  positions  that  is  the  binding  force. 
This  exception  proves  the  rule,  because  here  the  prophet 
first  ensures  that  the  king  himself  establishes  the 
principle  of  self  -condemnation  3  0.  Ahab  is  caught,  not  by 
30  This  point  is  made  manifest  by  the  fact  that  the  NEB  translates 
v.  40  as  follows:  "'As  I  was  busy  with  one  thing  or  another,  sir, 
he  disappeared-"  The  king  of  Israel  said  to  him,  "You  deserve  to 
die.  "  And  he  said  to  the  king  of  Israel,  "You  have  passed 
sentence  on  yourself.  "'  The  words  italicised  here  are  the 
translators,  addition.  Robinson  (1972:  233-4)  comments,  I  ...  these 
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an  oath,,  it  is  true,  but  by  the  articulation  of  a 
principle  of  applicability.  The  important  conclusion 
that  this  entails  is  this:  such  applicability  is  shown 
to  be  not  an  automatic  process  but  one  that  must  be 
assented  to.  There  is  no  obligation  on  the  king  to  be 
consistent  in  applying  his  own  judgment  to  himself 
except  in  so  far  as  he  has  explicitly  articulated  and 
assented  to  the  principle.  In  the  other  two  cases,  this 
principle  of  self-condemnation  is  not  articulated.  What 
is  binding  in  these  cases  appears  to  be  David's  oath. 
4.3.3  2  SAM  12  AND  2  SAM  14 
So  these  two  stories,  2  Sam  12:  1-5  and  2  Sam  14:  6-71 
rather  than  juridical  parables,  should  perhaps  best  be 
described  as  Oath-provoking  stories.  The  function  of 
both  is  to  induce  the  king  into  swearing  an  oath. 
Throughout  this  argument,  however,  the  nature  of  the 
parallel  between  the  two  incidents  has  been  taken  almost 
as  read.  on  closer  inquiry,  however,  we  may  find  that 
some  of  the  cautions  that  have  been  given  in  our  earlier 
review  of  the  phenomenon  of  mise  en  abyme  have  been 
missed.  In  order  to  explore  the  possibility  of  such  a 
complication  of  the  process,  we  will  turn  to  a  fuller 
translators  think  that  they  were  at  some  time  accidentally  omitted 
from  the  text.  The  words  'You  have  passed  sentence  on  yourself, 
are  then  understood  as  the  response  of  the  prophet  to  the  king.  In 
the  Hebrew  they  are  the  king's  reply  and  do  read  strangely.  '  On 
the  contrary,  the  argument  given  above  shows  that  the  implicit 
juridical  model  that  the  NEB  translators  are  drawing  upon  creates 
the  problem  which  they  then  have  to  solve  by  introducing  a 
modification  unsupported  by  any  textual  evidence.  If  the  juridical 
model  works,  then  why  is  the  king  induced  to  state  the  principle? 
Rather  than  the  text,  it  is  the  model  that  needs  to  be  changed. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  4  192 
examination  of  2  Sam  14  and  the  nature  of  the 
relationship  between  this  text  and  2  Sam  12. 
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CHAPTER  FIVE 
2  SAMUEL  14:  READING  AS  PARODY 
5.1  READING  2  SAM  14 
5.1.1  THE  TEQOITE  WOMAN'S  TALE 
The  story  of  David's  encounter  with  the  woman  of  Teqoa 
begins  by  recording  Joab's  recruitment  of  a  'wise  woman' 
from  the  village  of  Teqoa  whom  he  instructs  to  pretend 
to  be  a  mourner'.  He  tells  her  to  disguise  herself  as  a 
widow  and  waylay  the  king.  The  narrator  adopts  a  rather 
teasing  device  by  informing  the  reader  that  the  woman  is 
disguised,  and  by  telling  us  that  Joab  instructs  her  in 
what  to  say  to  the  king,  but  omitting  to  record  the 
conversation  between  the  woman  and  Joab.  The  reader 
knows  that  a  plot  is  hatched,  but  is  left  in  suspense  as 
to  how  it  will  play  itself  out. 
As  Fokkelman  points  out,  the  reader  is  left  knowing  more 
than  David,  but  less  than  Joab  and  the  woman.  He 
argues,  'This  provides  two  advantages:  we  listen  with 
interest  to  the  woman  whose  message  is  as  new  for  us  as 
it  is  for  David,  and  so  we  can  easily  empathize  with 
David's  position.  Simultaneously,  we  are  kept  in 
suspense  from  step  to  step  about  her  succeeding/ 
failing,  and  along  with  Joab,  looking  on  from  behind  the 
1  The  position  of  'wise  woman,  is  thought  to  represent  a 
recognised  status  in  Israelite  society,  designating  a  woman  who 
has  particular  skills  in  negotiation.  For  a  discussion  of  the 
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sceneS2,  we  follow  the  way  in  which  she  gives  form  to 
the  script  with  which  she  has  been  prompted,  (1981: 
129)3. 
2  Fokkelman  here  goes  beyond  the  text.  Joab  disappears  from  the 
text  between  vv.  3  and  21.  His  prompt  appearance  in  verse  21  might 
suggest  that  he  is  nearby,  but  Fokkelman  has  no  other  evidence  to 
support  his  contention;  even  less  so  the  confident  assertion  by 
Smith  (1899:  137)  that  'Joab,  as  a  high  officer  of  the  court  was 
standing  by  the  king  during  the  woman's  plea., 
3  we  then  read  that  'Joab.  put  the  words  in  her  mouth.  '  This 
raises  the  whole  question  of  whose  words  we  are  are  reading  in  the 
subsequent  speeches  of  the  woman.  Are  they  hers,  Joab's,  or  do 
they  have  an  odd  ambivalent  status?  This  becomes  particularly 
complex  in  verse  19,  where  the  woman  admits  to  David  that  she  is 
speaking  at  Joab's  behest.  The  woman  answers  that  Joab  put  the 
db.  rym  (words)  in  her  mouth  in  order  to  change  the  course  of 
affairs  (pny  hdbr)'.  The  oddity  of  the  relation  between  their 
speech  comes  to  a  head  here.  Did  Joab  put  these  words  in  her 
mouth,  the  words  that  expose  his  own  part  in  her  language?  Did  he 
instruct  her  to  'drop  the  mask'?  Or  is  she  here  speaking  her  own 
words?  What  meaning  does  the  distinction  have  in  the  text?  The 
point  becomes  more  complex  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  same  word 
dbr  is  repeated  in  the  text. 
For  a  discussion  that  comes  down  strongly  on  the  side  of  Joab,  see 
Nicol  (1982),  continuing  a  line  of  argument  deriving  from  Whybray 
(1968:  59)  who  declares  that  this  is  'really  a  story  of  Joab's 
wisdom  rather  rather  than  that  of  the  woman.  '  Nicol  argues  that  in 
a  literary  situation  the  claim  that  Joab  might  have  anticipated 
the  king's  every  objection  is  'entirely  possible,  (1992:  98-99). 
If  this  is  so,  then  we  are  really  talking  about  the  wisdom  of  the 
narrator  (see  the  comments  of  Spangenberg  1986:  275).  How  are  we 
to  extract  a  quantity  such  as  'Joab's  wisdom,  from  the  speech  of 
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questionable  assertion  that  v.  3  implies  Joab  has  authorial 
control  over  every  word  uttered?  Nicol's  warning  that  using  such  a 
story  to  derive  confident  reconstructions  of  Israelite  society  is 
however  well  taken. 
Hoftijzer  (1970:  419  n3)  lists  the  parallel  uses  of  the  phrase  'to 
put  words  in  the  mouth  of,  in  Ex  4:  15,  Num  22:  38,  and  Ezra  8:  17. 
In  each  of  these  cases,  he  contends  that  the  subordinate  (Aaron, 
Bileam  and  the  Judean  high  officials  respectively)  has  to  carry 
out  the  instructions  of  their  superior  (Moses,  God  and  Ezra)  to 
the  letter.  Camp  (1981:  17  n.  8)  argues  that  the  woman  needs  great 
skill  to  carry  out  her  assignment  in  the  face  of  the  unpredictable 
responses  of  David.  She  comments  that  Aaron  is  appointed  as 
Moses,  mouthpiece  because  of  his  eloquence,  not  merely  to  relay 
Moses,  words,  but  to  put  them  in  the  best  form.  This  is  also  seen 
in  the  other  case  where  we  see  Joab  in  the  role  of  'script- 
writer,.  In  2  Sam  11:  19-21,  Joab  instructs  the  messenger  who  is 
to  take  the  news  of  Uriah's  death  to  David  in  what  to  say.  What 
the  messenger  actually  says  is  rather  different  (2  Sam  11:  22-24). 
The  difficulties  and  wider  consequences  of  these  passages  will  be 
discussed  later.  Fokkelman  declares  'The  Tekoite  woman  has 
delivered  a  masterpiecel(1981:  141).  of  course,  all  the  words  that 
are  presented  to  us  in  the  text  are  those  of  the  narrator. 
Hermisson  (1971:  142)  turns  the  argument  round  by  regarding  the 
woman  as  a  fictional  necessity  created  by  the  story  which  she 
tells.  The  story  of  a  widow  pleading  for  her  son  requires  a  widow 
to  tell  it.  The  fact  that  she  is  a  wise  woman  pretending  to  be  a 
widow  is  a  further  narrative  refinement  which  Hermisson's  account 
does  not  seem  to  require.  This  begs  the  question  as  to  how  we  are 
to  decide  that  the  the  narrator  is  using  his  invention  and  when  he 
is  constrained  by  historical  exigencies.  Again,  this  problem  will 
recur.  Suffice  it  to  say  for  the  moment  that  what  we  are 
confronted  with  is  a  literary  artefact,  which  may  or  may  not  be 
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In  essence,  the  story  the  woman  relates  is  simple.  She 
tells  David  that  she  is  a  widow.  One  of  her  sons  has 
killed  the  other  and  the  family  is  demanding  the 
murderer's  life  in  return,  which  would  leave  her  husband 
without  an  heir4.  However,  it  involves  the 
counterposition  of  two  opposing  versions  of  justice. 
One  involves  the  death  of  a  son,  and  the  need  for  that 
death  to  be  avenged.  Opposed  to  this  is  the  need  for  an 
heir  to  carry  on  the  name  of  the  father.  If  the  son  is 
executed  to  fulfil  the  demands  of  justice,  this  will 
spell  not  only  his  own  death,  but  the  death  of  his 
father's  line.  The  king  tells  her  that  he  will  deal 
with  her  case  later.  The  woman  then  announces  that  she 
will  take  any  guilt  on  herself,  and  again  presses  the 
king.  He  declares  that  no-one  will  harm  her.  The  woman 
then  urges  him  to  invoke  the  Lord,  which  he  does, 
swearing  that  'As  the  Lord  lives,  not  one  hair  of  your 
son's  head  shall  fall  to  the  ground., 
She  then  exposes  the  parallel  between  the  king's 
banishment  of  his  own  son  Absalom  and  the  peril  her  son 
was  exposed  to.  David's  own  conduct  is  at  odds  with  his 
judgment.  She  begins  an  explanation  of  why  she  made 
this  point  to  the  king,  but  he  asks  her  whether  Joab  was 
Whatever  else  we  can  say,  it  is  at  least  subject  to  the 
conventions  of  literary  production. 
4  The  parallels  between  the  plot  of  this  story  and  the  story  of 
Cain  and  Abel  &Cil  commented  on  by  Blenkinsopp  and  by  Brueggemann  in 
his  elaborate  association  of  the  story  of  Adam  and  Eve  with  this 
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with  her  in  this.  She  concedes  that  it  is  so.  The  king 
then  tells  Joab  that  he  will  recall  Absalomo5 
5.1.2  ALONSO  SCHbKEL'S  HERMENEUTIC  MODEL 
5.1.2.1  Alonso  Schbkells  Reading 
This  story  is  the  basis  for  the  paper  by  Luis  Alonso 
Sch6kel  in  which  he  introduces  the  idea  of  'David  as 
reader,  which  we  have  been  exploring  (Alonso  Sch6kel 
1967).  In  his  characteristically  sensitive  account, 
Alonso  Schdkel  begins  by  discussing  the  role  of  each  of 
the  named  characters  with  an  eye  on  the  eventual  model 
of  reading  that  he  will  erect.  Joab  represents  the 
author,  but  it  is  imperative  for  the  success  of  the 
story  that  his  identity  becomes  apparent  only  at  the  end 
of  the  transaction.  He  is  not  a  disinterested 
participant  as  his  own  future  depends  on  the  result  of 
this  transaction,  but  for  that  very  reason  he  has  to  be 
absent,  and  entrust  the  enactment  of  the  dramatic 
scenario  he  has  devised  to  the  woman  of  Teqoa.  Joab  has 
already  appeared  in  this  role  of  dramatic  coach,  when  he 
instructs  the  messenger  who  is  bringing  the  news  of 
Uriah's  death  to  David  in  2  Sam  11:  19. 
David  as  spectator,  or  reader  is  not  left  to  the  role 
of  critical  observer.  He  is  induced  to  become  so 
involved  in  the  drama  that  he  takes  a  'leap  on  the  stage 
and  "enters  the  play-1(1976:  195).  Alonso  Sch6kel  draws 
the  parallel  with  Elihu  in  the  book  of  Job,  who  is  so 
frustrated  by  the  dialogue  between  Job  and  his  friends 
that  he  cannot  contain  himself  and  intervenes  (job  32). 
5  This  simplicity,  however,  is  masked  by  a  whole  catalogue  of 
textual  problems.  These  are  dealL  with  in  some  detail  in  the 
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He  also  draws  the  parallel  to  the  playlet  in  Hamlet, 
where  the  spectators  find  to  their  increasing  discomfort 
that  they  are  by  no  means  outside  the  play  they  observe. 
Alonso  Sch6kel  analyses  three  aspects  of  the  woman's 
intervention.  Her  speeches  have  three  functions:  to 
convey  information,  to  indicate  her  emotional 
involvement  in  the  case,  and  place  a  plea  before  the 
king  to  act.  He  sums  up  David's  reaction  as  follows:  'To 
the  information  he  responds  by  understanding,  to  the 
expression  by  interest,  and  to  the  plea  by  involving 
himself/pledging  himselfl(1976:  197) 
He  goes  on  to  break  down  this  reaction  further.  To 
begin  with,  'To  understand,  David  must  be 
ignorantl(1976:  197).  In  order  to  be  affected  by  the 
juridical  issue,  David  must  be  unaware  of  the  fictional 
nature  of  the  text.  The  woman  must  breach  the  barrier 
which  his  anger  against  Absalom  has  imposed  to  his  full 
understanding  of  the  situation.  In  order  to  do  this, 
the  woman  has  to  intervene  with  judicious  admixtures  of 
reactions.  Contrary  to  some  other  critics,  Alonso. 
Sch6kel,  far  from  finding  the  woman  verbose,  admires  her 
expertise  in  maieutics  which  allows  her  to  'checkmate 
the  king  in  eight  moves'. 
5.1.2.2  Alonso  Schdkel's  Conclusions 
Alonso  Sch6kel  draws  several  conclusions  from  this 
encounter  which  have  hermeneutic  consequences.  Firstly, 
he  notes  that  the  identity  of  the  author  is  not  the  key 
to  the  interpretation  of  the  story,  pace  the  researches 
of  many  historical  critics.  Neither  is  the  identity  of 
the  referent.  Both  of  these  have  an  effect  but  only  by 
their  revelation  at  the  end  of  the  story.  In  both 
cases,  it  is  David,  the  'reader',  who  names  the 
referent.  He  it  is  who  introduces  Joab's  name  when  he 
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is  who  finally  identifies  the  banished  one  as  Absalom 
when  he  speaks  his  name  in  his  instruction  to  Joab  to  go 
and  fetch  the  young  man  Absalom. 
Secondly,  he  argues  that  it  is  in  dialogue  with  the 
woman  that  David  comes  to  identify  the  nature  of  his  own 
attitude,  and  thus  to  be  able  to  change  it.  Alonso 
Sch6kel  sees  this  coming  about  in  the  final  description 
of  David  as  'wise,  as  a  result  of  his  forensic  skill. 
The  epithet  'wise'  is  transferred  from  the  woman  to 
David.  His  wisdom  is  shown  in  the  fact  that  he  chooses 
rightly  between  good  and  evil  in  recalling  his  son.  As 
we  shall  see,  this  may  be  the  point  at  which  we  have  to 
to  begin  to  take  issue  with  Alonso  Schdkel.  How  wise 
David  has  been,  and  the  connotations  of  that  epithet  in 
2  Samuel  are  matters  we  shall  discuss  below. 
However,,  Alonso  Sch6kel  goes  on  to  derive  some 
interesting  general  lessons  from  this  text.  The  point 
of  hermeneutics  is  not  dispassionate  understanding,  but 
transformation.  The  quest  for  the  author  can  be  a  great 
excuse  to  misunderstand  the  content,  and  can  relieve  the 
the  reader  of  moral  responsibility  for  his  reaction  to 
the  text.  So  David  as  reader  is  revealed  by  the 
alteration  of  his  attitude  from  hostility  to  acceptance 
of  his  son. 
Neither  is  it  necessary  to  identify  the  referent.  To 
enquire  what  the  name  of  the  woman's  dead  husband  was  is 
not  germane  to  the  task  of  interpretation.  Alonso 
Sch6kel  uses  the  image  of  tying  the  text  down  by  details 
of  reference  like  Gulliver  immobilised  by  the 
Lilliputians.  By  doing  so,  the  text  can  be  safely 
confined  to  the  past,  to  the  historic. 
But  the  point  is  to  respond  to  what  he  calls  its 
symbolic  meaning,  the  way  in  which  any  narrative, 
whether  fictional  or  historical,  embodies  human  values 
in  the  mode  of  its  telling  rather  than  in  its  content. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  5  20  0 
This  timeless  quality  enables  the  text  to  'cut  the 
hawsersl,  (1976:  204)  of  its  historical  setting  and  enter 
into  dialogue  with  a  contemporary  reading. 
Alonso  Schdkel  ends  by  summarising  the  significance  of 
David  as  reader  in  the  following  ratio: 
David  Reader 
Teqoite  Text 
This  final  scheme  leaves  out  the  role  of  Joab,  the 
present  yet  absent  figure  of  the  author  in  the  text. 
Alonso  Sch6kel  is  here  pointing  out  the  necessary 
intervention  and  commitment  of  the  reader  in  the 
construction  of  the  meaning  of  the  text.  Yet  here  again 
we  may  have  questions  to  ask  about  the  nature  and 
effectiveness  of  David's  interventions. 
5.1.2.3Critique  of  Alonso  Sch6kel 
Alonso  Schdkells  account  of  David's  response  seems  at 
least  questionable.  His  David  is  'understanding', 
'interested'  and  involved,  in  the  story.  Yet  compared 
to  David's  response  in  2  Sam  14,  the  whole  transaction 
is  much  more  drawn  out.  As  opposed  to  his  two  short 
interventions  in  2  Sam  12  1-15,  David  is  given  nine 
speeches  in 
,2  Sam  14:  1-24.  Why  should  David's 
utterances  be  so  different  in  quantity,  when,  as  we  have 
seen,  all  we  can  mean  by  speaking  of  David  as  reader  is 
the  analysis  of  his  utterances  and  their  relation  to  the 
texts  that  precede  them?  on  this  basis  alone,  the 
parallel  between  the  two  cases  is  less  clear  than  it 
might  seem  at  first  sight.  So  what  is  the  nature  of 
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Our  earlier  theoretical  discussions  led  us  to  the 
conclusion  that  David  as  reader  means  David  as  utterer. 
It  is  in  the  entextualisation  of  the  perlocutionary 
aspect  of  his  reaction  to  the  woman's  speeches  that  we 
will  find  the  answer  to  what  it  means  to  explore  'David 
as  reader,  in  this  text.  In  this  case,  we  will  make  use 
of  the  insights  of  H.  P.  Grice  into  'conversational 
implicature,  (Grice  1975). 
5.2  2  SAM  14  AND  CONVERSATIONAL  IMPLICATURE 
5.2.1  GRICE  AND  IMPLICATURE 
Grice  suggests  that  conversation  takes  place  under  the 
guidance  of  a  co-operative  principle  which  places 
speakers  under  the  obligation  to  express  themselves  in  a 
way  that  will  facilitate  interpretation,  and  requires 
hearers  to  assume  that  the  remarks  they  hear  are 
designed  to  make  sense,  so  that  they  will  make  an  effort 
to  interpret  what  they  hear,  even  if  at  first  its 
relevance  seems  unclear. 
5.2.2.1  Grice's  Maxims 
Grice  summarised  the  speaker's  obligations  under  four 
maxims: 
1.  Quantity 
a)  Make  your  contribution  as  informative  as  is 
required  (for  the  current  purposes  of  the 
exchange). 
b)  do  not  make  your  contribution  more  informative 
than  is  required. 
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Try  to  make  your  contribution  one  that  is  true 
a)  Do  not  say  what  you  believe  to  be  false 
b)  Do  not  say  that  for  which  you  lack  adequate 
evidence. 
3.  Relation 
Be  relevant 
Manner 
Be  perspicuous 
a)  avoid  obscurity  of  expression 
b)avoid  ambiguity 
c)  be  brief 
d)  be  orderly 
5.2.2.2  Leech's  Maxims 
Grice's  principles  were  expanded  upon  by  Leech  (1983: 
132)  to  include  what  he  called  the  Politeness  principle, 
which  falls  under  the  following  six  maxims: 
1.  Tact  maxim:  Minimise  cost  to  other/maximise 
benefit  to  other 
2.  Generosity  maxim:  Minimize  benefit  to  self/ 
maximize  cost  to  self. 
3.  Approbation  maxim:  minimise  dispraise  of 
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4.  Modesty  maxim:  Minimize  praise  of  self/maximize 
praise  of  self. 
Agreement  maxim:  Minimize  disagreement  between 
self  and  others 
6.  Sympathy:  Minimize  antipathy  between  self  and 
others 
These  principles  and  maxims  are  proposed  by  Grice  and 
Leech  as  the  conventional  conditions  to  be  met  if  the 
communicative  transaction  is  to  be  maintained.  Like  all 
conventions,  they  are  revealed  more  readily  in  the 
breach  than  in  the  observance,  and  as  we  shall  see, 
obedience  to  them  may  not  be  in  the  speaker's  control  - 
judgments  as  to  what  is  true,,  relevant,  or 
'ambiguous'  are  just  that:  judgments.  We  shall  also  go 
on  to  question  whether  ambiguity  is  ultimately 
avoidable. 
5.2.2.3  Implicature 
It  is  when  these  maxims  seem  to  the  hearer  to  be  broken 
that  we  may  have  examples  of  conversational  implicature. 
The  hearer  has  to  come  to  a  decision  whether: 
a)  they  are  being  broken  in  an  attempt  to  disrupt  the 
communicative  transaction 
b)  the  breakdown  has  occurred  through  a  failure  in  the 
system,  for  instance  a  mishearing  or  misunderstanding, 
c)  the  speaker  is  challenging  the  hearer  to  the 
imaginative  creation  of  a  context  in  which  the  utterance 
would  be  relevant. 
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1)  break  off  communication  as  a  result  of  being 
contradicted,  teased  or  snubbed, 
2)  attempt  to  repair  communication,  perhaps  by  asking 
for  a  word  to  be  repeated,  orrephrasing  her  own  remarks 
3)  opt  to  interpret  the  remark  in  the  light  of  shared 
unexpressed  knowledge  of  the  wider  context. 
Implicature  also  encodes  social  and  political 
assumptions  about  the  relationship  between  the  speakers, 
as  Leech  seeks  to  point  out.  In  particular,  the  kinds 
of  assumptions  about  information  and  values  shared 
between  the  speakers  and  which  therefore  can  be  assumed 
as  context  and  brought  into  play  in  the  resolution  of 
implicatures  both  reveal  and  establish  the  social 
standing  of  each. 
Conversation  may  be  designed  to  reinforce  or  to  change 
these  patterns  of  relationship,  and  this  may  be  effected 
by  the  use  of  more  or  less  formal  modes  of  speech  and 
address,  for  instance.  of  course,  this  whole  analysis 
bears  more  than  a  passing  similarity  to  the  analysis  of 
schemata  which  we  used  in  our  earlier  chapter. 
As  we  have  also  discussed,  the  problem  is  compounded  in 
the  case  of  conversations  recorded  in  a  text,  or 
overheard:  the  two  cases  are  formally  not  very 
different.  In  both  cases,  the  two  interlocutors  may  be 
able  to  assume  a  commonality  of  knowledge  or  experience 
denied  to  the  reader  or  the  overhearer.  with  these 
points  in  mind,  let  us  see  what  we  can  deduce  about  the 
interaction  between  David  and  the  Teqoite  woman  by 
analysing  David's  responses  to  the  woman.  we  will 
analyse  each  of  the  nine  transactions  between  David  and 
the  woman  in  the  light  of  these  maxims, 
5.2.2  DAVID'S  RESPONSES  AND  IMPLICATURE Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  5  205 
1.  v.  5:  In  response  to  the  woman's  cry  'Save  0  king', 
David's  response  is  literally  'What  with  you?  '  This 
short  phrase  is  found  in  parallel  contexts  as  a  response 
to  a  requeSt6.  However,  what  the  words  do  not  convey  is 
the  tone  in  which  it  is  said.  It  could  express  a 
willingness  to  help,  or  else  an  irritation  at  being 
importuned.  The  woman's  use  of  the  title,  and  the 
king's  possibly  rather  peremptory  use  of  this  short 
pronominal  phrase  already  establish  a  distance  between 
them. 
2.  David's  first  response  to  the  woman's  story  of  her 
son  is  to  reply,  'Go  to  your  house  and  I  will  give 
orders  concerning  you.  '  This  speech  seeks  to  bring  the 
encounter  to  an  end,  by  specifically  sending  the  woman 
away,  and  is  also  notably  non-committal.  The  king  only 
promises  to  give  orders';  we  are  not  even  at  this  stage 
told  whether  these  will  be  in  the  woman's  favour  or  not. 
Conceivably,  they  could  be  orders  to  silence  her. 
In  any  event,  David  evades  giving  any  decision  on  the 
case.  He  could  be  said  to  breach  the  maxim  of  quantity, 
in  not  giving  a  full  answer,  and  in  some  sense  also 
breaches  the  politeness  principle:  the  woman  is  ordered 
to  go,  at  some  cost  of  effort  to  herself,  whereas  the 
king  only  takes  on  the  vague  obligation  of  giving 
orders'.  The  use  of  the  simple  imperative  indicates  the 
6  jos  15:  18,  where  Achsah  requests  Caleb  for  land;  1  Kings  1:  16, 
where  Bathsheba  requests  David's  confirmation  of  Solomon's 
succession;  2  Kings  6:  28,  where  the  king  is  requested  to  judge  between  two 
cannibal  mothers.  Interestingly,  all  these  occasions  involve  a 
woman  requesting  something  from  a  ruler.  Moore  (1990:  100)  points 
out  the  assonance  between  mh  1k  and  m1k  in  2  Kings  6:  28, 
commenting  that  'the  king  is  the  problem!  '  The  masculine  form  of 
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king's  assumption  that  he  has  no  need  to  negotiate  with 
the  woman.  In  several  ways,  he  breaches  the  cooperative 
principle.  This  all  adds  up  to  a  signal  that  he  is  not 
interested  in  continuing  the  communicative  transaction. 
3.  The  woman  attempts  to  repair  the  communicative 
transaction  by  an  exaggerated  use  of  the  Tact  and 
Generosity  maxims,  taking  the  cost  of  the  transaction 
upon  her  or  else,  by  implicitly  accusing  the  king  of 
breaching  these  maxims,  depending  on  the  reading  we  take 
of  this  verse.  In  response  to  the  woman's  acceptance 
of,  or  fear  of,  the  guilt  arising  from  her  quest,  David 
promises  that  anyone  who  says  anything  to  her  will  not 
touch  her  again.  This  still  does  not  impinge  on  the 
case  in  point.  What  David  promises  is  her  own 
protection,  and  that  by  means  of  a  rather  sinisterly 
understated  threat.  The  fate  of  her  son  is  not  alluded 
to  at  all.  Here  David  seems  to  breach  the  principle  of 
co-operation,  again  signalling  that  the  transaction  is 
at  an  end. 
4.  v.  11  In  response  to  a  direct  plea  from  the  woman 
that  he  invoke  his  God,  David  swears  that  not  one  hair 
of  her  son's  head  shall  touch  the  ground.  David  utters 
an  oath  which,  as  we  shall  explore  further,  has  far- 
reaching  consequences,  consequences  of  which  he  is 
unaware.  In  the  immediate  context,  however,  we  are  left 
in  the  dark  as  to  what  prompts  him  to  this.  Is  it  a 
considered  judgement,  or  is  this  the  rash  exclamation  of 
a  king  who  is  driven  to  distraction  by  the  reiterated 
questioning  of  the  woman? 
After  David's  reluctance  and  equivocation  in  his 
previous  speeches,  this  second  hypothesis  seems  equally 
plausible,  especially  as  the  woman's  speech  adds  no  new 
information.  She  simply  repeats  her  plea  that  her  son  be 
not  destroyed  by  the  avenger,  this  time  without  the 
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such  a  different  response,  which  could  have  been  his 
immediate  reply  to  her  speech  in  verse  7?  In  terms  of 
Grice's  analysis,  it  may  be  that  here  David  is  breaching 
the  maxim  of  quantity;  the  assurance  David  gives  is  at 
once  hyperbolic,  too  strong  for  the  situation,  and,,  as  we 
shall  see,  ambiguous,  involving  a  breach  of  4c. 
5.  v.  18  In  response  to  the  woman's  long  speech 
justifying  her  actions,  the  king  commands  the  woman  not 
to  hide  anything  from  him.  The  request  implies  that 
there  is  a  possibility  that  she  is  doing  exactly  that,  a 
possibility  the  reader  is  well  aware  of.  it  may  be  that 
tý\P-  wom,  34n1s  breach  of  the  maxims  of  quantity,  in  that  she 
gives  the  king  much  superfluous  information,  and  of 
manner,  in  that  her  speech  is  long,  repetitive  and 
larded  with  obscurities  and  exaggerated  expressions  of 
respect  for  the  king,  lead  to  a  suspicion  that  she  may 
also  be  breaching  the  maxims  in  other  ways. 
Specifically,  she  is  concealing  the  source  of  her 
request,  and  thus  not  telling  the  whole  truth. 
David's  reply  is  thus  not  a  response  to  any  aspect  of 
the  content  of  the  woman's  speech.  Instead  it  is 
directed  to  the  parameters  of  the  communicative 
transaction,  setting  out  the  requirement  for  honesty. 
David  makes  explicit  the  need  to  assume  the  maxim  of 
quality  for  the  transaction  to  continue. 
6.  v,  19  After  the  woman  acquiesces  in  the  king's 
insistence  on  the  compliance  with  his  imposed 
conventions,  David  requests  to  know  if  Joab  has  been  at 
the  bottom  of  this.  The  reader  may  interpret  this  as 
tVo-ýDavid  has  detected  the  doubleness  of  the  woman's  speech, 
and  has  deduced  the  identity  of  the  other  voice  in  it. 
What  leads  him  to  this  conclusion?  Surely  it  is  the 
fact  that  the  woman's  concern  for  and  knowledge  of  the 
relationships  between  the  king  and  his  son  imply  a 
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herself  and  the  king  that  David  knows  does  not  accord 
with  the  reality  of  their  respective  situations.  This 
gap  between  social  reality  and  the  world  of  her  language 
opens  up  to  be  filled  by  the  figure  of  Joab. 
David's  final  two  speeches  are  not  directed  to  the 
woman.  His  speech  in  v.  21  to  Joab,,  'Behold,  I  grant 
this')  indicates  that  he  expects  Joab  to  assent  to  the 
fact  that  there  has  been  a  request  made,  and  that  Joab 
knows  what  it  was.  Neither  need  be  specified.  Howe4er, 
the  king  goes  on  actually  to  speak  the  words  that  will 
bring  about  the  desired  effect,  to  bring  back  the  young 
man  Abs  lom.  However,  his  final  speech  throws  a 
question  mark  over  this.  For  the  first  time  in  this 
transaction,  we  are  given  a  speech  without  being  told 
specifically  who  the  hearer  of  the  speech  is.  Is  it 
directed  to  Joab,  or  to  some  other  unnamed  servants? 
Who  is  its  audience,  apart  from  the  readers  who  overhear 
it? 
It  also  puts  a  limit  on  the  king's  response.  The  king 
puts  his  own  interpretation  on  the  recalling  of  the 
banished  one  which  the  woman  has  lured  him  to.  To 
recall  is  to  recall,  but  not  necessarily  to  restore  to 
former  privileges.  It  is  only  after  a  subsequent 
transaction  which  involves  the  burning  of  Joab's  field 
that  the  king  and  his  son  are  restored  to  one  another, 
but,  as  the  following  chapters  will  reveal,  the  problem 
remains  unresolved. 
So,  by  this  analysis,  does  David  actually  meet  Alonso 
Sch6kel's  description  of  him  as  a  reader?  Surely,  in 
fact,  David  is  revealed  as  a  very  reluctant  participant 
in  the  transaction,  who  is  induced,  perhaps  through 
exasperation,  into  making  a  rash  oath  and  acquiesces  to 
the  trick  of  his  general  with  a  bad  grace,  only 
fulfilling  as  much  of  the  requirement  of  his  oath  as  he 
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interpreted  as  attempts  to  break  off  the  communication, 
rather  than  as  expressions  of  interest,  enthusiasm  and 
commitment. 
5.2.3  DAVID  AS  READER  IN  2  SAM  14 
The  David  of  2  Sam  12  seems  to  fit  Alonso  Sch6kel's 
description  more  closely.  In  that  first  encounter, 
David  is  interested,  enthusiastic  and  commits  himself  to 
an  unequivocal  condemnation  and  judgment  on  the  rich 
man.  How  different  his  response  to  the  wise  woman 
proves  to  be. 
Once  bitten,  twice  shy,  it  seems.  Is  the  reader  meant  to 
take  David's  sense  of  d6ja  vu  as  a  prompt  to  a  sense  of 
d6j&  lu  ?  In  his  discussion  of  the  nature  of  Nathan's 
parable  David  Gunn  asks,  'What  would  have  happened  if 
the  king  had  said  to  Nathan,,  "Well,,  I'm  sorry  for  the 
poor  man  but  there  may  be  more  to  this  than  meets  the 
eye  -  take  the  case  to  the  examining  magistrate"7.1  (Gunn 
1982:  41).  This  is  virtually  what  happens  in  this 
second  encounter,  bringing  a  slightly  farcical  aspect  to 
it,  reminiscent  of  the  black  humour  of  David's  own 
repeated  attempts  to  persuade  Uriah  to  sleep  with 
Bathsheba  (2  Samuel  11:  7-13). 
So  what,  then,  is  the  relationship  between  these  two 
stories,  and  these  two  pictures  of  David  as  reader? 
5.3  2  SAMUEL  14  AND  2  SAMUEL  12 
5.3.1  SIMILARITIES 
Jan  Fokkelman  (1981)  lists  the  similarities  between 
David's  encounter  with  the  woman  of  Teqoa  and  the 
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Again,  David  is  approached  as  a  judge  with  a  ficti- 
tious  case  which  will  lead  to  a  tua  res  agitur. 
Again  he  binds  himself  with  an  oath  ...  when  he 
passes  sentence.  Whereas  Nathan  was  the  voice  of 
God  in  Ch[apter]  12,  here  the  wise  woman  is  the 
voice  of  Joab  and  simultaneously  an  envoy.  Again, 
an  impasse  of  David's  must  be  broken 
through.  (Fokkelman  1981:  129)7 
He  draws  particular  attention  to  the  equivalences 
between  the  actors  in  each  story: 
The  parallelism  in  the  series  of  scenes  shows  that 
the  duo  Joab/woman  is  the  successor  to  the  twosome 
Yahweh/Nathan.  The  voice  of  David's  conscience  is 
Nathan's  voice  is  God's  voice  [sic],  and  the  voice 
of  the  woman  is  Joab's  voice  -  they  too  make  an 
appeal  to  David's  conscience.  Just  as  Nathan  is 
literally  and  essentially  sent  by  God,  so  too  is 
the  woman  sent  by  Joab.  (1981:  142) 
Fokkelmann  sums  up  the  effect  of  these  similarities  as 
follows:  'The  entire  parallel  ...  already  points  to  the 
particular  significance  of  the  figure  of  Joab.  '(1981: 
158)  For  Fokkelman,  the  structural  equivalence  of  the 
roles  of  God  and  Joab  in  these  two  stories  serves  to 
reveal  to  the  reader  the  God-like  qualities  of  Joab  the 
reconciler. 
one  could  equally  well  argue  that  it  reveals  the  Joab- 
like  qualities  of  God.  Rather  than  revealing  Joab  as  a 
God-like  reconciler,  God's  own  efforts  at  reconciliation 
have  the  same  overtones  of  ruthlessness  and  fallibility 
7  These  parallels  are  also  noted  by  Waldman  (1986)  who  points  out 
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as  Joab's.  In  2  Samuel  12  God  is  responsible  for  the 
death  of  one  of  David's  sons,  as  Joab  will  be  in  2 
Samuel  18.  Throughout  the  books  of  Samuel,  Joab's 
ruthless  interventions  on  David's  behalf,  yet  often 
against  David's  own  wishes,  have  a  quality  recognisable 
in  God's  relationship  to  his  chosen  ones.  To  take  one 
instance,  Joab's  remarkable  reproach  to  David  in  2 
Samuel  19:  5-7  has  strong  emotional  resonances  with  the 
message  God  conveys  to  David  through  Nathan  in  2  Samuel 
12:  7-12. 
There  is  no  a  priori  reason  to  suppose  that  the  analogy 
between  the  two  protagonists  is  to  be  read  in  one 
direction  alone.  In  any  case,  how  far  a  reconciliation 
is  effected  in  2  Samuel  14  is  a  moot  point.  Just 
because  David  finds  himself  entrapped  by  his  oath  into 
recalling  Absalom  does  not  mean  he  has  to  like  it.  The 
grudging  way  in  which  he  adheres  to  the  letter  rather 
than  the  spirit  of  this  agreement  fuels  Absalom's 
frustration  and  contributes  the  eventual  outbreak  of 
hostilities  between  them.  The  results  of  Joab's 
intervention  seem  to  me  better  expressed  by  David  Gunn 
when  he  writes  that  it  is  to  prove  disastrous  for  the 
state  and,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  war,  for  Joab's 
personal  status.  1(1982:  158)  So  much  for  the  wisdom  and 
benignity  of  the  protagonists  of  this  incident.  Again, 
is  Joab  here  shown  to  be  God-like,  or  does  this  perhaps 
cast  a  shadow  over  God's  actions  in  2  Sam  12? 
In  effect,  what  Fokkelman  seems  to  me  to  miss  is  the 
mutually  destabilising  effect  of  a  parodic  relationship 
between  the  two  accounts.  In  putting  forward  this 
thesis  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  parody,  like  irony, 
is  difficult  to  demonstrate  conclusively.  This  is 
especially  so  as  its  effect  is  achieved  by  playing  on 
the  competence  of  the  reader.  This  is  well  illustrated 
by  the  reception  of  Jonathan  Swift's  'Meditation  on  a 
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composed  out  of  exasperation  at  being  obliged  to  read  to 
his  patroness  from  Boyle's  Meditations  evening  after 
evening.  on  one  occasion,  he  substituted  this  parodic 
invention  of  his  own.  The  good  lady,  all  unawares, 
pronounced  it  the  most  inspiring  of  the  lot.  8 
5.3.2  DEFINITIONS  OF  PARODY 
Despite  the  difficulties,  one  offer  of  a  definition  of 
parody  is  to  be  found  in  John  R.  Miles's  article 
'Laughing  at  the  bible:  Jonah  as  parody'(Miles  1990). 
For  Miles,  parody  assumes  the  audience's  prior  knowledge 
of  a  familiar  text  or  a  familiar  style,  what  Gdrard 
Genette  in  his  turn  calls  the  1hypotext'.  on  which  the 
parodist  then  composes  his  1hypertext'  (1982:  11-12). 
This  textual  or  stylistic  starting  point  differentiates 
parody  from  other  ostensibly  similar  genres  such  as 
satire  or  burlesque.  But  Miles  goes  on  to  assert  that 
the  target  of  the  parody  is  not  so  much  the  text  itself, 
but  the  audience  that  takes  it  seriously.  So,  to  refer 
to  our  earlier  example,  Swift's  parodic  meditation  was 
not  really  directed  at  Boyle's  texts  per  se  -  black 
marks  on  white  paper  are  not  troubled  by  such  things  - 
but  at  his  patroness's  uncritical  appreciation  of  the 
assumptions  and  conventions  they  embodied.  Even  Boyle 
as  author  only  comes  under  attack  in  so  far  as  he  took 
these  conventions  seriously  himself.  Parody  calls  the 
audience's  attention  to  the  conventions  operating  in  a 
text  or  a  style  by  seeming  to  obey  them  but  applying 
them  to  incongruous  purpose9. 
8  This  anecdote  is  recounted  in  Murray  (1954:  112-113) 
Templeton  (1992)  discusses  the  role  of  parody  as  a  mode  of 
interpretation,  but  also  as  an  internal  process  within  the  Old 
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Gary  Saul  Morson,  expounding  Mikhail  Bakhtin's  account 
of  parody,  reinforces  this  view  when  he  claims  that  by 
removing  an  utterance  from  its  original  occasion,  or 
perhaps  displaying  its  conventions  in  a  new  context,  the 
parodist  can  expose  'the  otherwise  covert  aspects  of 
that  occasion,  including  the  unstated  motives  and 
assumptions  of  both  the  speaker  and  the  assumed  and 
presumably  sympathetic  audience,  (Morson  1989:  71).  He 
also  usefully  lists  three  techniques  which  may  alert  the 
reader  to  the  possibility  that  a  particular  text  may  be 
a  parody,  even  in  the  absence  of  any  original.  These 
diagnostic  signs  are: 
l.  exaggeration  -  particularly  the  heightening  of 
contrasts 
2.  incongruity  -  countergeneric  elements 
3.  punning  -  perverse  reading  of  polysemic  elements.  10 
in  7.17-18  as  a  bitter  parody'  of  Psalm  8:  4,  he  sees  parody  as  a 
mode  of  appropriation  of  texts  which  transposes  them  to  a  new 
context  (1992:  285).  He  asks  'And  if  Scripture  parodies 
Scripture,  does  that  not  give  Writing  a  licence  (or  license)  to  do 
the  same?  There  are  songs,  of  course  that  give  rise  antiphonally 
to  the  "song  alor(side  the  song-  (the  Beigesang),  but  also  songs 
that  evoke  "the  song  against  the  song"  (the  Gegensang).  And  man 
being  plural,  with  a  legionary  soul,  both  functions,  singing 
alongside,  and  singing  against,  can  be  fulfilled  simultaneously 
and  ambiguously.  To  which  a  third  may  be  added:  a  song  sung 
against  itself,  a  text  written  against  itself  (and  every  other),  a 
literary  critical  text  that  is  also  critical  of  the  criticism;  in 
a  word,  self-parodyl(1992:  284). 
10  Adapted  from  Morson  (1989:  67). Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  5  214 
Although  these  can  only  be  indications,  we  are  in  the 
fortunate  position  of  having  both  hypotext  and  hypertext 
if  we  wish  to  postulate  that  2  Samuel  14  represents  a 
parody  of  2  Samuel  12.  Is  there  then  any  evidence  of 
the  presence  of  these  elements  which  might  support  such 
a  reading? 
5.3.3  2  SAM  14  AS  PARODY:  THE  EVIDENCE 
In  fact,  it  is  there  in  abundance.  First  of  all,  there 
is  clearly  a  bathetic  contrast  between  the  figures  David 
has  to  deal  with  in  2  Samuel  14  and  2  Samuel  12.  We 
have  already  pointed  out  that  God  seems  to  be 
substituted  with  Joab,  whose  press  elsewhere  in  Samuel 
is  none  too  f  avourable.  Similarly,  whereas  in  2  Samuel 
12  we  have  David  confronted  with  the  forbidding  figure 
of  an  accredited  prophet  sent  at  the  bidding  of  God,  in 
2  Samuel  14  we  have  the  slightly  ludicrous  figure  of  a 
wise  woman  who  has  swathed  herself  in  dust  and  weeds  at 
the  bidding  of  Joab".  within  the  conventions  which  2 
Samuel  at  least  purports  to  embody,  women  are  not  of 
high  status,  and  to  be  described  as  wise  is  no 
compliment.  we  need  only  think  of  the  depiction  of  the 
,  very  wise'  character  who  appears  in  the  intervening 
chapter,  Amnon's  treacherous  friend  and  adviser  Jonadab. 
11  Hoftijzer  (1970:  443  n.  1)  remarks:  'The  different  status  of  the 
prophets  in  these  cases  is  already  clear  from  the  fact  that  they 
represent  God  and  speak  in  His  Name,  as  both  Nathan  and  the 
unknown  prophet  do  (2  Sam.  xii  7,1  Reg.  xx  42).  This  is  quite  a 
difference  from  the  Tekoite  woman  who  speaks  for  one  of  the  king's 
servants  and  does  not  reveal  the  fact  until  forced  to  do  so  (2 
Sam.  xiv  19).  She  acts  -  as  the  prophets  do  -  under  directions, 
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This  leads  us  to  consider  the  way  in  which  David  himself 
differs  between  the  two  encounters.  We  could 
encapsulate  this  by  saying  that  his  faults  in  chapters 
13  and  14  are  those  of  impotence,  while  in  chapters  11 
and  12  the  problem  is  a  sight  too  much  potency.  The 
grand  sins  of  adultery  and  murder  in  chapter  11  merit 
divine  intervention  and  penalties  which  jeopardise  the 
whole  future  destiny  of  the  Davidic  dynasty.  By 
contrast,  the  ugly  mess  of  chapter  13  which  is 
compounded  by  David's  failure  to  act  decisively  merits 
only  the  intervention  of  Joab,  and  the  issue  is  over  the 
banishment  of  one  of  David's  sons,  not  necessarily  a 
matter  of  life  and  death. 
As  we  have  seen,  his  impetuous  but 
decisive  response  to  Nathan  is  replaced  with  a  cautious, 
even  anxious,  reaction  to  the  woman's  request.  David  is 
reduced  to  a  banal  parody  of  himself. 
There  are  also  several  intriguing  features  in  the 
language  of  the  woman  of  Teqoals  speeches  which  are 
interlarded  with  somewhat  forced  similes  and  proverbs  to 
the  extent  that  they  pose  some  knotty  problems  of 
translation.  The  surviving  son  is  compared  to  a  coal 
about  to  be  quenched  (2  Samuel  14:  7).  The  transience  of 
human  life  is  captured  in  the  image  of  water  poured  on 
the  ground  which  cannot  be  gathered  up  again  (2  Samuel 
14:  14).  It  is  at  least  noteworthy  that  the  books  of 
Samuel  are  otherwise  very  sparing  of  figurative 
language.  There  are  exceptional  passages  which  all  turn 
out  to  represent  the  language  of  persuasive  negotiators 
put  to  the  test:  Abigail's  speech  to  David  where  she 
seeks  to  avert  his  threat  of  massacre  against  Nabal's 
household  (1  Samuel  25:  24-31),  Hushails  deceptive  advice 
to  Absalom  as  he  seeks  to  persuade  him  not  to  attack 
David  (2  Samuel  17:  7-13),  and  the  wise  woman  of  Abel  who 
is  negotiating  with  Joab  for  the  safety  of  the  city 
caught  up  in  Sheba's  revolt(2  Samuel  20:  18).  With  no 
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the  woman  of  Teqoals  distinctive  style  might  represent  a 
recognisable  heightening  of  a  wise  woman's  typically 
flowery  speech  to  an  audience  familiar  with  such 
characters.  12 
The  wise  woman  also  assures  David  twice  that  he  is  'like 
an  angel  of  the  Lord',  both  in  his  ability  to  discern 
good  from  evil  (v.  17)  and  in  his  knowledge  of  what  is 
going  on  (v.  20).  It  is  hard  to  avoid  the  conclusion 
12  On  this  point,  see  B.  P.  Church  (1947:  30):  'Two  of  the  most 
striking  examples  of  real  literary  skill  [in  2  Samuel]  are  the 
speeches  of  the  woman  of  Tekoa  and  of  Hushai  the  Archite.  Both 
speeches  are  meant  to  deceive,  and  the  author  has  shown  their 
speciousness  in  their  unnecessary  length  and  flowery  language. 
Figures  of  speech  are  comparatively  rare  in  Hebrew  prose,  and 
especially  simile  which  is  more  complex  than  the  metaphor  which 
comes  naturally  to  the  oriental...  As  a  result  of  this  literary 
device  a  smooth  persuasiveness  is  given  to  the  arguments 
suggesting  the  insincerity  of  the  speakers.  ' 
Contrast  this  with  the  verdict  of  Claudia  Camp  who  sees  the  apt 
use  of  proverbs  by  the  wise  women  of  2  Samuel  as  part  of  their 
professional  status  and  their  success  in  diplomacy:  'In  the  wise 
women's  use  of  proverbs  to  lend  incisiveness  and  authority  to 
their  arguments,  we  have  seen  the  kind  of  persuasive  counsel, 
presented  in  a  compelling  manner,  that  a  royal  advisor  maybe 
employed,  (1981:  21).  See  also  Bar-Efrat's  comments  on  Hushails 
speech  to  Absalom:  'The  speech,  which  is  coloured  throughout  by  a 
plethora  of  images  and  figurative  language,,  reaches  its  apogee  in 
this  respect  at  its  close.  In  order  to  conceal  the  weakness  of 
his  plan,  Hushai  appeals  to  his  audience's  emotions,  using 
fantastic  descriptions  in  order  to  inflame  its  imagination. 
Excitement  suppresses  rational  consideration'  (1989:  236). Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  5  217 
that  this  is  ironic  when  she  has  just  succeeded  in 
hoodwinking  him  into  recalling  Absalom.  Even  his 
apparent  astuteness  in  identifying  the  hand  of  Joab  in 
her  intervention  comes  too  late  to  prevent  him  from 
swearing  the  oath  that  traps  him.  Indeed,  it  is  never 
clear  that  he  identifies  her  accurately  as  a  wise  woman 
acting  the  part  of  a  mourner.  It  is  easier  to  interpret 
this  story  on  the  basis  that  he  imagines  the  woman  to  be 
a  genuine  plaintiff  whom  Joab  has  coached  in  making  the 
application  of  her  own  case  to  David.  As  for  his  ability 
to  discern  good  and  evil,  it  is  precisely  his  woeful 
failings  in  this  which  have  created  the  situation  that 
Joab  is  trying  to  rectify,  to  say  nothing  of  his  conduct 
in  chapters  11  and  12, 
If  we  go  on  to  look  at  the  other  occasions  on  which  this 
same  expression  'like  an  angel  of  the  Lord'  is  applied 
to  David  in  the  books  of  Samuel,  they  merely  serve  to 
reinforce  this  impression.  In  1  Samuel  29:  9,  Achish, 
king  of  Gath,  proclaims  that  David  is  as  blameless  in 
his  sight  as  an  angel  of  the  Lord'.  when  the  reader 
knows  from  1  Samuel  27:  8-12  that  David  has  been  busily 
slaughtering  Achish's  allies  behind  his  back.  The  other 
person  who  uses  the  expression  of  David  is  Mephibosheth 
(2  Samuel  19:  27)  in  a  context  where  David  is  making  the 
third  in  the  series  of  contradictory  judgments  as  to 
the  proper  distribution  of  Saul's  property  between  Ziba 
and  Mephibosheth.  David's  wisdom  and  discernment  are 
certainly  not  put  in  a  good  light  by  this  case, 
especially  as  Mephibosheth's  final  word  is  to  propose 
his  own  solution  in  contradiction  to  David's!  We  might 
finally  note  that  the  only  other  use  of  the  expression 
'angel  of  the  Lord'  comes  in  2  Samuel  24,  where  God 
sends  an  angel  to  bring  a  plague  on  the  people  of  Israel 
as  a  result  of  David's  decision  to  institute  a  census. 
Here  the  judgment  of  this  king  who  is  like  an  angel  of 
the  Lord,  is  the  cause  of  God's  angel  of  destruction  be- 
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this  take  the  wise  woman's  words  as  any  kind  of 
compliment? 
In  any  case,  just  how  'wise,  is  the  intervention  of 
Joab  and  the  wise  woman?  Cazelles  (1955:  26-27)  is 
uncompromising:  'The  wisdom  in  question  is  the  same  as 
the  insidious  wisdom  of  Jonadab  in  the  preceding  chapter 
(13:  3)  whose  advice  does  end  up  delivering  Tamar  to 
Amnon  but  with  the  consequences  which  one  knows., 
Indeed,  Jonadab  is  described  as  a  'very  wise,  man.  His 
advice  to  Amnon,  which  precipitates  the  whole  crisis 
that  leads  to  Absalom's  banishment,  involves  disguise. 
In  order  to  sleep  with  his  half-sister  Tamar,  Amnon  is 
to  pretend  to  be  ill,  just  as  the  wise  woman  is  to 
pretend  to  be  a  mourner.  It  involves  deception  not  only 
of  Tamar,  but  more  particularly  of  David,  whose 
permission  is  necessary  before  Tamar  can  visit  Amnon  in 
his  quarters.  It  is  also  a  wisdom  which  is  about 
subverting  reason  and  decency,  which  paradoxically  leads 
to  what  Tamar  calls  'wanton  folly'.  Jonadab's  other 
contribution  is  the  devious  trick  of  consoling  the  king 
for  the  death  of  his  eldest  son  by  reassuring  him  that 
only  one  of  his  sons  is  dead,  not  all  of  them.  Jonadab 
then  takes  credit  for  giving  him  this  good  news,  without 
revealing  any  compunction  for  over  the  death  of  the  man 
who  was  his  friend.  Jonadab  comes  out  of  the  story  as 
the  wise  one  who  understood  what  was  happening.  who, 
however,  was  better  placed  to  know  that  Amnon  was  the 
target  of  Absalom's  wrath?  This  wisdom  is  manipulation 
in  pursuit  of  self-interest,  which  leads  to  the  death  of 
the  one  who  imagines  he  is  the  beneficiary.  13 
13  Bar-Efrat  in  his  detailed  study  of  2  Sam  13  offers  a  possible 
interpretation  that  might  exonerate  Jonadab  on  the  grounds  that 
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So  in  the  case  of  2  Samuel  14,  do  we  see  a  parallel? 
The  ultimate  result  of  the  intervention  is  civil  war  and 
the  death  of  the  possible  benefactor  Absalom  in  the 
pursuit  of  the  throne,  a  death  which  ultimately  leads  to 
the  circumstances  of  Joab's  own  execution. 
Gunn  judges  that  in  his  intervention  in  2  Samuel  14  Joab 
for  once  has  the  interests  of  the  state  at  heart  in  his 
intervention  but  it  proves  disastrous  both  for  the  state 
and  for  Joab's  personal  status  (1982:  100).  McCarter 
concludes  that  it  is  the  Machiavellian  disregard  for 
larger  moral  issues  in  the  interests  of  attaining  an, 
immediate  goal  typical  of  the  sons  of  Zeruiah.  Anderson 
(1989:  191)  argues  that  the  concern  of  the  narrative  is 
actually  to  exonerate  David  to  an  extent  from  the  ill- 
advised  recall  of  Absalom'.  He  ends  up  trapped  by  his 
own  oath  through  his  merciful  response  to  the  woman.  The 
effort  to  exonerate  David  shows  just  how  ill  advised  the 
action  is  thought  to  be. 
Yet  it  might  be  argued  that  the  problem  is  not  so  much 
the  recall  of  Absalom,  but  the  disregard  that  David 
shows  him  by  refusing  to  admit  him  to  his  presence.  If 
this  is  so,  what  price  David's  wisdom  and  obedience? 
turn  against  Amnon  in  disappointment  (1989:  249-50).  Even  if  we 
grant  that  his  motives  towards  Amnon  were  not  duplicitous,  his 
attitude  to  David  and  above  all  to  Tamar  was  far  from  commendable 
on  the  most  charitable  interpretation.  This  reading  attempts  to 
save  Jonadab's  morals  at  the  expense  of  his  ability  to  foresee  the 
result  of  his  intervention;  either  way,  his  'wisdom'  seems  of 
dubious  value. 
On  a  more  general  point  that  the  proleptic  epithet  'wise,  often 
serves  to  drive  home  in  retrospect  the  ironic  difference  between 
the  character's  auspicious  potential  under  God  and  his  miserable 
performance  in  opposition  to  God'  see  Sternberg  (1985:  345). Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  5  220 
His  reluctant  and  half-hearted  response  is  hardly 
- 
consonant  with  the  picture  of  the  interested,  eager 
pillar  of  moral  virtue  that  Alonso  Schbkel  depicts. 
Either  way,  the  wisdom  of  the  episode  is  severely  thrown 
into  question. 
5.4  THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  PARODIC  READING 
5.4.1  REREADING  2  SAM  12 
If  this  accumulated  evidence  does  point  to  a  parodic 
relationship  between  the  stories,  what  does  this  imply? 
Perhaps  it  is  necessary  to  state  explicitly  that  to  say 
that  the  story  in  2  Samuel  14  is  a  parody  of  that  in  2 
Samuel  12  is  not  to  imply  that  2  Samuel  12  at  some  time 
existed  as  an  independent  text,  2  Samuel  14  being 
composed  as  a  satirical  commentary  upon  it.  In  itself 
this  description  of  their  relations  carries  no  such 
implications.  2  Samuel  12  has  a  priority  conferred  by 
the  sequence  of  reading.  In  its  present  position  in  the 
book  of  2  Samuel,  2  Samuel  12  establishes  the  pattern 
which  we  recognise  in  2  Samuel  14.  It  is  only  as  we 
recognise  that  pattern,  however,  that  it  makes  sense  to 
speak  of  2  Samuel  12  as  the  original,  story.  It 
becomes  the  original  by  virtue  of  its  repetition.  What 
is  implied,  however,  is  that  at  the  level  of  composition 
there  is  an  awareness  of  both  texts.  If,  as,  for 
example,  P.  Kyle  McCarter  would  claim,  2  Samuel  12  and 
14  are  from  different  documents  (McCarter  1984:  305-6), 
at  the  very  least  the  close  correspondence  between  the 
stories  shows  a  very  heavy  redactorial  hand. 
Important  as  such  questions  may  be,  I  am  more  concerned 
at  this  juncture  to  explore  the  consequences  of  this 
reading  for  our  understanding  of  what  is  going  on  in  the 
text  of  2  Samuel  12.  The  thought  that  there  may  be  a 
parodic  relationship  between  chapters  12  and  14  entices 
us  to  reread  chapter  12.  As  Joan  Hartwig  expresses  it: Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  5  221 
The  parody  emphasizes  similarities  between  the 
original  and  the  imitation;  yet  the  difference  is 
so  great  that  it  activates  the  potentialities  of 
meaning  in  the  original.  Because  of  the  almost 
automatic  reviewing  process  it  promotes,  the  parody 
heightens  and  expands,  even  as  it  qualifies,  the 
meaning  of  that  which  it  imitates.  (Hartwig  1983: 
5) 
This  puts  a  question  mark  over  the  traditional  reading 
of  the  story  in  2  Samuel  12  as  a  tale  of  repentance,  a 
reading  enshrined  in  the  ascription  of  Psalm  51  to  the 
penitent  David.  In  his  reading  of  the  story,  Stuart 
Lasine  argues  strongly  that  David's  behaviour  shows  no 
real  change  after  his  encounter  with  Nathan,  and 
certainly  not  the  radical  improvement  that  a  full- 
blooded  repentance  would  provoke.  'His  repentance.  'says 
Lasine,  'does  not  teach  him  what  he  needed  to  learn  in 
order  to  rule  more  justly  when  similar  situations 
arose.  '(1984:  85)  Certainly  David's  subsequent  actions 
in  2  Samuel  do  not  show  any  sign  of  increased  insight  or 
moral  stature,  a  point  well  borne  out  by  2  Samuel  14. 
Lasine  also  suggests  another  line  of  thought  when  he 
points  out  the  rather  mawkish  sentimentality  of  Nathan's 
parable,  even  more  marked  in  some  of  its  readers.  He 
latches  on  to  Fokkelman's  rhapsody  on  the  love  of  the 
pauper  and  the  sheep: 
The  twosome  of  pauper  and  sheep  grows  into  a  unity 
in  an  atmosphere  of  warmth  and  care.  This  unity  is 
practical  and  emotional  and  therefore  existential. 
It  emanates  the  mystical  lustre  of  everyday  life, 
as  we  often  suspect  and  even  come  to  know  in  our 
most  open  moments.  (Lasine  1984:  103,,  quoting 
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In  contrast  to  this,  we  might  want  to  ask  'What  kind  of 
a  man  is  it  that  goes  to  bed  with  a  sheep?  '  This 
quotation  from  Fokkelman,  which  it  would  be  hard  to 
better  in  any  parody,  prompts  the  thought  that  within 
the  framework  if  2  Samuel  11  and  12,,  Nathan's  story  is 
itself  functioning  as  a  parody  of  David's  acts.  For  the 
reader  of  2  Samuel,  that  is.  In  terms  of  our  strict 
definition  of  parody  as  a  genre  dependent  on  a  prior 
text,  David  does  not  experience  it  as  a  parody.  We  as 
readers  do,  as  we  compare  it  to  the  text  of  chapter  11. 
By  its  exaggerated  and  slightly  ludicrous  insistence  on 
the  emotional  implications  of  a  minor  incident  of  sheep- 
rustling,  it  calls  attention  to  the  disproportion  of 
David's  own  actions  and  his  disregard  for  the  emotional 
lives  of  others.  David  is  forced  to  re-read  his  own 
depiction  of  the  events  in  2  Samuel  11.  What  he  had 
perhaps  represented  to  himself  as  'the  tale  of  the 
crafty  king  merely  getting  what  was  his  due',  is  re- 
presented  to  him  as  the  tale  of  a  powerful  man  revealing 
his  callous  selfishness.  14  The  question  then  becomes,  to 
what  extent  does  David  recognise  the  truth  of  this 
description? 
The  answer  would  appear  to  be  that  he  does  recognise  it, 
but  not  to  the  extent  that  this  causes  any  fundamental 
shift  in  his  attitudes.  Just  as  he  recognises  the  hand 
14  See  Brown  (1984:  56):  "  ...  the  story  about  an  innocent  ewe 
lamb  was  not  really  a  story  about  an  innocent  ewe  lamb,  but  a 
story  about  a  guilty  king  ...  David  suddenly  saw,  in  what  must 
have  been  a  sickening  moment  of  insight,  that  he  had  been  reading 
not  only  "The  Ewe  Lamb  Story"  incorrectly,  but  "The  David  Story" 
as  well,  which  up  to  that  point  had  gone:  "Kings  are  entitled  to 
whatever  they  want  and  are  entitled  to  get  it  by  whatever  means 
they  choose.  " Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  5  223 
of  Joab  in  his  encounter  with  the  Teqoite,  but  does  not 
fully  grasp  the  implications  and  depth  of  this 
involvement,  David  both  acknowledges  and  fails  to 
acknowledge  the  hand  of  God  in  Nathan's  intervention. 
'I  have  sinned  against  the  Lord,  '  he  says  (2  Samuel  12: 
13),  but  such  recognition  is  not  necessarily  repentance. 
This  ambivalence  may  be  reflected  in  God's  double-edged 
forgiveness.  David  is  to  survive,  but  at  the  expense  of 
his  son. 
5.4.2  DAVID  AND  THE  OATH. 
After  this  rather  circuitous  comparison  of  David  as 
reader  in  the  two  accounts,  there  is  one  particular 
aspect  of  this  parodic  relationship  which  I  wish  to 
explore.  The  widow's  insistence  on  the  oath,  and  the 
complexity  of  the  transaction  by  which  she  secures  it 
emphasise  starkly  the  importance  of  David's  oath  in  both 
stories.  David  as  reader  is  David  as  swearer.  In  both 
cases,  David's  oath  serves  parallel  functions.  It  ties 
David  to  the  words  rather  than  the  meaning  of  his 
utterance. 
In  both  cases,  too,  the  oath  is  the  handle  by  which 
David's  reading  is  turned  back  on  him.  The  oath  as 
ambiguous  utterance  means  that  David  as  utterer  is 
committed  to  a  reading  that  another  can  re-read  or 
counter-read. 
Both  stories  then  turn  on  a  rather  grim  play  on  words. 
In  chapter  14  David  swears  that  not  one  of  the  banished 
son's  hairs  will  fall  to  the  ground.  Peter  Ackroyd  has 
noted  that  this  is  a  possible  link  with  the  unusual 
insistence  on  the  beauty  and  quality  of  Absalom's  hair 
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identification  of  Absalom  with  this  son15.  (Ackroyd 
1977:  135;  see  also  Anderson  1989:  190). 
What  has  not  often  been  noted  is  that  this  oath  is 
fulfilled  to  the  letter,  but  not  in  spirit.  Absalom  is 
killed,  despite  the  implication  of  David's  oath  that  he 
will  not  be  harmed.  But  as  he  is  hanging  in  a  tree,  not 
one  of  his  hairs  does  touch  the  ground16.  Could  this  be 
a  parodic  heightening  of  the  notorious  equivocation  of 
oaths  and  oracles?  Both  the  reference  and  the  the 
outcome  of  the  oath  are  unlooked  for  and  not  part  of 
David's  immediate  intention,  by  which  we  must  mean  the 
immediate  resolution  of  their  polysemy. 
It  leads  us  to  wonder  if  there  is  a  similar  phenomenon 
in  2  Samuel  12:  5.  David's  expletive  describing  the  rich 
man  as  a  'son  of  death'  finds  a  telling  echo  in  Nathan's 
warning  that  his  'son'  will  'die'.  Such  reinscription 
of  the  figurative  as  the  literal  has  been  identified  as 
one  of  the  common  features  of  parody. 
15  The  connection,  however,  between  the  mention  of  Absalom's  hair 
in  2  Sam  14:  26  and  his  death  -  though  generally  on  the  assumption 
that  Absalom  was  entangled  by  his  hair  -  has  a  long  history;  see 
the  Mishna  Sota  1,8  which  reads  'Absalom  gloried  in  his  hair  - 
therefore  he  was  hung  by  his  hair,  [cited  by  Fokkelman  148  n.  148]. 
There  is  no  textual  evidence  that  Absalom  was  entangled  by  his 
hair,  which  would  make  it  an  indirect  cause  of  his  death,  but  this 
does  not  alter  the  fact  that  he  dies  suspended  in  mid  air  with  the 
consequences  noted  in  the  text  above. 
16  Blenkinsopp  (1966:  51  n.  6)  is  the  only  commentator  who  makes 
this  connection,  and  then  only  allusively:  'We  should  note  the 
finesse  in  putting  into  David's  mouth  the  assertion:  "Not  one  hair 
of  your  son  shall  fall  to  the  ground"  (cf.  1  Sam  xiv  45)  in  view  of 
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The  implications  of  this  suggestion  will  be  explored 
further  in  our  next  chapter  where  we  explore  the  nature 
of  the  biblical  oath.  David  as  reader,  as  we  have 
already  established,  means  David  as  utterer.  If  David 
as  reader  in  both  of  these  cases  becomes  David  as 
swearer,  then  the  function  of  the  oath  in  the  text  and 
its  implication  for  the  character  of  David  become  key 
questions. 
It  also  brings  to  the  fore  the  relation  between  the  oath 
and  polysemy.  As  we  have  seen,  the  question  of  polysemy 
and  its  resolution  is  central  to  the  process  of  reading. 
In  exploring  the  nature  of  the  oath,  we  can  investigate 
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APPENDIX:  TEXTUAL  CRITICISM  OF  2  SAMUEL  14 
5a.  1  2  SAM  14:  1 
The  text  of  2  Sam  14  has  created  many  points  of 
controversy,  which  in  themselves  reveal  interesting 
points  about  the  reading  stances  of  its  commentators. 
The  chapter  begins  by  intimating  that  Joab,  David's 
general,  has  noted  that  the  king's  'heart,  was  'toward, 
or  against,  [ý.  V]  his  son  Absalom,  who  is  in  self- 
imposed  exile  after  killing  his  brother  Amnon. 
Immediately  we  hit  on  an  interpretive  crux  which  is  not 
resolvable  by  textual  criticism.  The  problem  of 
interpetation  here  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
preposition 
ý17is  intrinsically  ambiguous  in  a  way  that 
is  not  reproducible  in  English.  Was  David  'for'  or 
'against'  his  son? 
Most  commentators  have  read  this  as  expressing  David's 
desire  to  be  reconciled  to  his  son  (e.  g.  Hertzberg  1964: 
328,  Gordon  1986:  266),  a  desire  which  Joab  furthers  by 
his  scheme.  Fokkelman's  contrary  judgment  (1981:  126) 
that  2  Samuel  13:  39  and  14:  1  express  David's  continuing 
hostility  to  his  son  is  a  minority  view,  but  one  for 
which  he  adduces  several  lines  of  defence.  In 
particular,  he  argues  that  the  length  of  time  that  has 
elapsed  before  David  expresses  any  desire  for 
reconciliation,  and  the  very  fact  that  Joab  has  to 
embark  on  an  elaborate  ploy  to  trap  David  into  recalling 
his  banished  son  both,  support  his  contention'. 
1  Fokkelman's  arguments  have  borne  subsequent  fruit.  Anderson 
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5a.  2  2  sAm  13:  39 
The  decision  between  the  two  positions  depends  on  how  2 
Sam  13:  39  is  interpreted,  but  it  too  is  ambiguous.  At 
this  key  juncture  of  the  story  the  phrase  expressing 
David's  attitude  to  his  son  is  capable  of  radically 
different  interpretations.  In  2  Sam  13:  39,  this  is 
partly  due  to  a  problem  in  the  syntax  of  the  MT,  but 
this  merely  emphasizes  the  point  that  the  interpretAt-, 
decisions  by  commentators  as  to  whether  the  king  is 
hostile  to  his  son  or  not  have  to  depend  on  judgments 
not  reached  on  linguistic  grounds. 
The  MT  of  13:  39  reads: 
. nm--ý-n  ji:  mwý.  v  m*vjmwýR  nný  1-ýmm  -n-7.  'ýzni  1..  1.1-  1.  AT:  -...  V*  T  J*  T-:  - 
The  masculine  subject  'David  the  king'  follows  a 
feminine  verb  which  causes  a  problem  of  interpretation. 
LXX  and  Q  both  indicate  rwp  hm1k  the  spirit  of  the 
king,  as  the  subject,  which  would  indeed  accord  better 
with  the  feminine  verb.  The  meaning  of  the  verb  itself 
is  a  source  of  dispute.  Its  root  meaning  is  taken  as 
'to  cease,  or  'finish,.  in  this  context,  however,  does 
it  simply  mean  'to  cease',  or  does  it  carry  the  extended 
meaning  of  being  'spent',  or  'exhausted',  by  longing? 
The  alternative  interpretations  of  the  subjecCof  the 
verb  have  rather  different  connotations  in  relation  to 
the  infinitive  which  comes  next  in  the  sentence, 
translated  'going  out,  or  'going  forth,.  If  we  take  the 
MT  as  it  stand,  David  the  king'sgoing  forth'suggests  a 
literal  movement.  In  the  suggested  emendation,  the  verb 
has  to  take  a  more  metaphorical  colouring  when  expresses 
the  'going  forth,  of  the  king's  spirit.  There  is  also 
McCarter  opts  for  the  more  neutral  'the  king's  mind  was  on 
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disagreement  whether  the  king  (or  king's  spirit)  goes 
out  to  (ýR)  Absalom  or  against  (ý.  V)  him,  though,  as  we 
have  seen,  the  preposition 
ýD  itself  carries  a  range  of 
connotations.  As  a  result  of  these  various 
possibilities,  translations  of  this  verse  cover  the 
following  range: 
'And  the  spirit  of  the  king  longed  to  go  forth  to 
Absalom;  for  he  was  comforted  about  Amnon,  seeing 
he  was  deadl(RSV) 
'And  David  gradually  began  to  lose  his  abhorrence 
of  Absalom,  for  he  was  comforted  about  Amnon  seeing 
he  was  deadl(Hertzberg); 
'King  (David's]  enthusiasm  for  marching  out 
against  [him]  was  spent,  for  he  was  consoled  over 
Amnon's  deathl(McCarter); 
'The  king's  anger  ceased  to  be  actively  directed 
against  Absalom  for  he  had  become  reconciled  to  the 
fact  that  Amnon  was  deadl(Anderson) 
'David  longed  intensely  to  march  out  against 
Absalom,  for  he  was  grieved  about  Amnon  that  he  was 
dead.,  (Jongeling,  cited  in  Fokkelman) 
Each  translator  has  had  to  come  to  a  decision  on  the 
question  of  the  nature  of  David's  relationship  to  his 
son  on  very  fluid  textual  evidence.  Is  'going  out'  to 
one's  son  an  expression  of  loving  longing,  or  of 
military  aggression?  The  fact  that  such  different 
conclusions  are  possible  indicates  graphically  that  such 
decisions  reveal  more  about  the  assumptions  about  the 
dynamics  of  such  relationships  that  the  various 
commentators  bring  to  the  text  than  they  do  about  the 
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5a.  3  2  SAM  14:  15-17 
One  particular  point  of  debate  has  been  over  the  place 
of  verses.  15-17.  McCarter  (1984:  345-46)  supports  the 
suggestion  of  Budde  (1902:  267)  that  they  should  be 
moved  up  to  follow  verse  7.  His  argument  is  that  the 
woman  drops  her  disguise  in  vv  13-14,  when  she  makes  the 
direct  application  to  David's  case.  When,  then,  she 
seems  to  revert  to  speaking  about  the  case  of  her  son  in 
v.  16,  the  incongruity  is  glaring.  It  is  this  passage 
which  leads  to  Budde's  notorious  accusation  that  she  is 
guilty  of  Iblosse  Schwatzhaftigkeit'  [mere  chatter] 
(Budde  1902:  267).  Budde  is  not  the  only  critic  to  excuse 
the  incoherence  and  long-windedness  of  the  woman's 
speech  on  the  grounds  of  her  sex.  This  judgment  is 
questionable  in  itself,  but  may  also  serve  as  a  short 
cut  in  the  attempt  to  delve  into  the  implications  of  her 
speech.  Perhaps  there  is  more  to  the  matter  than  this 
suggests. 
In  McCarter's  view,  these  problems  are  solved  by  moving 
the  verses,  when  they  become  part  of  the  initial 
articulation  of  her  request  rather  than  a  redundant 
amplification  of  it.  Hoftijzer  (1970:  438)  opts  to 
circumvent  the  problem  by  interpreting  the  woman's  words 
as  citing  rather  than  reverting  to  her  case.  He  agrees 
with  McCarter  in  regarding  the  latter  as  impossible  now 
that  the  mask  has  been  dropped,  but  does  not  thereby 
conclude  that  the  text  has  to  be  reordered.  Fokkelman, 
on  the  other  hand,  takes  another  line.  He  attempts  to 
demonstrate  that  the  problem  only  exists  because  of 
McCarter's  assumption:  I  ...  the  fiction  has  not  yet  been 
given  up,  however;  on  the  contrary,  even  in  v.  16  the 
woman  still  plays  the  role  of  waylaid  widow  who  is 
counting  on  the  king's  redeeming  word/,  -  and  he  notes: 
'Her  bringing  up  the  Absalom  case  doesn,  t  necessarily 
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Though  Fokkelman  does  not  spell  this  out,  the  problem 
seems  to  be  that  there  are  three  positions,  not  two, 
that  the  woman  adopts: 
1.  widow  pleading  her  case 
2.  widow  pleading  her  case  with  consciousness  of 
its  application  to  the  state  of  the  nation  and 
the  king's  family  circumstances. 
3.  wise  woman  acting  the  part  of  2. 
Dropping  the  veil  of  role  1  does  not  mean  that  she  is 
exposed  as  really  occupying  role  3  rather  than  2. 
Indeed,  it  is  not  clear  that  David  ever  identifies  her 
with  role  3.  It  is  possible  that  Joab  could  have  found 
a  widow  with  just  such  a  grievance  and  persuaded  her  to 
make  the  application  of  her  (genuine)  case  to  David's 
actions.  David's  question  'Is'the  hand  of  Joab  with  you 
in  this?,  would  not  enable  him  to  discriminate  between 
the  two  possibilities.  This  may  have  a  bearing  on  the 
assessment  of  the  acuity  shown  by  David  in  seeing 
through  the  ruse.  Hertzberg,  indeed,  sees  these  verses 
as  'particularly  fine'  (1964:  332),  and  sees  the  woman's 
strategy  as  an  example  of  a  kind  of  subtlety  of 
negotiation  still  to  be  found  in  the  East. 
5a.  4  2  SAM  14:  13-14 
Further  problems  are  found  in  verses  13-14.  The  extent 
of  these  can  be  seen  by  comparing  the  translations 
offered  by  McCarter  (1984:  336)  and  Fokkelman  (1981: 
135) 
'Why  have  you  devised  such  a  thing  against  the 
people  of  Yahweh?,  she  said.  'For  by  reason  of  the 
king's  having  said  this  thing  they  become  guilty, 
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return.  For  your  son  is  dead,  and  as  water  spilled 
on  the  ground  cannot  be  gathered  up,  so  he  cannot 
take  up  his  life  again.  Yet  it  seems  reasonable  to 
the  king  to  keep  his  exile  away  from  him.  '(McCarter 
1984:  336). 
Why  hast  thou  then  undertaken  such  against  God's 
people?! 
Yes,  because  the  king  has  uttered  this,  he  is 
guilty  for  not  taking  back  his  cast-out  one. 
Verily,  we  must  certainly  die, 
Yes,  as  water  oozing  into  the  soil  which  can  no 
more  be  gathered  upI 
But.  would  God  make  no  effort  or  take  no  initiative 
to  let  the  cast-out  one  not  remain  cast  out  from 
him?  (Fokkelman  1981:  135) 
The  MT  of  these  verses  reads: 
ntýt--)  -iinzvjm  mnýi  7v.  trm  zt-m  'nmtn'i  n 
%TT:  7-  TT  ST  :T*  IT  PT 
mcqhc-)  oimim  ol-*N 
<T  T- 
ý6  nttý  "mrR  criý:.  m  mmzi  nim  nv:  -,  -:.  )  14  :  imirnN  Itmn 
J  V.  *  T  J'  T'  Ti 
-jnýmý  nim:  Win  MUM  WM  mv)rf,  7ý%  kum,  -kýýl  I-mw,  V,  T  -:  r-  T7  <T  T 
rr 
Both  Fokkelman  and  McCarter  agree  that  IrM  is  best 
taken  as  the  proposition  mn  +  pilel  infinitive  construct 
of  dbr  rather  than  as  the  hithpalel  participle  (see  here 
BDB  181).  This  verse  is  the  only  occasion  where  the 
participle  would  appear  in  this  construction.  otherwise 
it  is  only  found  in  Num  7:  89  and  Ezek  2:  2;  43:  6  (the 
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of  what  the  king  has  done  in  or  b  uttering  this  phrase.  y 
What  has  the  king  perpetrated  against  the  people? 
Hoftijzer  discusses  the  history  of  interpretation  of 
this  verse  thoroughly  (1970:  430  and  notes).  One 
interpretation  sees  a  parallel  between  David's  banishing 
of  Absalom  and  the  threat  to  the  widow's  son  with  Israel 
here  cast  as  the  widow  and  Absalom  as  the  favoured  son 
of  the  people.  David  has  thus  taken  the  widow's 
remaining  son.  Hoftijzer,  however,  prefers  to  see  the 
reproach  as  directed  at  the  king  for  implicating  the 
people  in  the  consequences  of  his  unfulfilled  oath. 
Fokkelman  sees  the  guilt  as  the  king's,  but  McCarter, 
following  the  same  line  of  thought,  takes  it  to  a 
further,  but  unnecessary,  stage  in  making  the  king's 
guilt  the  fact  that  he  has  made  the  people  guilty  and  so 
regarding  the  people  as  the  subject  of  the  verb. 
A  greater  difference  is  to  be  found  in  the  translation 
of  verse  14.  Fokkelman  here  follows  the  MT  which  seems 
to  record  a  proverbial  saying  about  the  irreversibility 
of  death.  Again  Hoftijzer  gives  an  extensive  review  of 
interpretations  (1970:  431-34  and  notes).  The  proverb 
has  been  read  by  various  commentators  either  as  a 
warning  to  David  that  if  he  does  not  act  immediately,  it 
may  be  too  late,  or  else  as  an  encouragement  to  put  the 
death  of  Amnon  in  perspective.  Hoftijzer's  own 
suggestion  is  that  the  emphatic  nature  of  the  infinitive 
construct  is  commonly  used  when  the  death  sentence  is 
passed,  not  for  natural  death.  The  woman  is  implicitly 
accusing  the  king  of  having  passed  a  death  sentence  on 
the  people  by  his  conduct.  That  being  said,  however, 
might  we  not  ask  how  else  the  woman  could  make  a 
powerful  statement  of  the  brute  facts  of  mortality? 
Just  because  a  death  sentence  lends  itself  to  such 
vehemence  does  not  imply  that  every  such  statement 
carries  that  force.  McCarter  dismisses  all  these 
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dead'.  The  MT  reading  is  a  trite  generalisation, 
(1984:  341).  McCarter's  own  reading  is  hardly  a 
startling  revelation.  The  phrase  is  followed  by  a 
metaphorical  proverb  as  both  agree.  As  we  shall  see, 
the  very  triteness  of  the  statement  could  explain  its 
presence. 
The  final  sentence  reveals  major  differences.  McCarter 
again  follows  LXXL.  He  reads  the  MT  11hym  as  lyw, 
taking  the  subject  not  as  'God,  but  as  the  dead  son  who 
cannot  take  up  his  life  for  himself'.  Fokkelman,  on 
the  other  hand,  again  follows  Hoftijzer  who  attempts  to 
make  sense  of  the  MT  as  it  stands.  He  takes  the 
expression  ns,  nps  literally  'to  take  up  (one's]  life, 
as  an  idiom  for  'to  aim  one's  activities  at,  or,  in 
Fokkelman's  interpretation,  'to  make  an  effort'. 
In  the  second  phrase,  the  interpretation  differs  widely. 
Mccarter  translates  the  MT  literally  as  land  he  [God] 
devises  a  plan  not  to  keep  an  exile  away  from  him., 
Having  opted  not  to  follow  the  reading  11hym  above,  he 
here  again  follows  LXXL,  and  translates  a  text  which 
supposes  a  rather  different  Hebrew  basis  MVjMn  7ýn-j7  ZVjMj 
rj-JýJýnn  M-71ý  .  This  he  translates  literally  as  'And 
the  king  thinks  a  thought  to  exile  from  him  an  exile' 
which  he  paraphrases  as  the  phrase  in  his  translation. 
Unusually,  he  gives  no  detailed  reconstruction  of  the 
process  by  which  the  LXX  may  have  arrived  at  this 
version.  we  might  then  suspect  that  this  is  a  case  where 
it  has  resorted  to  paraphrase,  and  may  not  be  reflecting 
its  Hebrew  Vorlage  with  any  accuracy.  Fokkelman  is 
influenced  by  Hoftijzer  who  follows  the  MT,  but  here  not 
completely.  Hoftijzer  again  argues  for  an  idiomatic 
usage  whereby,  rather  than  I  plaiv  ,  the  word  T  I- 
should  be  taken  as  ldeedý.  Fokkelman  opts  for  the  lesser 
extension  of  meaning  to  initiative,,  which  combines 
elements  of  deed  and  plan.  Both  see  the  two  phrases  as 
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Fokkelman  adoptsthe  very  common  resource  of  reading  Zt,  TJ 
'take  away,  for  ZVjrTI  'plan',  a  suggestion  of  Ewald's, 
which  gives  a  sense  along  the  lines  of  'And  God  will  not 
take  away  the  life  of  one  who  devises  plans  not  to  keep 
an  exile.  away  from  him'. 
The  NIV  offers  a  version  which  does  not  demand  any 
emendation  of  the  MT  or  Hoftijzer's  appeal  to  idiom: 
'But  God  does  not  take  away  life:  instead,  he  devises 
ways  so  that  a  banished  person  may  not  remain  estranged 
from  him.,  It  does,  however,  impose  a  rather  elaborate, 
though  not  impossible,  syntax  on  the  Hebrew  sentence, 
and  also  a  rather  dubiously  defensible  piece  of 
theology.  God  quite  obviously  does  take  away  life  on 
many  occasions  in  the  Old  Testament,  though  the  woman  of 
Teqoa  would  not  be  the  first  or  last  person  who  was 
prepared  to  assert  as  a  general  theological  principle 
the  view  of  God's  actions  that  suited  her  immediate 
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CHAPTER  SIX 
YAHWEH  AND  THE  OATH  IN  BIBLICAL  NARRATIVE 
There  has  been  remarkably  little  discussion  of  the  oath 
forms  of  the  Old  Testament  and  what  there  has  been 
concentrates,  not  unexpectedly,  on  philology  and 
comparative  linguistics  rather  than  on  the 
narratological  functions  of  the  oath'.  Rather  than 
seeking  to  elucidate  the  origins  of  the  characteristc 
form  of  the  biblical  oath,  I  want  to  ask  what 
conventions  are  at  work,  and  what  is  the  reader  led  to 
take  from  the  manipulation  of  these  conventions. 
Narratologists  have  not  investigated  this  phenomenon  in 
any  great  depth,  presumably  because  it  is  not  a  standard 
device  in  modern  literature  or,  for  that  matter, 
speech2. 
6.1  OATH  FORMULAE 
I  The  most  comprehensive  treatment  is  still  to  be  found  in 
J.  Pedersen's  Der  Eid  bei  den  Semiten  (Pedersen  1914)  which  forms 
the  basis  of  the  more  recent  papers  by  Blank  (1950-51),  Lehmann 
(1969)  and  Gehman  (1975). 
2  The  most  useful  discussions  are  to  be  found  in  investigations  of 
the  poetics  of  ancient  Greek  drama,  though  it  is  well  to  be  wary 
as  to  whether  like  is  being  compared  to  like.  The  plot  of  a  play 
like  Oedipus  turns  on  the  consequences  of  oaths  taken.  It  is 
Oedipus,  pledge  to  find  and  banish  Laiusýmurderer  that  sets  in 
train  the  tragedy.  In  particular,  Barbara  Goff's  discussion  of  the 
poetics  of  Euripides'  Hippolytus  (Goff  1989)  has  proved  very 
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There  are  several  ways  to  swear  in  the  Old  Testament. 
The  root  which  underlies  the  vocabulary  of  swearing  in 
OT  Hebrew  is  vzWshaba',,  which  is  also  the  root  for 
'seven'.  Quite  what  the  connection  between  the  two  is 
remains  unclear:  one  common  explanation  is  that  the 
sacrifice  or  exchange  of  seven  animals  was  an  ancient 
practice  accompanying  or  confirming  an  oath3.  Something 
of  the  sort  seems  to  be  behind  the  rather  obscure  story 
in  Gen  21:  22-31  where  Abraham  sets  apart  seven  ewe-lambs 
as  a  witness  to  the  fact  that  he  dug  the  well  at 
Beersheba,  a  name  that  can  equally  well  mean  the  well  of 
the  oath,  or  the  well  of  seven.  We  will  come  back  to 
the  elements  of  gift,  sacrifice  and  witness  accompanying 
the  concept  of  the  oath. 
Another  verb  which  seems  to  share  this  semantic  field  is 
im,  which  is  commonly  translated  as  'to  vow'.  The 
narratological  significance  of  the  difference  in  use 
between  the  two  verbs  is  not  pasy  to  determine.  Both 
involve  an  act  of  commitment  to  the  future,  or  an 
anchoring  of  uncertainty,  though  ndr  most  often  involves 
the  idea  of  a  gift  pledged  to  God  either  in  return  for 
divine  favour,  or  as  an  earnest  of  the  speaker's 
sincerity4. 
3  So,  for  instance  Lehmann  (1969),  citing  Abraham's  sacrifice, 
with  similar  sacrifices  of  seven  animals  in  Num  23:  1,14,23,29 
and  in  texts  from  Canaanite  sources.  Pedersen  (1914)  disputes 
this  position. 
4  For  a  study  of  this  particular  verb  and  the  whole  phenomenon  of 
the  vow  in  Israel  and  cognate  cultures,  see  Cartledge  (1992). 
Cartledge  devotes  his  final  chapter  to  a  consideration  of  the 
literary  function  of  vows  in  Hebrew  Narrative.  Although  it  is 
necessary  to  acknowledge  the  point  that  he  makes  at  the  very 
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literary  scholars,  have  been  all  too  cavalier  in  their  use  of  the 
terms  loath,,  vow,  and  curse,  which  are  clearly  differentiated 
in  the  biblical  text,  in  terms  of  their  narratological  function 
there  are  marked  similarities.  Cartledge  acknowledges  that  the 
,  building  block,  of  both  vow  and  oath  is  the  promise. 
In  the  case  of  the  oath,  the  promise  is  tied  to  a  curse. 
Cartledge  points  out  that  in  such  cases,  though  there  is  a 
conditionality  to  the  oath,  it  is  the  curse,  not  the  oath,  that  is 
conditional  (1992:  18).  Though  formally  this  is  true,  the 
introduction  of  conditionality  into  the  formula  brings  a  shadow  of 
possibility  that  the  oath  may  not  be  confirmed.  He  contrasts  the 
vow  with  the  oath  in  that  whereas  the  oath  moves  from  human  action 
to  God's  potential  response,  the  vow  moves  in  the  opposite 
direction.  It  typically  consists  of  a  plea  for  divine  action, 
followed  by  a  conditional  promise  of  the  worshipper's  response. 
Cartledge  concludes  his  study  with  an  examination  of  the  literary 
function  of  the  five  vows  which  he  classes  as  'narrative  vows,  in 
the  Old  Testament: 
Num  21:  1-3;  Israel's  vow  to  put  cities  under  the 
ban. 
Gen  28:  10-22;  Jacob's  vow  to  set  up  pillar  and 
serve  God. 
Jud  11:  30-40:  Jephthah's  vow  to  sacrifice  the 
first  who  meets  him  on  his  return. 
Sam  1:  1-11  Hannah  vows  to  dedicate  her  son  to 
Yhwh. 
2  Sam  15:  1-8  Absalom's  reported  vow  to  worship  in 
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For  the  purposes  of  this  discussion,  based  as  it  is  on 
the  oath  that  David  swears  in  his  response  to  Nathan, 
propose  to  concentrate  on  those  oaths  and  vows  which 
invoke  the  name  of  God. 
'THUS  DO  THE  LORD  AND  THUS  ADD  I 
There  are  two  basic  formulae  to  be  investigated  here, 
each  with  minor  variants.  The  fullest  formula  is  an 
oath  invoking  a  curse:  'God  do  so  to  X  and  more  also  if 
a  certain  state  of  affairs  comes  about,  or  is  not 
found  to  be  true.  So,  for  example,  as  part  of  his 
mourning  for  Abner,  David  swears  'May  God  do  so  to  me 
and  more  if  I  taste  bread  or  anything  else  before  the 
sun  sets'  (2  Sam  3:  35). 
There  are  several  intriguing  elements  to  this 
formulation.  First  of  all,  it  ties  the  oath  firmly  to 
the  body.  The  physicality  and  vulnerability  of  the 
body  becomes  the  ground  in  which  the  possibility  is 
anchored.  The  uncertainty  of  the  pledge  is  bound  to  the 
Cartledge  explains  that  in  all  these  cases,  the  narrator  has 
deliberately  used  the  device  of  the  vow  as  a  crucial  turning  point 
in  the  narrative:  'These  examples,,  he  concludes,  give  convincing 
testimony  that  the  biblical  authors  and  editors  not  only 
understood  the  high  significance  of  the  vow  as  a  popular  cultic 
practice,  but  also  consciously  exploited  its  emotive  and 
structural  potential  in  their  work,  (1992:  199).  But  beyond  this, 
he  does  not  engage  in  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  nature  of  this 
use.  He  does,  however,  make  the  point  that  in  the  last  case, 
Absalom  is  prepared  to  lie  in  a  context  where  he  takes  the  name  of 
the  Lord  in  vain,  a  point  that  relates  to  the  consideration  of  the 
use  of  the  divine  name  in  oath  formulae. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  6  239 
continuity  of  the  flesh.  This  bodily  aspect  of  the  oath 
is  of  great  importance.  When  push  comes  to  shove,  it  is 
the  body  which  will  bear  the  mark;  this  is  what  is 
behind  a  pledge  such  as  the  pound  of  flesh  exacted  in 
The  Merchant  of  Venice.  Nietzsche  made  the  point  that 
the  pledge  of  continued  responsibility  is  often  exacted 
in  the  form  of  pain,  pain  being  the  great  mnemonic.  The 
promisor  gives  over  his  body  to  the  mercy  of  the 
creditor. 
6.1.1.1  Scarry:  Oath  and  Wounding 
Elaine  Scarry  has  carried  this  idea  further  in  her  book 
The  Body  in  Pain,  where  she  elaborates  the  thesis  that 
the  very  inarticulacy  of  pain  is  what  makes  it  possible 
to  anchor  the  vagaries  of  speech  into  the  body  (Scarry 
1985)p  The  concrete  reality  and  vulnerability  of  the 
body  are  enlisted  as  the  earnest  of  the  elusive  faculty 
of  speech  when  there  is  a  'crisis  of  substantiation, 
(1985:  127).  It  also  is  made  plain  in  the  association  of 
promise  and  sacrifice,  and  of  promise  and  bodily 
mutilation,  most  powerfully  seen  in  the  practice  of 
circumcision.  What  the  mind  may  forget,  the  body  will 
remember.  And,,  as  we  shall  see  later,,  the  faithfulness 
5  Scarry  (1985:  127)  refers  specifically  to  the  biblical  account  of 
Abraham's  servant  placing  his  hand  under  his  master's  thigh  as  he 
swears  to  find  a  wife  for  Isaac  among  Abraham's  kin  (Gen  24:  2-9). 
'An  unsubstantiated  statement  (unsubstantiated  because  its 
realization  belongs  to  the  future)  is  given  substantiation  by 
being  placed  immediately  beside  the  material  reality  of  the  body. 
The  place  touched  by  the  servant  is  so  intimate  that  it  is  almost 
interior  to  the  body,  and  it  is  in  oaths  often  the  interior  of  the 
body  that  is  exposed,  usually  through  some  form  of  wounding,  in 
attempts  to  bestow  the  force  of  the  material  world  on  the 
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of  divine  promises  are  manifested  in  the  alteration,  the 
wounding,  of  human  beingsr  of  human  flesh.  This  is  the 
only  evidence  human  beings  can  have  of  the  constancy  of 
the  divine,  in  the  constancy  of  the  body. 
Man  can  only  be  created  once,  but  once  created,  he 
can  be  endlessly  modified;  wounding  re-enacts  the 
creation  because  it  reenacts  the  power  of 
alteration  that  has  its  first  profound  occurrence 
in  creation  (Scarry  1985:  183). 
The  use  of  wounding  the  body  as  a  way  of  evoking  or 
witnessing  to  the  presence  of  God  is  attested  in  several 
passages  in  the  Hebrew  Bible.  Pre-eminent,  of  course, 
is  the  sign  of  circumcision.  In  addition,  there  is  the 
phenomenon  by  which  the  name  of  God  is  written  on 
people's  bodies:  land  another  will  write  on  his  hand 
"The  Lord's"I  (Isa  44:  5).  The  priests  of  Baal  cut 
themselves  with  knives  to  invoke  their  god  (1  Kings 
18:  28).  The  fact  that  this  is  forbidden  to  the  people 
of  Israel  as  a  sign  of  mourning  (Deut  14:  1;  Jer  16:  6) 
indicates  that  it  was  a  temptation. 
But  there  are  more  particular  scenes  of  wounding:  the 
laming  of  Jacob  at  the  ford  Jabbok  (Gen  32:  25);  the 
assault  on  Moses  which  leads  to  his  circumcision  (Ex 
4:  24-26);  or  the  disease  that  smites  Job  (job  2:  4-8). 
In  these  cases,  the  Lord's  special  interest  is  made 
public  by  the  alteration  of  the  body  of  the  one  singled 
out. 
The  case  of  Job  demonstrates  the  point.  Job's  problem 
is  that  he  is  singled  out  by  his  righteousness,  and  so 
comes  to  the  attention  of  God  and  Satan.  Even  after  the 
loss  of  his  wealth,  his  home  and  his  children,  Job 
blesses  the  Lord.  Satan  is  then  permitted  to  assail  Job 
himself,  when  he  puts  forward  the  argument,  'Skin  for 
skin!  All  that  a  man  has  he  will  give  for  his  life.  But Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  6  241 
put  forth  your  hand  nowr  and  touch  his  bone  and  his 
flesh  and  he  will  curse  thee  to  thy  facel(Job-2:  4-5). 
Job's  body  becomes  the  final  site  of  the  battle  for 
blessing.  His  other  losses  are  either  of  property,  or 
may  have  been  caused  by  factors  outside  Job's  immediate 
responsibility.  Even  the  death  of  his  children  may  have 
not  been  directed  at  Job.  Job  1:  5  records  Job's 
punctilious  sacrifices  which  atone  for  the  possibility 
that  his  sons  have  sinned  and  cursed  God  in  their 
hearts.  When  they  are  killed,  it  could  be  that  this 
possibility  has  come  to  pass;  perhaps  it  was  Job's  sons, 
own  misdemeanours  which  brought  about  their  deaths  as  a 
tragic  but  just  act  of  vengeance  by  God,  an 
interpretation  suggested  by  Bildad  in  Job  8:  4.  When 
Job's  own  body  is  smitten  with  sores,  however,  no  other 
can  share  the  imposition.  It  is  Job's  dilemma  that  he 
knows  that  his  body  is  knit  together  and  sustained  by 
God,  and  yet  it  is  maintained.  only  as  the  arena  for  his 
pain.  It  is  the  witness  of  God's  sustaining  power 
devoted  however  to  his  destruction. 
6.1.1.2  Oath  and  Conditionality 
Secondly,  this  formulation  brings  out  the  conditionality 
of  the  oath.  Such  an  oath  hold  out  the  possibility  of 
failure  in  its  very  structure.  By  this  formula,  the 
desired  result  is  introduced  by  excluding,  but  thereby 
admitting,  the  possibility  of  its  failure.  But  without 
the  possibility  of  failure  there  would  be  no  need  for, 
and  no  virtue  in,  the  swearing  of  the  oath  at  all.  If 
human  beings  always  said  what  they  meant,  oaths  would  be 
superfluous;  if  human  beings  could  only  tell  falsehoods, 
there  would  be  no  point  in  instituting  such  a  custom 
either.  It  is  because  human  communication  is  fallible Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  6  242 
that  there  is  a  place  for  the  oath  or  the  promise  in 
speech6. 
6  It  is  instructive  to  turn  to  the  discussion  of  the  promise  in 
Kant's  Foundations  of  the  Metaphysics  of  Morals.  He  uses  it  as  an 
example  to  illustrate  the  application  of  the  moral  principle  of 
universalisability  in  deciding  whether  it  can  ever  be  right  to 
promise  deceitfully: 
The  shortest  but  most  infallible  way  to  find  the  answer  to 
the  question  as  to  whether  a  deceitful  promise  is  consistent 
with  duty  is  to  ask  myself:  Would  I  be  content  that  my 
maxim  (of  extracting  myself  from  difficulty  by  a  false 
promise)  should  hold  as  a  universal  law  for  myself  as  well 
as  others?  And  could  I  say  to  myself  that  everyone  may  make 
a  false  promise  when  he  is  in  difficulty  from  which  he 
cannot  otherwise  escape?  I  immediately  see  that  I  could 
will  the  lie  but  not  a  universal  law  to  lie.  For  with  such 
a  law  there  would  be  no  promises  at  all.  Inasmuch  as  it 
would  be  futile  to  make  a  pretense  of  my  intention  in  regard 
to  future  actions  to  those  who  would  not  believe  this 
pretense  -  or  if  they  overhastily  did  so  -  who  would  pay  me 
back  in  my  own  coin.  Thus  my  maxim  would  necessarily 
destroy  itself  as  soon  as  it  was  made  into  a  universal  law. 
(1978:  22-23) 
By  the  same  token,  however,  if  we  make  it  a  universal  principle 
that  everyone  must  only  speak  the  truth,  then  we  also  destroy  the 
concept  of  the  promise,  which  would  become  supererogatory.  Even 
given  the  inescapable  slippage  of  language,  if  truth  telling  is  a 
universal  law,  and  if  I  act  on  that  assumption,  it  becomes 
unnecessary  for  me  to  preface  any  statement  about  my  future 
intentions  with  the  words  'I  promise,.  My  bare  word  is  security 
enough.  So  it  seems  that  either  way  the  act  of  promising  is 
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Such  conditionality  is  carried  over  into  the  other  form 
of  the  oath  which  we  will  examine.  This  second  form  is 
introduced  by  the  formula,  'As  X  lives,  ...  .X  may  be 
either  divine,  Yhwh  or  God,  or  else  another  human  be- 
ing,  most  of  ten  the  king7.  Conventionally,  the  verb 
itself  marks  the  difference  between  a  oath  dependent  on 
the  divine,  and  one  predicated  of  a  human  being;  before 
the  name  Yahweh  or  other  divine  equivalents  the  form  hd 
appears  whereas  in  other  contexts,  most  often  invoking 
the  king,  the  verb  is  pointed  hay. 
Following  this  introductory  formula,  we  find  the 
substantive  clause  of  the  oath  intriguingly  retains  in 
Hebrew  the  syntax  of  conditionality  and  negativity  in  a 
way  that  is  hard  to  reproduce  in  English.  So.  for  in- 
stance,  when  Saul  swears  to  the  witch  of  Endor  that  she 
will  not  come  to  any  harm  (1  Sam  28:  10).  he  says 
literally,  'As  the  Lord  lives,  if  you  are  met  by  evil 
for  this  deed';  i.  e.  'you  will  not  be  punished  for 
this  What  in  English  is  a  negative  statement  is  in 
Hebrew  given  the  form  of  a  conditional.  Here,  the  oath 
is  tied  to  the  continuity  of  the  existence  of  God,  or  of 
This  demonstrates  the  point  that  the  possibility  of  failure,  of 
misfire  and  abuse,  is  constitutive  of  the  act  of  promising. 
Indeed,  it  arises  because  these  are  inescapable  conditions  of 
communication. 
If  this  is  so,  what  does  this  indicate  about  the  status  of  the 
subject  if  it  is  predicated  on  the  promise? 
7  See  here  Greenberg  (1957)  who  argues  that  the  particle  'r  should 
be  regarded  as  the  construct  of  a  noun,  the  singular  of  the 
otherwise  attested  plural  C"M'lifel,  and  so  translates  the 
formula,  by  the  life  of  This  makes  little  material 
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the  human  being  addressed.  The  guarantee  of  coherence 
and  stability  is  the  unchangeableness  of  God. 
6.2  DIVINE  NAMES  AND  THE  OATH 
6.2.1  THE  INVOCATION  OF  THE  DIVINE  NAME 
The  invocation  of  the  name  of  God  in  an  oath  is  a 
serious  business.  The  third  of  the  ten  commandments 
makes  this  clear:  'You  shall  not  take  the  name  of  the 
Lord  your  God  in  vain;  for  the  Lord  will  not  hold  him 
guiltless  who  takes  his  name  in  vain,  (Ex  20:  7;  Deut 
5:  11).  Lev  19:  12  enjoins  'And  you  shall  not  swear  by  my 
name  falsely,  and  so  profane  your  God;  I  am  the  Lord., 
The  prophets  also  emphasize  the  heinousness  of  swearing 
by  another  name  than  Yahweh's.  Jeremiah  rails  against 
the  people  for  swearing  by  those  who  are  no  gods'  (Jer 
5:  2).  Amos  proclaims,  'Those  who  swear  by  Ashimah  of 
Samaria,  and  say  "As  thy  god  lives,  0  Dan,  "  and  "As  the 
way  of  Beersheba  lives,  "  they  shall  fall  and  never  rise 
again,  (Amos  8:  14).  Zephanaiah  decries  hypocritical 
swearing  by  'those  who  bow  down  and  swear  to  the  Lord 
and  yet  swear  by  Milcom,  (Zeph  1:  5).  The  same  point  is 
made  positively  in  Jer  12:  16  where  the  Lord  promises  to 
Israel's  neighbours:  'And  it  shall  come  to  pass,  if 
they  will  diligently  learn  the  ways  of  my  people,  to 
swear  by  my  name  "as  the  Lord  lives",  even  as  they 
taught  my  people  to  swear  by  Baal,  then  they  shall  be 
built  up  in  the  midst  of  my  people., 
This  particular  example  leads  to  the  suggestion  that 
within  the  text,  a  refinement  of  the  convention  holds 
true.  I  would  argue  that  every  oath  sworn  in  Yahweh's 
name  is  fulfilled,  and  so  the  reader  begins  to  operate 
with  this  convention.  Oaths  sworn  without  using  the 
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thwarted.  The  key  seems  to  be  the  mention  of  Yahweh's 
name. 
This  functional  differentiation  between  'Yahweh'  and 
'Elohim,  in  Deuteronomy,  Joshua  and  Judges,  where,  of 
course,  they  have  long  been  seen  as  markers  of  different 
documentary  sources,  is  reassessed  by  Polzin.  He  sums 
up  his  position  on  the  use  of  these  terms  in  the  book  of 
Judges  as  follows: 
It  appears  likely  that  in  the  Book  of  Judges  the 
use  of  now  'Yahweh,,  now  'Elohiml,  has 
compositional  implications,  whatever  might  be 
previous  assertions  about  the  diachronic  aspects  of 
such  an  alteration.  In  those  passages  where  there 
is  a  shift  between  'Yahweh,  and  'Elohiml,  the  use 
of  'Elohim,  appears  to  signal  a  deity  whose 
identity  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  speaker 
uttering  his  name  or  in  the  view  of  the  speaker's 
audience,  is  either  not  Yahweh  himself  or  a  deity 
unable  clearly  to  be  identified  with  Yahweh  in  a 
particular  instance  of  communication.  (1981:  175-6) 
6.2.2  YAHWEH  AND  THE  FULFILMENT  OF  THE  OATH 
My  contention  is  that  there  is  a  similar  functional 
differentiation  at  work  in  the  narrative  convention  of 
oath  formulae.  Whether  it  arose  from  a  scribal 
reluctance  to  record  an  oath  sworn  in  Yahweh's  name  that 
was  not  fulfilled  or  whether  it  was  a  deliberately 
exploited  convention  is  hard  to  elucidate.  Regardless 
of  its  origin,  it  now  serves  as  a  cue  to  the  reader  as 
to  whether  or  not  the  oath  will  be  fulfilled.  An  oath 
sworn  in  Yahweh's  name  will  inevitably  be  fulfilledf 
an  oath  sworn  in  any  other  name,  may  not  be. 
We  will  investigate  the  exceptions  below.  The  same 
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of  a  human  being,  or  an  oath  sworn  on  the  name  'Elohim'. 
These  may  be  fulfilled,  but  they  may  not. 
The  same  uncertainty  holds  true  of  any  reported  oath. 
So,  for  instance,  in  2  Sam  19:  23,  David  is  reported  to 
have  sworn  to  Shimei  'You  shall  not  die'.  This  oath  is 
rescinded  on  David's  death  bed  in  1  Kings  2:  8-9  where 
David  quotes  himself  as  having  sworn  in  Yahweh's  name 
that  he  will  not  put  Shimei  to  death  by  the  sword.  This 
is  an  interestingly  more  specific  oath.  David  recalls 
it  while  instructing  Solomon  to  make  sure  that  the  oath 
is  subverted  after  his  death.  Solomon  then  imposes 
another  oath  on  Shimei  by  swearing  that  he  will  die  if 
he  crosses  the  Kidron  valley.  Shimei  does  so  and  is 
then  executed  by  Benaiah  (1  Kings  2:  46). 
Here  we  have  a  prime  example  of  an  oath  being  evaded  by 
being  interpreted  literally:  David  does  not  kill  Shimei 
by  the  sword,  Benaiah  does.  But  this  story  is  imposed 
on  another  one  where  David  seems  to  break  a  direct 
promise  that  Shimei  will  not  die.  Of  course, 
interpreted  literally,  no  man,  not  even  a  king,  can  make 
such  a  promise  to  another.  Everyone  dies.  The 
implication  is  clear,  though,  that  Shimei  is  being 
promised  a  protection  which  is  later  cynically 
withdrawn.  Here  David's  initial  oath  is  reported  rather 
than  stated,  so  that  the  text  itself  does  not  contain  a 
false  oath  in  Yahweh's  name.  The  later  oath,  as  we  have 
seen  is  fulfilled,  but  fulfilled  through  an  act  of 
equivocation,  and  even  here  is  not  directly  quoted. 
David  merely  reports  that  he  swore  the  words  by  the 
Lord.  At  no  point  in  the  text  is  there  a  full  direct 
quote  of  the  oath. 
Another  suggestive  example,  this  time  involving 
reporting  a  vow  in  the  name  of  Yahweh  which  may  never 
have  occurred,  is  to  be  found  in  2  Sam  15:  7-8.  Absalom 
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worship  him  in  Hebron  if  he  was  restored  to  Jerusalem  in 
order  to  conceal  the  military  strategy  behind  his 
departure  from  his  father's  court.  There  is  no 
indication  in  the  text  that  Absalom  fulfils  this  vow, 
and  the  suspicion  remains  that  this  may  have  been 
nothing  but  a  stratagem,  similar  to  that  adopted  by  both 
David  and  Samuel  in  earlier  stories.  David  explains  his 
absence  from  Saul's  table  as  due  to  an  obligation  to 
meet  for  a  family  sacrifice  (1  Sam  20:  6).  Samuel 
himself  at  Yahweh's  instigation  had  used  the  excuse  of  a 
sacrifice  with  David's  family  to  account  for  his  own 
trip  to  Bethlehem  to  anoint  David  (1  Sam  16:  1-3).  The 
difference  is  that  only  Absalom  baldly  recounts  a  vow  to 
the  Lord  which  may  be  part  of  a  ploy.  Absalom  at  least 
rests  under  the  suspicion  of  having  taken  the  Lord's 
name  in  vain,  something  that  certainly  would  not  bode 
well  for  his  future  chances. 
An  example  which  tends  to  confirm  the  hypothesis  that 
oaths  in  the  name  of  Yahweh  have  a  different  status  from 
those  in  the  name  'Elohim,  appears  in  the  series  of 
oaths  in  1  Sam  258,  the  story  of  Nabal  's  dealings  with 
David.  Having  refused  to  help  David  and  insulted  him, 
Nabal  becomes  the  object  of  David's  revenge.  David 
swears  in  the  name  Elohim:  'Elohim  do  so  to  the  enemies 
of  David  and  more  also  if  by  morning  I  leave  so  much  as 
one  wall-pisser  of  all  who  belong  to  him'(1  Sam  25:  22). 
Abigail,  Nabal's  wife  saves  the  situation  by  pleading 
8  Peter  Miscall  (1978)  distinguishes  the  divine  and  human  word  as 
follows:  'In  the  case  of  the  divine  word,  e.  g.,  prophecy,  oracle, 
etc.,  it  is  a  question  not  of  whether  it  will  be  fulfilled  but  of 
how  it  will  be  fulfilled.  However,  with  a  human  word,  e.  g., 
blessing,  prediction,  etc.,  it  is  a  question  of  whether  it  will  be 
fulfilled  and  not  just  of  how.  For  example,  In  (sic)  I  Sam.  25, 
David's  vow  is  not  fulfilled  because  of  Abigail's  plea.,  (1978:  33) Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  6  248 
the  stupidity  of  her  husband.  She  swears  in  her  turn  by 
Yahweh,  and  by  the  king's  own  life:  'Now  then,  my  lord, 
as  Yahweh  lives  and  as  your  soul  lives,  seeing  the  Lord 
has  restrained  you  from  bloodguilt,  now  then  let  all 
your  enemies  and  those  who  seek  to  do  evil  to  my  lord  be 
as  Naball  (1  Sam  25:  26). 
This  is  a  subtle  counter  to  David's  oath,,  in  that  it 
presumes  that  his  action  is  already  restrained  - 
assuming  what  she  wants  to  prove,  in  a  sense.  David  in 
turn  replies  with  an  oath  which  confirms  his  assent  to 
Abigail's  pleas,  thus  effectively  rescinding  his  earlier 
oath:  'For  as  surely  as  the  Lord  the  God  of  Israel 
lives,  who  has  restrained  me  from  hurting  you  unless  you 
had  made  haste  and  come  to  meet  me,  truly  by  morning 
there  had  not  been  left  to  Nabal  so  much  as  one  male'(1 
Sam  25:  34). 
There  has  been  a  certain  amount  of  controversy  over  the 
place  of  the  phrase  'enemies  of  David,  in  the  first 
oath,  which  has  been  seen  as  a  euphemism9.  in  the 
9  So,  among  others,  McCarter  (1980:  394)  who  writes  'this 
expansion  is  surely  a  deliberate  attempt  to  distort  the  original 
meaning.  The  threat  is  never  carried  out,  and  a  scribe  has 
changed  David's  words  to  protect  him  (or  his  descendants!  )  from 
the  consequences  of  his  oath.  '  This  seems  to  presuppose  that  the 
scribe's  business  is  to  record  the  historical,  or  historically 
plausible  words  of  David.  It  is  possible,  I  submit,  that  the  very 
narrative  exigencies  that  McCarter  alludes  to  may  actually  have 
taken  priority.  In  which  case,  it  is  the  reversion  to  a  putative 
original  that  distorts  the  'meaning',  or  at  least  the  narrative 
function,  of  the  text.  whatever  the  historical  David  may  or  may 
not  have  said,  the  character  David  gives  a  speech  which,  if  we  are 
right  in  constructing  the  conventions,  could  act  proleptically  in 
indicating  that  David's  oath  may  not  be  fulfilled. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  6  249 
context  that  we  are  exploring,  the  introduction  of  the 
phrase  deflects  the  unfulfilled  oath  from  David  himself, 
and  is  echoed  in  Abigail's  use  of  the  phrase,  which  can 
hardly  be  a  euphemism.  But  the  important  point  for  our 
purposes  is  that  David's  first  oath  which  remains 
unfulfilled  is  sworn  by  'Elohim,  rather  than  'Yahweh,; 
in  fact,  his  'Yahweh'  oath  trumps  his  'Elohistic,  card 
6.3  THE  NARRATOLOGICAL  FUNCTIONS  OF  THE  OATH 
6.3.1  STANDARD  FUNCTIONS 
6.3.1.1  Prolepsis 
What  then  are  the  narratological  functions  that  the  oath 
can  perform?  Most  obviously,  the  oath  is  a  form  of 
prolepsis,  an  indication  of  the  future  state  of  the 
characters  that  carries  us  forward  in  the  temporal 
sequence  of  the  narrative.  As  readers,  the  proleptic 
swearing  of  an  oath  by  a  character  acts  as  a  promise  to 
us.  We  are  induced  to  ask:  will  what  is  sworn  .  come 
to  pass?  We  read  on  to  see  whether  or  not  such  a 
fulfilý.  ment  will  occur.  Our  judgment  of  a  character 
whose  oath  is  not  fulfilled  may  be  harsh. 
6.3.1.2  Analepsis 
Secondly,  oaths  may  have  an  analeptic  function  -  the 
oath  may  be  sworn  to  verify  a  past  state  of  affairs.  Or 
else  it  may  be  at  the  moment  of  fulfil,  ment  that  the 
oath  is  recalled.  This  may  serve  to  confirm  the 
convention  that  the  oath  is  accompanied  by  its 
fulfil-6.  )ment,  but  in  at  least  one  case,  whether  the  oath 
was  ever  sworn  is  open  to  question:  the  oath  recalled  by 
Nathan  and  Bathsheba  to  David  in  1  Kings  1:  17. 
Adonijah  the  son  of  Haggith  has  made  it  clear  that  he 
has  ambitions  for  the  throne.  Nathan  the  prophet,  who Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  6  250 
has  been  conspicuously  absent  from  Adonijah's  plans, 
points  out  the  dangers  to  Solomon's  mother,  Bathsheba. 
Nathan  claims  that  Adonijah  has  proclaimed  himself  king. 
The  narrative  evidence  is  rather  that  he  intends  to; 
Nathan  is  perhaps  here  putting  pressure  on  Bathsheba. 
He  advises  her  to  save  her  life  and  Solomon's  by  going 
to  David  and  asking  him,  'Did  you  not,  my  lord  the  king, 
swear  to  your  maidservant,  saying,  "Solomon  your  son 
shall  reign  after  me?  "',  after  which  Nathan  will  come 
in.  The  point  is,  of  course,  that  we  have  no  account  of 
David  swearing  such  an  oathlO. 
10  Fokkelman,  for  instance,  finds  it  'fascinating  that  we  can 
construe  all  sorts  of  evidence  either  proving  or  disproving  the 
,,  historicity,  -'of  the  king's  oath,  yet  there  is  no  single  proof  to 
be  found  in  the  OT,  that  is,  not  in  the  sole  plane  in  which  we, 
methodologically  speaking,  may  seek  -  that  of  literary  art  in 
which  1  Kings  1-2  is  contained.  We  simply  do  not  know  if  Nathan's 
words,  repeated  by  Bathsheba,  recall  an  actual  event'  (1981:  353- 
4).  Fokkelman  goes  on  in  a  footnote  to  provide  some  marginal 
notes,  (354  n.  12).  He  comments  on  the  oddity  that  the  oath  is  not 
mentioned  earlier,  especially  if  the  whole  story  is  taken  as  a 
succession  narrative.  However,  he  considers  the  hypothesis  that 
it  is  invented  by  Nathan  as  hard  to  reconcile  with  the  portrait  of 
an  upright  man  of  God  in  2  Samuel.  It  is  surely  not  so  hard  to 
reconcile  with  the  Nathan  of  2  Sam  7,  the  prophet  who  blithely 
assures  David  that  his  plan  to  build  a  temple  has  the  Lord's 
blessing,  only  to  be  forced  to  correct  this  verdict  when  the  word 
of  the  Lord  comes  to  him.  Ahlstr6m  (1961:  123)  indeed  tries  to 
make  a  case  that  Nathan's  naming  of  Solomon  as  Jed,  idiah 
constitutes  the  oath  in  question,  but  apart  from  the  fact  that 
there  is  no  evidence  of  any  oath  form,  Nathan  was  certainly  not 
ignorant  of  this,  and  there  seems  little  to  stop  him  recalling  his 
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Bathsheba  goes  further  in  the  terms  of  the  investigation 
we  have  been  conducting,  and  specifically  states  to 
David  that  he  swore  by  the  Lord  your  God';  note  the 
pronoun1l.  Nathan  then  comes  in  as  she  is  explaining 
the  peril  she  and  Solomon  will  face  if  Adonijah  is 
allowed  to  succeed  and  asks  whether  David  has  ever  said 
that  Adonijah  should  be  his  successor.  This  certainly 
renders  it  unlikely  that  we  are  to  take  the  oath 
concerning  Solomon  as  public  knowledge.  Nathan  seems  to 
envisage  that  the  king  may  well  have  appointed  Adonijah 
as  his  successor  without  the  knowledge  of  his  closest 
councillors.  Commentators  have  suggested  that  we  have 
here  an  instance  where  the  ageing  king,  out  of  touch 
with  reality  as  is  witnessed  by  his  reported  ignorance 
of  Adonijah's  move,  is  being  manipulated  into  a  course 
of  action  on  the  basis  of  an  oath  which  he  never  made12. 
This  point  is  noted  by  Alter  (1981:  98)  who  sees  a  subtlety  of 
narrative  presentation  in  this  story  indicated  by  the  small  but 
significant  shifts  of  vocabulary  and  emphasis  between  Bathsheba's 
and  Nathan's  presentation  of  their  case.  He  ends  his  account  of 
the  use  of  incremental-  repetition  in  their  speeches  by  commenting, 
j  ...  here,  as  elsewhere  in  the  Bible,  language  manifestly  makes 
things  happen'(1981:  100).  Contrast  Alter's  praise  of  Bathsheba's 
'persusasive  inventiveness'(1981:  98)  with  Whybray's 
characterisation  of  her  in  this  scene  and  others  as  'a  good- 
natured,  rather  stupid  woman'(1968:  40)  who  failed  to  see  the 
danger  of  Adonijah's  bid  for  the  throne  until  Nathan  spelt  it  out. 
12  See  the  discussion  of  this  issue  by  Jones  (1990:  50-53)  where 
he  argues  that  the  oath  is  a  fabrication  principally  on  the 
grounds  that  Adonijah  appears  to  have  no  knowledge  of  such  an  oath 
when  he  claims  the  throne,  and  Nathan's  pretence  that  he  has  no 
knowledge  of  it  when  he  asks  David  if  he  had  sworn  an  oath  in 
favour  of  Adonijah.  Against  this,  see  the  comment  of  De  Vries  who Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  6  252 
What  this  approach  does  achieve  is  a  unique  case  of  an 
oath  confirming  an  oath;  David  swears  to  do  as  he  had 
sworn  (1  Kings  1:  29).  Whatever,  then,  the  validity  of 
the  first  oath,  it  is  now  irrelevant.  Nathan  and 
Bathsheba  have  induced  the  king  to  swear  to  what  they 
want.  Solomon's  position  is  assured  by  a  royal  oath  in 
the  name  of  Yahweh.  This  story  thus  represents  the 
device  of  the  oath-inducing  ploy  not  by  evoking  a 
fictional  character  against  whom  the  king  measures 
himself,  or  by  appealing  to  his  juridical  role  as 
opposed  to  his  role  within  his  family,  but  by  exploiting 
the  differentiation  between  the  present  David,  old, 
impotent  and  with  failing  powers  against  the  former 
David  of  which  the  David  addressed  seems  to  have  little 
knowledgel3. 
6.3.1.3  Allodiegesis 
opines  that  such  subtle  psychologizing  has  to  be  beyond  the  naive 
art  of  the  narrator,  however  much  it  may  possibly  have  motivated 
the  historical  Nathan  and  Bathsheba'  (1985:  15);  a  comment  so  much 
at  odds  with  the  thrust  of  our  reading  as  almost  to  suggest  its 
own  refutation.  Where  does  this  element  of  'has  to'  creep  in? 
Who  says?  In  any  event,  the  narrator  is  assumed  not  only  to  be 
naive,  but  more  naive  than  the  putative  characters.  I  am  at  a 
loss  to  see  the  grounds  for  De  Vries's  assumption,  even  given  his 
premises.  If  Nathan  could  think  of  it,  why  not  the  narrator?  Who 
other  than  the  narrator  offers  evidence  of  what  Nathan  might 
think? 
13  In  actual  fact,  this  sense  is  rather  contradicted  by  David's 
vigorous  response,  and  the  rather  chilling  precision  of  his  memory 
of  the  wrongs  done  to  him  as  he  lists  them  to  Solomon  in  the  next 
scene.  Is  David  in  fact  duped  -  or  does  he  play  the  part  of  a 
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A  third  case  might  be  called  the  allodiegetic  oath.  By 
having  a  character  swear  on  the  name  of  Yahweh  that  a 
change  in  circumstances  would  have  brought  about  a 
different  outcome,  the  narrator  is  able  to  display  an 
additional  dimension  to  the  character  by  providing  us 
with  a  glimpse  of  an  actualisable  possibility.  The 
author  is  not  simply  confined  to  the  story-line  which 
allows  for  only  one  alternative  to  be  actualised,  but 
can  display  another  line  backed  up  by  the  name  of  God. 
David's  oath  to  Abigail  in  1  Sam  25:  34  discussed  above 
is  a  prime  example  of  this.  David  swears:  'For  as 
surely  as  the  Lord  the  God  of  Israel  lives,  who  has 
restrained  me  from  hurting  you  unless  you  had  made  haste 
and  come  to  meet  me,  truly  by  morning  there  had  not  been 
left  to  Nabal  so  much  as  one  malel(l  Sam  25:  34).  The 
oath  leaves  us  in  no  doubt  that  things  might  have  turned 
out  very  badly  for  the  whole  of  Naballs  household.  Such 
a  massacre  is  revealed  as  the  kind  of  action  David  might 
engage  in14.  A  side  of  David's  character  not  previously 
revealed  is  exposed  to  the  reader's  view,  not  merely  as 
a  vague  possibility  but  in  terms  of  possible  actions 
which  are  backed  by  divine  authority.  This  is  as  real  a 
possibility  for  David  as  his  actual  conduct. 
14  See  here  the  contention  of  Levenson  who  sees  the  episode  with 
Nabal  as  'the  very  first  revelation  of  evil  in  David's 
characterl(1978:  10).  This  is  revealed  through  the  allodiegetic 
oath.  We  might  mention,  however,  the  possible  earlier  indication 
that  David  has  a  less  savoury  side  in  Eliab's  attack  on  his 
motivation  for  turning  up  at  Saul's  camp:  'I  know  your  presumption 
and  the  evil  of  your  heart'  (1  Sam  16:  28).  Eliab,  of  course,  is 
not  necessarily  a  reliable  witness,  as  the  supplanted  elder 
brother,  but  his  words  have  long  resonances.  See  also  the  caveat 
of  Gordon  (1980:  53)  who  doubts  whether  the  narrator  would  have 
seen  the  story  in  terms  of  David's  moral  character. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  6  254 
6.3.2  EXCEPTIONAL  OATHS  AS  NARRATIVE  DEVICES 
There  are  two  occasions  where  the  convention  that  an 
oath  sworn  in  Yahweh's  name,  if  such  a  convention 
exists,  does  not  seem  to  hold:  in  1  Sam  14:  39,  where 
Saul  takes  an  oath  to  kill  Jonathan,  and  in  1  Sam  29:  6, 
where  Achish  swears  to  David's  uprightness.  In 
examining  these  cases,  we  will  pick  up  on  many  of  the 
points  that  have  already  been  made  in  discussing  the 
function  of  the  oath. 
6.3.2.1  1  Sam  29 
To  take  the  latter  case  first,  as  it  is  in  some  ways  the 
easier,  Achish,  the  king  of  Gath/swears  to  David's 
uprightness  when  he  is  faced  with  the  understandable 
doubts  of  his  Philistine  allies  over  David's  reliability 
as  part  of  their  attack  on  Israel.  'As  the  Lord  lives,, 
you  have  been  upright  and  to  me  it  seems  right  that  you 
should  march  out  and  in  with  the  campaign.,  (1  Sam  29:  6) 
As  readers,  we  know  that  David  has  been  slaughtering 
Achish's  allies  behind  his  back,  and  lying  to  Achish 
about  his  activities.  He  even  goes  so  far  as  to  save 
no-one  alive  in  case  it  is  spoken  of  (1  Sam  28:  8-12). 
Achish  swears  to  the  truth  of  something  that  the  reader 
knows  to  be  false.  Or  so  at  least  it  would  appear. 
We  should  note,  however,  that  there  are  a  few  anomalies 
here.  First  of  all,  what  is  the  king  of  Gath  doing 
swearing  by  Yahweh?  Whose  words  are  these  -  his  or  the 
narratorls?  Secondly,  there  is  a  typical  example  of  the 
equivocation  in  the  word  yashar  'upright'.  Such  words 
have  a  very  different  meaning  depending  on  who  is 
uttering  them.  For  Achish,  and  the  Philistines,  upright 
means  'loyal  to  the  Philistine  cause,.  Put  in  the  sphere 
of  Yahwistic  discourse,  however,  upright  means  loyal  to 
Yahweh'.  That,  of  course,  is  exactly  what  David  has 
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with  Achish,  he  has  actually  been  promoting  the  welfare 
of  Yahweh's  people  by  surreptitiously  killing  their 
enemies.  In  the  juxtaposition  of  the  words  lyhwh'  and 
Vasha.  rl  in  the  mouth  of  the  Gittite  king,  the  oath 
points  up  the  blindness  of  the  king.  It  certainly  seems 
to  provide  for  the  possibility  that  the  oath  is  indeed 
in  accordance  with  its  narrative  context. 
6.3.2.2  1  Sam  14 
Much  more  problematic  for  this  theory  is  the  case  of 
Saul's  oath  in  1  Sam  14:  39.  Yet  I  think  we  can  argue 
that  this  is  the  exception  which  proves  the  rule  that 
directly  quoted  oaths  in  the  name  of  Yahweh  are 
fulfilled. 
1  Sam  14  contains  a  complex  story  of  interlocking  oaths, 
beginning  in  v  24  with  Saul's  curse  pronounced  on  any 
man  who  eats  food  until  the  evening  of  the  battle. 
Jonathan  has  gone  off  with  his  armour  bearer  to  carry 
out  a  daring  raid  on  the  enemy  camp  and  so  does  not  hear 
the  curse.  He  breaches  it  by  tasting  some  honey  as  he 
and  the  people  are  journeying  through  the  forest.  Only 
then  is  he  told  of  Saul's  prohibition,  to  which  he 
reacts  with  scorn.  Having  eaten,  he  is  revived  while  the 
people  are  faint. 
There  is  something  a  little  strange  here,  though.  Why 
has  Jonathan  not  been  told?  Two  odd  remarks  earlier  in 
the  chapter  may  have  some  bearing  on  this.  Firstly  in 
verse  3,  we  are  told  that  the  people  did  not  know  that 
Jonathan  had  gone  off  on  his  raid,  so  they  might  presume 
that  he  had  heard  the  order.  on  the  other  hand,  verse 
17  records  the  fact  that  Saul,  noticing  the  turmoil  the 
raid  caused  among  the  Philistines,  had  a  count  made  of 
his  entourage,  and  found  Jonathan  and  his  armour  bearer 
missing.  Did  Saul  then  know  that  Jonathan  would  not 
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Ironically,  the  upshot  of  Saul's  curse  which  seems  to 
have  some  motivation  in  the  regulations  hedging  about 
holy  war  is  that  the  people  fall  on  the  plundered 
animals  once  the  battle  is  over.  They  are  so  famished 
that  they  omit  to  observe  the  proper  rituals  of 
slaughter  and  eat  the  meat  with  blood  in  it.  Saul  seeks 
to  prolong  the  fight,  but  his  priest  advises  that  they 
consult  the  Lord,  who  will  give  no  answer.  Saul  then 
determines  to  hunt  out  the  bringer  of  sin  on  the  people. 
'As  the  Lord  lives  who  saves  Israel,  '  he  swears,  though 
it  be  in  Jonathan  my  son,  he  shall  surely  die'(1  Sam 
14:  39).  Is  this  the  nobility  of  the  king  willing  to 
sacrifice  his  own  son  for  the  common  good,  or  is  there  a 
more  sinister  undertone? 
We  may  be  excused  our  suspicions  when  Saul  calls  for 
lots  to  be  drawn  with  Jonathan  and  himself  on  the  one 
side,  and  everyone  else  on  the  other.  The  lot  falls  on 
Saul  and  Jonathan,  and  a  second  lot  falls  on  Jonathan 
alone,  who  proclaims  his  readiness  to  die.  Saul  again 
swears,  this  time,  be  it  noted,  in  the  name  Elohim-,  'God 
do  the  same  to  me  and  more  also;  you  shall  surely  die, 
Jonathan,  (1  Sam  14:  44). 
It  is  at  this  point  that  the  people  intervene,  taking  an 
oath  themselves:  'As  the  Lord  lives,  there  shall  not  one 
hair  of  his  head  fall  to  the  ground;  for  he  has  wrought 
with  God  this  day,  (1  Sam  14:  45)  Here  we  have  two 
anomalies;  we  have  two  oaths  sworn  in  the  name  of  Yahweh 
directly  opposed,  and  we  have  a  collective  oath  taken  by 
the  people.  Two  oaths  in  the  name  of  the  Lord  confront 
each  other,  as  Saul  confronts  his  people,  one  against 
many.  It  is  the  people's  version  that  prevails.  They 
ransom  Jonathan,  but  the  chapter  ends  with  Saul's 
abandonment  of  his  chief  business,  the  pursuit  of  the 
Philistines  echoing  the  standard  response  in  Israel  when 
things  get  beyond  a  joke,  the  retreat  of  every  man  to 
his  own  tent  and  the  abandonment  of  community. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  6  257 
6.3.3  THE  EXCEPTION  THAT  PROVES  THE  RULE 
I  would  submit  that  this  unparallelled  opposition  of  two 
oaths  is  a  device  whereby  the  flouting  of  narrative 
convention  points  up  the  breakdown  of  the  authority 
structures  in  the  society.  The  whole  issue  of  Saul's 
authority  over  the  people  is  a  fraught  one.  The  matter 
of  the  double  coronation  of  Saul  has  been  a  topic  of 
scholarly  debate  for  a  long  time.  Without  being  drawn 
into  the  intricacies  of  the  debate,  the  moment  when 
Saul's  kingship  is  really  established  is  not  in  his 
anointing  by  Samuel  (1  Sam  10:  1),  or  in  his  selection  by 
lot  in  Mizpah  (10:  20-21),  or  even  his  acclamation  by  the 
people  (10:  24).  In  the  words  of  Wellhausen,  'Saul  at 
this  point  is  only  king  de  jure:  he  does  not  become  king 
de  facto  until  after  he  has  proved  himself.,  (1961: 
250). 
What  establishes  Saul's  authority  is  the  fact  that  the 
people  follow  him  as  one  man  when  he  sends  out  the 
summons  to  aid  the  besieged  city  of  Jabesh-gilead.  His 
authority  is  conferred  in  that  moment  by  their 
acceptance  of  it15.  Kingship  is  a  matter  of  negotiated 
assent. 
His  speech  act  of  summons  has  great  power,  of  course.  He 
sends  with  it  the  pieces  of  a  yoke  of  oxen  which  he  has 
hacked  to  bits  under  the  inspiration  of  the  spirit,  but 
1-5  The  paradigm  example  of  this  is  in  2  Sam  20  the  story  of  the 
revolt  of  Sheba,  who  is  called  a  'worthless  fellow'  and  has  no 
status.  Yet  he  blows  his  trumpet  and  calls  out  his  slogan,  tWe 
have  no  portion  in  David,  and  we  have  no  inheritance  in  the  son  of 
Jesse;  every  man  to  his  tents,  0  Israel!,  The  result  is  that  'all  the  men  of 
Israel  withdrew  from  David  and  followed  Sheba  the  son  of  Bichri"(2 
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even  here  there  is  a  note  which  demands  caution.  The 
power  of  destruction  is  not  vented  against  the  enemy, 
but  against  his  own  people.  'Whoever  does  not  come  out 
after  Saul  and  Samuel,  the  same  be  done  to  his  oxeni,  he 
proclaims  (1  Sam  11:  7),  an  utterance  which  formally  is 
rather  similar  to  an  oath  in  its  conditionality  and  the 
physicality  of  both  sign  and  sanction,  but  where, 
tellingly,  no  divine  confirmation  is  sought  or  offered. 
The  implication  seems  to  be  that  it  will  be  Saul  himself 
who  will  dismember  the  oxen  of  the  people. 
whatever  its  power,  in  the  last  resort  this  summons  need 
not  be  heeded.  The  people  do  come  and  thereby 
constitute  the  authority  that  they  recognise.  By  the 
same  token,  nothing  can  ever  be  the  same  once  they  have 
revoked  Saul's  oath.  Saul  is  marked  out  in  the  Old 
Testament  as  the  one  character  whose  oath  spoken  in  the 
name  of  Yahweh  does  not  find  fulfilment. 
The  further  consequences  of  this  exception  will  be 
discussed  below.  For  our  present  purposes,  here  indeed 
we  have  the  exception  that  seems  to  prove  the  rule. 
Oaths  sworn  in  the  name  of  Yahweh  are  fulfilled.  The 
corollary  of  this  observation  is  that  we  may  hypothesise 
that  this  is  a  narrative  convention  that  the  narrator 
may  manipulate.  The  readership  when  it  comes  across 
such  an  oath  sworn  by  a  character  is  left  in  no  doubt 
that  it  will  be  fulfilled.  At  first  sight  this  seems  to 
undercut  the  narrative  stratagem.  The  seventh  veil  has 
been  dropped.  Where  is  the  suspense?  But  of  course,  we 
now  become  intrigued  by  the  indeterminate  possibilities 
of  the  mode  of  fulfillment. 
Sternberg  (1985)  discusses  the  effect  of  the 
anticipation  of  the  future  through  prediction  and 
prophecy  in  terms  of  a  clash  between  suspense  and 
curiosity.  'Real  suspense,  as  the  clash  of  hopeful  and 
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retardatory  play  of  how-when-why  hypotheses,  which 
leaves  our  mind  free  for  the  manipulation  of  curiosity 
about  the  past.  Attention  shifts  from  terminus  to 
route,  from  long-range  effect  to  intermediate  causes, 
from  plot  as  such  to  its  motivation  through  the  tangle 
of  God's  providence  and  human  character  that  makes 
biblical  history-'  (1985:  285-286) 
The  oath  will  be  fulfilled  but  not  necessarily  in  the 
way  that  the  character  or  indeed  the  reader  envisages16. 
The  seductive  stratagem  of  the  text  then  becomes  to 
evoke  curiosity  as  to  how  this  will  happen,  and  how  the 
character  may  act  under  the  misplaced  security  of  the 
meaning  he  thinks  the  oath  will  ensure.  Alternatively, 
we  may  be  offered  a  situation  where  the  character  seeks 
himself  to  circumvent  the  effects  of  an  oath. 
6.3.4  OATHS  AND  EQUIVOCATION 
16  See  on  this  point  L.  A.  Turner's  discussion  of  what  he  calls 
'announcements  of  plot'  in  Genesis  (1990).  These  consist  of 
prophecies,  commands,  oaths  and  promises  whereby  a  prediction  of 
the  future  course  of  events  is  made,  often  as  a  revelation  of  the 
divine  intention.  Turner  points  out  that  'human  attempts  to 
frustrate  the  Announcements  tend  to  fulfill  them;  human  attempts 
to  fulfill  the  Announcements  tend  to  frustrate  them'(1990:  179) 
Turner  attributes  this  partly  to  'Yahweh's  habit  of  not  clarifying 
the  exact  nature  of  the  Announcement  at  the  outset'(1990:  179). 
He  goes  further  in  seeing  an  ironic  gap  between  Yahweh's 
intentions  and  the  subsequent  course  of  events  which  reveals 
Yahweh's  dependency  on  human  obedience  and  initiative.  See  also 
G.  C.  Nicol  who  sees  the  impetus  of  the  Genesis  narratives  as  the 
result  of  the  conjunction  in  these  narratives  of  divine  promise 
with  a  wide  variety  of  events  which  bring  the  fulfilment  of  the 
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6.3.4.1  2  Kings  5 
In  2  Kings  5  we  find  a  series  of  oaths  which  turn  out  to 
have  different  resolutions  from  the  ones  which  the 
reader  or  indeed  the  character  anticipates.  Having  been 
cured  of  leprosy  by  Elisha,  Naaman  offers  him  a  gift. 
Elisha  swears  'As  the  Lord  lives,  whom  I  serve,  I  will 
receive  none,  (2  Kings  5:  16).  However,  his  servant 
Gehazi  decides  to  take  advantage  of  this  situation:  'As 
the  Lord  lives,  I  will  run  after  him  and  get  something 
from  him'(2  Kings  5:  20).  He  follows  Naaman  and  requests 
a  talent  of  silver  and  two  festal  garments  on  Elisha's 
behalf  for  two  recently  arrived  young  prophets.  Naaman 
presses  two  talents  on  him.  Gehazi  hides  his  loot  in 
the  house.  Elisha,  sure  enough,  receives  none  of  it. 
However,  Elisha  wants  to  know  where  Gehazi  has  been. 
When  Gehazi  tells  him  'Nowhere,  '  Elisha  reveals  that  he 
knows  the  whole  story.  Indeed  Gehazi  will  get  something 
from  Naaman:  'Therefore,  '  pronounces  Elisha,  'the 
leprosy  of  Naaman  will  cleave  to  you  and  to  your 
descendants  for  ever/(2  Kings  5:  27).  Not  what  Gehazi 
was  after,  but  the  letter  of  his  oath  is  fulfilled 
admirably. 
In  this  case,  the  equivocation  is  possible  because 
Gehazi  only  specifies  that  he  will  get  something'.  The 
immediate  and  obvious  resolution  of  this  general  word  is 
the  'gift'  but  the  story  reveals  that  it  can,  of  course, 
equally  well  refer  to  the  leprosy. 
6.3.4.2  Oath  as  trap 
The  other  side  of  this  coin  are  the  stories  where  men 
use  the  inviolability  of  an  oath  to  trap  others  into  a 
course  of  action.  In  Joshua  9.  we  have  a  story  which 
revolves  around  the  efforts  of  the  inhabitants  of  Gibeon 
to  entrap  the  Israelites  into  making  a  treaty  with  them. 
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distant  people  with  no  claim  to  the  land,  the  Gibeonites 
send  a  delegation  who  disguise  themselves  as  weary 
travellers  from  a  distant  country,  putting  on  worn  out 
garments  and  packing  only  mouldy  old  provisions.  When 
they  meet,  the  men  of  Israel  point  out  that  Israel 
cannot  make  a  covenant  with  their  neighbours.  At  this 
the  Gibeonites  protest,  showing  them  the  mouldy  old 
bread  which  they  claim  was  baked  the  day  they  set  out, 
the  burst  wineskins  and  the  holes  in  their  shoes  and 
claiming  to  have  travelled  for  many  days  from  their 
distant  homeland.  The  men  of  Israel  fall  for  it,  and 
swear  a  covenant  with  the  Gibeonites,  without  taking  the 
precaution  of  consulting  the  Lord. 
When  the  ruse  is  discovered,  the  people  of  Israel  voice 
their  discontent  at  their  leaders,  stupidity,  but  the 
leaders  insist  that  the  covenant  must  stand.  So  the 
Gibeonites  are  saved  from  slaughter  and  put  to  work. 
Indeed,  it  is  on  behalf  of  the  Gibeonites  that  the  sun 
stands  still,  as  Joshua  ensures  the  slaughter  of  their 
neighbours  who  have  resolved  to  punish  them  for  treating 
with  Israel.  17 
17  This  oath  has  longer  narrative  consequences,  as  it  becomes  the 
motivation  for  2  Samuel  21.  The  Gibeonites  demand  the  death  of  7 
of  Saul's  sons  as  recompense  for  the  breaking  of  this  oath  of 
protection  by  Saul,  who  has  been  carried  away  by  his  zeal  for  the 
Lord  and  has  tried  to  slay  them.  This  has  resulted  in  a  three 
year  famine,  which  David  is  trying  to  have  lifted.  So  David  hands 
over  Saul's  two  sons  by  Rizpah,  and  the  five  sons  of  Saul's 
daughter  Merab,  sparing  only  Jonathan's  son  Mephibosheth  for  the 
sake  of  the  oath  between  himself  and  Jonathan.  This  whole  episode 
is  rather  strange,  as  there  is  no  record  of  this  act  on  Saul's 
part  in  1  Samuel,  where  this  kind  of  overzealous  disobedience  on 
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6.3.4.3  Oath  evasion 
A  final  refinement  of  this  formula  is  a  narrative  that 
depicts  people  evading  the  force  of  their  own  oath  by 
playing  on  its  equivocation.  In  Judges  21,  we  have  a 
story  where  Israel  has  to  do  just  this. 
As  a  result  of  the  incident  at  Gibeah  where  a  man 
sacrifices  his  concubine  to  save  himself  from  the 
attentions  of  a  lustful  crowd  of  Benjaminites  (Jud  19), 
the  rest  of  Israel  met  at  Mizpah  to  pronounce  judgment 
on  them  (Jud  20).  In  Jud  21:  1  we  are  told  analeptically 
that  they  had  sworn  at  that  meeting  that  no  one  should 
give  his  daughter  to  a  Bpnjaminite  as  a  wife.  But  this 
of  course  means  that  Benjamin  will  die  out  as  a  tribe, 
as  by  this  stage  it  has  been  reduced  to  a  fugitive  band 
of  six  hundred  men. 
Then  in  Jud  21:  5.  we  hear  that  they  had  sworn  that  any 
tribe  that  did  not  come  to  Mizpah  should  be  put  to 
death.  We  are  not  clear  at  this  stage  what  the 
relevance  of  this  oath  is.  The  most  obvious  resolution 
is  to  take  it  as  a  further  sanction  against  Benjamin, 
which  was  of  course  itself  missing  from  this  gathering. 
In  fact,  it  turns  out  that  no-one  from  Jabesh-gilead  had 
appeared.  So  Israel  hits  upon  the  neat  solution  of 
killing  all  the  inhabitants'of  Jabesh-gilead  except  four 
hundred  virgins,  and  giving  these  to  the  Benjaminites. 
This  story  therefore  hinges  around  two  analeptic  oaths. 
There  is  no  mention  of  either  of  these  oaths  in  the 
account  of  the  rally  at  Mizpah  in  Jud  20:  1-11.  The 
problem  in  the  story  arises  through  one  oath  and  the 
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reader  is  left  with  an  uncertainty  over  the  distinction 
between  the  two  oaths,  not  knowing  who  did  not  come  to 
the  assembly  at  Mizpah. 
The  first  oath  here  poses  itself  as  a  riddle:  Benjamin 
must  marry  Israelite  women;  the  Israelites  have  sworn 
not  to  give  them  their  daughters;  who  then  can  Benjamin 
marry?  The  answer  is  to  circumvent  the.  need  for  the 
fathers  of  some  Israelite  women  to  give  them  away. 
Israel  never  swore  that  Benjamin  could  not  marry  any 
Israelite  women,  only  that  no  Israelite  father  could 
give  away  his  daughter.  Slaughtering  the  fathers  on  a 
legitimate  pretext  such  as  that  provided  by  the  second 
oath  is  one  answer.  Dead  fathers  cannot  give  or 
withhold  their  consent.  In  a  second  twist,  the  four 
hundred  virgins  turn  out  not  to  be  enough  for  six 
hundred  Benjaminites,  so  the  people  sanction  the 
abduction  of  the  daughters  of  Shiloh.  Again,  no-one 
gives  their  daughters;  they  have  been  stolen.  Indeed,, 
in  Jud  21:  22,  the  people  suggest  that  they  will  make 
this  very  point  to  the  men  of  Shiloh  if  they  find  they 
have  to  explain  themselves  to  aggrieved  relatives:  'And 
when  their  fathers  and  brothers  come  to  complain  to  us, 
we  will  say  to  them,  'Grant  them  graciously  to  us; 
because  we  did  not  take  for  each  man  of  them  his  wife  in 
battle,  neither  did  you  give  them  to  them,  else  you 
would  now  be  guilty'  (my  emphasis]. 
Here  too,  then,  the  irrevocability  of  the  oath  is 
tempered  by  the  looseness  of  its  language.  The  key 
becomes  the  concept  of  giving  in  marriage.  An  added 
frisson  of  narrative  interest  is  given  by  the  lack  of 
specificity  in  the  second  oath,  by  ambiguous  anaphora. 
Who  is  "he"  in  the  sentence  'he  shall  be  put  to  death' 
(v.  6)?  We  are  also  given  clear  indications  that  the 
people's  desires  and  intentions  are  at  odds  with  the 
deeds  their  language  obliges  them  to  perform,  as  they 
weep  and  feel  compassionate  towards  Benjamin.  (Jud  21:  3) Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  6  264 
The  narrative  problem  then  becomes  the  resolution  of 
this  impasse  where  language  has  proved  to  bind  the 
people  to  unexpected  and  unwanted  obligations.  The 
existence  of  this  convention,  then,  causes  both 
characters  and  readers  to  look  for  the  fulfilment  of  the 
oath. 
6.4  DAVID'S  OATHS  AND  THE  READER 
6.4.1  2  SAM  14  AND  2  SAM  12 
So  what  bearing  does  this  have  on  the  oaths  that  David 
swears  to  Nathan  and  to  the  woman  of  Teqoa?  Both  of 
these  are  oaths  sworn  in  the  name  of  the  Lord  'As  Yahweh 
lives  ...  The  narrative  convention  we  have  identified 
thus  raises  the  reader's  expectation  that  both  of  them 
be  fulfilled,  though  not  necessarily  as  David 
expects.  The  paradox  of  the  oath  form  is  that  in 
seeking  to  disambiguate  his  own  language,  to  make  the 
tie  between  word  and  act  secu  re,  David  becomes  tied  not 
to  any  single  meaning  but  to  the  possibilities  of 
unexpected  meanings,  -indeed  to  the  whole  range  of 
meanings  which  can  be  taken  out  of  his  utterance. 
In  chapter  14,  David  swears  that  not  one  of  the 
banished  son's  hairs  will  fall  to  the  ground.  His  son 
Absalom  is  killed,  of  course,  but  as  he  is  hanging  in  a 
tree,  not  one  of  his  hairs  does  touch  the  ground18.  In 
the  grim  humour  of  the  pun,  this  could  be  taken  a 
parodic  heightening  of  the  equivocation  of  oaths  and 
18  See  the  discussion  of  this  point  on  page  224  above. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  6  265 
oracles.  David's  words  are  fulfilled,  but  none  of  the 
characters,  nor  the  reader  can  anticipate  the  form  of 
their  fulfil-nent.  The  reader  who  already  knows  the 
outcome  of  the  story,  however,  may  be  led  by  the 
existence  of  this  convention  to  look  with  close 
attention  at  the  words  he  uttered. 
This  then  may  lead  us  to  notice  the  similar  phenomenon 
in  2  Samuel  12:  5.  David's  expletive  describing  the  rich 
man  as  a  'son  of  death,  finds  a  fatal  echo  in  Nathan's 
warning  that  his  son,  will  die,.  The  reader  is 
alerted  by  the  oath  form  to  read  this  utterance  with 
great  attention.  Although  the  precise  way  in  which 
these  words  will  come  to  be  applicable  is  not  clear,  the 
reader  may  well  anticipate  that  David's  utterance  will 
be  taken  up  in  an  unexpected  way.  Nathan's  echo  of  the 
key  words  of  the  oath  then  is  highlighted  or 
foregrounded- 
6.4.2  RASH  OATHS 
If  this  link  in  fact  exists,  then  David's  oath  could  be 
regarded  as  the  unintentional  cause  of  his  son's  death. 
His  son  dies  because  he  becomes  the  referent  of  the 
oath.  In  this  regard,  the  resonances  of  the  story  are 
with  the  other  two  incidents  where  an  oath  or  vow 
implicates  the  death  of  a  child. 
One  of  these  we  have  already  examined  in  some  detail, 
Saul's  oath  to  kill  whoever  had  violated  his  prohibition 
against  eating  in  1  Sam  14:  24.  As  we  have  seen,  there 
are  reasons  to  question  just  how  unaware  Saul  is  of  the 
consequences  of  his  words.  As  we  will  explore  further 
below,  there  is  at  least  a  suspicion  that  this  is  a 
device  which  provides  a  convenient  occasion  for  Saul's 
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The  other  narrative  that  springs  to  mind  as  a  parallel 
is  the  story  of  iephthah's  vow  in  Judges  11:  30-31.  In 
exchange  for  victory  over  the  Ammonites,  he  vows  to 
offer  the  first  creature  he  meets  on  his  return  home  to 
the  Lord  as  a  burnt  offering  .  It  is  his  daughter  whom 
he  meets.  'Alas,  my  daughter,,  he  cries,  'you  have 
brought  me  very  low  and  you  have  become  the  cause  of 
great  trouble  to  me;  for  I  opened  my  mouth  to  the  Lord 
and  I  can  not  take  back  my  vow'  (Jud  11:  35). 
Cartledge  (1992:  179)  puts  forward  the  idea  that 
iephthah's  vow  was  not  rash  in  the  sense  of  being 
uncalculated.  It  is  hard  to  translate  the  vow  as  having 
any  reference  other  than  a  person19.  Cartledge  wonders 
if  iephthah  is  not  making  aa  calculated  bid  to  put 
Yahweh  on  the  spot.  He  makes  a  vow  which  he  is  well 
aware  can  be  taken  as  pledging  his  daughter  to  Yahweh, 
and  signals  his  willingness  to  sacrifice  her.  In  effect 
he  leaves  the  final  choice  tc>  Yahweh  as  to  whom  he  will 
meet,  and  whether  the  sacrifice  will  be  required. 
However  we  interpret  this,  as  an  unwitting  blunder  or  a 
calculated  gamble,  iephthah's  reaction  to  his  daughter 
reveals  the  nature  of  the  language  of  his  vow.  Leaving 
aside  the  well-worn  observation  that  it  is  a  bit  rich  of 
iephthah  to  blame  his  daughter  in  these  circumstances, 
we  have  here  a  classic  statement  of  the  irrevocability 
of  the  vow.  In  seeking  to  bind  the  subject,  the  oath 
liberates  language,  in  a  way  analogous  to  writing.  The 
words  take  on  a  life  of  their  own.  Unreferred  pronouns 
turn  out  to  implicate  unexpected  people.  The  polysemy 
19  This  is  in  contrast  to  the  rabbinic  censure  of  iephthah  on  the 
grounds  that  he  might  have  left  himself  in  the  impossible  position 
of  having  to  sacrifice  an  unclean  animal  such  as  a  dog  or  a  pig  to 
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Of  words  allows  phrases  to  take  on  unexpected  contours 
and  implicationS20. 
But  it  is  also  a  rash  vow  whose  dire  implication  is  the 
death  of  a  child.  Jephthah  dies  with  no  heir.  Just  as 
he  himself  is  in  origin  a  bastard,  thrust  out  from  his 
father's  house  by  his  legitimate  brothers  with  the  words 
'You  shall  not  inherit  in  our  father's  house;  for  you 
are  the  son  of  another  woman,  (Jud  11:  2),  his  line  dies 
with  him, 
6.5  DAVID  AS  READER;  DAVID  AS  SWEARER 
In  2  Sam  12,  David  here  is  provoked  by  Nathan  into 
making  an  irrevocable  utterance  which  has  consequences 
that  he  did  not  foresee.  Yet  this  is  in  response  to  an 
irrevocable  utterance  of  another  kind,  which  again  had 
consequences  he  did  not  foresee  -  the  sexual  'utterance' 
of  his  seed  which  engenders  the  child  in  Bathsheba's 
womb,,  an  aspect  of  the  situation  which  we  willexplore 
more  fully  in  our  concluding  chapter. 
20  In  this  connection,  it  is  interesting  that  several  scholars, 
beginning  with  the  mediaeval  Jewish  commentator  Kimhi,  have  sought 
to  argue  that  in  fact  Jephthah  does  not  sacrifice  his  daughter. 
This  line  of  argument  is  extensively  documented  by  David  Marcus 
(Marcus  1986  esp.  7-12).  Marcus  himself  supports  the  contention 
that  the  notice  that  Jephthah's  daughter  'never  knew  a  man'  (Jud 
11:  39)  is  consistent  with  the  possibility  that,  rather  than  being 
killed,  she  was  dedicated  to  perpetual  virginity  in  the  service  of 
the  temple.  This  is  indeed  a  possibility,  but  the  text  remains 
ambivalent,  an  ambivalence  that  could  as  well  be  explained  as  a 
reticence  over  the  direct  admission  that  a  human  sacrifice  could 
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If  we  then  compare  this  transaction  with  David's  own 
dealings  with  the  Amalekite  in  2  Sam  1,  we  can  see  that 
it  is  a  case  of  the  biter  bit.  David  executes  the  man 
on  the  basis  of  his  reading  of  a  statement  that  he 
extracted  from  him  under  interrogation.  The  link 
between  the  man's  words  and  his  intentions,  and  between 
his  account  and  the  events  behind  it,  turns  out  to  be 
irrelevant.  The  man  is  bound  to  the  implications  of  his 
words. 
Both  Nathan  and  the  woman  of  Teqoa  employ  complex 
strategies  to  provoke  David  to  utter,  and  therefore  to 
reveal  his  own  stance  as  a  reader  of  their  texts.  The 
conventions  of  the  oath  then  bind  him  irrevocably  to  his 
speech,  but  not  in  any  sense  to  a  determinate  meaning. 
For  the  reader,  the  frisson  comes  when  David's  words 
find  their  interpretation,  when  their  possibilities  are 
actualized  in  the  death  of  two  of  Davidfs  sons. 
Nor  need  we  suppose  that  the  meaning  of  David's  oath  is 
exhausted  by  this  paronomastic  resolution.  Just  as 
David's  oath  that  not  one  of  the  hairs  of  the  woman  of 
w,  m  (*,  h  Av  caxtý, 
Teqoals  fictional  sonZredounds  on  Absalom,  the  hidden 
referent  of  her  story,  so  David's  own  words  come  to 
haunt  him.  David  has  sworn  by  Yahweh  that  the  one  who 
has  done  this  is  a  son  of  death,.  By  his  own  oath, 
David  has  described  himself.  David  is  the  son  of 
death,.  In  purely  narrative  terms,  the  character  David 
is  bound  to  this  self-description. 
In  the  next  chapter,  we  will  explore  the  implications  of 
the  identification  of  David  as  son  of  death,.  In  doing 
so,  the  form  of  this  thesis  will  reflect  the  form  of  the 
linguistic  phenomenon  that  we  are  investigating.  In  his 
oath,  David  seeks  to  assure  Nathan  that  he  is  bound  to 
the  execution  of  justice  in  the  restoration  of  the 
imbalance  opened  up  by  Nathan's  narrative.  As  it  turns 
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are  interpreted  under  a  different  schema  from  the  one  he 
imagines  is  in  operation.  The  oath,  designed  to  narrow 
the  range  of  possibilities  of  interpreýLtion,  to  marry 
intention,  utterance  and  act,  turns  out  to  be  an 
utterance  which  activates  a  whole  series  of  unexpected 
possibilities. 
In  the  same  way,  our  study  will  now  concentrate  on  this 
single  phrase  of  David's.  the  implications  of  which  will 
open  up  a  new  range  of  resonances  in  the  study  of  the 
uses  of  language  by  characters,  and  its  effect  on  the 
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CHAPTER  SEVEN 
DAVID  AS  SON 
7.1  DAVID'S  RESPONSE  TO  NATHAN 
1.1  TEXT 
At  the  end  of  the  previous  chapter,  we  made  the 
suggestion  that  David's  oath  in  his  response  to  Nathan 
acts  as  a  self-description.  David  names  himself  as  son 
of  death,.  In  the  light  of  our  previous  discussion  of 
the  oath,  let  us  move  on  to  a  closer  examination  of  the 
implications  of  his  response  to  Nathan's  parable. 
The  MT  gives  his  response  as: 
TTVT  7'  T 
-)nvný%  -no  ritio-m  t5wm  nin 
'AT  :-:  -'.  T  ýT  TVT 
IT  TT  V-  T  JT  7-  TT 
'And  David  was  greatly  angered  against  the  man  and  said 
to  Nathan,,  "As  the  Lord  lives,,  the  man  who  did  this  is  a 
son  of  death;  and  he  will  restore  the  lamb  fourfold' 
because  he  did  this  thing  and  did  not  spare2.  " 
I  The  only  major  textual  disagreement  between  the  MT  and  the  LXX 
is  over  the  number  of  times  that  the  lamb  should  be  repaid.  The 
LXX  has  sevenfold'.  Commentators  are  divided  over  which  should 
be  preferred.  In  favour  of  'fourfold,  is  the  legislation  in  Exod 
21:  37  which  prescribes  such  a  penalty  for  theft.  The  Talmud  (Yoma Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  7  271 
22b)  makes  the  restitution  have  a  direct  bearing  on  David.  He 
pays  for  the  death  of  Uriah  with  the  lives  of  four  children:  the 
first  child  of  Bathsheba,  Tamar,  Amnon  and  Absalom.  We  will  take 
up  this  point  below. 
The  argument  for  'sevenfold'  is  that  it  carries  the  implications 
of  perfection.  Those  who  see  this  passage  as  a  record  or 
reproduction  of  a  spontaneous  outburst  argue  that  he  would  be  more 
likely  to  use  this  symbolic  number  rather  than  make  the  considered 
judgement  of  the  legal  prescription.  This  was  later  emended  by 
legalistic  editors  concerned  to  have  David  make  a  judgment  in  line 
with  the  law.  This,  of  course,  begs  the  question  precisely  of  the 
status  of  this  text.  Carlson  (1964:  152-157)  makes  a  great  deal  of 
this  alternative  reading  in  the  course  of  his  attempt  to 
demonstrate  that  a  series  of  sevenfold  cycles  underlies  the 
structure  of  the  Succession  Narrative.  He  finds  a  legal 
justification  in  Prov  6:  31  which  prescribes  a  sevenfold 
restitution  for  theft.  He  notes  further  the  fact  that  David's  son 
dies  'on  the  seventh  day'.  There  is  also  the  point  taken  up  by 
Coxon  (1981:  250)  that  the  root  D=Vj  appears  in  Bathsheba's  name 
and  so  makes  a  subtle  connection  between  the  answer  and  the  story, 
especially  in  the  light  of  the  reference  to  the  other  element  of 
her  name  in  the  wordnz  'daughter,  in  v  3,  when  the  lamb  is 
compared  to  a  daughter.  Again,  we  might  extend  this  link  to  the 
alternative  reading  of  v8  in  the  Syri-Ac  which  reads  daughters, 
(bnt)  where  MT  has  'house'  (bt).  We  might  also  note  the  connection 
between  this  root,  Bathsheba's  name,  and  the  oath  which  we  are 
examining  and  which  has  such  imporfant  effects.  Bathsheba  is  also 
implicated  in  the  oath  that  ensures  Solomon's  succession  in  1 
Kings  1:  29. 
Both  alternatives  are  attractive;  in  such  cases  I  opt  to  stick  to 
the  MT. 
Many  commentators  follow  Schill  (1891:  318)  in  making  the  simple 
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The  verse  begins  with  an  idiomatic  expression,  literally 
'David's  nostril  smoked  greatly',  registering  David's 
anger  against  I  the  man,  3.  The  perlocutionary  ef  f  ect  of 
Nathan's  parable  is  thus  inscribed  in  the  text  as  a 
have  pity/spare,  to  'he  had  pity  on/spared  what  was  his.  '  The 
argument  is  that  this  means  that  the  verb  h.  ml,  which  also  appears 
v.  4  where  the  rich  man  'spares'  to  take  one  of  his  own  flock,  has 
the  same  meaning  on  its  two  occurrences.  However,  there  is 
abundant  evidence  that  precisely  this  kind  of  play  on  the 
ambivalence  of  the  meaning  of  a  root  is  a  common  device  in 
biblical  style,  as  Simon  (1967:  231)  makes  clear.  It  also  avoids 
the  juxtaposition  of  two  different  expressionitranslated  as 
'because':  1qb  Isr  and  11  1jir  (see  McCarter  1984:  294-5).  Again, 
this  does  not  seem  a  particularly  unusual  piece  of  syntax.  There 
being  no  textual  evidence  to  support  this  change,  I  opt  to  follow 
the  MT. 
This  is  the  only  occasion  on  which  this  expression  is  applied  to 
David.  Elsewhere  in  the  books  of  Samuel  it  is  used  as  follows 
1  Sam  11:  6  Saul's  anger  is  kindled  by  the  news  that  the  men  of 
Jabesh  have  been  blinded 
17:  28  David's  brother  Eliab  is  angered  by  David's  appearance 
on  the  battlefield. 
20:  30  Saul  is  angered  by  Jonathan's  predilection  for  David. 
20:  34  Jonathan  is  angered  by  Saul's  determination  to  kill 
David. 
2  Sam  6:  7  The  Lord's  anger  is  kindled  against  Uzzah  for 
touching  the  ark. 
We  might  note  that  a  high  proportion  of  these  occurrences  involve 
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bodily  function,  used  metaphorically  to  describe  an 
emotional  reaction. 
7.1.2  SON  OF  DEATH 
7.1.2.1  one  who  deserves  to  die' 
The  particular  focus  of  our  attention  is,  as  we  have 
said,  to  examine  the  implications  of  the  phrase  'a 
son  of  death'.  What  does  this  juxtaposition  of  the  idea 
of  procreation  and  the  idea  of  death  imply? 
The  standard  modern  translation  is  to  take  this  phrase 
as  a  death  sentence:  this  man  deserves  to  die.  '  In 
this  particular  circumstance,  it  is  argued,  the  very 
fact  that  David  is  later  assured  by  Nathan  that  he  will 
not  die  (v.  13)  implies  that  he  is  under  a  sentence  of 
death4.  The  only  formal  candidate  for  such  a  sentence  is 
this  self-reflective  condemnation.  As  against  that,  we 
might  argue  that  once  David's  involvement  in  murder  and 
adultery  has  been  made  clear,  there  is  no  requirement 
for  a  formal  death-sentence.  Death  hangs  over  him  in 
any  case. 
There  also  seems  to  be  a  contradiction  on  the  face  of  it 
between  such  a  sentence  of  death  and  the  supplementary 
requirement  for  restitution.  The  second  penalty  seems 
rather  banal  after  the  first,  and  indeed  would  be  rather 
hard  for  a  dead  man  to  fulfil. 
24:  1  The  Lord's  anger  against  Israel  makes  him  incite  David  to 
conduct  a  census. 
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we  can  of  course  circumvent  this  by  speculating  that  it 
is  the  dead  man's  estate  that  would  be  charged.  An 
alternative  adopted  by  Phillips  (1966:  243)  is  to  see 
this  phrase  as  David's  expression  of  frustration  at  a 
legal  system  that  does  not  prescribe  the  penalty  of 
death  for  this  crime.  In  law,  the  man  is  only  guilty  of 
stealing  a  sheep,  and  his  callous  disregard  of  the  poor 
man's  situation,  while  deplorable,  is  not  punishable. 
David  is  thus  saying  'This  man  deserves  to  die;  but  as 
the  law  only  allows  a  penalty  of  restitution,  all  I  can 
do  is  to  to  set  his  punishment  at  the  maximum  fine  of 
four  (seven?  )  sheep.,  5 
7.1.2.2  Other  translations 
What  evidence  is  there,  however,  that  this  expression 
bears  this  nuance  of  judicial  condemnation  to  death? 
Kimchi  suggests  that  it  is  an  emotional  outburst  rather 
5  This  verse  has  indeed  been  used  to  make  the  contrary  argument 
that  here  we  have  clear  evidence  that  the  death  penalty  could  be 
imposed  for  stealing  a  sheep,  either  as  part  of  Israel's  legal 
tradition  or4decreed  by  the  king  who  as  the  final  court  of  appeal 
was  able  to  promulgate  case  law  in  the  absence  of  precedent.  This 
argument,  for  which  see  Macholz  (1972a:  165),  presumes  that  as 
David  reacts  to  the  case  as  if  it  were  authentic,  his  reaction  can 
be  used  to  derive  information  about  historical  juridical  procedure 
in  Israel.  See  on  this  point  Jackson  (1972:  144-48)  who  casts  doubt 
on  the  evidence  that  such  a  provision  ever  existed.  Whitelam 
(1979:  135)  and  Niehr  (1987:  118)  make  the  more  fundamental  point  of 
the  untenable  assumptions  that  Macholz's  argument  makes  about  the 
nature  of  the  texts.  Even  if  David  takes  the  story  as  genuine, 
the  narrator  may  be  presenting  us  with  a  wholly  artificial 
situation,  in  which  we  are  hardly  entitled  to  suppose  that  the 
first  interest  is  the  accurate  exposition  of  Israelite  legal 
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than  a  death  sentence  (Sosevsky  1986:  324).  This 
interpretation  is  followed  by  many  modern  commentators 
(see  inter  aliasGerlemam.  1977:  133,,  Ackroyd  1977:  109,, 
Anderson  1989:  162).  An  alternative  suggestion  is 
offered  by  McCarter  who  opts  to  translate  the  phrase  as 
'a  fiend  of  helll(1984:  299).  He  argues  for  this  on  the 
grounds  that  there  is  no  good  parallel  for  the  extension 
of  the  meaning  of  ben  to  include  this  idiomatic  sense  of 
,  deserving  of  ...  1.  Instead,  he  takes  as  parallels 
phrases  such  as  ben-beliyalal  I  son  of  hell,  6,  which  are 
general  expressions  of  disgust  and  contempt. 
Indeed,,  such  parallels  as  there  are  for  the  use  of  ben 
in  expressions  where  it  forms  a  construct  chain  with  an 
inanimate  or  abstract  noun  can  all  be  translated 
satisfactorily  in  an  extension  of  the  general  sense  of 
'having  a  loyalty  or  connection  to...,,  'coming  within 
the  sphere  of  ....  I  or  even  'tainted  with....  I  death  or 
whatever  the  absolute  noun  might  be7. 
The  two  close  parallels  that  might  be  adduced  in  order 
to  defend  the  translation  'deserves  to  die,  are  the 
expressions  ben-gorni  'son  of  my.  threshing  floor'  (Isa 
6  For  a  review  of  the  various  suggestions  as  to  the  derivation  of 
this  phrase  see  Emerton  1987  and  the  bibliography  there  appended. 
All  the  various  suggestions  agree  that  the  term,  however 
construed,  expresses  a  strong  despisal  of  the  one  so  labelled. 
7  The  phrases  that  might  be  considered  include  expressions  such  as 
bene  ýayil  (1  Sam  14:  52,18:  17,2  Sam  2:  7)  sons  of  valour',  where 
the  implication  is  that  the  men  are  valorous,  not  that  they 
'deserve  valour'.  Compare  the  phrase  ben  hameratstseaý  son  of 
murdering,  by  which  Elisha  describes  the  king  of  Israel  in  2  Kings 
6:  32,  translated  in  e.  g.  the  RSV  as  'murderer,  not  one  who 
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21:  10)  and  bin  hakkoth  son  of  scourging,  (Deut  25:  2). 
These  might  be  translated  one  who  deserves  to  be 
threshed,  and  one  who  deserves  to  be  scourged'.  The 
first,  however,  occurs  in  the  context  of  the  destruction 
of  Babylon  where  it  might  equally  well  be  translated 
,  one  who-has  been  threshed',  as  indeed  many  modern 
translations  attest8. 
The  most  convincing  case  can  be  made  for  Deut  25:  2, 
where  the  judge  has  to  decide  which  of  two  disputants  is 
guilty  and,  if  the  guilty  man  is  bin  hakkothl,  arrange 
to  have  him  beaten.  This  certainly  lends  itself  to  the 
possibility  that  the  judge  could  sentence  the  man  by 
saying:  'This  man  is  bin  hakkothl  in  strict  parallel  to 
what  David  does  in  this  passage.  In  this  case  the 
phrase  would  be  translated  'worthy  of  a  beating',  the 
Y 
reading  found  in  the  LXX  (aýtog,,.,  akjy(bv).  There  is,  on 
the  other  hand,  also  the  possibility  that  the  phrase 
could  mean  that  he  is  the  one  who  has  struck  the  blow  in 
the  dispute,  just  as  the  sons  of  uproar,  (bene  shalon) 
in  Jer  48:  45  and  the  'sons  of  rebellion,  (bene  meri)  in 
Num  17:  25  are  not  deserving  of,  but  the  cause  of,  the 
violence  that  is  attributed  to  them.  The  punishment 
then  fits  the  crime.  So,  too,  the  phrase  ben  mawet  may 
allude  to  the  death-dealing  rather  than  death-deserving 
qualities  of  those  to  whom  it  is  applied. 
David's  phrase,  then,  rather  than  condemning  the  rich 
man  to  death  as  one  'deserving  to  die'  may  be  a 
description  of  the  man  as  a  murdering,  death-dealing 
scoundrel,  one  who  brings  death  in  his  train. 
8  The  RSV  translates  the  phrase  10  my  threshed  and  winnowed 
ones';  the  REB  opts  for  'My  people,  once  trodden  out  on  the 
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McCarter's  translation  then  seems  nearer  the  mark  than 
the  more  usual  interpretation. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  our  argument  to  show  more  than 
that  this  is  a  possible  translation  of  the  phrase.  if, 
as  we  claim,  the  polysemy  of  the  oath  is  one  of  its 
characteristics,  it  would  be  quite  possible  for  the 
phrase  to  carry  the  meaning  of  a  death  sentence,  and  yet 
also  have  the  function  of  an  epithet. 
As  such,,  if  it  describes  David  as  a  death  dealer,,  then 
there  is  evidence  that  bears  out  such  a  description. 
Directly  or  indirectly,  the  books  of  Samuel  are  filled 
with  violent  deaths  which  are  either  carried  out  by 
David,  or  at  his  behest.  Other  deaths,  such  as  Naballs, 
seem  to  occur  providentially  to  David's  benefit.  There 
are  also  several  deaths  which  David  vehemently  disclaims 
any  involvement  with,  but  which  bring  him  great  gains  in 
power  and  influence.  In  particular,  the  deaths  of  Saul, 
Abner  and  Ishbosheth  fall  into  this  category.  Most  of 
those  who  have  any  dealings  with  David  have  met  their 
deaths  by  the  time  that  he  exceptionally  dies  in  bed  of 
old  age.  If  David  is  here  implicitly  described  as  a 
'son  of  death'  in  the  sense  of  one  who  brings  death  on 
others,  the  description  seems  to  be  valid,  without 
implying  that  he  deliberately  engineered  all  these 
deaths. 
what  brings  a  particular  importance  to  this  phrase  'son 
of  death,  is  that  in  the  Hebrew  Scriptures  it  is  used  only 
,-  in  association  with  David.  It  is  used  solely  by 
David  or  to  ref  er  to  David9  in  the  two  instances  of  its 
9  The  related  phrase  ben  temuthah  occurs  in  Psalms  79:  11  and 
102:  21.  In  both  psalms  it  stands  in  parallel  to  the  word  I  syr 
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use  other  than  in  2  Sam  12.  These  occasions  are  as 
follows: 
7.1.3  DAVID  AS  'SON  OF  DEATH' 
7.1.3.1  1  Sam  20:  (30-)31. 
In  these  verses,  Saul  rails  against  Jonathan  when  he 
comes  to  explain  David's  absence  from  the  royal  table. 
His  speech  is  prefaced  by  the  same  idiom  expressing 
anger  as  David's  speech  in  2  Sam  12:  5,  and  contains 
three  instances  of  expressions  translatable  as  son  of 
...  1,  here  italicised: 
Then  Saul's  anger  was  kindled  against  Jonathan  and 
he  said  to  him,  'You  son  of  a  perverse.,  rebellious 
woman,  do  I  not  know  that  you  have  chosen  the  son 
of  Jesse  to  your  own  shame  and  to  the  shame  of  your 
mother's  nakedness?  For  as  long  as  the  son  of 
Jesse  lives  upon  the  earth,  neither  you  nor  your 
kingdom  will  be  established.  Therefore  send  and 
fetch  him  to  me,  for  he  is  a  son  of  death.  ' 
This  speech  raises  important  issues  about  the  function 
of  sonship  in  this  text  which  we  will  explore  further 
below.  Suffice  it  to  note  here  that  the  phrase  son  of 
death,  comes  as  the  culmination  of  a  series  of  such 
phrases,  all  of  which  have  a  negative  connotation. 
Furthermore,  it  is  David's  threat  to  Jonathan's  security 
which  is  stressed.  The  phrase  could  be  interpreted  as 
pointing  to  David  as  the  bearer  of  death  for  Jonathan. 
they  do  not  deserve  to  die,.  They  may  have  been  sentenced  to 
death,  but  it  is  also  possible  to  interpret  this  passage  as  those 
who  are  in  the  sphere  of  death,  about  to  die  of  neglect  or  else 
simply  those  separated  from  the  living  by  imprisonment.  See 
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If  so  it  takes  on  an  added  irony  in  verse  33  where  it  is 
Saul  who  threatens  his  son's  life  when  he  takes  up  his 
spear  to  cast  it  at  Jonathan'O.  Yet  if  Saul  had 
succeeded  in  killing  his  son  in  his  wrath  over 
Jonathan's  relationship  with  David,  then  David  would 
indirectly  have  been  the  cause  of  Jonathan's  death. 
Here,,  too,  the  phrase  'son  of  death,  might  be  taken  to 
imply  that  Saul  is  pronouncing  a  death  sentence  on 
David.  Perhaps  we  might  interpret  the  incident  as 
implying  that  David  is  to  be  brought  to  Saul  because  he 
,  deserves  to  die,.  But  against  this  we  could  argue  that 
the  phrase  is  not  so  much  a  death  sentence  as  a  general 
execration  of  David  as  a  potential  bringer  of  death. 
Jonathan's  reply  'Why  should  he  die?  What  has  he  done?, 
might  be  taken  to  indicate  that  here  ben  mawet  does 
carry  the  implications  of  a  death  sentence,  but  equally, 
the  structure  of  verses  30-31  may  argue  that  it  is  a 
culminating  insult,  whose  implications  Jonathan  can  read 
without  it  being  necessary  to  assume  that  these  reflect 
any  inescapable  connotation  of  Saul's  words. 
7.1.3.2  1  Sam  26:  16. 
In  this  verse  David,  who  has  stolen  into  Saul's  camp  and 
removed  the  kings  spear,  himself  describes  Saul's 
general  Abner  and  his  men  as  lbene  mawet,  for  their 
neglect  of  the  king's  safety.  This  time  the  description 
10  Strictly  speaking,  the  MT  only  states  that  'Saul  took  up  his 
spear  to  cast  it  at  him,.  The  reference  of  the  pronoun  could 
conceivably  be  David,  who  has  been  at  the  receiving  end  of  Saul's 
spear  before  this  (1  Sam  18:  11).  The  alternative  and  predominant 
view  that  Jonathan  is  the  target  is  strengthened  by  Saul,  s  hostile 
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is  not  applied  to  him;  he  is  the  one  who  utters  it. 
Again,  it  is  not  necessary  to  assume  that  this  implies 
any  kind  of  death  sentence  or  even  a  judgement  that 
death  was  merited.  It  could  equally  be  the  case  that 
the  death  referred  to  is  rather  the  peril  into  which 
they  placed  Saul  by  their  negligence,  if  indeed  any 
specific  reference  is  required.  Once  again,  a  general 
implication  of  worthlessness  is  all  that  the  context 
would  require. 
In  the  light  of  these  two  examples,  David's  use  of  the 
phrase  in  2  Sam  12:  5  can  be  seen  as  combining  features 
of  both  of  the  former  uses  in  that  he  is  both  the  one 
uttering  and  the  one  referred  to  by  the  phrase. 
If  then  we  take  David's  exclamation  as  a  self- 
description  which  is  not  necessarily  a  sentence  of 
death,  a  position  which  these  episodes  do  nothing  to 
contradict,  we  are  now  made  aware  that  it  is  a  phrase 
which  has  had  associations  with  David  earlier  in  the 
text.  This  has  a  bearing  on  what  it  might  mean  for 
David  to  be  described  as  'son  of  death.  ' 
To  explore  this  concept  further  we  shall  look  at  the 
series  of  incidents  where  David  is  referred  to  as  a  son. 
In  doing  so,  we  discover  that  David's  status'as  'son'  is 
highly  problematised  within  the  text  of  the  books  of 
Samuel.  In  order  to  uncover  the  nature  of  this  problem, 
we  will  examine  the  relevant  incidents  in  turn. 
7.2  DAVID  AS  SON 
7.2.1  'WHOSE  SON  IS  THIS  YOUNG  MANV 
1  Sam  17 
David's  status  as  a  son  is  the  subject  of  one  of  the 
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Saul's  question  in  1  Sam  17,  three  times  repeated,  as  to 
whose  son  the  young  man  who  has  just  killed  Goliath  may 
bell.  The  oddity  stems  from  the  fact  that  Saul  himself 
refers  to  David  by  name  in  1  Samuel  16:  19,  when  he 
instructs  Jesse  to  send  him  his  son.  How  are  we  to 
explain  the  fact  that  Saul  knows  that  David  is  Jesse's 
son  at  the  end  of  ch.  16,  and  yet  seemingly  has  to  ask 
whose  son  he  is  only  a  chapter  later?  12 
There  are  3  basic  approaches  to  this  problem: 
11  The  question  is  addressed  directly  to  Abner  (17:  55),  and  then 
repeated  in  Saul's  injunction  to  Abner  to  inquire  into  the  young 
man's  ancestry  (17:  56).  Saul  finally  confronts  David  directly 
with  the  question  (17:  58). 
12  For  a  recent  discussion  of  these  issues,  see  Campbell  (1991: 
10-15).  Campbell  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  the  attempt  at 
harmonization  has  failed,  but  that  this  is  only  a  problem  for  the 
critical  reader.  For  many  purposes,  he  argues,  a  'panoramic 
reading,  (1991:  15)  is  perfectly  adequate,  one  which  el-ides  the 
difficulties,  helped  along  by  the  decision  to  read  the  story  as 
beginning  at  1  Sam  17:  1  instead  of  16:  14,  and  ending  at  17:  54.  It 
would  be  hard  to  surpass  this  as  an  example  of  a  solution  to  a 
problem  arrived  at  by  a  quite  deliberate  refusal  to  read  the  text. 
Campbell  also  sees  these  chapters  as  the  product  of  a 
sophisticated  intention  to  preserve  two  stories  rather  than  to 
compress  and  eliminate  their  differences.  This  is  in  order  to 
offer  two  different  visions  of  David's  coming  to  power  (1991:  13- 
14).  But  here  Campbell  himself  seems  to  be  offering  two 
incompatible  accounts  of  the  interpretation  of  this  hiatus.  A 
panoramic  view  of  his  own  paper  is  perhaps  necessary  to  preserve 
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1.  Some  commentators  attempt  to  harmonise  the  stories. 
This  must  depend  on  finding  a  plausible  narrative  to 
explain  Saul's  repetition  of  the  question.  Either  he 
has  forgotten  that  he  already  knows  the  answer13,  or  is 
asking  for  supplementary  informationA.  It  may  be,  of 
course,  that  he  has  simply  failed  to  recognise  David15. 
or  perhaps  he  is  not  really  requesting  information  but 
is  making  some  oblique  rhetorical  point  by  this 
question,  for  instance  registering  his  disbelief  that 
such  a  stripling  could  accomplish  so  daring  a  feat16. 
13  Saul's  subsequent  attacks  of  madness  have  been  offered  as  a 
possible  explanation  for  such  a  lapse  of  memory. 
14  So  Ginzberg  (1913:  88)  conflates  aggadic  sources  which  indicate 
that  Saul  wants  to  discover  whether  David,  who  he  knew  was  of  the 
tribe  of  Judah,  belonged  to  the  clan  of  Perez  or  the  clan  of 
Zerah.  If  the  former,  then  Saul  would  be  confirmed  in  his 
suspicion  that  David  was  destined  for  kingship.  This  of  course 
depends  on  the  variable  reference  of  the  concept  'son'.  It  can 
refer  to  the  membership  of  a  tribe  or  clan  rather  than  to  a 
family.  Beyond  that,  there  is  no  textual  basis  for  the  conjecture 
that  Saul  had  any  way  of  knowing  that  the  future  king  would  be 
descended  from  Perez.  Keil  and  Delitzsch  (1975:  178)  interpret  the 
question  as  reflecting  Saul's  desire  to  find  out  who  the  father  of 
such  a  fine  young  man  might  be  in  order  to  bring  the  father  into 
his  entourage. 
15  So  Gunn  (1980:  79)  speculates  on  'David's  appearance,  as  he 
matures,  being  greatly  altered  so  as  not  to  be  recognisable  on  his 
reappearance  before  Saul  and  his  general., 
16  Polzin  (1989:  174-5)  offers  a  complex  reading  along  these 
lines.  He  suggests  that  the  reader  can  account  for  the  first  two 
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2.  By  contrast,  many  commentators  have  seen  this 
discrepancy  as  evidence  that  two  traditions  about  the 
introduction  of  David  to  Saul's  court  have  been 
conflated.  This  explanation  is  bolstered  by  the  fact 
that  one 
'' 
manuscript  tradition  of  the  Septuagint  (LXXB 
and  allied  manuscripts)  preserves  a  shorter  text  than 
the  MT17.  The  implications  of  this  are  a  matter  of 
debate'19.  Does  the  LXX  represent  an  abbreviation  of  the 
MT19  or  is  the  MT  an  expansion  of  the  LXX?  20  The  latter 
is  now  the  majority  opinion.  Yet  if  this  is  so,  we  have 
from  David  to  recognise  him,  and  that  he  was  not  aware  that  David 
was  actually  going  to  attack  Goliath,  given  that  he  had  discarded 
Saul's  armour.  This  explanation  will  not  account  for  Saul 
addressing  the  question  to  David  face  to  face.  Here  Polzin  sees  a 
multi-layered  implication  in  the  question-,  a  self-ironic 
recollection  of  Saul's  earlier  dismissal  of  David;  a  genuine 
amazement  that  the  son  of  an  ordinary  fellow  like  Jesse  could 
bring  this  adventure  off;  and  a  veiled  directive  that  David  should 
henceforth  regard  Saul  as  his  father.  Campbell  (1991:  13  n.  31) 
calls  this  reading  a  'valiant  attempt'  that  'fails  to  carry 
conviction',  but  see  below. 
17  In  chapters  17  and  18,  the  shorter  version  common  to  both 
Hebrew  and  Greek  traditions  is  17:  1-11,32-40,42-48a,  49,51-54; 
18:  6afý-9;  12a,  13-16,20-21a,  22-29a.  In  addition  the  Hebrew  has: 
17:  12-31,41,48b,  50;  17:  55-18:  6a(x;  18:  10-11,12b,  17-19,21b, 
29b-30. 
18  This  is  reflected  in  the  detailed  but  ultimately  unresolved 
examination  of  the  debate  in  Barth6lemy  et  al.  (1986). 
19  Wellhausen  (1871:  104-112)  argues  that  LXX  is  an  early  attempt 
at  a  harmonisation  of  the  MT  text.  If  so,  it  is  not  a  very 
successful  one  as  it  still  contains  discrepancies.  The  boy  who 
cannot  manage  Saul's  armour  in  17:  33  and  17:  38-40  does  not  accord 
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still  to  explain  why  the  seams  show  so  much.  Is  this 
the  result  of  clumsy  editing,  or  is  it  a  sophisticated 
technique?  Are  the  redactors  of  the  MT  simply 
constrained  by  the  effort  to  preserve  two  equally 
revered  accounts  with  minimal  editing,  or  is  there  more 
to  it? 
3.  This  leads  us  to  the  third  approach,  which  seeks  to 
account  for  the  preservation  of  the  tensions  in  the 
text.  Most  of  the  commentators  who  adopt  this  approach 
are  perfectly  happy  to  concede  that  the  text  may  well 
have  a  history  of  editing,  but  are  more  concerned  to 
explain  why  the  seams  would  be  left  showing.  Gros  Louis 
comments  I  ...  surely  whoever  put  the  narrative  into  this 
final  form  was  aware  of  the  inconsistency  too;  such 
inconsistency  in  close  proximity  in  a  narrative  is  more 
than  an  author's  nodding;  it  is  the  equivalent  of  deep 
sleep,  (1977:  20). 
Gros  Louis  accounts  for  this  inconsistency  in  terms  of 
his  wider  reading  of  the  David  stories.  He  sees  a 
consistent  pattern  whereby  David's  private  life  is  set 
against  his  public  role.  In  this  instance,  David  is 
first  introduced  into  the  private  world  of  Saul's  tent 
as  his  intimate,  the  one  who  can  soothe  his  melancholy 
with  music.  In  ch.  17,  however,  David  acts  in  the  glare 
20  This  is  now  the  majority  position.  See  e.  g.  McCarter  (1980: 
306-309)  who  sees  the  extra  material  in  the  MT  as  deriving  from  an 
independent,  coherent,  alternative  account.  Klein  (1983:  174)  is 
more  cautious  in  claiming  the  existence  of  an  independent  account, 
especially  as  McCarter  has  to  reject  17:  14b-15,16,23b,  31  and 
18:  10-11,17b,  and  29b  as  harmonizing  additions.  For  an 
entertaining  account,  fictional  as  all  such  accounts  must  be,  of 
the  way  which  such  a  harmonization  might  occur  and  the  reasons 
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of  publicity  as  a  warrior  and  hero.  The  two 
introductions  reflect  the  duality  that  persists 
throughout  David's  story  between  the  man  and  the  king. 
Robert  Alter  adopts  a  similar  line  in  his  discussion  of 
1  Samuel  16-17  (1981:  147-153).  He  speaks  of  the 
'binocular  vision'(1981:  148)  of  David  which  the  author 
provides  by  the  technique  of  'composite  artistry.  '  The 
discussion  forms  part  of  a  chapter  where  Alter  is 
arguing  that  the  biblical  authors  sought  to  record  the 
complexity  of  their  subjects  and  their  characterisations 
using  a  technique  of  montage,,  juxtaposing  blocks  of 
material  which  gave  very  different  perspectives,  rather 
than  attempting  to  assimilate  them  into  a  unified 
account.  21  In  another  metaphor,  he  compares  the 
technique  to  that  of  Cubist  painting  which  imposes 
incompatible  perspectives  for  expressive  effect  (1981: 
146).  He  draws  an  analogy  with  the  two  creation  stories 
in  Genesis,  where  a  human-centred  'horizontal,  view 
23-  Alter  (1981:  148)  regards  these  chapters  as  particularly 
significant  for  his  theory  as  he  dates  their  composition  to  only  a 
few  decades  after  the  events.  He  argues  that  the  author  was  thus 
much  less  constrained  by  the  need  to  work  with  traditions  which 
already  had  status  and  fixity  than,  say,  the  authors  of  Genesis. 
This  means  that  the  discrepancies  in  the  text  of  1  Samuel  are  more 
likely  to  be  the  result  of  the  author's  deliberate  choice:  I  ...  if 
he  chose  to  combine  two  versions  of  David's  debut,  one  theological 
in  cast,  and  the  other  folkloric,  it  was  because  both  were 
necessary  to  his  conception  of  David's  character  and  historic 
role,  (1981:  148).  Apart  from  the  assumption  about  the  date  of 
the  composition  of  this  text  that  Alter  makes,  one  could  equally 
well  argue  that  proximity  to  the  event  would  put  tighter 
restrictions  on  the  author,  if  we  imagine  that  he  is  trying  to 
tell  the  story  of  David's  debut  to  an  audience  which  presumably 
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follows  a  more  stylized,  theocentric  version.  The  two 
maintain  a  tension  over  the  vexed  theological  question 
of  the  relation  between  divine  initiative  and  human 
response.  David  is  depicted  both  as  the  object  of 
divine  choice,  and  as  the  young  hero  whose  rise  to  the 
kingship  depends  on  his  own  sharp  wits  and  bravery. 
Alter's  account  is  endorsed  by  Fokkelman.  who  finds  it 
'quite  unacceptable  that  the  author  was  not  aware  of  the 
friction  between  16:  14-23  and  cap.  17,  (1986:  202).  He 
goes  on  to  conclude  that  the  author  'found  it  quite 
unnecessary  or  quite  incorrect  to  deny  that  he  was  using 
two  sources  or  traditions  concerning  the  first  meeting. 
on  the  contrary,  he  simply  saw  the  chance  of  making 
positive  use  of  the  fact  that  more  than  one  tradition 
was  available,  (1986:  202).  He  also  draws  attention  to 
the  fact  that  the  author  devotes  3  verses  to  this 
transaction  which  could  have  been  summarised  in  a  few 
words. 
Another  commentator  who  takes  this  line  is  Miscall 
(1983:  71-73;  1986:  120-210).  He  warns  that  the 
tensions  in  the  text  should  not  be  resolved  too  easily. 
Though  he  opens  up  the  questions,  he  does  not  answer 
them.  He  reproaches  other  critics  for  choosing  one 
topic  or  theme  from  the  text  as  the  core  meaning  and 
then  honing  the  other  details  to  fit  this.  He  is 
content  to  conclude  with  the  verdict  that  the  final 
section  of  ch.  17  is  opaque,  its  significance  is 
indeterminable,  (1983:  71). 
An  explanation  for  the  growth  of  this  technique  is 
ventured  by  Damrosch  (1987).  He  sees  a  dynamic 
interaction  between  the  sense  of  the  complexity  of 
historical  affairs  and  the  technical  demands  of  editing 
together  pre-existing  accounts.  'On  the  one  hand,  a 
metaphoric  view  of  character  and  history  inspired  the 
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narrative  doublings;  on  the  other  hand,  the 
compositional  pressures  inherent  in  combining  disparate 
sources  and  traditions  would  in  turn  have  reinforced  a 
metaphoric  and  ironic  view  of  history  as  a  series  of 
repetitive  transformations  of  earlier  events'(1987: 
234). 
7.2.1.2  Foregrounding  the  question 
Interesting  though  these  readings  are,  they  do  not 
account  for  the  stark  inconsistency  of  the  repeated 
question  in  this  particular  instance.  This  subtle  point 
about  the  conflict  of  the  private  and  the  personal  is 
made  elsewhere  without  requiring  such  a  blatant 
narrative  inconsistency  which  the  text  does  nothing  to 
resolve. 
One  commentator  whose  interest  is  in  the  narrative 
coherence  of  the  final  form  of  the  text  is  Polzin  (1989: 
171-176)22.  He  begins  by  pointing  out  the  contrast 
between  these  verses  and  v.  15.  'Why  would  some  guiding 
intelligence  take  care  in  verse  15  to  make  David's 
situation  there  consistent  with  the  events  of  the 
22  Polzin  (1989:  259  n.  20)  provides  a  substantial  review  of  the 
reasons  why  he  opts  to  read  the  MT  without  becoming  embroiled  in 
the  text-critical  arguments  over  1  Sam  17  and  18.  He  does  this  in 
the  form  of  a  critique  of  Tov's  detailed  analysis  (Tov  1985)  which 
seeks  to  demonstrate  that  the  LXX  text  is  a  coherent  and  plausible 
version,  rather  than  the  product  of  an  abridgement  of  the  MT. 
Polzin  concludes,  'What  is  clear  from  Tov's  exercise,  it  seems  to 
me,  is  that  no  amount  of  internal  text-critical  evidence  of  the 
type  Tov  employs  can  render  either  alternative  more  likely  than 
its  opposite'  (1989:  260  n.  21).  Polzin  calls  his  own  integrated 
reading  of  the  MT  a  'calculated  response'(1989:  261  n.  21)  to  the 
notion  that  the  Hebrew  text  is  incoherent  and  conflated. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  7  288 
previous  chapter,  but  then  allow  to  stand,  or  worse 
still  incorporate,  a  conclusion  that  is  inconsistent  not 
only  with  chapter  16  but  also  with  Saul's  and  David's 
meeting  in  the  middle  of  chapter  17?  1(1989:  172). 
Polzin  answers  this  by  pointing  out  the  rhetorical 
effect  of  these  questions  on  the  reader:  'The  narrator 
certainly  succeeds  in  getting  the  reader's  attention  at 
the  end  of  the  chapter:  Saul's  question  to  Abner  in 
verse  55  falls  upon  one's  ears  like  a  thunderclapl(1989: 
171). 
This  is  an  aspect  that  most  other  commentators  do  not 
touch  on,  and  w  hich  seems  to  me  of  prime  importance. 
The  very  inappropriateness  of  this  question,  especially 
in  its  three-fold  repetition,  serves  to  bring  it  to  the 
reader's  notice23.  Polzin  enjoins  us  to  take 
responsibility  for  reading  this  story,  rather  than 
dismissing  it  as  incoherent  with  what  he  calls  a 
'redactional  shrug'  (1989:  172).  Polzin's  subsequent 
discussion  of  the  significance  of  this  question  has  been 
mentioned  above.  What  is  important  for  our  purposes  is 
to  acknowledge  his  detection  of  the  function  of  this 
incoherence  and  repetition. 
In  a  more  impressionistic  way,  Segal  urges  the  reader  to 
imagine  that  'the  two  stories  are  not  erroneously,  or 
innocently,  but  insistently  inconsistent  and  meant  to 
blow  the  mind  fruitfully,  (1987:  113).  She  explains 
that  'The  mind  must  imagine  the  impossible,  and  can't, 
and  can't  let  it  alone,  and  keeps  trying  to  argue  itself 
out  of  its  distress,  (1987:  112). 
23  As  Polzin  remarks,  'That  Saul's  question  about  David  is 
expressed  not  just  once  but  three  times  in  these  four  verses 
should  at  least  alert  the  reader  that  Saul's  questioning  is  being 
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The  narrative  effect  of  this  disruption  is  undeniable; 
it  brings  the  question  to  the  fore.  Here  we  have  a 
prime  example  of  a  case  of  Idefamiliarization',  of 
making  strange.  As  Herbert  Schneidau  points  out  in  his 
discussion  of  the  use  of  this  device  in  biblical 
poetics,  this  word  also  encapsulates  the  nature  of  what 
is  going  on  in  the  text.  'Familiarization,  as  the  word 
itself  reveals,  implies  familial  interdependence: 
breaking  free  of  dependence  on  our  families  is 
necessarily  estrangement,  (1976:  34).  David  himself 
here  is  Idefamiliarized';  the  narratological  oddity  of 
this  question  at  this  place  coincides  with  David's 
movement  into  liminality,  his  removal  from  Jesse's 
family  and  his  as  yet  uncertain  incorpc(ation  into  Saul's 
household,  and  his  eventual  appear  ance  as  Saul's  heir. 
It  is  this  aspect  of  the  text  which  our  enquiry  has 
already  encouraged  us  to  take  seriously.  Just  whose  son 
is  David? 
7.2.2  'WHO  IS  THEIR  FATHERV 
At  the  beginning  of  David's  career,  then,  the  question 
is  posed  'Whose  son  is  this  young  man?,  in  a  way  that 
the  reader  can  neither  ignore  nor  assimilate.  It  is 
therefore  all  the  more  striking  that  a  similarly 
enigmatic  question  over  fatherhood  appears  toward  the 
beginning  of  Saul's  career24. 
24  Edelman  (1991:  135)  notes  the  link  between  the  two  questions, 
which  she  sees  as  both  seeking  the  answer  'Yahweh,.  In  her 
interpretation,  Saul  is  asking  whether  this  test  of  the  killing  of 
Goliath  confirms  the  rumours  of  David's  anointing  which  he  has 
heard.  She  also  draws  attention  to  the  link  between  this  question 
and  Naballs  twofold  denunciation  of  David  as  son  of  no-one,  and 
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On  his  return  from  his  anointing  by  Samuel,  Saul,  as 
Samuel  had  prophesiedf  encounters  a  band  of  prophets  and 
is  himself  seized  by  the  prophetic  spirit.  This 
provokes  the  people  to  ask  the  question,  'What  has  come 
over  the  son  of  Kish?  Is  Saul  also  among  the  prophets?, 
(1  Sam  10:  11-12)  which  the  text  informs  us  attains  the 
status  of  a  proverb.  It  also  provokes  'a  man  of  the 
place,  to  answer  'And  who  is  their  father?,  25  This 
question,  like  the  one  which  we  have  been  discussing, 
gains  prominence  by  its  very  oddity.  what  can  it  mean? 
In  what  sense  is  it  an  answer  provoked  by  the  previous 
question,  which  has  given  rise  to  its  own  crop  of 
speculations  as  to  its  meaning? 
The  wider  context,  is  suggestive.  The  word  'father, 
appears  on  one  other  occasion  in  this  chapter,  when 
Samuel  predicts  that  the  two  men  who  will  meet  Saul  will 
say  to  him,  'The  asses  which  you  went  to  seek  are  found, 
connected  with  Saul's  outburst  in  1  Sam  22:  7-8  (see  Gunn  1980:  97) 
and  forward  to  Sheba's  cry  in  2  Sam  20:  1. 
25  In  the  alternative  etiology  given  for  this  proverb  in  1  Sam  19: 
24,  there  is  no  equivalent  to  the  man's  question.  of  course,  the 
whole  point  of  a  proverb  is  that  it  is  applicable  to  a  variety  of 
situations,  that  it  has  become  detached  from  the  particular 
occasion  of  its  first  utterance.  So  McCarter  speculates  that 
,  this  saying  may  have  been  applied  to  situations  involving 
participation  in  a  particular  group  or  activity  by  an  individual 
who  for  one  reason  or  another  would  not  have  been  expected  to 
participate  ...  When  someone  would  find  an  unlikely  individual 
involved  in  some  group,  therefore,  he  would  say,  "Is  Saul,  too, 
among  the  prophets?  "'  (1980:  183-4).  Note  however,  that  in  a  way 
not  totally  dissimilar  to  the  episode  we  have  just  been  examining, 
the  striking  repetition  of  the  proverb  serves  to  draw  attention  to 
it,  and  the  very  fact  that  the  repetition  is  inexact  may  serve  to 
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and  now  your  father  has  ceased  to  care  about  the  asses 
and  is  anxious  about  you,  saying,  "What  shall  I  do  about 
my  son?  "'(10:  2)  A  father  expresses  his  bewilderment 
over  a  son26. 
The  people  also  preface  their  question  in  10:  11  by 
asking  'What  has  come  over  the  son  of  Kish?  '  This 
reminds  us  that  the  father  most  obviously  in  question  is 
Kish.  The  issue  of  Saul's  relationship  to  his  father  is 
thus  highlighted  in  the  text.  In  this  perspective,  the 
precise  implication  of  this  question  for  the  sociology 
of  Israel's  prophetic  movement  is  not  the  point, 
interesting  though  it  may  be  to  speculate  on  such 
matterS27.  Whatever  the  meaning  of  the  phrase  I  sons  of 
the  prophets',  it  does  show  that  the  word  provides  a 
26  This  is  of  course  Samuel's  anticipation  of  what  the  two  men  may 
present  as  a  quotation  from  Kish,  an  anticipation  which  is  not 
explicitly  confirmed  in  the  text  of  Samuel,  and  which  is  at  a 
third  remove  from  its  imputed  speaker.  We  might  note  the  parallel 
that  both  David  and  Saul  are  sent  off  on  an  errand  by  their  father 
that  involves  a  donkey.  In  David's  case,  in  1  Sam  16:  20  records 
his  father's  sending  him  to  Saul's  court  with  a  donkey  laden  with 
gifts.  Both  David  and  Saul  find  more  than  they  bargain  for  in  the 
shape  of  an  encounter  that  will  lead  eventually  to  their  gaining 
the  throne. 
27  So,  for  example,  Ackroyd  (1971:  85)  relates  the  question  to  the 
concept  of  the  sons  of  the  prophets,  who,  by  implication  must 
have  a  'father,,  perhaps  the  leader  of  a  band  or  school  of 
prophets.  He  takes  the  word  ZN  here  to  indicate  an  interpreter, 
citing  the  parallels  of  Joseph  who  describes  himself  as  Pharaoh's 
'father'  (Gen  45:  8)  and  Micah's  request  to  the  Levite  to  be  a 
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bridge  between  the  biological  family  and  the  affiliative 
bond.  The  possibility  that  Saul  is  now  breaking  out  of 
the  role  as  son  of  Kish,  is  raised.  He  is  in  fact 
referred  to  by  this  epithet  only  once  more  in  1  Samuel, 
very  much  the  exception  that  proves  the  rule.  In  1  Sam 
10:  20-21,  Saul  is  chosen  by  lot  from  among  the  tribe  of 
the  Matrites.  However,  Saul  is  missing.  He  has  quite 
literally  separated  himself  from  his  family  in  order  to 
evade  a  selection  process  which  is  rooted  in  the 
genealogical  structures  of  Israel. 
Yet  on  both  occasions  the  reference  to  Saul  as  a  son  of 
the  prophets  is  in  the  form  of  a  question.  Saul  is  not 
clearly  drawn  into  the  orbit  of  the  prophets,,  but  rather 
left  in  a  limbo.  This  is  of  course  the  position  he  must 
be  in  as  the  first  king.  There  is  a  basic  dilemma  in 
the  text  over  the  transition  to  the  hereditary  monarchy. 
The  kingfs  son  gains  his  pos,  ition  because  he  is  the  son 
of  the  king.  The  dynasty  looks  back  to  its  founder  for 
its  legitimacy.  But  how  is  that  founder  himself 
legitimised?  who  is  the  father  of  the  first  king? 
This  question  resurfaces  again  in  the  case  of  David. 
David  becomes  the  founding  father  of  the  monarchy.  The 
same  dilemma  reappears  only  here  with  an  added 
complication.  Not  only  must  David's  legitimacy  be 
established,  but  there  is  now  a  legitimate  rival, 
Jonathan,  Saul's  son. 
The  question  'Whose  son  is  David?,  thus  becomes  the 
animating  question  of  the  text.  It  is  also  a  question 
that  receives  multiple  answers  in  the  books  of  Samuel. 
David  is  referred  to  as  the  son  of  four  characters; 
Jesse,  Saul,  Nabal  and  Death.  In  the  next  section,  I 
will  discuss  David's  relationship  to  each  of  these 
figures,  before  going  on  to  discuss  the  implication  of 
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7.3  SON  OF  JESSE 
7.3.1  DAVIDS  GENEALOGY 
The  first  mention  of  David  in  1  Sam  is  as  the  youngest 
among  the  sons  of  Jesse  the  Bethlehemite.  Jesse  is 
given  no  genealogy  in  Samuel,  which  is  suggestive  in 
itself  28.  The  books  of  Samuel  are  on  the  whole  reticent 
when  it  comes  to  genealogies  anyway,  but  Elkanah,  and 
hence  Samuel,  is  given  four  generations  of  ancestors  in 
addition  to  his  tribal  designation: 
There  was  a  certain  man  of  Ramathaim-zophim  of  the 
hill  country  of  Ephraim,,  whose  name  was  Elkanah  the 
son  of  Jehoram,  son  of  Elihu,  son  of  Tohu,  son  of 
Zuph,  an  Ephraimite  (1  Sam  1:  1). 
The  same  pattern  is  repeated  in  the  case  of  Kish,  Saul's 
father;  four  generations  of  ancestors  and  a  tribal 
designation: 
There  was  a  man  of  Benjamin  whose  name  was  Kish, 
the  son  of  Abiel,  son  of  Zeror,  son  of  Becotath  son 
of  Aphiah,  a  Benjaminite(l  Sam  9:  1). 
Ruth,,  of  course,  preserves  a  tradition 
David's  ancestry  back  through  Jesse  to 
(Ruth  4:  18-22)  and  the  genealogy  of  thi 
1  Chron  2  contains  a  parallel  account. 
fact  remains  that  even  by  the  reticent 
Samuel,  Jesse,  and  thus  David,  have  no 
that  carries 
Boaz  to  Perez 
e  sons  of  Judah  in 
That  said,  the 
standards  of 
genealogy  in  this 
28  In  1  Sam  16:  1  he  is  introduced  simply  as  Jesse  the 
Bethlehemitel;  on  his  reintroduction  in  1  Sam  17:  12,  he  appears  as 
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text.  When  David  replies  to  Saul  that  he  is  the  son  of 
his  servant  Jesse,  what  information  is  the  reader  given? 
7.3.2  JESSE  AND  DAVID 
7.3.2.1  Jesse  as  father 
The  most  penetrating  recent  account  of  Jesse  is  to  be 
found  in  Rosenberg,  who  cautions  us:  'The  story  of 
Jesse,  like  all  else  in  biblical  narrative,  is  the  sum 
total  of  the  words  spoken  about  him.  There  are  dangers 
to  reading  too  much  into  a  text  that  speaks  so 
sparingly,  but  when  sparse  words  are  the  only  story  we 
have,,  we  must  make  what  we  can  from  what  we  are  given. 
The  words  are,  after  all,  what  the  makers  of  the  text 
chose  for  us  to  know  about  Jesse,  so  the  burden  of 
interpretation  is  not  to  be  skirted29r  (1986:  176). 
He  comments  on  the  disjunction  between  Jesse's  house  and 
the  house  that  David  himself  founds.  This  first  appears 
in  the  disjunction  between  Jesse  and  his  seven  sons,  who 
29  We  need  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  makers  of  the  text  may  have 
been  writing  for  an  audience  which  had  a  stock  of  common  knowledge 
about  Jesse  which  is  not  available  to  us.  Strictly  speaking, 
then,  what  they  chose  for  us  to  know,  would  have  to  include  their 
expectations  of  our  previous  knowledge.  In  the  event,  however, 
this  makes  no  practical  difference  to  the  fact  that,  as  Rosenberg 
says,  we  modern  readers  have  to  make  the  best  of  what  we  have. 
Indeed,  Rosenberg's  restrictive  formulation  is  to  be  preferred  to 
the  attitude  which  makes  the  probability  that  the  first  audience 
knew  more  of  Jesse  than  we  do  a  licence  for  speculation.  The  fact 
that  neither  Samuel  (16:  1)  or  Saul  (16:  18-19)  has  to  ask  for 
further  identification  may  reflect  the  assumption  that  Jesse  is 
well  known,  either  in  the  world  of  the  text  or  to  the  readership, 
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all  appear  at  the  sacrifice  to  which  Samuel  bids  them, 
and  the  eighth  son30  who  is  out  keeping  the  f  locks.  How 
are  we  to  interpret  this  disjunction?  Is  it  an  instance 
of  the  youngest  son  being  disregarded  as  too  young  to  be 
of  significance  (Hertzberg  1964:  138).  or  is  the  parallel 
to  be  drawn  with  Jacob  and  his  devotion  to  Benjamin? 
Benjamin  is  also  separated  from  his  brothers  when  they 
go  down  to  Egypt  but  here  as  an  index  of  his  father's 
protective  love.  Is  this  Jesse's  motive?  Is  he  keeping 
David  back  in  order  to  spare  him  from  whatever  Samuel 
has  in  mind?  The  initial  reaction  of  the  elders  of 
Bethlehem  to  Samuel's  arrival,  after  all,  had  been  one 
of  fear  over  whether  his  intentions  were  peaceful  (1  Sam 
16:  4-5). 
At  all  events,  16:  20  records  Jesse  sending  David  to  Saul 
along  with  gifts.  Again,  is  Jesse  sending  his  son  as 
one  more  gift  among  the  others,  or  is  he  taking  care 
that  his  cherished  boy  is  received  in  the  most 
auspicious  circumstances?  David's  status  as  Jesse's  son 
is  emphasized  by  the  repetition  of  the  word  in  vv.  19 
and  20.  What  the  emotional  content  of  the  relationship 
between  the  two  may  be  is  not  disambiguated. 
The  same  motif  of  David  as  messenger  and  go-between 
recurs  in  17:  17-18  when  Jesse  sends  David  to  take 
provisions  to  his  three  brothers  who  are  fighting  with 
Saul's  army  and  to  their  commander.  We  get  some  sense  of 
30  1  Chron  2:  15  lists  David  as  the  seventh  son.  In  view  of  the 
importance  of  the  number  seven  in  the  biblical  text,  this  may 
reflect  an  attempt  by  Chronicles  to  bring  David  into  a  position  of 
prominence.  Equally,  the  story  in  Samuel  may  be  using  the  number 
symbolically  to  represent  David  as  the  extra,  the  supernumerary 
son,  already  in  some  sense  displaced  from  the  'complete,  number  of 
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a  reciprocity  in  the  relationship  between  Jesse  and  his 
sons  from  his  request  that  David  should  bring  back  a 
token  from  them.  Yet  the  very  request  that  David  should 
bring  some  proof  of  delivery  could  suggest  that  Jesse 
had  reason  to  suspect  that  he  might  not  carry  out  his 
commission.  As  it  turns  out,  David  leaves  the 
provisions  with  the  keeper  of  the  baggage  and  that  is 
the  last  we  hear  of  them. 
We  are  left  uncertain  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
relationship  between  Jesse  and  his  son.  Does  he 
represent  the  protecting  father,  or  the  father  who  seeks 
to  reject  or  suppress  his  son? 
7.3.2.2  Jesse's  disappearance 
Other  than  in  such  references,  Jesse  himself  disappears 
from  the  story,  as  do  the  rest  of  David's  family.  There 
is  one  obscure  reference  in  1  Sam  22:  3-4  when  David  asks 
the  king  of  Moab  to  allow  David's  father  and  mother  to 
stay  with  him  until  the  outcome  of  his  rebellion  against 
Saul  is  known.  Nothing  is  subsequently  heard  of  them. 
In  2  Sam  8:  2,  Moab  is  mentioned  as  a  conquered  enemy  of 
David's,  its  captives  subjected  to  a  draconian  and 
arbitrary  execution  of  two  thirds  of  their  manpower. 
Rabbinic  sources  suggest  that  this  is  retaliation  on 
David's  part  for  the  murder  of  his  parents  by  their 
supposed  guardianS31. 
Rosenberg  (1986:  174)  describes  David  as  indirectly 
responsible,  for  their  deaths,  which  is  certainly 
31  See  e.  g.  Rashi,  on  Numbers  Rabbah  14:  1  because  they  had  killed 
his  father,  mother  and  brothers.  IFor  it  states:  and  he  led  them 
before  the  king  of  Moab  (1  Sam  22:  4)  and  we  do  not  find  mention  of 
their  departure  from  there.,  See  Rosenberg  (1986:  304  n-2). Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  7  297 
pushing  the  evidence,  but  his  comment  comes  in  his 
interesting  discussion  of  the  royal  household  as  the 
repository  par  excellence  of  shame,  'the  desire  to  cover 
up  oneself,  one's  body,  one's  emotions  and  needs,  one's 
presence  to  another.  '  The  interaction  of  the  political 
and  familial  in  the  royal  household  is  the  key  to  this 
transition32.1  Samuel  17  is  in  his  view  a,  story  which 
details  the  leaving  of  the  father's  house  in  a  complex 
and  subtle  way.  He  sees  this  as  an  archetypal  moment 
in  the  history  of  fathers  and  younger  sons,  the 
emergence  of  the  historical  actorl(1986:  176).  As  he 
puts  it:  'The  least  significant  son  of  Jesse  has  become 
the  author  of  Jesse's  significance'.  Jesse  is  only 
remembered  because  of  his  famous  son  whom  he  tried  to 
conceal. 
In  Rosenberg's  reading,  the  concealment  of  Jesse  by  the 
text  is  a  counterpoise  to  the  concealment  of  David  by 
his  family.  David's  biological  descent  is  not  in 
question,  but  he  refuses  to  accept  the  social 
consequences  of  that  descent.  To  be  identified  as  the 
son  of  Jesse,  implies  a  whole  set  of  social  parameters 
which  form  a  boundary  to  who  David  can  be.  Rosenberg 
reads  David's  reply  to  Saul  as  an  assertion  of 
independence:  'The  son  of  your  servant  Jesse  the 
Bethlehemite,  is  to  be  taken  as  'I  who  am  free  am  the 
son  of  one  who  serves,  of  one  who  has  not  understood  his 
freedoml(1986:  180).  There  is  a  move  from  the  filiative 
to  the  affiliative  relationship. 
32  Rosenberg  here  is  drawing  on  Cavell's  essay  on  King  Lear 
(Cavell  1969:  267-293),  where  he  argues  that  the  whole  conspectus 
of  tragedy  that  ensues  in  the  play,  which  leaves  none  of  the 
characters  unscarred,  and  none  immune  from  the  charge  of  wrong- 
doing,  depends  on  the  attempt  to  evade  the  threat  of  self- 
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This  is  of  course  unsupported  by  any  textual  evidence, 
but  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  David's  natural 
parents  disappear  from  the  text  from  this  point.  The 
name  of  his  father,  however,  does  not  disappear  from  the 
text  as  we  shall  go  on  to  discuss.  At  key  points  in  the 
text,  David  is  spoken  of  as  the  'son  of  Jesse,.  it 
becomes  part  of  David's  'proper  name'  in  terms  of  our 
discussion  in  Chapter2  above.  We  will  examine  each  of 
these  incidents  to  see  if  there  is  a  common  strand  to 
them. 
7.3.3.  'SON  OF  JESSE'  AS  INSULT 
7.3.3.1  1  Sam  20:  26-34 
In  these  verses,  Saul  uses  the  epithet  three  times  in  a 
context  where  the  reader  is  well  aware  that  Saul  is 
harbouring  murderous  thoughts  about  David.  In  1  Sam  20: 
27,  Saul,  missing  David  from  the  table,  asks,  'Why  has 
not  the  son  of  Jesse  come  to  the  meal,  either  yesterday 
or  today?  '  Jonathan  replies  that  David  is  attending  a 
sacrifice  with  his  family  in  Bethlehem.  Note  that 
Jonathan  uses  David's  name,  rather  than  echoing  Saul's 
phrase,  *but  it  is  Jonathan  who  is  the  one  who  brings  up 
the  matter  of  the  family  sacrifice. 
There  is  an  echo  here  of  the  last  sacrifice  which  the 
text  has  referred  to  as  taking  place  at  Bethlehem,  the 
one  which  Samuel  conducted  when  he  came  to  anoint  David 
king  (1  Sam  16:  1-3).  That  sacrifice  is  also  a  ruse, 
one  which  Samuel  uses  at  the  Lord's  instigation  in  order 
to  give  himself  an  excuse  for  being  in  Bethlehem.  We 
might  also  note  the  similarity  to  the  excuse  that 
David's  own  son  Absalom  uses  in  2  Sam  15:  7-8  where  he 
engineers  his  escape  to  Hebron  by  pleading  that  he  has 
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Note,  too,  how  Jonathan  embellishes  David's  story.  In 
20:  6,  David  suggests  to  Jonathan  that  he  tells  his 
father  that  there  is  a  yearly  sacrifice  in  Bethlehem  for 
all  David's  family.  It  is  Jonathan  who  introduces  in  vv 
28-29  the  idea  that  it  is  David's  brother  who  has  bidden 
him  to  attend.  In  view  of  Eliab's  reaction  to  David  in 
1  Sam  17:  28,  this  seems  odd  to  the  reader,  as  is  the 
further  insistence  that  David  wishes  to  be  with  his 
brothers.  None  of  his  brothers  otherwise  figures  in  the 
narrative.  Why  is  there  no  mention  of  Jesse  or  David's 
mother?  This  is  particularly  intriguing  in  that  there 
is  in  this  episode  a  reversal  David's  transition  from 
Jesse's  household  to  Saul's  in  1  Sam  17. 
Saul's  response  to  this  excuse  is  an  outburst  against 
Jonathan  for  his  foolish  loyalty  to  David  at  the  expense 
of  his  own  inheritance.  Saul  speaks  twice  of  the  son 
of  Jesse'  ,  but  uses  another  son,  epithet,  calling 
Jonathan  the  son  of  a  perverse  and  rebellious  woman'. 
At  the  very  least,  this  suggests  that  the  use  of  the 
word  'son,  to  indicate  condemnation  by  association  is 
circulating  in  this  text.  This  culminates  in  Saul's  use 
of  the  epithet  'son  of  death,  in  20:  31,  the  implications 
of  which  we  explored  earlier. 
The  sexual  connotations  of  this  speech  of  Saul's  are 
powerful.  Jonathan's  choice  of  David  shames  his 
mother's  nakedness',  a  strong  term  if  we  relate  it  to 
the  context  of  Lev  18:  6-18  and  similar  passages  which 
prescribe  drastic  penalties  for  exposing  a  mother  or 
father's  nakedness.  Levenson  and  Halpern  (1980:  515-6) 
relate  this  language  to  the  possibility  that  David  has 
stolen  Ahinoam,  Saul's  wife  and  Jonathan's  mother  (1  Sam 
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Ahinoam  who  David  'takes,  apparently  in  lieu  of  Michal 
(1  Sam  25:  43)33. 
Be  that  as  it  may,  here  we  have  a  father  uniquely  in  the 
Old  Testament  referring  in  what  seem  to  be  crude  and 
blatant  terms  to  his  wife's  genitals  in  the  course  of  an 
argument  with  that  woman's  son.  That  son  was  engendered 
when  Saul  uncovered  Ahinoam's  nakedness,  and  is  accused 
of  bringing  shame  on  that  nakedness.  The  shame  of  the 
act  of  copulation  resonates  with  the  shame  of  the 
fickle,  incontrollable  product  of  that  copulation.  The 
son  who  opts  for  the  affiliative  relationship  with  David 
rather  than  the  filiative  relationship  with  Saul 
undercuts  the  whole  economy  of  the  hereditary  system, 
and  activates  all  the  resentments  of  the  father.  The 
resentment  over  the  act  of  procreation  which  will  lead 
Saul  to  cast  his  spear  at  Jonathan  in  v.  33  is 
uncomfortably  near  the  surface. 
So  in  this  extract,  the  name  used  of  David  represents  a 
clash  between  the  two  discourses  of  father  and  son,  a 
clash  where  Saul  uses  the  language  of  sonship  to 
distance  and  denigrate  both  of  his  sons'.  natural  and 
33  Levenson  (1978:  9-10)  makes  the  case  for  the  identification  of 
the  two  royal  wives.  He  draws  attention  to  Nathan's  remark  in  2 
Sam  12:  8  where  he  refers  to  the  Lord  having  given  David  his 
master's  wives.  In  addition,  he  interprets  Saul's  action  in 
conveying  David's  wife  Michal  to  Paltiel,  which  is  mentioned  in 
the  next  verse  in  1  Sam  25  (v.  44),  as  a  quid  pro  quo  for  David's 
appropriation  of  Saul's  wife.  Jonathan's  mother,  then,  is 
'perverse  and  rebellious'  in  having  abandoned  Saul  for  David. 
There  is,  of  course,  no  direct  evidence  for  any  of  this,  but  the 
coincidence  of  names,  otherwise  infrequent  in  the  Hebrew  Bible,  is 
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adoptive.  David  is  son  of  Jesse,  and  so  alien,  and  out 
of  line  for  the  throne. 
7.3.3.2  1  Sam  22. 
Saul  also  uses  this  epithet  when  he  is  berating  the 
Benjamites  for  their  failure  to  keep  him  informed  about 
Jonathan's  rebellion.  He  ironically  questions  the  son 
of  Jesse's  ability  to  provide  his  followers  with  land 
and  vineyards.  we  might  especially  note  the  contrasts  in 
8: 
'No  one  discloses  to  me  when  my  son  makes  a  league 
with  the  son  of  Jesse,  none  of  you  is  sorry  for  me 
or  discloses  to  me  that  my  son  has  stirred  up  my 
servant  against  me,  to  lie  in  wait,  as  at  this 
day.  ' 
Again,  the  language  of  sonship  is  at  once  used  to 
distinguish  Jonathan  and  David,  and  yet  brings  both  of 
them  together.  Jonathan  is  'my  son'  yet  he  acts  like 
the  'son  of  Jesse',  who  is  not  here  Saul's  son,  but  his 
servant. 
The  epithet  is  also  used  in  1  Sam  22:  9  by  Saul's 
ruthless  henchman  Doeg  the  Edomite,  reporting  the  action 
of  Abimelech  in  giving  David  Goliath's  sword.  There  is  a 
certain  irony  in  Saul's  scornful  dismissal  of  David's 
obscure  ancestry  when  he  himself  is  descended  by  his  own 
admission  from  the  humblest  of  all  the  families  of  the 
tribe  of  Benjamin,  (1  Sam  9:  21)34. 
34  We  read  even  less  about  Kish  than  we  do  about  Jesse.  He  is 
given  only  one  speech  in  the  biblical  text,  when  he  sends  Saul  off 
with  a  servant  to  search  for  his  lost  asses  (1  Sam  9:  3).  The 
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7.3.3.3  1  Sam  25:  10 
The  contrast  between  son  and  servant  reappears  in  the 
use  of  this  epithet  by  Nabal  in  1  Sam  25:  10.  He 
dismisses  David's  claims  contemptuously: 
Who  is  Davi  ?.  Wo  is  the  son  of  Jesse?  There  are 
many  servants  nowadays  who  are  breaking  away  from 
their  masters. 
In  the  context  of  Naballs  further  refusal  to  give 
provisions  to  men  who  come  from  I  know  not  where,,  the 
obscurity  of  David's  origins  is  emphasized.  To  claim 
descent  from  Jesse  is  tantamount  to  coming  from  nowhere. 
We  shall  presently  go  on  to  examine  this  particular 
pericope  more  closely. 
The  epithet  also  appears  in  2  Sam  20:  1  in  the  slogan 
which  Sheba  son  of  Bichri  uses  to  promote  his  rebellion 
emphasizing  the  lack  of  connection  between  Israel  and 
the  son  of  Jesse.  35 
7.4  SON  OF  NABAL 
7.4.1  1  SAM  25:  8 
7.4.1.1  Filiation  and  liminality 
David  himself  describes  his  relationship  to  Nabal  as 
that  of  a  son  in  1  Samuel  25:  8.  This  rather  startling 
self-identification  comes  at  the  end  of  the  speech  that 
David  instructs  his  young  men  to  make  to  Nabal.  They 
35  The  same  slogan  reappears  in  1  Kings  12:  16  when  Israel  rebels 
against  David's  grandson  Rehoboam.  Contrast  the  slogan  attributed 
to  Amasai,  chief  of  the  Thirty,  in  1  Chron  12:  18. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  7  303 
are  to  point  out  to  Nabal  that  David  and  his  men  have 
defended  the  flock  and  so  deserve  some  recompense:  'Pray 
give  whatever  you  have  at  hand  to  your  servants  and  to 
your  son  David., 
Nabal  rejects  this  designation  of  himself  as  David's 
father.  As  we  have  seen,  he  asks  the  rhetorical 
question  'Who  is  David?  Who  is  the  son  of  Jesse?, 
Quite  specifically  he  counters  the  claim  by  a 
disparaging  reference  to  David's  biological  paternity. 
He  also  implies  that  David  falls  under  the  category  of  a 
slave  breaking  away  from  his  master.  Again,  this 
contradicts  the  language  of  sonship  that  is  at  work 
between  David  and  Saul.  David,  Nabal  implies,  is  Saul's 
servant.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  it  is  in  this 
very  verse,  1  Sam  25:  10,  that  David's  young  men  are 
first  referred  to  by  the  narrator  as  his  servants,  a 
designation  which  thereafter  becomes  more  and  more 
frequent  in  the  text.  Heretofore  they  have  been  his 
'young  men'. 
Why,,  then,  does  this  suggestion  of  a  filiative 
relationship  between  Nabal  and  David  arise  in  the  text 
at  all?  At  a  superficial  level,  David  is  making  a 
polite  and  ingratiating  approach  which  is  repudiated  by 
the  churlish  Nabal.  But  we  may  suspect  that  there  is 
more  to  the  matter  than  this. 
Regina  Schwartz  (1992)  examines  the  wider  ramifications 
of  the  theme.  The  name  Nabal,  as  is  well  known,  is  the 
word  for  fool,,  but  also  for  an  outcast,  and  has  a 
resonance  with  the  word  nebalah,  a  corpse.  Besides  its 
resonances  in  this  chapter,  the  word  reappears  later  in 
the  narratives  about  David. 
David's  daughter  Tamar  uses  the  word  folly,  to  describe 
her  half-brother  Amnon's  conduct  in  raping  her  (2  Sam 
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which  David  himself  becomes  a  fool  in  the  Bathsheba 
episode.  In  this  episode,  he  shows  himself  to  be  a  true 
son  of  Nabal,  of  whom  Abigail  says  'Nabal  is  his  name 
and  nabal  is  his  naturef  (1  Sam  25:  25). 
Indeed,  the  connection  is  closer  than  Schwartz 
indicates.  It  is  Abigail's  intervention  that  keeps 
David  from  what  he  himself  admits  would  have  been  an 
action  of  folly,  the  massacre  of  Naballs  household. 
In  the  Bathsheba  episode,  however,  David  does  just  what 
Abigail  prevents  him  from  doing  in  1  Sam  25.  He  brings 
about  the  death  of  Uriah,  who  has  done  nothing  to  harm 
him,  an  even  more  heinous  action  than  his  hot-headed 
desire  to  kill  Nabal  who  had  insulted  him  and  his  men. 
In  both  tales,  David  becomes  the  husband  of  another 
man's  wife,  and  in  both  cases,  the  man  dies.  Both 
stories  thus  turn  on  the  question  as  to  whether  David 
will  prove  himself  to  be  a  'son  of  Naball  or  not. 
7.4.1.2  Narrative  Analogy  in  1  Sam  24-26 
Levenson  (1978)  brings  out  the  narrative  analogy  between 
these  two  episodes.  He  sees  this  story,  sandwiched  as 
it  is  between  the  two  similar  stories  in  1  Sam  24  and  26 
of  David's  merciful  action  towards  Saul,  as  a  proleptic 
glimpse  of  the  downfall  of  David.  David  here  is  shown 
for  the  first  time  as  capable  of  the  ruthless  violence 
that  sets  the  whole  sorry  train  of  events  after  Uriah's 
death  into  motion: 
...  the  David  of  chaps.  24  and  26  is  the 
character  whomwe  have  seen  since  his  introduction 
in  chap.  16  and  whom  we  shall  continue  to  see  until 
2  Samuel  11,  the  appealing  young  man  of  immaculate 
motivation  and  heroic  courage.  But  the  David  of 
chap.  25  is  a  man  who  kills  for  a  grudge.  The 
episode  of  Nabal  is  the  very  first  revelation  of 
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he  stops  short.  But  the  cloud  that  chap.  25  raises 
continues  to  darken  our  perception  of  David's 
character.  (1978:  27) 
Levenson  seems  to  have  overlooked  the  strange  but 
telling  episode  of  Eliab's  speech  to  David  in  1  Sam  17: 
28-30,  where  his  brother  says  that  he  knows  David's 
presumption  and  the  evil  of  his  heart.  At  the  very 
moment  when  David's  first  moves  into  Saul's  world  are 
occurring,  we  have  the  suggestion  that  his  motives  are 
less  than  pure.  Though  this  can  be  dismissed  as  the 
reaction  of  an  elder  brother  on  the  same  lines  as  the 
reaction  of  Joseph's  brothers  to  him,  it  also  raises  a 
cloud,  that  with  hindsight  foreshadows  David's  later 
peccadilloes.  This  observation  of  course  strengthens 
rather  than  weakens  Levenson's  case. 
However,,  as  Robert  Gordon  has  suggested  (Gordon  1980). 
the  links  between  these  three  chapters  are  even  closer. 
Gordon  hypothesises  that  Nabal  stands  as  a  narrative 
surrogate  for  Saul.  He  points  out  that  the  place  names 
associated  with  Nabal  in  1  Sam  25:  2  are  ones  also 
associated  with  SauJ36.  Nabal  also  acts  as  if  he  were  a 
king.  Indeed,  the  word  'king,  itself  appears  in  the 
text  to  describe  the  lavishness  of  the  feast  Nabal  holds 
to  celebrate  the  shearing,  like  the  feast  of  a  king'  (1 
Kings  25:  36). 
Gordon  regards  the  function  of  1  Sam  25  as  the 
reinforcement  of  the  sense  that  bloodguilt  would  be 
fatal  to  David's  move  towards  the  kingship.  He  sees  an 
36  Maon  is  named  three  times  in  1  Sam  23:  24f  as  the  area  where 
David  hid  and  where  Saul  nearly  captures  him.  Carmel  also  has  a 
Saulide  association  as  the  place  where  Saul  erected  his  stele  to 
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incremental  repetition  in  the  three  chapters  which  shows 
an  increasing  resistence  of  David  to  the  idea  of  the 
inappropriateness  of  revenge  for  bloodguilt.  chapter  26 
is  not  just  a  redundant  repetition  of  chapter  24. 
Whereas  in  chapter  24  David  does  desecrate  the  royal 
person  by  the  symbolic  action  of  cutting  the  edge  off 
Saul's  robe,  in  chapter  26  he  refrains  from  touching 
Saul's  person.  Saul  is  also  more  vulnerable  in  chapter 
26  despite  the  fact  that  he  is  surrounded  by  his  men. 
In  that  chapter,  the  whole  camp  is  sunk  in  a  deep  sleep. 
Chapter  25,  Gordon  agrees,  is  proleptic.  In  it  'the 
whole  issue  of  grievance,  revenge  and  blood-guilt  is 
played  through  to  its  conclusion.  Thus  David  is  given  a 
preview  of  what  will  happen  if  he  commits  his  case  to 
God  and  leaves  Saul  unharmedf  (Gordon  1980:  57).  Just 
as  Nabal  is  smitten  by  God  without  David  having  to  incur 
the  guilt  of  killing  him,  so  Saul  will  die  without  any 
intervention  by  David. 
This  is  in  direct  contrast  to  Levenson's  reading  of  the 
same  chapter.  Where  they  agree  is  in  the  claim  that 
chapter  25  is  proleptic.  Their  judgment  of  its 
implications  is  very  different,  however. 
7.4.1.3  Nabal  and  Saul 
Here,,  then,  the  relationship  between  the  three  chapters 
is  seen  in  much  the  same  way  by  the  two  commentatorsf 
but  very  different  conclusions  are  drawn.  This  can  only 
confirm  an  ambivalence  at  work  in  the  text  itself  in 
that  it  supports  such  different  conclusions.  That 
ambivalence  is  carried  over  into  the  whole  matter  of  the 
father-son  relationship  with  which  the  text  is  dealing. 
In  chapter  25  we  have  a  story  where  David  makes  the 
overture  of  declaring  himself  a  son.  Nabal  rebuffs  it, 
and  in  what  could  be  read  as  a  classically  Freudian Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  7  307 
move,  David  reacts  with  murderous  hostility  to  this 
unresponsive  father  figure.  This  violence  becomes 
deflected  when  it  is  diverted  into  the  vengeance  of 
taking  the  father's  wife.  Abigail's  pleas  can  thus  be 
reinterpreted  as  a  case  of  seduction  by  the  mother.  As 
rejected  son  of  Naball,  David  takes  revenge,  not  by 
overt  violence,  but  by  marrying  Abigail. 
Yet  if  Nabal  is  a  surrogate  for  Saul,  the  connections 
become  even  more  suggestive.  At  the  end  of  this  chapter 
(1  Sam  25:  43).  we  are  told  of  another  marriage  that 
David  contracts,  that  with  Ahinoam  of  Jezreel-  As  we 
have  already  seen,  it  is  striking  that  Saul's  own  wife, 
the  mother  of  Jonathan,,  a  woman  who  implicitly  he 
described  as  'perverse  and  rebellious,  in  his  outburst 
against  David  in  1  Sam  20:  30,  is  also  named  Ahinoam  (1 
Sam  14:  50).  Is  there  a  parallel  here  too  between 
David's  taking  of  Abigail  from  Nabal  and  his  taking  of 
Ahinoam,  from  Saul? 
Be  that  as  it  may,  there  is  a  close  parallel  in  the  use 
of  the  language  of  sonship  between  these  chapters.  If 
Nabal  is  referred  to  by  David  as  his  father,  on  three 
occasions,  Saul  describes  David  as  his  son.  These  three 
occasions  occur  in  the  very  chapters  24  and  26  that  we 
have  been  discussing. 
7.5  SON  OF  SAUL 
7.5.1  SONS  OF  SAUL 
In  1  Sam  24:  16,  Saul  responds  to  David's  speech  chiding 
him  for  his  suspicion  by  asking  'Is  this  your  voice,  my 
son  David?,  In  1  Sam  26:  17,  the  same  question  is 
echoed.  Saul  repeats  the  designation  of  David  as  his 
son  in  1  Sam  26:  21.  Here  it  comes  in  the  context  of 
Saul's  own  identification  of  himself  as  one  who  has 
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David  part  finally  on  a  word  of  blessing  from  Saul: 
'Blessed  be  you,  my  son  Davidl  You  will  do  many  things 
and  succeed  in  them.  ' 
Here  we  need  to  take  account  of  the  paradox  that  this 
text  constantly  circles  round,  the  fact  that  David,  the 
founder  of  the  royal  house,  is  himself  the  son  of  Jesse, 
and  the  second  king,  not  the  first.  Saul's  son 
Jonathan,  his  rightful  heir,  does  not  succeed  him. 
7.5.2  SON  OF  THE  KING 
David  Jobling  (1978:  4-25)  devotes  a  study  to  the  role 
of  Jonathan  in  1  Sam  13-31.  In  essence,  he  concludes 
that  Jonathan  as  a  character,  whatever  the  historical 
basis  of  this  narrative  may  be,  serves  as  a  necessary 
intermediary  device  between  Saul  and  David.  He  becomes 
the  agency  of  transfer  of  power  from  Saul  to  David. 
Saul  cannot  transfer  power  to  David  because  part  of  the 
sign  of  his  rejection  is  his  lack  of  knowledge  that  he 
is  rejected.  Jonathan  provides  the  missing  link: 
'Jonathan's  identification  with,  his  heirdom.  to,  Saul, 
provide  him  with  the  royal  authority  to  abdicate;  his 
identification  with  David  enables  the  emptying  of  his 
own  heirdom.  into  David,  (1978:  18).  In  Jobling's 
account,  Jonathan  serves  to  mediate  a  fundamental 
paradox  in  Israel's  story: 
1.  Monarchy  is  intrinsically  dynastic,  but 
2.  Israel's  monarchy  is  not  traced  from  her  first 
king  (1978:  17) 
This  formulation  of  Jobling's,  however,  masks  an  even 
deeper  problem  in  the  consideration  of  the  monarchy.  If 
the  monarchy  is  dynastic,  how  can  there  legitimately  be 
a  first  king?  Jobling's  formulation  is  predicated  on  an 
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empirical  fact  that  Israel's  monarchy  does  not  follow  an 
uninterrupted  dynastic  line.  The  further  question  makes 
it  clear  that  this  is  not  simply  a  historical  anomaly. 
There  is  an  intrinsic  difficulty  in  'beginning,  a 
monarchy.  Just  as  there  is  an  inherent  problem  with  the 
first  human  being,  so  there  is  a  like  problem  with  the 
first  king. 
Jobling  hypothesises  that  Jonathan  serves  to  mediate  the 
dichotomy  that  has  been  set  up.  He  is  the  heir  who 
renounces  his  filiative  claim  to  Saul's  throne  in  favour 
of  the  affiliative  claim  of  comradeship  with  David. 
Another  of  Saul's  children  might  at  first  sight  be 
thought  to  be  better  placed  to  accomplish  this  feat. 
Saul  weds  his  daughter  Michal  to  David.  He  is  thus  tied 
into  the  royal  household,  although  as  the  story  is 
recounted  in  1  Sam  18:  17-29  this  is  a.  calculated  act 
of  hostility. 
Jonathan,,  however,,  performs  a  function  that  Michal 
cannot  because  of  her  sex.  Though  David  can  possess  her 
affiliatively  in  a  way  that  the  culture  forbids  with  her 
brother,  she  cannot  as  a  woman  stand  in  the  direct  line 
of  succession.  She  cannot  directly  confer  the  throne  on 
him.  In  addition,  Saul  is-able  to  give  Michal  to 
another  man,  Paltiel  (1  Sam  25:  44).  Precisely  because 
there  is  no  formal,  legal,  culturally  sanctioned 
relationship  between  David  and  Jonathan,  Saul  cannot  do 
the  same  with  the  relationship  with  Jonathan. 
Saul  is  also  bound  to  Jonathan  in  a  more  intimate  way 
than  to  his  daughter,  in  that  Jonathan  is  his  heir.  We 
will  explore  at  length  below  the  ambivalence  of  the 
relation  between  father  and  son  that  the  concept  of  the 
heir  involves.  At  this  juncture,  let  us  note  that 
Saul's  designation  of  David  as  his  son  also  can  be  taken 
as  a  tacit  acknowledgement  that  David  will  be  his 
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states:  'And  nowf  beholdf  I  know  that  you  shall  surely 
become  king,  and  that  the  kingdom  of  Israel  shall  be 
established  in  your  hand.  ' 
In  some  sense,  then,  David  becomes  the  substitute  for 
Jonathan.  This  is  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  they  are 
both  the  subject  of  parallel  incidents  in  the  narrative. 
The  nature  of  these  common  events,  however,  is  at  first 
sight  surprising.  They  are  both  the  objects  of  Saul's 
hatred,  and  both  of  them  come  under  his  threat  of  death. 
Saul  casts  his  spear  at  David  in  1  Sam  18:  12,  and  makes 
to  do  the  same  to  Jonathan  in  1  Samuel  21:  30.  In 
addition,  as  we  have  seen,  Saul's  conduct  towards 
Jonathan  in  1  Sam  14  is  at  least  suspicious.  His 
murderous  intent  towards  David  is  made  explicit  in  the 
text  on  several  occasionS37,  but  Jonathan  is  no  less 
threatened  by  him. 
37  Saul's  hostility  to  David  is  first  mentioned  in  1  Sam  18:  9  in 
response  to  the  song  of  the  women  who  praise  David  for  killing 
tens  of  thousands  in  comparison  to  Saul's  thousands.  In  verse  10 
and  11  he  seeks  David's  death  for  the  first  time.  In  1  Sam  18: 
25,  we  are  made  privy  to  Saul's  hope  that  David  will  be  killed 
seeking  the  bridal  price  of  one  hundred  Philistine  foreskins  for 
the  hand  of  Michal,  incidentally  a  plan  for  a  proxy  killing  that 
has  echoes  in  David's  plan  to  dispose  of  Uriah.  In  19:  1,  Saul 
explicitly  tells  his  servants,  including  Jonathan,  that  David  is 
to  be  killed.  Jonathan  effects  a  reconciliation,  but  once  again, 
in  19:  10,  Saul  casts  his  spear  at  David  and  in  19:  11ff  attempts 
to  arrest  him  at  home.  From  then  on,  hostilities  are  open  between 
them  until  the  moments  of  reconciliation  in  chapters  24:  16-22  and 
26:  21.  Despite  these,  in  27:  1  David  acknowledges  the 
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To  be  Saul's  son,  then,  is  to  be  at  the  mercy  of  a 
death-dealing  father,  to  be  a  son  of  death,.  Why  this 
should  be  we  shall  explore  in  our  next  chapter.  For  the 
moment,  we  shall  turn  to  consider  the  significance  of 
the  multiplicity  of  the  figures  to  whom  David  relates  as 
son. 
7.6  THE  SEARCH  FOR  THE  FATHER 
7.6.1  MULTIPLE  FATHERS 
7.6.1.1  Schroeter 
The  result  of  our  enquiry  seems  to  be  the  anomalous 
position  that  David  is  the  son  of  more  than  one  father. 
Strange  though  it  seems,  this  is  not  unprecedented. 
Just  such  a  concept  of  the  multiplicity  of  fathers  is 
explored  in  relation  to  Oedipus  Rex  by  James  Schroeter 
(1961). 
Schroeter  argues  that  the  play  is  divided  into  sections 
where  different  characters  occupy  a  position  in  relation 
to  Oedipus  which  represents  an  aspect  of  the  complex 
paternal  function.  The  four  characters  -  Teiresias, 
Creon,  the  Messenger,  and  the  herdsman  -  are  all  older 
than  Oedipus,  and,  so  Schroeter  claims,  each  also  has  a 
nurturing  role.  Teiresias  fosters  Oedipus,  psychic  good 
(his  happiness),  Creon  his  political  good  (his  rule), 
the  Messenger  his  social  good  (his  nurture)  and  the 
herdsman  his  biological  good  (his  physical  existence) 
(1961:  189). 
Schroeter  argues  that  this  multiplicity  of  fathers  gives 
Oedipus  his  universal  significance.  In  defence  of  this 
thesis,  he  draws  attention  to  the  widespread  trope  by 
which  founding  figures  are  brought  up  by  foster  parents. 
The  examples  he  cites  are  King  Arthur,  raised  by  humble 
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Mohammed  who  is  raised  by  his  grandfather  and  an  uncle; 
Jesus  who,  though  son  of  God,  is  raised  as  the  son  of  a 
carpenter.  Schroeter's  contention  is  that  this  dual 
origin  means  that  each  both  shares  and  transcends  the 
ordinary  lot  of  the  people  to  whom  he  becomes  a  national 
leader. 
In  Sophocles,  play,  this  device  of  mediation  is  carried 
to  a  further  level.  Oedipus's  four  fathers  represent  a 
whole  spectrum  of  human  types  and  of  social 
rel  ationships,  which  Oedipus  comes  to  embody  in  a 
unique  synthesis. 
7.6.1.2  Paul 
Yet  there  are  another  two  obvious  candidates  for 
inclusion  in  this  spectrum  whom  Schroeter  omits  to 
mention,  presumably  because  neither  of  them  appears  in 
the  play  in  person.  They  are  Laius  and  Polybus, 
Oedipus,  natural  and  adopted  fathers.  The  role  of  these 
two  is  discussed  in  R.  A.  Paul's  paper  on  'Symbolic 
I[nterpretation  in  Psychoanalysis  and  Anthropology'  (Paul 
1980:  286-294)  where  he  sees  them  as  representing  the 
decomposition  of  the  figure  of  the  father  as  destroyer 
and  rescuer:  'the  complicated  and  ambivalent  father  is 
broken  into  two;  Laios,  who  wants  to  kill  his  son,  and 
Polybos,  who  saves  him.  Nothing  supernatural  has  been 
added,  but  rather  the  character  of  the  father  has  been 
decomposed  into  two  characters,  each  representing  a 
different  aspect'  (1980:  294). 
Paul  carries  his  analysis  further  in  an  examination  of 
the  paternal  roles  in  the  gospels  (1980:  292-3).  He 
there  finds  a  structure  which  provides  four  places  for 
the  father  in  the  four  possible  logical  combinations  of 
the  two  aspects  of  father  as  destroyer  and  preserver. 
In  Jesus's  case,  the  four  fathers  are: Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  7 
God 
Joseph 
Herod 
Pilate 
destroyer 
not-destroyer 
destroyer 
preserver 
preserver 
not-preserver 
not-destroyer  not-preserver 
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While  this  may  be  a  little  neat,  both  these  are 
suggestive  for  our  purposes.  The  three  human  fathers  to 
whom  David  relates  all  exhibit  this  ambivalence.  Jesse 
gives  David  biological  life,  but  his  name  attached  to 
David  is  an  obstacle  to  his  attainment  of  his  status  as 
king.  Does  he  seek  to  protect  or  to  repress  his  son? 
Saul,  on  the  other  hand,  gives  David  his  status  but  also 
acts  as  an  obstacle  by  his  very  existence.  He  is 
represented  both  as  loving  David  (1  Sam  16:  21)  and  as 
seeking  to  kill  him.  Yet  as  father,  he  is  inviolable. 
David  refuses  to  take  the  obvious  course  of  killing  Saul 
to  protect  his  own  lif  e38.  It  is  Nabal  who  represents 
the  possibility  of  the  death  of  the  father,  necessary 
for  the  son's  life. 
The  relationship  between  these  figures  is  alluded  to  by 
Bach  (1989:  53).  She  sees  David's  allegiance  to  Saul 
and  Nabal  as  surrogate  fathers  as  an  expression  of  his 
liminal  situation.  'No  longer  the  child  shepherd 
guarding  his  father's  flocks  in  the  hills  of  Bethlehem, 
38  There  are  of  course  other  aspects  to  the  stories  of  David's 
sparing  of  Saul.  If  he  did  kill  Saul,  David  in  his  turn  would  be 
vulnerable  both  to  the  vengeance  of  Saul's  kinsfolk  and  also  to 
any  ambitious  assassin  who  opted  to  follow  his  example  in  usurping 
the  throne.  In  the  context  of  the  present  discussion,  however, 
the  interaction  between  David  as  son  and  Saul  as  father  is  the 
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not  yet  ready  to  discard  the  time  of  sonship.,  She 
contrasts  David's  fate  with  that  of  Jonathan,  who  is 
never  able  to  discard  the  role  of  son.  Of  course  in 
this  regard,  David  has  a  peculiar  advantage  over 
Jonathan.  Just  because  he  is  not  Saul's  biological 
heir,  the  two  facets  of  the  father  as  progenitor  and  &S 
predecessor  in  power  are  separable  for  him.  Jonathan, 
by  contrast,  has  no  option  of  playing  one  Ifather'(4 
against  another. 
Indeed  this  is  true,  but  in  the  end,  the  designation 
that  David  takes  to  himself  unwittingly  is  as  'son  of 
death,.  This  too  is.,,  as  we  shall  see,  an  ambiguous 
designation.  whatever  David's  intentions,  the  textual 
fact  is  that  all  these  paternal  figures  are  dead  by  the 
end  of  1  Samuel.  Jesse,  whether  alive  or  dead, 
disappears  from  the  narrative  through  David's  agency. 
Nabal  dies,  by  divine  intervention  we  are  told,  but  the 
intention  of  'parricide,  is  explicit  in  the  text.  The 
transition  between  the  two  books  of  Samuel  is  the  story 
we  have  investigated  of  the  Amalekite  messenger.  Saul 
too  is  dead,  and  David's  concern  to  exculpate  himself 
makes  it  clear  that  he  stands  under  suspicion  of  a  third 
form  of  parricide.  David  appears  as  the  'son  of  death' 
indeed;  the  death-dealing  son  of  deadly  fathers. 
The  whole  subject  of  the  relations  between  fathers  and 
sons  and  the  connection  between  fatherhood  and  death  in 
the  context  of  the  transition  to  a  hereditary  monarchy 
is  thus  shown  to  be  a  complex  one.  It  is  to  a  further 
consideration  of  these  relationships  that  we  will  turn 
in  our  next  chapter.  In  it  we  will  attempt  to  show  that 
the  designation  of  David  as  son  of  death,  reflects  a 
profound  unease  in  the  text  of  Samuel  with  the  business 
of  procreation  and  succession.  Every  son  is  a  son  of 
death';  the  outcome  of  the  father's  anxiety  over  his  own 
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death,  and  yet  also  a  permanent  sign  to  the  father  of 
his  own  death. 
7.6.2  READING  AND  THE  SEARCH  FOR  THE  FATHER 
Yet  in  this  whole  problematic,  the  problem  of  reading 
has  reappeared  in  a  new  guise.  Saul's  question  can  be 
seen  as  an  attempt  to  place  David  into  a  setting  in 
order  to  restrict  and  therefore  predict  the  range  of 
possibilities  that  can  be  predicated  of  him.  Saul's 
question  'Whose  son  is  this  young  man?,  is  a  question 
about  authorship.  Who  has  authored  David?  Who  is 
responsible  for  the  'utterance'  of  this  young  man  into 
the  discourse  of  the  society  of  the  text? 
The  problem  of  reading  reappears.  How  is  Saul  to  read 
David?  Through  this  question,  the  reader  is  also 
alerted  to  the  fact  that  this  matter  of/reading  Da.  d  and 
his  relations  to  his  origins  may  be  problematic.  Once 
again,  the  text  of  2  Samuel  refuses  an  answer  by 
providing  a  range  of  answers.  It  offers  us  several 
readings  of  David,  by  offering  us  several  candidates  for 
his  father. 
Yet,  as  in  the  case  of  Schroeter's  analysis  of  Oedipus, 
there  are  three  obvious  candidates  for  David's  father 
who  are  not  mentioned  in  that  role  within  the  text:  God, 
the  authorial  voice  and  the  reader.  Insofar  as  God  is 
the  creative  force  behind  the  world  of  the  text,  he 
could  be  described  ultimately  as  David's  father.  -ý-et 
thereis  also  the  authorial  voice  in  the  text  to  be 
considered.  what  is  the  relation  between  these  two? 
Yet  both  also  depend  on  the  intervention  of  the  reader. 
The  text  offers  only  black  marks  on  white  paper.  David 
as  character,  as  a  signed  site  of  heteroglossia,  is 
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up  in  the  place  of  the  father  of  the  character,  the  one 
who  brings  David  to  life'. 
By  investigating  further  the  problematic  of  the 
relations  between  fathers  and  sons  in  the  text,  we  will 
also  be  led  to  a  new  apprehension  of  some  of  the 
anxieties  and  ambivalences  inherent  in  the  relation  of 
the  reader  to  the  text  as  modelled  by  the  figure  of 
David.  Such  an  investigation  will  form  the  substance  of 
our  concluding  chapter. 
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CHAPTER  EIGHT 
FATHERS,,  SONS  AND  THE  ANXIETY  OF  UTTERANCE 
8.1  TENSIONS  BETWEEN  FATHER  AND  SON 
8.1.1  SON  AND  HEIR 
8.1.1.1  Steinmetz 
In  her  study  of  the  relationships  between  fathers  and 
sons  in  the  book  of  Genesis,  Devorah  Steinmetz 
summarises  the  ambivalence  of  such  relationships  as 
follows: 
Fathers  live  on  through  their  sons,  passing  down, 
together  with  physical  substance,  possessions, 
ideals,  and  customs.  Whatever  the  father  has 
accomplished  will  die  with  him  if  he  has  no  son  to 
take  over.  It  is  here  that  the  ambivalence  lies. 
As  an  extension  of  the  father,  the  son  ensures  his 
immortality,  yet  as  successor,  the  son  usurps  his 
place  -  he  can  continue  for  the  father  only  on  the 
father's  death. 
To  the  father,  then,  the  son  represents  both  the 
ultimate  promise  and  the  ultimate  threat, 
immortality  and  death,  and  the  father  responds  both 
by  claiming  his  son  and  by  rejecting  him,  in  being 
torn  between  nurturing  and  killing  him.  The  more 
closely  the  son  resembles  the  father,  the  more  he 
seems  able  to  continue  for  the  father,  the  more 
likely  violence  will  erupt.  (1991:  29) 
This  tension,  of  course,  operates  in  the  other  direction 
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and  his  status  to  the  father,  but  the  father  is  the 
obstacle  to  the  very  position  that  the  son  aspires  to. 
This  tension  is  particularly  acute  when  the  father  is, 
like  Abraham,  the  bearer  of  a  promise,  or  indeed  the 
king,  in  which  case  the  son  occupies  the  position  of 
heir.  Without  the  father,  the  son  has  no  claim,  but 
while  the  father  is  alive,  he  has  no  power.  Equally, 
without  a  son,  the  father  has  no  means  of  continuing  his 
power  or  his  name.  once  the  son  is  born,  however,  the 
father  has  a  physical  reminder  of  his  own  mortality,  and 
of  his  own  expendability,  constantly  before  his  eyes. 
The  heir  becomes  the  rival. 
Steinmetz  examines  this  tension  specifically  in  the 
stories  in  Genesis  which  involve  the  transmission  of  the 
divine  promise  between  the  generations  of  Abraham's 
descendants.  The  moment  of  transmission  involves 
conflicts  between  father  and  son,  and  between  rival 
brothers.  She  sees  a  central  dilemma  in  the  need  to 
ensure  the  continuity  of  the  family  as  a  unit  while 
containing  the  tensions  between  the  generations.  As 
Steinmetz  formulates  this:  I  ...  either  the  family 
members  remain  together  and  threaten  to  destroy  one 
another,  or  they  separate  and  are  in  danger  of  being 
lost  to  the  family's  special  mission'(1991:  11). 
This  means  that  a  problem  arises  in  the  transmission  of 
the  promise  between  successive  generations,  especially 
when  the  founding  promise  made  to  Abraham  in  Gen  12, 
like  that  made  to  David  in  2  Sam  7.  is  a  promise  of  a 
dynasty,  of  succession  and  transmission. 
8.1.1.2  White 
White  (1991:  187-203)  discusses  exactly  this  dilemma  in 
the  context  of  the  Akedah  in  Gen  22  which  he  interprets 
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of  transmission  of  the  promise.  As  he  defines  them,  the 
potential  obstacles  are  as  follows. 
In  one  scenario,  the  promise  is  transmitted 
biologically,  so  that  the  promise  passes  directly  to  the 
son.  But  the  whole  point  of  the  promise  is  that  the 
existence  of  the  father  is  founded  upon  the  promise. 
Abraham  is  who  he  is  not  because  of  his  descent  from 
Terah,  but  because  he  becomes  the  bearer  of  the  promise. 
The  son's  existence,  however,  reverts  to  the  exigencies 
of  biology.  As  White  summarises  it,  I  ...  what  the  first 
generation  experiences  as  divine  promise,  the  second 
generation  will  experience  as  familial  ambition'(1991: 
195). 
But  the  other  alternative,  that  the  promise  be  given 
anew  to  the  son,  breaks  the  hereditary  flow  and  in  a 
sense  renders  the  earlier  promise  ineffective.  If  the 
promise  states  that  the  family  will  bear  a  blessing  for 
future  generations,  why  should  the  promise  need  to  be 
repeated? 
The  dilemma  can  also  be  stated  in  terms  of  desire.  If 
the  desire  is  for  a  successor,  then  the  promise  is 
fulfilled  in  the  birth  of  a  son,.  -which 
becomes  the 
material  embodiment  of  the  fulfil  ment  of  the  desire. 
Once  fulfilled,  is  the  promise  not  redundant?  Does  this 
not  also  jeopardise  the  relationship  between  promisor 
and  promisee,  in  this  case  that  between  God  and  Abraham? 
Both  dilemmas  are  brought  to  a  head 
(God's)  demand  for  the  sacrifice  of 
Will  Abraham  abandon  his  loyalty  to 
promised  him  a  succession  in  opting 
material  fulfilment  of  his  desire? 
if  he  does  sacrifice  his  son,  then 
continuity  of  the  family. 
in  the  promisor's 
the  promisee's  son. 
the  voice  which 
to  cling  to  the 
on  the  other  hand, 
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There  is  another  aspect  of  this  that  White  does  not 
bring  out.  The  presence  of  the  new  bearer  of  the 
promise  renders  its  old  bearer  dispensable.  Until  Isaac 
is  born,  Abraham  leads  a  charmed  life.  He  knows  he  will 
survive  through  all  the  vicissitudes  of  his  existence  in 
order  for  the  promise  to  be  fulfilled.  Once  his  son  is 
born,  however,  Abraham  can  die.  There  is  no  need  for 
him  to  survive  longer,  because  the  promise  will  live 
without  him  in  the  form  of  his  son.  Isaac  is  the 
possibility  of  Abraham's  death.  If  indeed  Isaac  is 
sacrificed,  then  Abraham  again  becomes  the  sole  bearer 
of  the  promise.  His  age  is  no  barrier,  as  God  was  able 
to  intervene  to  bring  about  the  birth  of  Isaac.  What  has 
happened  once  can  happen  again.  whatever  its  merits, 
this  interpretation  at  any  rate  explains  the  lack  of 
protest  on  Abraham's  part  and  the  equivocation  of  his 
reply  to  Isaac  at  least  as  well  as  explanations 
predicated  on  his  piety  and  obedience. 
8.1.1.3  Rank 
The  importance  of  the  concept  of  the  heir  is  also 
central  to  Otto  Rank's  account  of  the  tension  between 
generations  (Rank  1959:  293-315).  In  particular,  he  is 
concerned  with  the  relationship  between  procreation  and 
continuity.  He  sees  three  stages  in  the  development  of 
society,  which  in  turn  generate  three  different  views  of 
the  ideological  status  of  the  child,  of  what  the  child 
represents:  the  collective,  the  patriarchal  and  the 
matriarchal. 
In  the  collective  stage,  which  is  often  also  matriarchal 
in  structure,  the  child  is  looked  on  as  the  bearer  of 
the  survival  of  the  group.  In  patriarchal  society, 
however,  the  child  becomes  identified  as  the  heir  of  its 
father,  the  bearer  of  his  personal  immortality.  In  the 
final  stage,  the  child  becomes  an  individual, 
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the  son  resents  being  his  father's  successor,  but  also 
because  the  father  resents  the  fact  that  his  survival 
depends  on  the  son.  Each  wishes  to  be  immortal  in  his 
own  right,  not  through  his  relation  to  the  other.  This 
resentment  may  lead  to  a  repudiation  of  fatherhood, 
exemplified  for  Rank  in  the  Oedipus  myth  by  Laius's 
abandonment  of  Oedipus. 
8.1.1.4  Girard 
A  contrasting  account  of  these  tensions  is  provided  by 
Ren6  Girard  (Girard  1977).  Girard  for  his  part  sees  the 
origin  of  conflict  in  the  tendency  to  imitation  which 
all  children  display.  The  male  child  adopts  the  father 
as  his  model,  and  so  imitates  him  in  his  desire  for  the 
mother.  This  results,  however,  in  the  model  becoming 
the  rival,  who  can  only  be  imitated  by  being  displaced. 
The  child  in  Girard's  account  is  innocent  of  this 
implication'.  It  is  the  father  who  reacts  by 
interpreting  the  child's  desire  as  a  potential  threat 
and  thereby  introduces  the  child  to  the  possibility  of 
violence.  As  Girard  puts  it,  'the  son  is  always  the 
last  to  learn  that  what  he  desires  is  incest  and 
1  The  term  double  bind,  derives  from  the  work  of  Bateson  on  the 
origins  of  schizophrenia  which  he  associates  with  the  imposition 
of  contradictory  imperatives  on  the  patient  (see  the  article 
'Toward  a  Theory  of  Schizophrenia,  [Bateson,  Jackson,  Haley, 
Weakland  (1972:  201-27)]).  The  content  of  the  mimetic  double 
bind  -  "Be  like  me/Don't  be  like  me-  -  Girard  relates  to  Freud's 
discussion  in  The  Ego  and  the  Id  where  he  explains  that  the 
relation  between  the  ego  and  the  superego  is  not  exhausted  by  the 
precept:  "You  ought  to  be  like  this  (like  your  father).,,  It  also 
comprises  the  prohibition:  "You  may  not  be  like  this  (like  your 
father)  -  that  is,  you  may  not  do  all  that  he  does;  some  things 
are  his  prerogative...  11  (Girard  1977:  178) Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  8  322 
patricide,  and  it  is  the  hypocritical  adults  who 
undertake  to  enlighten  him  in  this  matter'  (1977:  175). 
In  Girard's  account  such  mimetic  rivalry  is  at  the 
origin  of  all  violence.  It  evokes  what  he  calls  the 
,  mimetic  double  bind'.  Society  can  only  maintain  itself 
by  evolving  mechanisms  which  deflect  this  violence, 
either  by  adopting  hierarchies  which  mean  that  potential 
rivals  are  separated  into  different  spheres  of  activity 
or  by  turning  the  violence  on  an  innocent  scapegoat 
whose  death  will  lead  to  no  further  repercussions.  The 
act  of  patricide  breaches  the  distinction  between  father 
and  son.  They  behave  as  equals  in  a  form  of  fraternal 
rivalry  (1977:  74).  The  breaching  of  that  distinction 
in  turn  is  likely  to  lead  to  patricide. 
Girard  accounts  for  the  Oedipus  conflict  as  a  particular 
product  of  Western  society  as  the  power  and  status  of 
the  father  declines.  The  decline  of  the  father's 
authority  brings  him  into  direct  confrontation  with  the 
son  in  the  same  sphere,  where  he  functions  not  only  as 
model  but  as  obstacle  (1977:  188).  Of  course,  the 
reciprocal  observation  must  also  be  true;  this  same 
diminution  of  the  father's  power  leads  to  the  perception 
of  the  son  as  usurper  and  rival.  Girard  sees  a  modern 
crisis  brought  about  by  the  gradual  undermining  of  the 
position  of  the  father  as  the  giver  of  the  law,  which 
ends  up  in  a  frantic  search  for  a  source  of  law  which 
can  no  longer  be  found. 
Yet  again,  we  find  that  this  tension  is  characteristic 
of  the  hereditary  monarchy.  There  is  only  one  throne, 
one  position  of  kingship.  The  son  as  the  father's  heir 
must  imitate  him  completely,  must  become  king.  He  is 
destined  to  be  king,  indeed  groomed  for  that  role,  but 
can  only  be  king  if  his  father  is  removed  from  the 
scene.  As  the  father  declines  in  power  with  age  and  the 
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diminishes  until  they  may  come  to  a  point  at  which  they, 
and  only  they,  become  equal  claimants  to  the  same  object 
of  desire.  Especially  if  the  father  has  gained  the 
throne  by  conquest,  the  throne  as  the  symbol  of  power 
and  authority  is  manifestly  the  object  of  the  father's 
desire,  and  is  what  spurred  him  in  his  youth  to 
violence.  This  is  exactly  the  situation  that  according 
to  Girard  will  generate  violent  confrontations.  Here 
again  we  are  not  forced  to  choose  between  Girard's 
account  and  Freud's.  On  either  account,  the  mechanisms 
to  generate  violent  rivalry  between  father  and  son  are 
in  place,  and  will  reinforce  each  other. 
8.2  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  GENERATIONS  IN  THE  OLD 
TESTAMENT 
8.2.1  AGE  AND  YOUTH 
Wolff  (1974)  specifically  discusses  the  problems  between 
generations  in  the  Old  Testament.  He  sees  an  implicit 
opposition  along  the  following  lines  ,  which  is  not  a 
simple  evaluative  dichotomy;  both  youth  and  age  have 
their  advantages  and  disadvantages: 
age  =  wisdom/infirmity 
youth  =  folly/vigour2 
As  an  instance  of  the  folly  of  youth,  he  offers  as  a 
paradigm  the  disregard  of  the  advice  of  the  elders  by 
the  young  men  who  egg  Rehoboam  on  to  contempt  for  the 
people  in  1  Kings  12.  Isa  3:  4-5  holds  out  a  prospect  of 
2  This  is  ironically  confirmed  by  Eccl  4:  13:  'Better  is  a  poor  and 
wise  youth  than  an  old  and  foolish  king,  who  will  no  longer  take 
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the  insolence  of  youth,  as  does  Mic  7:  6,  as  a  warning 
symptom  of  social  decline.  The  extreme  case  is  found  in 
Deut  21:  18-21  where  the  instructions  for  the  public 
stoning  of  a  disobedient  son  are  given.  As  usual,  such 
legal  provisions  indicate  that  this  was  not  an  unknown 
problem  in  ancient  Israel,  or  else  it  would  not  have 
needed  to  be  legislated  against. 
Equally,  the  oppression  that  the  legacy  of  the  past 
exerts  on  the  young  and  the  fatalism  this  may  engender 
is  captured  in  the  proverb  'The  fathers  have  eaten  sour 
grapes,  and  the  children's  teeth  are  set  on  edge,  quoted 
in  Ezek  18:  2  and  Jer  31:  29.  In  both  cases  this  is 
quoted  in  order  to  refute  it  and  place  the  penalty 
squarely  on  the  shoulders  of  the  generation  who  have 
gone  astray.  Indeed,  the  theme  that  the  deeds  of  the 
fathers  are  to  be  regarded  as  a  cautionary  counter- 
example  is  also  found  in  the  text  (Ezek  20:  18,  Ps  78:  8). 
Disobedience  to  the  father  is  necessary  too,  if  Israel 
is  to  throw  off  the  bad  effects  of  the  past. 
So  Israel's  tradition  contains  both  the  provisions  for 
the  repression  of  the  revolt  of  the  younger  generation 
against  the  older,  and  encouragement  of  just  this 
revolt.  Both  repression  and  encouragement  are  evidence 
that  the  potential  of  such  conflict  exists. 
8.2.2  PLATO  AND  PARRICIDE 
A  further  aspect  of  this  is  illuminated  in  a  comparison 
which  can  be  drawn  from  the  works  of  Plato  where  the 
repression  of  this  conflict  between  generations  is  seen 
as  a  prerequisite  for  social  stability.  It  becomes 
inextricably  involved  in  the  issues  of  the  transmission 
of  culture  and  education.  In  book  2  of  the  Republic, 
Socrates  explicitly  condemns  the  repetition  of  the  story 
of  Ouranos  and  Kronos,  to  the  extent  that  the  story  is 
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condemned.  Hesiod's  account  of  Kronos  castrating  his 
f  ather  Ouranos  and  eating  his  own  children3  is,  So 
Socrates  avers,  based  on  I  ...  the  greatest  falsehood, 
involving  the  greatest  issues,  (Russell  &  Winterbottom 
1989:  15). 
It  should  not  be  told  in  public  even  if  it  were  true, 
particularly  because  of  its  effect  on  the  young:  'Nor  is 
it  to  be  said  in  a  young  man's  hearing  that  if  he 
committed  the  most  outrageous  crimes,  or  chastised  an 
erring  father  by  the  direst  means,  he  would  be  doing 
nothing  remarkable,  but  only  what  the  first  and  greatest 
of  the  gods  had  done'  (Russell  &  Winterbottom  1989:  15). 
Thus  the  possible  political  consequences  of  such  a  story 
are  made  plain.  The  consequences  of  such  programmes  of 
repression  and  censorship  are  not  explored  by  Plato. 
This  text  could  almost  be  designed  to  resist  the 
equalisation  of  the  powers  of  the  father  and  the  son 
which  Girard  sees  as  the  bugbear  of  modernity. 
West  (1966:  16-31)  discusses  the  extensive  parallels  to 
the  Ouranos  myth  in  Ancient  Near  Eastern 
literatures,  including  the  Enuma  Elish.  In  the  light  of 
its  wide  currency  in  neighbouring  cultures,  the  absence 
of  such  a  myth  in  the  biblical  corpus  is  intriguing. 
Despite  all  the  tensions  and  difficulties  between 
fathers  and  sons  in  the  narratives  of  the  Hebrew 
Scriptures,  there  is  no  recorded  case  of  parricide. 
3  Hesiod's  Theogony  (1.154-82)  gives  the  account  of  Kronos' 
castration  of  his  father  Ouranos  who  loathes  his  children  and  so 
has  prevented  their  birth.  In  lines  454-500  is  to  be  found  the 
myth  of  Kronos  himself  devouring  his  own  children  save  for  Zeus 
who  is  rescued  by  his  mother.  Kronos'  motive  is  an  oracle  which 
tells  him  that  he  will  be  destroyed  by  one  of  his  sons.  The 
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The  strictures  against  any  assault  by  a  son  on  a  parent 
are  stringent  and  merciless.  Ex  21:  15  prescribes  the 
death  penalty  for  anyone  striking  his  father  or  mother, 
and  in  Ex  21:  17  this  is  extended  to  anyone  who  curses 
or  mocks  his  parents.  In  Deuteronomy  21:  18-21,  we  have 
the  provision  that  parents  can  bring  a  disobedient  son 
before  the  elders  at  the  city  gate  and  have  him  publicly 
stoned.  There  is  no  specific  mention  of  a  penalty  for 
parricide,  but  the  harshness  of  the  penalties  for  these 
lesser  crimes  leave  little  doubt  of  the  utter  horror  it 
would  inspire.  Yet  the  forcefulness  of  the  legislation, 
while  it  may  reflect  the  severity  of  the  crime,  may  also 
represent  a  suppressed  anxiety  as  to  its  possibility. 
For  our  purposes,  it  is  interesting  that  the  most  overt 
statement  of  a  parricidal  ambition  in  the  Hebrew  Bible 
is  directed  against  David  by  his  son  Absalom.  Ahithophel 
in  2  Sam  17:  1-3  advises  Absalom  that  in  order  to  gain 
the  kingdom  it  is  David  who  must  be  killed,  and  proposes 
to  lead  a  force  to  strike  down  the  king  alone.  'And  the 
advice  pleased  Absalom  and  all  the  elders  of  Israel,  (2 
Sam  18:  4).  Even  here,  the  plan  directed  at  the  father 
will  be  executed  not  by  Absalom  himself  but  by 
Ahithophel. 
Yet,,  as  we  have  seen,  David  himself  as  'son  of  death,  is 
implicated  in  the  death  of  the  three  characters  who  fill 
the  role  of  his  father:  Jesse,  Nabal  and  Saul.  This 
leads  us  to  ask  whether  the  absence  of  parricides  in  the 
Hebrew  Scriptures  really  reflects  the  situation  in 
Ancient  Israel  or  whether  it  does  not  rather  reflect  the 
same  socio-political  concerns  that  Plato  articulates  in 
the  Republic.  Why  has  Israel  no  myth  of  parricide?  The 
evidence  of  the  relationships  between  Saul  and  his 
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makes  it  clear  that  it  is  not  that  the  tensions  do  not 
exist.  4 
Indeed,  given  the  understanding  of  the  physiology  of 
reproduction  in  Ancient  Israel,  the  identification 
between  the  son  and  the  father  would  appear  to  be  closer 
than  modern  understanding  would  allow.  The  theory  of 
generation  makes  the  tension  between  the  heir  as  the 
bearer  of  survival  and  the  possible  rival  even  clearer. 
we  shall  turn  now  to  consider  the  aspect  of  the 
relationship. 
8.2  3.  BIBLICAL  THEORIES  OF  GENERATION 
8.2.3.1  Biblical  References 
There  is  very  little  direct  discussion  of  theories  of 
the  physiology  of  generation  in  the  Old  Testament. 
There  are  however  hints  as  to  the  underlying  schema. 
The  most  sustained  account  of  the  process  of  generation 
comes  in  the  Wisdom  of  Solomon  7:  1-2: 
I  also  am  mortal,  like  everyone  else, 
a  descendant  of  the  first-formed  child  of  earth; 
and  in  the  womb  of  a  mother  I  was  molded  into 
f  lesh 
2.  within  the  period  of  ten  months,  compacted  with 
blood  . 
from  the  seed  of  a  man  and  the  pleasure  of 
4  The  absence  of  such  a  myth  in  the  Hebrew  Scriptures  is  commented 
on  by  Ostriker  (1993:  35-37),  who  sees  it  as  a  symptom,  not  of  the 
anxiety  of  inheritance,  but  as  part  of  the  repression  of  the 
murder  of  the  Mother  Goddess  which  is  the  basis  for  Israel's 
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marriage. 
There  are  also  brief  allusions  to  the  development  of  the 
embryo  in  the  womb  in  Psalm  139:  13: 
'For  you  formed  my  inward  parts, 
you  knitted  me  together  in  my  mother's  womb., 
and  also  in  Job  10:  9-11: 
9.  Remember  that  you  made  me  of  clay 
and  wilt  you  turn  me  to  dust  again? 
10.  Did,  you  not  pour  me  out  like  milk  and  curdle 
me  like  cheese? 
11.  You  clothed  me  with  skin  and  flesh, 
and  knitted  me  together  with  bones  and  sinews. 
8.2.3.2  Theories  of  generation 
These  passages,  fragmentary  as  they  are,  accord  with  a 
theory  of  reproduction  where  the  male  seed  interacts 
with  the  blood  in  the  woman's  womb  in  order  to  form  a 
'clot,  which  develops  under  divine  guidance  into  the 
embryo.  Indeed  Aristotle  in  his  Generation  of  Animals 
uses  almost  the  same  metaphor  as  that  found  in  Job  10: 
10: 
The  action  of  the  semen  of  the  male  in  setting' 
the  female's  secretion  in  the  uterus  is  similar  to 
that  of  rennet  upon  milk.  Rennet  is  milk  which 
contains  vital  heat  as  sense  does,  and  this 
integrates  the  homogeneous  substance  and  makes  it 
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The  other  passages  are  equally  compatible  with  this  sort 
of  theory,  though  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  the 
influence  of  Greek  scientific  thought  on  Wisdom  of 
Solomon  is  not  unlikely.  This  may  therefore  not  reflect 
the  theory  of  generation  that  underlies  earlier  writings 
in  the  Hebrew  Scriptures. 
That  being  said,  H6ritier  Aug6  (1989)  gives  an  account 
of  theories  of  the  relationship  and  genesis  of  blood  and 
semen  in  a  wide  range  of  ancient  and  modern  'pre- 
scientific,  cultures.  He  asserts  that  because  there  are 
inescapable  physical  facts  to  be  accounted  for  -  the 
facts  of  menstruation,  male  ejaculation  and  childbirth 
for  instance,  have  to  be  part  of  the  system  -  that  the 
wide  variety  of  hypotheses  offered  reflect  a  small 
number  of  coherent  models.  Basically,  blood  and  semen 
are  accounted  for  either  by  some  physiological  account 
of  their  production  in  the  body,  or  else  in  terms  of 
supernatural  gifts.  This  restricted  range  of  hypotheses 
makes  it  more  permissible  to  look  to  models  from  other 
cultures. 
Aristotle's  argument  is  that  the  male  provides  form 
while  the  female  provides  substance.  The  semen  is  a 
,  tool,,  something  that  provokes  a  change,  but  its 
material  substance  evaporates  and  has  no  part  in  the 
physical  body  of  the  child.  what  the  precise  nature  of 
the  understanding  of  this  process  was  when  the  text  of 
Samuel  was  produced  we  cannot  tell,  but  a  theory  that 
sees  the  male  semen  as  the  main  channel  of  reproduction, 
while  the  woman  provides  the  field,  in  which  the  male 
'seed'  is  planted  seems  to  have  some  explanatory  value 
when  we  approach  the  questions  of  the  rationale  behind 
Israel's  laws  on  sexual  behaviour  and  the  problematics 
of  the  stories  which  revolve  around  issues  of  sexuality. 
Such  a  theory  means  that  the  male  alone  is  the  true 
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him.  The  woman  provides  the  indispensable  matrix  in 
which  it  can  take  on  renewed  human  form.  However, 
descent  is  through  the  male,  and  the  conservation  of 
seed  becomes  a  priority.  It  is  literally  the  stuff  of 
life.  Yet  the  male  must  hand  over  this  essence  of 
himself  and  the  hope  for  the  future  of  his  line  to  the 
mysterious  safe-keeping  of  the  woman.  5 
8.3  THE  UNCERTAINTY  OF  UTTERANCE 
8.3.1  COITUS  AS  UTTERANCE 
Coitus  is  an  act  of  donation,  fraught  with  risk.  What 
if  the  woman  is  barren  and  the  seed  is  unable  to  spring 
up?  What  if  alien  seed  is  planted  in  her  womb  and 
supplants  the  legitimate  bearer  of  the  line?  The  man 
'utters'  his  seed,  but  has  no  guarantee  of  how  it  will 
be  received,  whether  it  will  bear  a  boy,  who  in  his  turn 
can  transmit  the  seed,  or  merely'  a  girl  who  will  bear 
the  children  of  other  lines.  In  this  gap  of 
uncertainty,  of  hidden  burgeoning,  God  is  at  work. 
The  consequences  of  this  sense  of  the  uncertainty 
inherent  in  fatherhood  are  profound.  The  importance  of 
5  The  mystery  is  given  voice  in  2  Maccabees  7:  22-23  where  the 
mother  exhorting  her  seven  sons  who  are  being  put  to  death  says: 
'I  do  not  know  how  you  came  into  being  in  my  womb.  It  was  not  I 
who  gave  you  life  and  breath,  nor  I  who  set  in  order  the  elements 
within  each  of  you.  Therefore  the  Creator  of  the  world,  who 
shaped  the  beginning  of  humankind  and  devised  the  origin  of  all 
things,  will  in  his  mercy  give  life  and  breath  back  to  you  again, 
since  you  forget  yourselves  for  the  sake  of  his  laws.  '  Note  here 
too  the  implication  that  the  mother  supplies  the  'elements,  of  the 
embryo,  but  not  the  ordering,  power.  The  role  of  the  father  is 
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the  father  as  against  the  mother  in  this  reflects  the 
age-old  observation  that  it  is  a  wise  child  that  knows 
its  father,  -  and  a  wise  father  that  knows  his  son. 
Freud  himself  quotes  the  old  legal  tag  'pater  semper 
incertus  est,  mater  certissimal  [paternity  is  always 
uncertain,  maternity  is  most  certain]  (Freud  1977:  223). 
There  is  an  uncertainty  about  the  relationship  between 
father  and  child  that  does  not  exist  in  the  case  of  the 
mother,  just  because  of  the  delay  between  copulation  and 
child-birth,  and  the  hiddenness  of  the  process  of 
development.  This  parallels  the  uncertainty  inherent 
between  a  linguistic  utterance  and  its  reception  by  the 
audience.  Yet  that  gap  of  uncertainty  between  father 
and  child  is  often  only  bridged  by  a  linguistic 
utterance,  the  recognition  of  the  child  by  the  father, 
the  acceptance  of  responsibility  as  father.  This  is 
often  symbolised  by  the  inheritance  of  the  father's 
name,  a  key  concept  in  the  Hebrew  bible.  The  nearest 
that  the  Former  Prophets  approach  to  a  concept  of 
immortality  is  the  perpetuation  of  the  name6. 
8.3.2  LACAN  AND  THE  NAME  OF  THE  FATHER 
With  the  reintroduction  of  the  theme  of  the  name,  we 
find  a  resonance  with  the  work  of  the  French 
6  In  2  Samuel  14,  the  wise  woman  of  Teqoa 
ultimately  unworkable  reconciliation  wth 
which  the  crux  of  her  problem  is  the  fact 
left  with  no  name.  It  is  the  survival  of 
which  is  at  the  heart  of  the  genealogical 
of  the  historiography  of  Israel. 
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that  her  husband  will  be 
the  name  of  the  father 
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psychoanalyst  Jacques  Lacan.  He  insists  that  fatherhood 
is  a  linguistic  phenomenon: 
The  question  is  that  the  sum  of  these  facts  - 
copulating  with  a  woman,  that  she  thereafter 
carries  something  for  a  certain  time  in  her  belly, 
that  this  product  ends  up  being  ejected  -  never 
ends  up  in  constituting  the  notion  of  what  it  is  to 
be  a  father.  I'm  not  even  talking  about  the 
cultural  edifice  implied  in  the  term  6tre  pere,  I'm 
simply  talking  about  what  it  is  to  be  a  father  in 
the  sense  of  procreating.  ...  So  that  procreation 
can  have  its  full  meaning,  it  is  also  necessary 
that  there  is  an  apprehension,  or  a  relation  to, 
the  experience  of  death  which  gives  its  full 
meaning  to  the  term  procreate. 
Rather,,  'the  attribution  of  procreation  to  the  father 
can  only  be  the  effect  of  a  pure  signifier,  of  a 
recognition,  not  of  a  real  father,  but  of  what  religion 
has  taught  us  to  refer  to  as  the  Name-of-the- 
Father'(1977:  198). 
The  concept  of  the  Name-of-the-Father  became  a  central 
reference  point  in  Lacan's  theory  of  symbolization,  not 
something  susceptible  to  easy  summary.  Lacan  himself 
acknowledges  its  origins  in  the  return  of  the  dead 
father  in  Freud's  Totem  and  Taboo  (Lacan  1977:  199).  In 
this  essay  (Freud  1985a:  43-224),  Freud  provides  a 
theory  of  the  origin  of  religion  and  of  the  prohibition 
of  incest  in  the  hypothesis  of  an  originary  murder  of 
the  father  by  a  'primal  horde,  of  brothers  who  attack 
the  father  in  order  to  gain  access  to  the  women  whom  he 
has  in  his  sole  control.  Freud  describes  how  the  guilt 
of  this  murder  produces  guilt  which  leads  both  to  the 
repression  of  the  knowledge  of  the  murder,  but  also  to 
the  elevation  of  a  symbolic  totem  to  fill  the  place  of 
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against  which  they  were  rebelling  and  forbid  themselves 
access  to  the  women  of  the  horde.  This  command  derives 
its  unquestionable  force  from  the  dead  father  symbolised 
by  the  totem. 
The  conjunction  of  fatherhood  and  death  in  Lacan's 
thought  gives  rise  to  the  insight  that  both  of  these 
sta  tes  can  only  be  known  through  the  agency  of  the 
signifier.  Though  Lacan  does  not  specifically  indicate 
this,  the  common  factor  for  both  states  is  absence. 
Both  the  father  and  the  dead  are  lost  to  the  present, 
the  father  through  the  gap  between  copulation  and  the 
emergence  of  the  faculty  of  recognition  in  the  child. 
Just  as  the  child  can  have  no  knowledge  of  those  who  die 
before  its  birth  without  the  faculty  of  symbolisation 
and  language,  to  acknowledge  the  father  as  progenitor 
demands  the  same  faculty.  This  same  faculty  also 
enables  the  son  to  transmit  that  memory  to  the 
succeeding  generations.  The  mechanism  that  evokes  the 
dead  also  allows  the  recognition  of  the  father.  These 
two  coalesce  in  the  figure  of  the  dead  father  which  at 
once  exists  through  and  validates  the  symbolic  order. 
8.3.3  THE  MIRROR  STAGE 
Lacan  sees  the  father  as  the  crucial  factor  in 
introducing  the  child  to  the  world  of  language.  Lacan's 
account  of  development  begins  with  the  child  as  an 
amorphous  mass  of  impressions,  what  he  punningly  calls 
the  hommelette.  The  first  organising  movement  which 
begins  the  separation  of  the  child  as  a  subject  in  his 
own  right  is  the  mirror  stage,  where  the  child 
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reflected,  so  it  supposes,  in  the  mother.  But  this  is 
an  illusion.  7 
The  child  supposes  that  the  mother  reacts  to  serve  the 
child's  needs,  and  that  the  child  is  the  full 
satisfaction  of  the  needs  of  the  mother.  But  sooner  or 
later  the  child  must  come  to  a  point  where  its  desires 
are  no  longer  met  by  the  mother,  where  it  becomes  aware 
of  the  world  beyond  the  mother.  A  gap  opens  up  between 
desire  and  its  satisfaction,  a  gap  which  Lacan 
assimilates  to  the  distinction  between  signifier  and 
signified  in  Saussurian  linguistics8. 
Saussure  himself  had  sought  to  tie  the  two  together,  but 
Lacan  insists  on  the  slippage  which  means  that  the 
signifier  can  never  be  tied  to  the  signified.  This  he 
calls  the  Nom  du  P6re  or  by  another  punning 
identification  the  Non  du  P&re;  the  parental  name  is 
also  the  parental  prohibition,  the  prohibition  that 
blocks  the  fulfillment  of  the  child's  desire. 
The  position  of  the  father  in  Lacan's  theory  is  summed 
up  by  Forrester  as  follows: 
In  contrast  to  other  recent  psychoanalytical 
theories,  which  stress  the  pre-eminence  of  the 
mother-child  relationship  (pre-Oedipal.,  pre- 
genital),  Lacan  affirms  the  centrality  for  the 
subject's  history  of  the  triadic  Oedipal  complex, 
in  which  the  function  of  the  father  is  both 
7  See  on  this  Lacan  (1977:  1-7),  his  most  succint  account  of  the 
mirror  stage. 
8  For  a  succinct  account  of  Saussure's  distinction  here,  see 
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essential  and  mythical:  essential,  since  the  father 
is  the  representative  of  the  law,  in  the  last 
instance  the  (senseless)  law  of  language,  and 
supplies  the  third  term  or  mediating  function  that 
allows  the  child  to  find  his  place  in  the  symbolic 
order  (language)  and  escape  from  the  blind  alley  of 
fascination  with  the  image  (other)  of  the  mirror 
stage,  experienced  in  fantasy  as  fascination  with 
the  mother;  mythical  because  the  father's  function 
is  strictly  metaphorical  -  he  functions  neither  as 
a  real  father  (flesh  and  blood)  nor  as  an  imaginary 
father  (though  the  latter  figures  in  fantasy  as  an 
ideal  and  punitive  agency)  but  as  the  Name  of  the 
Father,  with  his  name  assigning  the  child  a  place 
in  the  social  world  and  allowing  the  child  to 
become  a  sexed  being  through  the  phallic  function 
(i.  e.  sign  of  sexual  difference)  to  which  the  Name 
of  the  Father  refers.  (1990:  110) 
Whether  this  is  a  disaster  or  a  liberation  is  a  matter 
of  intense  debate;  both  within  the  Lacanian  subject  and 
between  Lacan  and  those  critics  who  see  him  as 
entrenching  the  paternal,  the  male  in  the  discourse  of 
psychoanalysis9.  It  is  not  our  purpose  here  to  venture 
opinions  in  a  field  which  is  riven-with  internal 
dissensions,  but  there  is  a  clear  relationship  between 
this  debate  and  the  debate  in  contemporary  feminist 
theology  over  the  possibility  of  living  with  the 
patriarchy  of  the  Old  Testament.  our  concern  here  is 
not  with  Lacanian  theory  per  se,  but  how  it  may  serve  to 
illumine  the  power  and  strangeness  of  the  biblical 
texts. 
8.3.4  NAME  AND  CONTINUITY 
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In  2  Samuel  14,  as  we  have  seen,  ,,,  the  wise  woman  of  Teqoa 
entices  David  into  an  ultimately  unworkable 
reconciliation  with  Absalom  by  a  story  in  which  the  crux 
of  her  problem  is  the  fact  that  her  husband  will  be  left 
with  no  name.  It  is  the  survival  of  the  name  of  the 
father  which  is  at  the  heart  of  the  genealogical 
anxiety,  and  the  heart  of  the  poetics  of  the  Hebrew 
Scriptures. 
Lacan  also  specifically  refers  to  the  interaction  of  the 
divine,  the  symbolic  with  the  processes  of  human 
procreation:  I  ...  the  Lord  with  the  unpronounceable  name 
is  precisely  he  who  sends  children  to  barren  women  and 
old  men.  The  fundamentally  transbiological  character  of 
paternity,  introduced  by  the  tradition  of  the  destiny  of 
the  chosen  people,  has  something  that  is  originally 
repressed  there,  and  which  always  re-emerges  in  the 
ambiguity  of  lameness,  the  impediment  and  the  symptom, 
of  non-encounter,  dustuchia,  with  the  meaning  that 
remains  hiddenf(1979:  248). 
Lacan's  citing  of  the  Name-of-the-fhther  brings  together 
themes  that  have  occupied  us  throughout  our  discussion. 
In  the  link  he  draws  between  the  identity  of  the 
subject,  the  uncertainty  of  Fatherhood,  the  name  of  God 
as  the  bridge  between  the  father  and  the  child,  and  the 
theme  of  wounding  in  the  Hebrew  Scriptures,  we  can  find 
a  condensation  of  the  questions  that  we  have  been 
exploring. 
The  most  recent  explorations  of  these  topics  are 
astonishingly  anticipated  by  St  Augustine  in  his 
Confessions.  As  he  wrestles  with  the  need  to  believe  in 
God  without  proof  and  on  the  word  of  others,  he  casts 
around  for  analogies.  He  writes:  'Most  strongly  of  all 
it  struck  me  how  firmly  and  unshakeably  I  believed  I  was 
born  of  a  particular  father  and  mother,  which  I  could 
not  possibly  know  unless  I  believed  it  upon  the  word  of Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  8  337 
others.  1(1942:  104)  This  one  sentence  brings  together 
the  impossibility  of  knowing  our  own  origin  directly, 
the  role  of  language  and  of  community  in  the 
identification  of  our  parents,  and  the  way  in  which  this 
belief  can  become  the  foundation  for  other  beliefs, 
culminating  in  the  belief  in  God'O.  Augustine  grounds 
his  belief  in  God  in  the  unreasonable  certainty  of  his 
belief  in  his  paternity,  guarnteed  only  by  the  word  of 
others,  of  witnesses.  Yet  this  whole  edifice  could 
crumble.  If  the  certainty  of  God's  existence  is  tied  to 
the  uncertainty  of  parenthood,  then  rather  than  being  a 
founding  belief,  perhaps  it  is  derived,  and  derived  on 
no  good  basis. 
In  this  light,  the  lack  of  a  myth 
Hebrew  Scriptures  is  a  measure  of 
the  Hebrew  Scriptures,  along  with 
name  Yahweh,  the  unpronounceable 
seen,  its  narratological  function 
the  fulfilment  of  the  oath.  This 
of  parricide  in  the 
the  investment  that 
Augustine,  make  in  the 
name  with,  as  we  have 
of  the  guarantee  of 
is  an  investment  in 
10  The  picture  is  further  complicated  by  the  rather  fraught 
relationship  between  Augustine  and  his  own  father,  and  the 
closeness  of  his  identification  with  his  mother.  Paul  Fleischman, 
for  instance  (1989:  167),  suggests  that  his  conversion  is  a 
repudiation  of  his  father's  world  of  sexuality  and  violence,  and 
the  substitution  of  God  as  the  ideal  father  in  his  place.  This 
adds  another  layer  to  the  story.  It  is  Augustine's  attempt  to 
evade  the  consequences  of  the  paternity  that  he  has  been  led  to 
believe  in  that  drives  his  conversion.  If  he  had  not  come  to  this 
certainty  of  belief  in  his  relationship  to  his  father,  he  would 
not  have  come  to  the  point  of  rejecting  him,  but  neither  would  he 
have  had  the  categories  into  which  he  inscribes  the  figure  of 
God,  his  mother's  true  love,  who  becomes  his  real  father.  His 
unshakeable  belief  is  what  leads  him  to  doubt  and  to  a  new 
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repression.  That  name  becomes  the  sign  which  will  cover 
the  gaps,  that  will  ensure  the  continuity  of  the 
genetic  line,  of  the  individual  subject  and  the 
coincidence  between  speech  and  act.  Yahweh  names  the 
unspoken,  yet  omnipresent  anxiety  of  utterance  in  these 
texts. 
8.4  READER  AS  FATHER,  READER  AS  SON 
As  a  result,  we  can  at  last  reach  the  climactic  claim  of 
this  thesis,  which  is  that  the  impact  of  the  biblical 
text  on  the  reader  is  predicated  on  the  anxieties  of 
fatherhood.  The  reader  is  both  father  and  child  of  the 
text.  The  narratives  of  David  as  reader  display  this 
fact.  In  the  process  of  reading  these  texts,  the  reader 
is  led  both  to  observe  and  to  enact  this  double  motion. 
The  reader  of  2  Sam  12  infers  a  David  who  is  brought  to 
judgement  as  a  result  of  two  acts  of  utterance.  The 
utterance  of  his  seed  results  in  the  unforeseen  and 
unconcealable  sign  of  the  birth  of  the  nameless  child. 
The  utterance  of  his  oath  results  in  the  unforeseen 
exposure  of  his  false  reading  of  that  situation.  The 
invocation  of  the  name  of  God  brings  on  him  the  judgment 
attached  to  that  name.  David's  misreading  is  made  to 
redound  on  the  head  of  the  son  who  dies. 
The  reader,  however,  not  only  observes  but  is  obliged., 
as  reader,  to  enact  the  same  process  of  judgement  and 
discrimination  as  David,  and  is  forced  to  utter,  a 
reading.  The  David  whom  the  reader  fathers  on  the  text 
becomes  the  reader's  version  of  the  child  in  the  text. 
the  judgemeQt  turned  on  David  is  also,  as  we  have  seen,,, 
implicitly  turned  on  the  reader  in  the  ambiguity  of 
reference  in  the  expression  'You  are  the  man.  '  The 
reader  is  brought  before  the  tribunal  of  the  God  who 
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reader  in  the  text,  David's  oath,  yet  that  guarantee 
turns  the  oath  against  the  utterer's  intentions. 
The  reader  is  shown  that  illumination  comes  through 
misreading,  by  the  very  act  of  reading  which  he  or  she 
is  undertaking.  What  we  read  is  David's  misreading.  By 
the  application  of  the  device  of  parody,  even  that 
reading  has  later  to  be  modified  in  the  light  of  2 
Samuel  14. 
Yet  insofar  as  the  text  provokes  the  reader  into  the 
utterance  of  reading,  the  text  fathers  the  reader.  If. 
as  we  have  discussed  above,  the  reader  as  subject  comes 
to  a  sense  of  coherence  and  identity  through  the  acts  of 
interpretation  and  utterance  for  which  he  or  she  takes 
responsibility,  then  the  reader  not  only  is  exposed  to 
the  ambivalences  of  the  father  towards  the  son,  of  the 
reader  to  the  reading,  but  also  to  those  of  the  son 
towards  the  father.  The  text  then  gains  its  emotional 
power  by  buying  into  and  provoking  the  reader's 
anxieties  about  his  or  her  own  status  as  father  and 
child. 
There  would  appear  to  be  a  glaring  paradox  in  the  idea 
of  the  female  reader's  anxiety  of  fatherhood.  The 
structure  of  the  anxiety  between  utterance  and  reception 
is  nevertheless  communicated  in  the  text  of  Samuel 
through  the  medium  of  male  anxieties  about  the 
continuity  of  the  subject.  The  whole  issue  of  gendered 
reading  is  too  complex  to  be  raised  here,  and  arguably 
it  is  not  for  a  male  reader  to  do  more  than  to  raise  the 
question.  Suffice  it  to  say  here  that  the  poetics  of 
this  text  is  a  poetics  of  fatherhood,  and  that  the 
understandable  reaction  that  many  feminist  readers  have 
to  these  texts  is  an  acknowledgement  of  that  fact.  = 
What  we  will  claim,  however,  is  that  this  apparent 
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power,  but  a  claim  to  power.  As  such,  it  reveals  that, 
like  all  such  claims  to  power,  it  can  only  be 
substantiated  by  the  assent  of  those  to  whom  it  is  made. 
In  actual  fact,  the  claim  to  power  is  a  revelation  of 
powerlessness,  of  vulnerability.  As  we  have  seen,  the 
male  domination  of  female  sexuality  in  the  text  is  not 
because  the  act  of  procreation  is  something  in  the  power 
of  the  male,  but  precisely  because  the  male  is  powerless 
to  procreate  himself  without  the  female.  Its  rigour  and 
violence  are  signs  of  impotence  rather  than  of  strength. 
The  need  for  the  male  to  validate  his  claim  to  paternity 
through  the  invocation  of  the  name  finds  ultimate 
expression  in  the  overarching  symbol  of  the  Name-of-the- 
-father,  in  Hebrew  Scripture,  the  name  Yahweh.  So  too, 
the  speaker,  in  order  to  validate  his  or  her  utterance 
invokes  that  name  in  the  oath.  The  convention  of  the 
oath  is  an  attempt  to  buy  into  the  power  of  the  name 
Yahweh,  the  authority  which  Yahweh  commands  as  the  first 
speaker,  which  validates  the  power  of  the  dýcourse  of 
the  present  speaker. 
The  implications  of  this  claim  to  authority,  however,, 
will  bear  further  examination.  If  it  is  claimed  that 
Yahweh  as  sign  bridges  the  gap  between  father  and  son, 
between  speaker  and  utterance,  between  reader  and 
reading,  then  it  seems  appropriate  to  question  just  what 
the  basis  of  this  claim  and  command  may  be.  Is  this 
claim  of  authority  substantiated  in  the  workings  of  the 
text?  The  implications  of  this  claim  to  power  by  the 
text  will  form  the  last  part  of  our  investigation.  How 
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CHAPTER  NINE 
FATHER'S  AUTHORITY  AND  TEXTUAL  POWER 
9.1  GOD  AND  AUTHORITY 
9.1.1  YAHWEH  AS  PLEDGE  OF  CONTINUITY 
9.1.1.1  Derrida 
Just  this  question  of  authority  is  investigated  by 
Jaques  Derrida  in  his  essay  on  the  American  Declaration 
of  Independence.  The  declaration  asserts  that  it 
derives  its  authority  from  the  people  of  the  United 
States;  but  no  such  entity  exists  until  the  Declaration 
is  assented  to.  The  document  serves  to  constitute  the 
authority  of  those  who  sign  it,  and  draws  on  the 
authority  of  their  signatures.  In  Austin's  terms,  is  it 
a  constative  document,  recording  a  preexisting  statement 
of  fact,  or  a  performative  one,  that  brings  about  a 
state  of  affairs? 
The  document  also,  however,  appeals  to  authority  of  God. 
Derrida  sees  this  as  an  illegitimate  attempt  to  ground 
the  'graphemic  identity',  as  he  calls  it,  of  the  nation 
in  some  recourse  to  an  ultimate  signator.  Petrey 
however,  sees  this  differently.  "The  Declaration  of 
Independence  performed  both  God  and  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  fact  that  the  performance  is  explicit  in 
one  case  and  implicit  in  the  other  is  trivial.  "  How  far 
then  is  Yahweh  performed  in  the  act  of  swearing?  If 
Israel  is  to  swear  by  no  other  name,  then  is  'Yahweh' 
replaceable  with  'that  which  we  swear  by?  ' 
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If  so  the  name  Yahweh  becomes  the  sign  of  a  narrative 
commitment  to  continuity  and  fulfil-ment.  Yet  there  is 
a  further  aspect  of  this  which  we  might  with  profit 
explore:  the  divine  oath.  Yahweh  is  not  only  the  locus 
of  swearing  but  swears  by  himself.  At  the  crucial  event 
of  the  Akedah,  Yahweh's  angel  announces  to  Abraham,  'By 
myself  have  I  sworn',  says  the  Lord,  'because  you  have 
done  this  and  have  not  withheld  your  son,  your  only  son, 
I  will  indeed  bless  you,  and  I  will  multiply  your 
descendants  as  the  stars  of  the  heaven  and  as  the  sand 
which  is  on  the  sea  shore.  '(Gen  22:  16-17)  The  writer  to 
the  Hebrews  comments  on  this:  'When  God  desired  to  show 
more  convincingly  to  the  heirs  of  the  promise  the 
unchangeable  character  of  his  purpose,  he  interposed 
with  an  oath,  so  that  through  two  unchangeable  things, 
in  which  it  is  impossible  that  God  should  prove  false, 
we  who  have  fled  for  refuge  might  have  strong  encouragemmt 
to  seize  the  hope  set  before  us  (Heb  6:  17-18)'. 
This  is  a  clear  statement  of  the  traditional  position. 
God's  promise  confirms  his  unchangeability,  and  is 
confirmed  by  it.  Yet  as  John  Searle  says,  'A  happily 
married  man  who  promises  his  wife  that  he  will  not 
desert  her  in  the  next  week  is  likely  to  provide  more 
anxiety  than  comfort  (1969:  59)'.  And  note  the  explicit 
stress  on  the  rhetorical  function  of  this  oath  in  Heb  6: 
17;  it  is  God's  desire  to  increase  his  credibility  with 
his  audience  that  leads  him  to  conjoin  these  two 
unchangeables.  But  if  we  turn  to  Ex  32  we  have  the 
w.  eýrd  story  where  the  Lord  tells  Moses  to  leave  him 
alone  so  that  he  can  destroy  the  people.  it  is  Moses 
that  recalls  his  oath  to  him  and  tells  him  to  repent,  in 
case  he  gives  the  Egyptians  the  chance  to  accuse  him  of 
evil  intentions  in  rescuing  the  people.  And  the  Lord 
duly  repents. 
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There  is  a  similar  incident  in  Numbers  14:  11,  where  we 
have  the  odd  portrayal  of  God  turning  to  Moses  in 
frustration  at  the  people's  obstinacy,  threatening  to 
annihilate  them  and  promising  to  raise  a  greater  people 
in  their  stead  with  Moses  as  their  founder.  Again  it  is 
Moses  who  calls  to  mind  God's  oath,  when  he  argues  that 
God  will  suffer  a  drastic  public  relations  debacle  when 
the  nations  conclude  that  he  was  unable  to  fulfil  his 
oath  to  bring  the  people  to  the  promised  Land.  So  who 
actually  is  the  source  of  faithfulness? 
Moses  himself  is  obviously  flawed  -a  murderer  and  a 
stammerer,  and  as  it  turns  out  fatally  disobedient  to 
God  in  the  seemingly  minor  matter  of  striking  the  rock 
at  Meribah  (Num  20:  10-13)  rather  than  speaking  to  it  as 
the  Lord  commanded.  Israel  is  continually  portrayed  as 
faithless  and  unstable.  Yet  these  stories  would 
indicate  that  God  also  is  not  a  stable  narrative  point. 
Faithfulness  here  seems  to  be  a  cooperative  venture,  in 
which  the  partners  to  the  promise  have  to  recall  each 
other  to  the  obligations  that  they  have  entered  into, 
something  that  has  to  be  negotiated,  argued  over  and 
fought  for  in  a  context  of  authority.  There  is  a 
distinct  sense  in  this  passage  that  God  has  assented  to 
some  sort  of  moral  authority  that  Moses  has  over  him. 
With  more  immediate  reference  to  the  texts  with  which  we 
are  dealing,  Samuel  specifically  states  to  Saul  that 
'The  Glory  of  Israel  will  not  lie  or  repent;  for  he  is 
not  a  man  that  he  should  repent,  in  1  Sam  15:  29.  Yet 
exactly  that  verb  has  been  used  by  the  Lord  himself  in 
his  statement  to  Samuel  in  verse  10  of  the  same  chapter: 
'I  repent  that  I  have  made  Saul  king;  for  he  has  turned 
back  from  following  me,  and  has  not  performed  my 
commandments-'  Samuel  here  uses  his  claim  that  the  Lord 
is  unchanging  in  order  to  justify  the  change  in  the 
Lord's  intentions  towards  Saul  in  the  stripping  away  of 
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This  change  is  not  simply  a  matter  of  Saul's  failure  to 
observe  the  commandments.  Earlier  in  the  book,  the  Lord 
is  quoted  by  the  man  who  brings  the  message  of  his 
rejection  to  Eli  as  follows:  'Therefore  the  Lord  the  God 
of  Israel  declares:  "I  promised  that  your  house  aAd  the 
house  of  your  father  should  go  in  and  out  before  me  for 
ever";  but  now  the  Lord  declares:  "Far  be  it  from  me; 
for  those  who  honour  me  I  will  honour  and  those  who 
despise  me  shall  be  lightly  esteemed",  (1  Sam  2:  30). 
The  implication  here  seems  to  be  that  the  Lord  is 
rescinding  what  reads  like  an  unconditional  promise  of 
perpetual  priesthood  to  Eli.  Whatever  the  shortcomings 
of  Eli's  house,  it  seems  that  the  conditionality  of  the 
promise  is  an  afterthought,  not  part  of  God's  original 
commitment. 
God  repents  of  what  he  does.  And  yet,  when  the  world 
becomes  corrupt,  God  does  not  simply  take  the  step  of 
rescinding  his  creative  word  by  saying  "Let  there  not  be 
light"  or  people  or  whatever.  He  seems  bound  by  his 
word.  As  we  have  seen,  his  promise  to  Abraham  irks  him, 
and  throughout  the  prophets,  there  is  a  tension  between 
God's  will  and  his  promise. 
9.1.3  THE  DIVINE  WORD  AS  BOND 
As  Austin  says,  what  binds  is  the  promise  -  both  God  and 
Israel  revolve  around  that.  What  we  might  call  the 
'crisis  of  continuity'  seems  to  me  to  be  a  key  to 
understanding  the  Old  Testament,  in  both  its  contents 
and  its  function.  The  book  exists  in  enacting  its 
theme,  which  is  to  ensure  the  survival,  the  continuity, 
of  the  community  that  in  turn  preserves  the  book. 
As  Harold  Fisch  puts  it:  'If  Hebrew  poetics  looks  to 
history  and  the  survival  of  the  people,  it  would  also  be 
true  to  say  that  it  is  the  word  that  bears  the  people, 
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is  not  because  the  people  is  undying  that  the  word 
survives;  it  is  rather  the  other  way  round"  (Fisch  1988: 
64). 
The  text  itself  may  seem  to  set  up  Yahweh  as  the 
guarantor  of  language  and  of  human  continuity,  and  yet 
our  reading  of  Yahweh  depends  on  the  assumption  of  the 
community  of  language  and  human  continuity.  That  would 
be  fairly  trivial  in  itself:  far  more  interesting  is 
that  fact  that  within  the  text,  we  see  this  odd 
oscillation  of  negotiated  authority.  At  some  level  God 
has  the  authority  that  human  beings  accord  him.  By 
opting  for  the  risk  of  language,  God  has  become  embedded 
in  the  possibilities  and  constraints  of  the  text,  on  the 
need  for  assent  from  a  reader'.  By  opting  to  anchor 
1  On  this  point  see  the  fascinating  essay  by  Rowan  Williams  (1990) 
which  touches  on  many  of  the  points  of  this  discussion.  He  likens 
any  use  of  language  to  'stepping  into  mid-air,,  taking  the  risk  of 
both  committing  the  freedom  of  thought  to  the  constraint  of  a  form 
of  words,  and  also  the  risk  of  being  misunderstood,  or  even  wonst-,;, 
understood  and  rejected.  He  also  says  that  being  human  is 
initially  a  matter  of  hearing  others  letting  themselves  be  heard, 
the  product  of  others  venturing  into  the  dangerous  waters  of 
constructive  speech.  1(1990:  12)  He  applies  this  insight  to  God  as 
well:  'God  cannot  but  'risk"  if  we  are  to  hear  God.  God  without 
human  language  is  not  the  God  who  actively  constructs  meaning  and 
hope.  But  the  God  who  speaks  our  language  is  unimaginably 
vulnerable;  in  the  sense  that  for  God  to  give  what  is  God  into  the 
hands  of  the  world  is  to  open  up  what  is  worse  than 
misunderstanding  and  rejection.  It  is  to  risk  idolatry  -  the 
assimilation  of  God  to  some  portion  of  the  perceived  world,  and 
thus  an  absence  of  God,  which  is  a  force  of  destructiveness  and 
disintegration'(1990:  15).  So  he  cites  the  insight  of  Ida  Gdres 
that  in  the  book  of  Judges,  God  is  used  as  a  sign  for  human 
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language  to  Yahweh,  the  Old  Testament  text  has  taken  the 
risk  of  being  absolutised  and  hijacked  into  communities 
which  live  from  its  power,  but  cease  to  read  it. 
In  so  far  as  God  is  that  which  we  swear  by,,  then  the 
oath  becomes  inextricably  the  earnest  of  the  continuity 
of  God  as  much  as  the  earnest  of  the  continuity  of  the 
one  who  swears  in  God's  name. 
God  then  is  not  above  the  exigencies  of  language. 
various  speech  act  theorists  have  worried  about  the 
status  of  a  divine  speech  act  such  as  'let  there  be 
light  In  the  act  of  saying  this,  God  brings  light 
into  being.  Only  the  divine  can  be  the  subject  of  a 
speech  act  predicated  on  the  verb  to  be.  And  yet  God, 
the  supreme  creator,  seems  to  be  in  a  position  where  the 
gap  between  intention  and  occurrence  affects  him  as 
well. 
9.2  DIVINE  SPEECH  ACTS 
9.2.1  'LET  THERE  BE  LIGHTf 
9.2.1.1  Searle 
Searle  himself  refers  to  a  special  category  of  speech 
acts,  the  supernatural  declarationl(1979:  18),  of  which 
God's  initial  speech  in  Genesis  1:  2  is  the  paradigm 
example:  'God  said,  "Let  there  be  light";  and  there  was 
light',  This  is  surely  the  archetypal  performative 
that  the  very  flexibility,  the  polysemy,  of  language  means  that 
the  rumour  of  the  possible  can  never  quite  be  suppressed.  That 
assimilation  may  be  to  the  forms  of  language  itself,  so  that  God 
becomes  the  expression  of  this  nature  of  language.  In  our 
discussion,  the  ambivalence  of  that  po4it-ion  has  been  exposed.  It 
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speech.  In  and  by  saying  these  words,  God  brings  about 
the  state  of  affairs  without  any  other  action.  However, 
it  is  also  rather  unusual.  It  is  predicated  on  the  verb 
'to  bef,  a  verb  which  is  not  readily  described  as  a 
performative  verb.  In  addition,  the  statement  is  made 
with  no  context,  and  no  audience.  For  Searle  this 
serves  to  bolster  his  argument  that  conventions  and 
institutions  are  not  necessary  for  a  performative  to 
have  validity. 
Such  a  response  earns  him  a  sharp  retort  from  Petrey 
(198  :  63):  'To  the  contrary,  divine  beings  are  totally 
incapable  of  performative  speech,  which  is  accomplished 
solely  by  the  protocols  organizing  human  communities., 
Petrey  here  defines  this  utterance  out  of  consideration. 
He  suspects  Searle  of  an  illegitimate  move  in  his 
attempt  to  detach  speech  acts  for  a  social  or 
institutional  context.  Certainly,  there  is  sufficient 
peculiarity  in  this  divine  sentence  to  give  us  pause 
when  it  is  used  as  a  central  plank  of  a  general  theory 
of  speech  acts.  However,  on  his  part,  Petrey  offers  no 
account  of  what  is  going  on  in  this  act  of  speech, 
except  to  say  that  such  divine  sentences  have  nothing  in 
common  with  human  speech  acts. 
Yet  both  Petrey  and  Searle  seem  to  concur  in  the  premise 
that  such  speech  is  divorced  from  any  institutional  or 
conventional  background,  merely  drawing  opposing 
conclusions.  Is  this  in  fact  justified?  Stark  though 
it  is,  this  speech  is  not  without  context.  It  follows 
after  the  description  of  the  formless  earth  and  is 
embedded  in  narrative  speech. 
9.2.1.2  Sternberg 
Sternberg  in  his  discussion  of  this  verse  states  that 
the  divine  speech  act  is  unique:  'In  the  biblical 
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exhibit  all  the  complications  that  have  bedeviled 
speech-act  theory;  but  this  only  throws  into  relief  the 
transcendence  of  the  divine  performative,  (1985:  107). 
Sternberg  argues  that  God's  performatives  never  fail, 
and  he  need  do  nothing  other  than  speak.  'A  divine 
speech-act  therefore  cannot  fail  to  take  effect,  unless 
God  changes  his  mind'(1985:  107).  This  is  a  significant 
caveat,  however,  and  one  rather  hard  to  fathom.  At  what 
point  would  God  change  his  mind?  once  he  has  uttered 
the  words  'Let  there  be  light',  what  is  there  to  prevent 
light  appearing,  especially  if,  as  Sternberg  argues, 
there  is  no  other  action  but  speech  necessary?  We 
return  to  Austin's  fundamental  point  about  the  promise 
and  intention.  God's  word  is  his  bond:  if  the  divine 
performative  operates  in  the  way  Sternberg  suggests, 
then  God  is  less  able  than  any  other  speaker  to  claim 
'My  tongue  said  it,  but  my  heart  did  not'.  In  addition, 
our  earlier  discussions  about  the  importance  of  failure 
to  the  whole  notion  of  the  speech  act  would  surely  need 
revising. 
Sternberg  does  consider  the  context  of  the  statement  by 
pointing  up  the  direct  repeat  which  may  seem  redundant: 
J...  and  there  was  light.,  In  his  view,  this  repetition 
represents  the  imposition  of  equivalence  between  two 
different  forms  of  speech:  the  direct  utterance  of  a 
character,  and  the  narrator's  report  of  an  event. 
Because  the  words  are  repeated  almost  exactly,  the  two 
apparently  disparate  phenomena  of  divine  speech  and 
narratorial  report  are  made  to  match.  'God  first 
appears  to  voice  the  performative  and  the  narrator  then 
echoes  him  to  vouch  for  the  performance'  (1985:  109). 
But  what  is  the  relation  between  the  two  in  terms  of 
authority?  This  passage  reads  very  much  as  if  we  have 
the  situation  of  a  new  convention  being  established  on 
the  concurrence  of  the  only  audience  available,  the 
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assents.  It  is  on  this  assent,  however,  that  the 
implementation  of  God's  proposals  depends.  There  is  a 
gap  between  divine  intention  and  speech  which  is  filled 
and  mediated  by  the  narrator. 
It  might  be  asked  whether  this  is  really  what  Sternberg 
wishes  to  imply.  The  answer  must  inevitably  be  that  his 
intentions  are  beside  the  point.  whether  he  intends  it 
or  not,  the  way  we  have  outlined  for  regarding  the  event 
may  turn  out  to  be  fruitful. 
9.2.2  DIVINE  SPEECH 
For  an  attempt  to  explore  further  the  interaction  of 
this  lunlocated,  divine  speech  and  the  narrative  speech 
that  encapsulates  it,  we  can  turn  once  again  to  Hugh  C. 
white.  He  makes  the  point  that  part  of  the  sense  of 
dislocation  in  this  verse  is  due  to  the  conjunction  of 
two  imponderables,  the  character  'God,  and  the  strange 
jussive  form  of  the  verb  'to  be'.  Does  the  nature  of 
the  character  account  for  the  oddity  of  the  speech,  or 
does  the  oddity  of  the  speech  give  access  to  the  mystery 
of  this  undescribed  character?  This  'divine  voice,  does 
not  speak  from  any  recognizable  spatio-temporal  location 
within  the  narrative  world,  a  feature  it  shares  with  the 
narratorial  voice,  yet  it  is  presented  as  the  voice  of  a 
personage  by  the  narrator.  White  concludes  that  the 
divine  voice  has  a  unique  status  in  the  text.  He  speaks 
of  it  as  that  third  voice  which  is  at  the  basis  of  the 
author's  own  creative  impulsel(1989:  101).  It  is  thus  a 
Voice,  a  position,  in  relation  to  which  the  author's 
standing  is  analogous  to  that  of  the  characters. 
White  follows  Bakhtin  in  seeing  subjectivity  as  derived 
from  the  response  to  the  voice  of  another.  The  divine 
voice  establishes  a  'third  ambiguous  locus  of 
subjectivity  beyond  the  narrative  work  to  which  the 
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In  his  later  discussions  of  the  similar  unlocated 
address  of  God  to  Abraham,  White  concludes  that  the  form 
of  speech  best  suited  to  evoking  this  subjective 
response  is  the  promise  and  its  related  forms,  the  oath 
and  the  pact:  'In  the  mutual  recognition  between 
promisor  and  promisee,  the  freedom  of  both  takes  on  the 
form  of  the  "mysterious  elective  contingency"  which 
underlies  the  decision  to  speak  and  to  listen,  and  in 
the  implicit  agreement  to  accept  the  conditions  of  the 
system  of  language  conventions  which  mediate  this 
relation.  1(1989:  104).  This  is  an  important  point  which 
White  later  seems  to  obscure  There  is  a  mutual  binding 
to  the  exigencies  of  speech  and  language  recorded  in  the 
text.  The  divine  is  as  bound  as  the  human  to  the 
conventions  of  language. 
Of  course,  there  are  problems  in  the  present  case  in 
transferring  that  analysis.  where  is  the  audience  which 
God  is  addressing?  In  what  sense  is  'Let  there  be 
light,  a  promise?  Again,  there  is  only  one  other  source 
of  language  on  the  scene  at  the  beginning  of  Genesis; 
the  narratorial  voice.  Is  this  then  a  case  where  it  is 
the  narratorial  voice  that  evokes  the  speech  from  the 
character?  In  a  sense,  because  the  narrator  requires 
that  there  be  light,  God  is  coerced  by  that  fact  into 
utterance.  That  utterance  does  become,  if  not  a  promise, 
then  in  a  profound  way  constituent  oý  the  divine  being, 
partly  as  the  result  of  -,.  (.  its  power. 
The  paradox  is  that  what  we  might  call  the  'high,  view 
of  the  divine  performative,  the  argument  that  it  is 
uniquely  inerrant,  places  restrictions  on  such  an 
utterer.  Once  this  utterance  is  made,  it  cannot  be 
repeated  by  the  utterer:  precisely  because  it  brings 
about  the  creation  of  light,  to  utter  it  again  would 
repeat  that  creation,  but  now  in  a  context  radically 
altered  by  the  existence  of  light.  Yet  what  could  it 
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utterer  whose  statements  are  of  this  kind  is  deprived  of 
not  only  the  necessity  but  also  the  possibility  of 
repetition. 
9.3  READER  AS  CREATOR,  READER  AS  CREATURE 
9.3.1  'LET  THERE  BE  LANGUAGE' 
But  it  is  not  only  light  that  is  brought  into  being  by 
this  act  of  speech.  God  as  speaking  subject  and  the 
conventional  system  of  language  both  spring  to  life  in 
this  act  of  utterance.  Yet  although  God  cannot  repeat 
the  utterance  simply  because  of  its  power,  God's 
performative  can  be  repeated  by  the  narrator  as 
description.  There  is  an  interaction  between  the 
language  of  God  and  the  language  of  the  narrator,  which, 
be  it  noted,  precedes  the  divine  speech  in  the  text. 
There  is  another  aspect  of  this  which  could  be  expressed 
in  the  following  observation  which  may  seem  at  first 
seem  both  banal  and  flippant.  The  fact  that  the  reader 
can  read  the  words  'Let  there  be  light,  depends  on  the 
fact  that  there  is  light.  without  light,  no-one  can 
read.  Yet  there  is  no  light  in  the  text;  sitting  in  the 
dark  looking  at-this  sentence  will  not  yield  much 
profit.  It  is  part  of  the  essential  context  in  which 
the  text  and  reader  must  be  situated.  Indeed,  it  is  the 
reader,  not  the  narrator  or  God  who  requires,  both  in 
the  sense  of  needing  and  of  demanding,  the  existence  of 
light.  Once  again,  there  is  a  reversal  at  work.  The 
pragmatic  fact  of  reading  demands  that  light  exist  and 
an  act  of  creation  of  light.  Which  founds  the  other? 
Is  the  reader  the  proof  that  such  an  act  took  place, 
which  she  can  no  more  doubt  than  her  own  existence,  or 
is  she  the  creator,  who  as  reader  posits  the  prior  act 
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The  same  is  true  for  the  existence  of  language.  Without 
some  understanding  of  languager  there  can  be  no  reading. 
And  yet  in  some  sense  this  text  claims  to  be 
inaugurating  language,  particularly  in  the  episodes  of 
divine  naming  in  Genesis  1.  In  Gen  1:  3,  there  is  no 
naming  of  light  as  such,  but  the  creative  speech  act 
functions  as  an  act  of  naming  as  well.  But  an  act  of 
naming  is  also  a  social  act.  To  name  something  entails 
an  expectation  that  others  will  assent  to  using  that 
name  for  it. 
There  is  an  etiological  element  to  this  text  and  as  with 
all  etiologies  there  is  a  double  thrust  to  it, 
illustrated  in  the  so-called  anthropic  principle.  This 
argument  contends  that  the  existence  of  humankind 
indicates  that  the  improbably  narrow  conditions  which 
have  permitted  and  sustain  this  existence  have  some 
intentional  basis.  The  universe  must  have  been  set  up 
within  these  parameters  deliberately  in  order  to  arrive 
at  such  an  unlikely  outcome.  However,  this  can  be 
turned  round  to  argue  that  the  fact  that  we  can  observe 
the  universe  means  that  it  must  be  the  kind  of  universe 
we  can  observe.  There  may  well  be  millions  of  other 
universes  which  we  do  not  observe  because  they  could  not 
sustain  human  life. 
So  the  fact  that  we  are  reading  this  text  can  be  taken 
as  a  demonstration  that  the  creative  act  we  are  reading 
about  must  have  occurred,  allowing  it  to  be  claimed  as  a 
'proof,  of  the  existence  of  God.  On  the  other  hand,  we 
could  argue  that  the  kind  of  people  who  could  read  would 
project  exactly  that  quality  on  any  divine  figure  that 
they  might  invent.  There  is  always  a  double  bind  of  the 
kind  which  bedevils  psychoanalytic  enquiry;  if  a 
patient  ascribes  their  neurosis  to  a  traumatic  event,  do 
we  conclude  that  the  severity  of  the  neurosis  proves 
that  the  event  took  place,  or  do  we  see  it  as  proof  that Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  9  353 
the  patient  is  likely  to  have  invented  the  event  to  have 
objectified  their  desire  or  dread? 
9.3.2  CREATURE  OR  CREATOR 
The  ambiguity  of  this  position  over  the  reality  of  the 
divine  voice  is  expressed  by  Elaine  Scarry: 
Sometimes  as  one  reads  through  the  Hebrew 
scriptures,  God's  existence  seems  so  absolute  and 
human  belief  in  that  existence  so  assumed  and 
widely  shared  that  doubt  within  the  story  of  any 
one  individual's  life  or  any  one  epoch  seems  like 
only  a  small  tear  in  the  page,  a  tiny  fold  in  an 
almost  invisible  shred  of  tissue  in  the  heart,  the 
dropping  of  a  single  stitch  in  the  endless  rounds 
of  a  woven  cloth.  God's  realness,  his  presence, 
seems  so  steady,  so  immediately  available  for 
apprehension,  that  the  individual  person  or  group 
that  fails  to  apprehend  Him  seems  only  an 
idiosyncratic  exception,  perversely  denying  of  what 
is  obvious.  Yet  at  other  readings  -  perhaps  even 
almost  simultaneously  -  it  seems  as  though  what  is 
on  every  page  described  in  these  writings  is  the 
incredible  difficulty,  the  feat  of  the  imagination 
and  agony  of  labor  required  in  generating  an  idea 
of  God  and  holding  it  steadily  in  place  (hour  by 
hour,  day  by  day)  without  any  graphic  image  to 
assist  the  would-be  believer.  (1985:  198) 
Scarry  regards  the  process  inscribed  in  the  text  as  the 
creation  of  what  she  calls  the  supreme  artifact', 
precisely  the  sort  of  voice  that  White  postulates,  as  an 
outcome  of  a  supreme  will  to  believe,  to  maintain  an 
image  in  continuity. 
Belief  is  the  act  of  imaginingo  It  is  what  the  act 
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credited  with  more  reality  (and  all  that  is 
entailed  in  greater  'realness'.  more  power,  more 
authority)  than  oneself.  It  is  when  the  object 
created  is  in  fact  described  as  though  it  instead 
created  you.  It  ceases  to  be  the  offspring,  of  the 
human  being  and  becomes  the  thing  from  which  the 
human  being  himself  sprung  fortho  It  is  in  this 
act  that  Isaac  yields  against  all  phenomenal 
assessment  to  Abraham,  that  Abraham  yields  to  God 
and  that  the  reader  yields  to  the  narrative:  it  is 
not  simply  the  willingness  to  give  one's  interior 
to  something  outside  of  oneself,  but  the 
willingness  to  become  the  created  offspring  of  the 
thing  in  whose  presence  one  now  stands.  (1985:  205) 
9.3.3  FATHERING  THE  FATHER 
This  willingness  to  become  the  offspring  of  one's  own 
creation  is  the  act  which  Kierkegaard  memorably  sums  up 
as  giving  birth  to  one's  father,.  It  is  this  act  that 
also  describes  the  anxiety  of  reading  the  Hebrew  bible. 
The  reader  constantly  gives  birth  to  his  father,  or  an 
entity  that  claims  to  stand  in  that  relation  to  him  or 
her.  The  reader  projects  an  authorial  voice  which  is 
tied  to  a  character  in  the  text  which,  if  what  is  said 
in  the  text  is  true,  inhabits  not  only  the  world  of  the 
text  but  the  reader's  world  as  well.  Unlike  any  human 
character,  who  is  bound  by  the  confines  of  time  and 
space,  God  can  exist  within  the  text  and  within  the 
reader's  world  simultaneously.  The  imperious  claim  of 
this  character  to  be  the  originator,  the  father,  of  the 
reader  invokes  the  anxiety  of  the  reader  both  as  son, 
and  as  father  of  his  own  father. 
This  theme,  of  the  child  as  its  own  father,  is  referred 
to  by  Schneidau  in  the  course  of  his  discussion  of  the 
relationship  between  Israel,  s  historiography  and  its 
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brings  out  many  of  the  themes  we  have  been  exploring  in 
the  biblical  stories  we  have  investigated.  He  sees  the 
Hebrew  scriptures  as  representing  a  departure  from  the 
mythological  sense  of  a  continuity  in  the  world  in 
favour  of  an  arbitrariness  which  he  associates  with 
paternity.  'Paternity  makes  us  aware  how  vulnerable  we 
are,  how  enmeshed  in  each  other,  no  matter  how 
masterfully  we  manipulate  our  lives,  (1976:  242).  He 
sees  this  as  a  rebuke  to  our  desire  to  be  self- 
engendered,  in  its  insistence  that  we  are  the  creatures 
of  God.  Schneidau  ties  this  sense  to  the  experience  of 
the  reader  in  arguing  that  that  contingency  is  the 
legacy  of  the  Bible  to  western  tradition.  So  he  writes: 
When  Shakespeare  promises  us  that  the  great  Globe 
itself',  the  theatre,  the  audience  and  the  world, 
wil;  kade  away  and  leave  not  a  rack  behind,  he 
voices  the  fundamental  Yahwist  insight  into  the 
constructedness  of  created  things.  Not  only  the 
fictions  but  we  ourselves  are  made:  and  something 
made  is  real  not  in  its  own  right  but  in  that  of 
its  maker;  so  that  the  easy  distinction  between 
fact  and  fiction  breaks  down.  (1976:  276) 
Yet  we  are  left  with  the  dilemma  that  the  distinction 
between  creator  and  created  itself  becomes  blurred. 
Insofar  as  Schneidau  is  arguing  that  the  Hebrew  stress 
on  paternity  faces  human  contingency  squarely,  we  must 
also  insist  that  it  brings  up  the  matter  of  divine 
contingency.  He  interprets  the  distinctiveness  of  the 
Hebrew  Scriptures  as  their  critique  of  any  myth  of  self- 
engenderment  in  their  refusal  of  mythical  stories  of 
self-creating  gods  and  heroes.  Yet  from  the  reader's 
point  of  view,  this  heightens,  rather  than  lessens  the 
dilemma.  A  god  or  a  character  who  appears  in  the  text 
as  self-generated  has  no  need  of  a  father.  The  reader 
is  not  necessarily  implicated  in  that  existence.  A 
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except  the  one  figure  of  Yahweh,  insists  on  the 
importance  of  that  act  of  engenderment,  and  throws  down 
a  challenge  to  the  reader.  If  only  one  source  of 
existence  is  allowed,  which  is  it,  reader  or  Yahweh? 
The  reader's  situation  comes  closer  to  that  depicted  in 
an  episode  in  Lewis  Carroll's  Through  the  Looking  Glass. 
Tweedledum  and  Tweedledee  confront  Alice  with  the 
sleeping  Red  King: 
'He's  dreaming  now,,  said  Tweedledee:  land  what  do 
you  think  he's  dreaming  about?  ' 
Alice  said  'Nobody  can  guess  that.  0' 
'Why,  about  youP  Tweedledee  exclaimed,  clapping 
his  hands  triumphantly.  'And  if  he  left  off 
dreaming  about  you,  where  do  you  suppose  you  would 
be?  ' 
'Where  I  am  now,,  of  course,,  said  Alice. 
'Not  you!  '  Tweedledee  retorted  contemptuously. 
'You'd  be  nowhere.  Why,  you're  only  a  sort  of 
thing  in  his  dream!, 
'If  that  there  King  was  to  wake.,  added  Tweedledum, 
'you'd  go  out  -  bang!  -  just  like  a  candle!  ' 
(Carroll  1962:  244) 
Yet  the  book  ends  when  Alice  herself  wakes  and  is  left 
wondering  whose  dream  it  was,  hers  or  the  Red  King's. 
"'He  was  part  of  my  dream,  of  course  -  but  then  I  was 
part  of  his  dream,  tool",  (1962:  346)  The  final 
sentence  of  the  narrative  is  a  question  addressed  to  the 
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The  difference  is,  of  course,  that  the  claim  that 
Carroll's  text  makes  for  the  Red  King  is  much  more  modest 
than  the  claims  made  for  the  character  of  Yahweh. 
Yahweh,  unlike  any  other  character  in  the  Hebrew 
Scriptures,  is  both  undying  and  omnipresent.  If  the 
claims  of  the  the  text  to  have  some  relation  to  the 
world  of  the  reader  are  true,  then  by  definition,  Yahweh 
is  present  and  active  in  the  reader's  present  situation. 
The  character  of  David,  by  contrast,  may  or  may  not  have 
some  historical  counterpart.  Even  if  he  did  exist,  the 
reader  has  no  expectation  of  encountering  him.  He  is 
long  dead,  and  far  distant.  Yahweh,  if  Yahweh  has 
existence  outside  the  text,  can  be  neither  dead  nor 
distant.  The  world  that  he  creates  and  sustains  is  the 
world  which  encompasses  the  reader.  No  such  universal 
claim  is  made  for  the  Red  King  within  Carroll's  text. 
The  question  becomes,  'Yahweh's  dream,  or  reader's 
dream?  Which  do  you  think  it  is?, 
9.3.4  TEXTUAL  POWER 
The  power  of  the  biblical  text  to  grasp  its  readers  is 
explored  in  Auerbach's  now  classic  essay  'Odysseus' 
Scar,  (1968:  3-23)  where  he  contrasts  the  style  of  two 
episodes  in  ancient  literature:  the  scene  in  Homer's 
Odyssey  where  Odysseus,  nurse  recognizes  him  from  the 
scar  on  his  leg,  and  the  story  of  the  sacrifice  of  Isaac 
in  Genesis  22. 
Auerbach  couples  this  with  what  he  calls  the  bible's 
,  tyrannical,  claim  to  truth  (1968:  14).  It  does  not 
simply  offer  another  possible  reality  for  us  to  divert 
ourselves  in  contemplating  it: 
The  Scripture  stories  do  not,  like  Homer's,  court 
our  favor,  they  do  not  flatter  us  that  they  may 
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and  if  we  refuse  to  be  subjected,  we  are  rebels  ... 
Far  from  seekingf  like  Homer,  merely  to  make  us 
forget  our  own  reality  for  a  few  hours,  [the  text 
of  the  Biblical  narrative]  seeks  to  overcome  our 
reality:  we  are  to  fit  our  own  life  into  its 
world,  feel  ourselves  to  be  elements  in  its 
structure  of  universal  history.  (1986:  15) 
It  is  no  wonder,  then,  that  the  reader  has  a  strong 
emotive  reaction  to  the  text.  The  twin  claims  of 
ambiguity,  and  of  authority,  make  demands  on  the 
reader's  ingenuity,  on  his  or  her  obedience,  and 
ultimately  on  his  or  her  'reality,.  Auerbach  represents 
the  transaction  in  terms  which  seem  to  strike  at  the 
very  identity  of  the  reader. 
What  is  of  interest  in  this  description  is  not  whether 
Auerbach  has  fairly  represented  the  relative  narrative 
strategies  of  Homer  and  the  Old  Testament,  or  whether 
his  account  of  the  power  of  Gen  22  is  either  adequate  to 
that  text  or  generalisable  beyond  it.  The  question  that 
arises  for  us  from  this  text  is  what  it  could  be  in  a 
series  of  black  marks  on  white  paper  that  could  give 
rise  to  these  claims.  Can  it  make  sense  to  represent  a 
text  as  'demanding'  interpretation  or  seeking  to 
subject,  its  readers?  How  could  such  an  artefact 
'overcome  the  reality'  of  its  readers,  or  even  present  a 
claim  so  to  do? 
9.4  FREUD  AS  READER  OF  OEDIPUS  REX 
9.4.1  FREUD  AND  THE  EFFECT  OF  ART 
one  towering  figure  who  concerned  himself  deeply  with 
the  effect  of  works  of  art  on  the  spectator  or  reader  is 
Sigmund  Freud.  In  his  study  'The  Moses  of  Michelangelo' 
(Freud  1985:  248-282)  Freud  makes  his  interest  in  these 
effects  clear  when  he  writes: Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  9  359 
...  works  of  art  do  exercise  a  powerful  influence 
upon  me,  especially  those  of  literature  and 
sculpture,  less  often  of  painting.  This  has 
occasioned  me,  when  I  have  been  contemplating  such 
things,  to  spend  a  long  time  before  them  trying  to 
apprehend  them  in  my  own  way,  i.  e.  to  explain  to 
myself  what  their  effect  is  due  t02.  Whenever  I 
cannot  do  this,  as  for  instance  with  music,  I  am 
almost  incapable  of  obtaining  any  pleasure.  Some 
rationalistic,  or  perhaps  analytic,  turn  of  mind  in 
me  rebels  against  being  moved  by  a  thing  without 
knowing  why  I  am  thus  affected  and  what  it  is  that 
affects  me. 
This  has  brought  me  to  recognize  the  apparently 
paradoxical  fact  that  precisely  some  of  the 
grandest  and  most  overwhelming  creations  of  art  are 
still  unsolved  riddles  to  our  understanding.  we 
admire  them,  we  feel  overawed  by  them,  but  we  are 
unable  to  say  what  they  represent  to  us.  (1985: 
253-254) 
As  Peter  Gay  summarises  Freud's  attitude,  'What 
intrigued  Freud  most  about  Michelangelo's  massive 
sculpture  was  that  it  should  intrigue  him  so  much'  (Gay 
1988:  315). 
9.4.2  THE  IMPACT  OF  OEDIPUS 
2  An  introductory  note  to  this  paper  in  the  Pelican  Freud  Library 
edition  records  Freud's  reminiscence  to  Edoardo  Weiss  that  he  had 
spent  every  day  of  three  weeks  in  September  1912  studying  and 
drawing  the  statue.  Be  also  remarks  that  he  only  dared  publish 
this  essay  anonymously:  'It  was  only  much  later  that  I 
legitimized  this  non-analytic  child.  '(1985:  252) Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  9  360 
9.4-2.1  Oedipus  Rex 
This  fascination  with  the  impact  of  artistic  creations 
is  at  the  heart  of  Freud's  work.  His  most  famous 
hypothesis,  that  of  the  Oedipus  complex,  derives  from 
his  engagement  with  the  play  Oedipus  Rex  by  Sophocles. 
Freud's  concern  with  Oedipus  is  prompted  by  the  power  of 
the  play  on  its  audience.  In  The  Interpretation  of 
Dreams  he  introduces  Sophocles,  play  as  confirmatory 
evidence  for  his  hypothesis  that  murderous  hatred 
towards  one  parent  and  being  in  love  with  the  other  are 
not  abnormal  symptoms  peculiar  to  psycho-neurotics  but 
universal  feelings  which  are  merely  magnified  in  certain 
pathological  caseS3.  He  writes: 
This  discovery  is  confirmed  by  a  legend  that  has 
come  down  to  us  from  classical  antiquity:  a  legend 
whose  profound  and  universal  power  to  move  can  only 
be  understood  if  the  hypothesis  I  have  put  forward 
in  regard  to  the  psychology  of  children  has  an 
equally  universal  validity.  What  I  have  in  mind  is 
the  legend  of  King  Oedipus  and  Sophocles,  drama 
that  bears  his  name.  (Freud  1976:  362) 
The  universal  significance  of  the  hypothesis  is,  he 
claims,  a  necessary  inference  suggested  by  the  universal 
power  of  the  play  to  move  its  audience.  Citing  this 
passage,  Bernard  Knox  comments: 
3  Freud  first  alludes  to  the  Oedipus  legend  in  this  way  in  a 
letter  to  Wilhelm  Fliess  dated  Oct  15th,  1897  (Freud  1984:  272) 
but  it  is  in  The  Interpretation  of  Drearns  that  he  gives  a 
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eee  it  is  fascinating  to  observe  that  this  idea, 
which  valid  or  not  has  had  enormous  influence, 
stems  from  an  attempt  to  answer  a  literary  problem 
-  why  does  the  play  have  this  overpowering  effect 
on  modern  audiences?  -  and  that  this  problem  is 
raised  by  an  ancient  Greek  tragedy.  (Sophocles 
1984:  132) 
9.4.2.2  The  Response  of  the  Audience 
This  is  an  important  and  often  neglected  point.  The 
datum  that  Freud  works  from  is  not  the  existence  of  the 
complex  which  then  is  used  to  explain  the  power  of  the 
play.  Formally  speaking,  the  argument  proceeds  in  the 
other  direction.  The  universal  appeal  of  the  play  is 
the  datum,  of  which  the  hypothesis  offers  an  account, 
but  a  rather  circular  account: 
(i)  The  play  has  universal  impact; 
its  plot  concerns  the  killing  of  the  father 
and  the  marrying  of  the  mother; 
(iii)  therefore  this  plot  has  universal 
significance. 
Freud  sees  this  significance  in  the  hypothesis  that  the 
plot  speaks  to  repressed  longings  in  every  member  of  its 
audience.  The  power  of  the  play  fuels  the  speculation 
that  that  power  depends  on  the  anxiety  of  the  open 
representation  of  repressed  desires. 
In  this  regard,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  common 
criticism  that  Oedipus  does  these  things  unwittingly  is 
rather  beside  the  point.  Freud  argues  that  it  is  the 
failure  of  Oedipus'  attempts  to  avoid  carrying  out  the 
dreadful  actions  foretold  by  the  oracle  that  registers 
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enacted  in  a  context  where  the  effort  at  repression  has 
brought  about  the  very  thing  that  was  dreaded.  Oedipus, 
self-imposed  exile  from  his  presumed  parents  in  order  to 
avoid  his  fate  is  what  leads  to  the  murder  of  his 
natural  father  and  his  incestuous  marriage  to  his 
mother. 
The  audience  responds  to  this  particular  oracular  doom, 
so  Freud  argues,  because  it  is  a  doom  laid  on  all  of  us. 
Not  only  does  the  audience  share  Oedipusf  incestuous  and 
murderous  desires,  but  it  is  made  aware  of  the  sense  of 
their  inescapability.  The  play  reveals  that  the  effort 
to  repress  such  desires  in  fact  permits  them  to  be 
enacted  in  unforeseen  ways. 
Freud  then  inverts  this  into  an  explanation  of  the  power 
of  the  play,  which,  it  should  be  remembered,,  is  the 
datum,  not  the  derived  conclusion.  The  play,  so  Freud 
argues,  has  its  power  because  it  addresses  the  repressed 
longings  of  the  Oedipal  complex.  Such  processes  of 
inversion  will  prove  to  be  a  recurrent  motif  in  our 
forthcoming  study. 
Freud's  work  suggests  that  the  impact  of  any  text 
depends  on  the  underlying  anxiety  that  it  activates.  If 
the  impact  of  OediPus  relates  to  the  audience's 
repressed  desires  in  relation  to  their  parents  what 
might  be  the  implications  of  the  impact  of  such  passages 
as  Gen  22  or  2  Sam  12?  What  anxiety  do  they  activate  in 
the  reader? 
Freud  derives  the  power  of  Sophocles,  play  from  its 
content  rather  than  its  structure.  What  grips  the 
audience,  he  avers,  is  not  the  fact  that  Oedipus  is 
caught  in  the  trap  of  an  oracle  which  he  cannot  escape. 
The  failure  of  modern  attempts  to  write  plays  which  try 
to  use  the  contrast  between  inexorable  fate  and  human 
impotence  confirms  this  analysis  in  Freud's  view. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  9  363 
Sophocles,  Play  grips  its  audience  because  of  its  theme 
of  incest.  This  is  made  explicit  in  his  remark,  'If 
Oedipus  Rex  moves  a  modern  audience  no  less  than  it  did 
the  contemporary  Greek  one,  the  explanation  can  only  be 
its  effect  does  not  lie  in  the  contrast  between  destiny 
and  human  will,  but  is  to  be  looked  for  in  the 
particular  nature  of  the  material  on  which  that  contrast 
is  basedl(1976:  364).  However,  Knox  (1984:  132)  points 
out  that  Freud's  insistence  on  the  power  of  the  contents 
can  be  challenged  on  the  same  grounds  that  he  uses  to 
dismiss  the  effect  of  the  inexorable  destiny. 
Voltaire's  Jdipe,  for  instance,,.  is  hardly  a  box  office 
success  though  it  deals  with  the  same  legend. 
On  this  point,  we  may  now  take  issue  with  Freud;  the 
sense  of  inevitability  that  the  play  conveys,  in 
particular  through  its  use  of  the  devices  of  the  oath 
and  the  oracle  is  not  to  be  separated  from  the  theme. 
The  link  between  the  oath  and  the  anxiety  of  fatherhood 
that  the  play  attributes  to  Oedipus'  father  Laius  is  an 
intimate  and  intriguing  one.  Both  reveal  the  anxiety  of 
utterance,  the  anxiety  of  the  realisation  that  the 
continuity  of  the  subject  depends  on  the  reception  of  an 
utterance,  the  entrusting  of  speech  or  seed  to  the 
receptive  other.  Just  as  David  utters  his  oath,  which 
then  turns  out  to  have  consequences  unforeseen,  so  he 
'utters,  his  seed  in  the  womb  of  Bathsheba,  again  with  a 
consequence  for  his  own  survival  and  the  engendering  of 
an  heir. 
9.4.3  OEDIPUS  AND  OATH 
A  reading  of  the  Oedipus  legend  which  takes  seriously 
these  linguistic  and  narrative  features  is  James 
Hillman's  'Oedipus  Revisited'(1991).  He  emphasizes  that 
the  whole  series  of  tragedies  that  befall  Oedipus, 
Jocasta  and  their  children  begins  in  Oedipus'  father 
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that  is  evinced  in  his  reaction  to  the  oracle  to  that 
effect  pronounced  by  Apollo.  4 
Hillman  goes  on,  however,  to  see  the  tragedy  as 
dependent  on  Laius  I  literal  reading  of  the  oracle,  and 
on  his  attempt  to  evade  it,  just  as  Oedipus  in  turn 
attempts  to  evade  the  prophecy  of  his  own  fate  by 
fleeing  from  his  supposed  parents. 
'Taking  action  to  avoid  the  prophecy  fulfills  the 
prophecy.  Hence  the  feeling  that  oracles  are 
inescapable,  foredooming.  But  the  doom  is  not  in 
the  prophecy;  it  is  in  the  action  taken  when  one 
hears  the  oracle  literally.  Laius  hears  literally 
and  so  literally  tries  to  kill  his  son;  so  that 
literally  he  is  killed  by  his  son  ...  Prophecy  is  a 
"forthtelling-  ...  stating  in  dark  speech  what  is 
archetypally  present  as  a  dark  potential  and  which 
may  become  enacted  in  the  day  world  in  time.  1(1991: 
118) 
Jocasta  reveals  this  to  Oedipus  as  follows: 
'An  oracle  came  to  Laius  one  fine  day 
(I  won't  say  from  Apollo  himself 
but  his  underlings,  his  priests)  and  it  declared 
that  doom  would  strike  him  down  at  the  hands  of  a  son, 
our  son,  to  be  born  of  our  own  flesh  and  blood.  ' 
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Though  this  last  sentence  is  itself  rather  dark 
speech',  and  seems  to  reduce  the  polysemy  of  the  oracle 
to  an  ambiguity  over  fulfil.  ment,,  Hillman  is  making  a 
crucial  point.  The  action  of  the  play  depends  on  the 
character's  reading  of  this  particular  ambivalent 
oracle.  It  is  ambivalent  in  that  although  it  announces 
that  Laius  will  die  by  his  son's  hand,  it  leaves 
unspecified  the  manner  in  which  this  end  will  be 
accomplished.  Laius,  failure  as  a  reader  is  that  he  is 
unaware  of  the  possibility  of  another  reading,  another 
reaction. 
Hillman  supplies  just  such  another  reading  of  the 
oracle: 
'If  we  imagine  a  second  sense  of  the  oracle,  then 
Laius  might  have  heard:  "Watch  your  son  deeply, 
study  his  heart,  grasp  his  ways,  for  he  has  the 
potential  for  your  end.  He  is  the  one  who  can  show 
how  your  life  ends,  the  ends  of  your  life-"  The 
son  offers  another  way  than  the  father's.  The  son 
is  the  ruling  mind's  potential  for  a  second  sense. 
He  is  the  next  generation,  a  generative 
understanding  beyond  the  literalism  of  a  king's 
kind  of  consciousness,  which  hardens  into  single 
meanings  when  the  bounds  of  any  kingdom  are  defined 
*.  el  (1991:  123) 
The  ambiguity  turns  on  the  double  meaning  of  lend,  as 
'goal'  or  as  'termination'.  Whether  or  not  we  deem 
Hillman's  particular  reading  convincing,  the 
significance  of  such  multiple  meaning  in  words  and 
indeed  utterances,  and  the  role  of  the  reader  in 
resolving,  or  activating,  this  multiplicity  of  meaning 
is  exactly  what  we  have  demonstrated  in  the  poetics  of 
the  books  of  Samuel. 
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9.5.1  POLYSEMY  AND  TRAGEDY 
For  an  account  which  relates  the  oath  to  the  reader's 
response  we  can  turn  to  J.  -P.  Vernant  (Vernant  1983)5 
on  the  function  of  ambiguity  in  the  workings  of  ancient 
Greek  drama,  in  particular  the  Oedipus  Rex.  He  writes: 
The  words  exchanged  in  the  theatrical  space, 
instead  of  establishing  communication  and  agreement 
between  the  characters,  on  the  contrary  underline 
the  impermeability  of  minds,  the  freezing  of 
character:  they  mark  the  barriers  which  separate 
the  protagonists,  and  they  trace  the  lines  of 
conflict.  Each  hero,  enclosed  in  the  universe 
which  is  his  own,  gives  a  word  a  meaning,  a  single 
meaning.  Against  this  unilaterality  another 
clashes  violently.  Tragic  irony  may  consist  in 
showing  how,  in  the  course  of  the  action,  the  hero 
finds  himself  literally  'taken  at  his  word'.  a  word 
which  turns  itself  against  him  in  bringing  him  the 
bitter  experience  of  the  meaning  which  he  insisted 
on  not  recognizing.  (Vernant  1983:  189-190) 
A. 
For  Vernant,  then,  tragedy  representsýclash  between  two 
or  more  different  resolutions  of  the  polysemy  of  a  word. 
In  particular,  he  draws  attention  to  the  way  in  which  a 
protagonist's  own  words  may  commit  him  to  a  course  of 
action  that  he  had  not  foreseen.  Of  course,  the  word 
that  redounds  on  a  protagonist's  head  may  either  be  his 
5  Vernant's  paper  is  referred  to  in  most  complimentary  terms  by 
Derrida  in  his  discussion  of  the  word  phaz-makos  (Derrida  1981: 
131  n  56).  He  does  distance  himself  from  Vernant's  professedly 
anti-Freudian  stance  in  'Oedipe  sans  complexel,  while  at  the  same 
time  taking  care  to  distinguish  his  own  analysis  from  the 
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own  interpretation  of  an  oracle,  or  else  his  own 
statement,  often  couched  in  the  form  of  an  oath. 
Vernant,  however  goes  on  to  describe  the  role  of  the 
spectator  or  reader  in  this  process: 
It  is  only  over  the  heads  of  the  characters, 
between  the  author  and  the  spectator  that  another 
dialogue  is  woven,  where  language  recovers  its 
property  of  communication  and  almost  its 
transparency.  But  what  transmits  the  tragic 
message,  when  it  is  understood,  is  precisely  that 
in  the  words  exchanged  between  men  there  exist 
zones  of  opacity  and  incommunicability.  In  the 
moment  when,,  on  stage,,  he  sees  the  protagonists 
adhering  exclusively  to  one  meaning  and,  thus 
blinded,  lose  themselves  or  tear  each  other  apart, 
the  spectator  is  led  to  understand  that  there  are 
in  reality  two  possible  meanings  or  more.  The 
tragic  message  becomes  intelligible  to  him  to  the 
extent  that,  wrested  from  his  former  certainties 
and  limitations,  he  realizes  the  ambiguity  of 
words,  of  values,  of  the  human  condition. 
Recognizing  the  universe  as  full  of  conflict, 
opening  himself  to  a  problematic  vision  of  the 
world,  he  makes  himself  embody  the  tragic 
consciousness  through  the  spectacle.  (1983:  190) 
It  is  the  realisation  not  of  the  'true'  meaning  of  the 
fatal  word  that  has  its  effect  on  the  audience,  but  the 
realisation  that  there  is  no  true  meaning,  that  any 
utterance  is  liable  to  misunderstanding  and 
misinterpretation.  The  spectator  is  the  point  at  which 
the  language  regains  its  transparency  as  a  communication 
between  author  and  spectator,  the  transparency  which  is 
lost  as  it  fractures  into  the  competing  discourses 
between  characters.  But  what  it  communicates  is 
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d'opacitd,,  areas  of  darkness,  in  the  speech  between 
people.  it  is  when  the  spectator  becomes  aware  that  the 
character  has  blindly  opted  for  one  meaning  that  he 
realises  that  in  fact  there  are  two  or  even  more  senses 
possible. 
9.5.3  THE  PLACE  OF  THE  READER 
Goff  (1990:  89)  argues  against  Barthes  and  vernant  that: 
I  ...  if  the  play  offers  to  put  the  audience  or 
reader  in  the  privileged  position  of  mantis,  it 
also  immediately  withdraws  that  offer;  the  claims 
for  manteia  are  undermined  by  the  insistence  on  the 
inevitability  of  misreading  and  misinterpretation 
in  communication  ...  While  the  play  functions  as  a 
demonstration  of  divinity,  it  denies  to  human 
speech  and  communication  any  security  or  stability. 
Human  speech  emerges  as  always  imperfect  and 
incomplete., 
Perhaps  the  two  positions  are  very  similar,  except  that 
Goff  leaves  open  the  possibility  that  there  may  be 
meanings  that  the  spectator  does  not  easily  grasp 
either.  So  the  reader  or  spectator  may  see  enacted  in 
the  text  his  or  her  own  misreading.  The  reader  or 
spectator  who  is  given  the  same  information  as  the 
interpretant  character  may  come  to  realise  that  she  or 
he  has  also  opted  for  only  one  possible  meaning.  The 
text  may  then  offer  a  second  meaning,  offering  an 
unexpected  further  interpretation  to  the  reader  as  well 
as  the  interpretant. 
As  Agamben  puts  it: 
In  Sophocles'  Oedipus  the  King,  the  division, 
always  inherent  in  every  human  word,  appears  most 
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is  subjected  to  a  double  destiny.  He  cannot  know 
all  that  he  says  and  if  he  wills  to  know,  he  is 
subjected  to  the  possibility  of  error  and  hubris, 
Now  language  becomes  the  site  of  a  conflict  between 
that  which  one  can  know  in  any  utterance  and  that 
which  one  necessarily  says  without  knowing. 
(Agamben  1991:  89) 
This  gap  is  the  gap  which  the  oath  is  designed  to 
bridge,  but  which  it  opens  wide  as  language  comes  adrift 
from  intention.  It  is  also  the  fatal  gap  which  allows 
Oedipus  to  interpret  the  oracle  that  he  will  kill  his 
father  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  that  outcome  possible. 
9.6  CONCLUSION:  DAVID  AS  READER 
Both  2  Samuel  12  and  2  Samuel  14  involve  David  as  reader 
swearing  an  oath  in  the  name  of  Yahweh.  This  invocation 
of  the  divine  name  carries  its  own  frisson.  moreover, 
both  oaths  have  a  direct  bearing  on  the  relation  between 
David  the  king  and  his  sons  and  heirs.  In  2  Samuel  12, 
David's  admission  of  guilt  leads  to  the  death  of  the 
unnamed  son  that  Bathsheba  bears  him,  and  to  the  birth 
of  Solomon,  the  son  who  will  succeed  him. 
It  is  this  sense  of  ambiguity,  of  the  'dark  potential' 
that  may  see  the  light  of  day  that  links  language  and 
fatherhood.  As  Bakhtin  and  Austin  indicate,  the 
inherently  dialogical  nature  of  language,  and  indeed  the 
social  basis  of  the  human  subject,  means  that  the 
analogy  can  be  drawn  to  the  paradox  that  the  only  form 
of  survival  of  the  individual  human  subject  depends  on 
the  transaction  of  procreation.  The  risk  of  utterance 
is  required  both  for  communication  and  for  procreation. 
The  risk  is  the  absolute  dependence  of  the  utterer  on 
the  hearer,  of  the  male  as  producer  of  seed  on  the  woman 
as  its  bearer.  In  her  womb,,  woman  bears  dark 
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time,  in  Hillman's  phrase.  Jocasta's  womb  bore  Oedipus, 
Bathsheba's  bore  the  nameless  child. 
Hence  the  power  of  the  text,  and  the  kind  of  claim  that 
it  makes  on  its  readers,  are  aligned  with  the  claims  and 
anxieties  of  the  relations  between  fathers  and  children. 
Just  as  in  the  case  of  Oedipus,  where  the  ineradicable 
relationship  of  generation  draws  Laius  and  Oedipus  to 
their  fatal  encounter  despite  their  best  efforts  to 
evade  it,  so  the  relation  between  fathers  and  children 
and  the  tension  between  them  informs  the  text  of  2 
Samuel. 
Both  text  and  child  as  utterances  take  on  a  physical  and 
vulnerable  existencebeyond  the  intentions  of  those  who 
engender  them,  a  life  that  both  offers  the  possibility 
of  survival  and  the  reminder  of  death  to  the  one  who 
engenders  it.  The  reader  is  then  implicated  as  both 
child  and  father  of  the  text,  and  indeed  fathers  his  or 
her  own  father  on  the  text.  It  is  the  anxiety  of 
fatherhood  that  underlies  the  reader,  s  involvement  in 
the  text. 
As  subject,  the  reader  is  constitued  by  the  acts  of 
linguistic  decision,  of  resolution  of  the  perlocutionary 
effects  of  language  that  reading  demands.  The  act  of 
reading  in  itself  modifies  and  constitutes  the  reader. 
The  reader  is  child  of  the  text  in  this  sense. 
Yet  the  reader  is  also  father,  in  that  the  process  of 
reading  is  a  matter  of  making  such  decisions,  of 
uttering  a  reading,  a  reading,  which  like  any  utterance, 
depends  on  its  reception  in  order  for  its  consequences 
to  be  clear. 
In  the  figure  of  D,  %Vi.  -d, 
the  reader  see  enacted  his  or 
her  own  transac'tions  of  reading  through  the  reading 
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ways  that  are  not  anticipated.  The  very  convention  that 
seeks  to  guarantee  that  resolution  in  invoking  the 
divine  name  only  serves  to  emphasise  rather  than  close 
the  gap  between  speech  and  act,  intention  and 
realisation. 
Yet  this  also  implicates  the  divine  in  the  exigencies  of 
language.  There  is  an  ideological  battle  for  precedence 
between  the  divine  character  and  the  character  of  the 
reader  which  is  formally  unresolvable.  The  text  offers 
the  reader  a  source  of  origin,  thereby  activating  the 
anxieties  of  the  heir,  and  the  anxieties  of  being 
ungrounded,  of  having  no  origin. 
The  text  'needs'  to  recruit  the  reader  as  its  'child,  in 
order  to  ensure  its  own  survival.  In  every  generation, 
it  will  only  survive  if  it  gathers  round  itself 
communities  that  will  ensure  its  transmission  to  the 
next  generation.  Or  rather,  that  anxiety  has  ensured, 
so  far,  that  this  unique  body  of  literature  has  been 
transmitted  and  continues  to  live  in  the  language  and 
conventions  of  communities  which  make  sure  that  their 
own  children  will  carry  it  on. 
It  does  so  by  making  claims  of  power,  of  authority, 
which  like  any  such  claims,  can  only  be  sustained  by  the 
consent  of  the  reader.  Such  consent  can  only  be  secured 
by  promises,  which  the  reader  cannot  ever  be  sure  will 
be  fulfilled.  It  holds  out  the  promise  of  survival,  but 
a  survival  only  predicated  on  its  own  survival,  in  an 
inextricable  circulation  of  textual  power. 
to  make  the  reader  aware  of  David  as  reader,  then 
her  own  status  as  an  entity  which  only  exists  in  acts  of 
reading,  of  interpretation,  of  judgement,  and  of  the 
unpredictability  of  these  judgements.  Whether  that  is  a 
matter  of  liberation,  of  hope,  of  freedom  from  the 
cons4aints  of  a  rigid  system  of  correspondence  beween Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Ch.  9  372 
sign  and  signifiedf  intention  and  action,  utterance  and 
reception,  or  whether  it  threatens  only  failure, 
misunderstandingr  and  the  collapse  of  meaning,  can  only 
itself  lead  to  such  an  act  of  reading,  and  of  judgement. 
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CHAPTER  TEN 
EPILOGUE:  DAVID'S  CHILD 
DAVID'S  REACTION 
As  a  final  word  on  the  poetics  of  fatherhood  in  the 
books  of  Samuel,  let  us  end  with  a  consideration  of  a 
section  of  the  text  in  which  David's  reading  of  the 
death  of  the  child  born  to  Bathsheba  is  recorded,  2  Sam 
12:  16-23. 
His  reaction  to  the  sickness  and  death  of  the  unnamed 
child  has  provoked  a  wide  range  of  interpretations. 
David  fasts  and  lies  on  the  ground  without  eating  and 
drinking  for  seven  days  while  the  child  is  dying,  but 
when  he  learns  that  the  child  has  died,  he  gets  up, 
washes  and  anoints  himself,  goes  to  the  Lord's  house  and 
eats.  His  servants  question  him  over  this  unaccountable 
behaviour.  David  replies,  'While  the  child  was  still 
alive,  I  fasted  and  wept;  for  I  said,,  "Who  knows  whether 
the  Lord  will  be  gracious  to  me,  that  the  child  may 
live?  But  now  he  is  dead;  why  should  I  fast?  Can  I 
bring  him  back  again?  I  shall  go  to  him,  but  he  will  not 
return  to  me.  "1(2  Sam  12:  23) 
10.2  THE  REACTION  OF  READERS 
This  scene  where  the  puzzlement  of  David's  hearers  i5 
inscribed  in  the  text,  has  exercised  the  ingenuity  of 
commentators.  It  is  a  prime  example  of  an  encoded 
Idefamiliarization'.  Their  verdicts  range  from 
Pedersen's  encomium  of  David  as  disclosing  a  radical  new 
attitude  to  the  rite  of  mourning  (1940:  455-57)  or 
Brueggemann's  heroic  picture  of  a  David  who  now  knows 
that  the  issues  of  his  life  are  not  to  be  found  in 
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through  Alter's  reading  of  'these  numb  and  dispiriting 
words'  as  giving  an  inkling  that  David  'has  a  newly 
tangible  sense  of  his  own  mortality'(1980:  128),  to 
WUrthwein's  severe  condemnation  of  a  David  who  'knows 
neither  God  nor  commandment,  (1974:  26)  in  his  cynical 
abandonment  of  human  decency. 
The  ambiguity  is  heightened  by  readers  such  as  Hertzberg 
(1962:  316)  and  Gerleman  (1977)  who  point  out  that  the 
death  of  the  child  can  be  construed  as  a  positive 
benefit  to  David.  It  is  an  indication  that  the 
transference  of  David's  sin  to  the  child  which  Nathan 
predicted  has  occurred,  and  therefore  by  implication 
David  is  no  longer  himself  in  peril  from  God's 
punishment.  Once  the  child  has  died,  David  is  in  the 
clear.  So  is  David's  mourning  merely  an  act  put  on  for 
public  consumption?  Gerleman  (1977:  138),,  for  instance, 
explains  the  servants,  confusion  as  caused  by  the  fact 
that  David's  servants  have  not  been  privy  to  God's 
judgment  as  meted  out  by  Nathan.  David's  attendants  can 
only  suppose  this  is  mourning,  whereas  he  and  the  reader 
know  that  this  is  supplication. 
Other  readers  themselves  stress  the  ambiguity.  So 
Perdue  asks,  'Are  these  the  words  of  a  grief-stricken 
father,  or  of  a  callous  ruler  realizing  he  had  failed  to 
negate  Nathan's  prophecy  predicting  trouble  from  the 
king's  own  house,  a  prediction  whose  initial  sign  was 
the  death  of  the  child?  1(1984:  77)  Whybray  asks, 
was  this  genuine  piety,  or  was  it  a  calculated  attempt 
to  impress  his  followers?  1(1968:  36)  Ackerman,  who 
points  out  that  the  narrator  leaves  the  reader  no  option 
but  confusion,  sets  out  the  dilemma  as  follows:  'Is  the 
story  depicting  a  cool  calculating  relationship  to  God? 
Or  does  it  show  David's  resilient  faith  that  accepts  the 
childfs  death  as  divine  judgment  after  his  pleas  for 
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No  single  commentator  seems  to  cover  the  whole  gamut  of 
interpretations,  but  the  range  is  startling.  The  wider 
context  does  not  do  much  to  help  the  reader  in  the 
effort  to  disambiguate  David's  statement.  David  has 
already  been  displayed  in  contradictory  attitudes  to 
situations  where  he  is  informed  of  a  death. 
10.3  DAVID  AND  THE  DEATH  OF  SONS 
His  reaction  to  Nathan's  parable  shows  a  strong 
emotional  response  to  the  death  of  a  sheep  and  to  the 
deprivation  of  a  poor  man.  Does  this  indicate  that 
David's  fasting  and  lying  on  the  ground  represents  a 
similar  emotional  outburst  at  the  news  of  the  child's 
death?  On  the  other  hand,  David's  cynical  dismissal  of 
the  death  of  his  crack  troops  with  the  callous  phrase 
'the  sword  devours  now  one  and  now  another,  (2  Sam  11: 
25)  argues  that  there  is  a  possibility  that  this  episode 
represents  the  same  disregard  of  death. 
Similarly,  we  have  the  contrast  between  his  outburst  on 
the  death  of  Absalom  which  argues  his  passionate 
devotion  to  this  rebellious  son.  Yet  he  treats  him  with 
what  could  be  interpreted  as  an  alienating  coolness  when 
he  returns  from  his  exile  in  his  mother's  country,  and 
even,  if  Jan  Fokkelman  is  to  be  believed,  plans  to  kill 
him  until  persuaded  otherwise  by  Joab. 
The  key  feature  of  this  episode  of  David's  reaction  to 
the  child's  death,  surely,  is  precisely  its  ambivalence. 
The  servants'  questioning  of  David's  motives  and  actions 
is  unusual  in  itself.  The  speculation  on  the  motives  of 
a  character  which  the  chorus  in  a  Greek  tragedy  can 
provide  is  very  seldom  to  be  found  in  Hebrew  narrative. 
within  the  text  there  is  an  inscribed  audience  which 
represents  the  reader's  bafflement  at  this  procedure. 
There  is  a  mise  en  abyme  of  incomprehension.  This 
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the  contrary  works  to  highlight  the  emotional  ambiguity 
of  the  answer  itself.  We  are  not  given  the  reaction  of 
David's  servants  to  his  response  to  their  question. 
Were  they  satisfied  by  his  answer,  scandalised,  or  were 
they  left  as  much  in  the  dark  as  they  were  before? 
David's  answer  is  left  ambiguous. 
10.4  DAVID  AND  READERS 
David  himself  appears  as  reader  of  the  servants' 
mutterings.  He  overhears  their  conversation,  a 
conversation  in  which  they  are  debating  the  advisability 
of  communicating  the  fact  of  his  son's  death  to  him,  and 
interprets  not  the  content  of  their  speech,  but  the  act 
of  secretive  speech  itself.  'When  David  saw  that  his 
servants  were  whispering  together  David  perceived  that 
the  child  was  dead;  and  David  said,,  "Is  the  child  dead?  " 
They  said,  "He  is  dead.  "'  Notice  the  order  of  the 
narrated  events  here.  David  perceives  the  death  of  his 
son  and  then  asks  a  question,  which  cannot  then  be  a 
search  for  information.  Its  perlocutionary  effect  is  to 
demonstrate  to  the  servants  that  David  has  understood 
the  death  of  the  child  merely  from  the  fact  that  they 
were  whispering.  His  subsequent  actions  are  then  to  be 
interpreted  in  the  light  of  that  knowledge. 
Neither  readers  in  the  text  or  outside  have  been  able  to 
disambiguate  this  reaction.  The  attempts  to  do  so,  more 
or  less  convincing  as  they  are,  can  only  reveal  the 
attitudes  and  assumptions  of  the  commentators  on  the 
text  rather  than  anything  to  do  with  the  construction  of 
the  character  of  David.  The  reader  is  brought  to  the 
point  of  facing  his  or  her  own  response  to  the  death  of 
this  child,  to  the  character  whose  oath  is  implicated  in 
that  death  and  to  the  God  who  is  represented  as  bringing 
that  death  about.  As  meta-readers,  we  then  can  use 
these  responses  to  pass  judgment  on  these  readers  from 
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of  the  Amalekite  after  his  death,  so  readers  are  induced 
to  utter  on  the  central  issue  of  this  text:  the 
relations  between  fathers,  sons,  and  death. 
But  what  is  left  to  the  reader  to  infer  is  the 
relationship  between  the  death  of  the  child  and  the  life 
of  God.  'As  the  Lord  lives  ...  1;  'a  son  of  death'.  It 
is  God's  faithfulness  that  has  le  d  to  the  death  of  the 
child;  or  is  it  the  death  of  the  child  which  becomes  the 
earnest  of  God's  life?  The  only  concrete  evidence  the 
text  can  offer  of  the  existence  of  the  God  invoked  in 
David's  oath  is  a  tiny  corpse.  God  lives,  if  he  lives, 
through  the  death  of  the  child. 
The  answer  then,  to  the  question  with  which  this  thesis 
began:  'What  is  it  to  read  2  Samuel?,  is  perhaps  here. 
It  is  to  confront  the  question  of  David's  unresolvable 
words  without  evading  the  emotional  consequences  of  the 
juxtaposition  of  a  living  God,  and  a  dead  child. Hugh  S.  Pyper  PhD  1993  Abbreviations  377 
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